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govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cr-00016-29
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
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ERIC GRANT
United States Attorney
JAMES CONOLLY
Assistant United States Attorney
501 I Street, Suite 10-100
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 554-2700
Facsimile: (916) 554-2900
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
BENJAMIN JOHN SARGISSON,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 2:22-CR-00016-DC
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
ORDER
DATE: October 9, 2026
TIME: 9:30 a.m.
COURT: Hon. Dena M. Coggins
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and
through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 9, 2026.
2. By this stipulation, defendant moves to continue the status conference until December 4,
2026, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between October 9, 2026, and December 4, 2026, under 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4].
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Current defense counsel received from prior defense counsel the discovery this
government produced in this case, which includes data from a DVR that recorded months of
footage at the location where the search warrant in this case was executed, which includes
months of recordings. Defense counsel is in the process of reviewing that footage and has
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
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indicated that they will need further time to review it and to determine whether or not further
investigation is necessary.
b) Defense counsel has also made additional requests for discovery related to the
facts in the search warrant executed at the defendant’s residence. The government is in the
process of gathering and redacting that discovery, as it contains a significant amount of financial
and personal information for individuals other than the defendant. Defense counsel will need
time to review that discovery once the government produces it.
c) The government has also produced other discovery associated with this case that
includes investigative reports and photographs. There is also physical evidence in the form of
the firearms in question, which the government has available for inspection, and will likewise
make any other physical evidence available for inspection.
d) Defense counsel desires additional time to review the discovery produced, as well
as the anticipated discovery mentioned above, to consult with his client, to conduct investigation
and research related to the current charges, to discuss potential resolutions to this matter, and to
otherwise prepare for trial.
e) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested
continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking
into account the exercise of due diligence.
f) The government does not object to the continuance.
g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the
case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the
original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,
et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 9, 2026 to December 4,
2026, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code
T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis
of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the
Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial
must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: September 29, 2026 ERIC GRANT
United States Attorney
/s/ JAMES CONOLLY
JAMES CONOLLY
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: September 29, 2026 /s/ KARREN KENNEY
KARREN KENNEY
Counsel for Defendant
BENJAMIN JOHN SARGISSON
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the court, having received, read and considered the parties’
stipulation filed on September 30, 2026 (Doc. No. 95), and good cause appearing therefrom,
APPROVES the parties’ stipulation. Accordingly, the Status Conference scheduled for October 9, 2026,
is VACATED and RESET for December 4, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 10 before the Honorable
Dena M. Coggins. The time period between October 9, 2026 and December 4, 2026, inclusive, is
excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the
Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), and B(iv) [Local Code T4], as the ends of
justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in
a speedy trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 5, 2026
___________________________
Dena Coggins
United States District Judge