govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-3_25-cv-09837-2

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
MARCIO CARRIOLLO, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
 
SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
Case No. 3:26 -cv-05836-JSC 
 
 
ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Re: Dkt. No. 3 
 
 
Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). 
(Dkt. No. 3.) On June 15, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and an Ex 
Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking his release from custody and 
 to enjoin Defendants from re-detaining him absent prior notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. 
(Dkt. No. 3.) For the following reasons, the TRO is GRANTED. 
BACKGROUND 
According to the record before the Court, Petitioner, who is originally from Brazil, entered 
the United States on March 18, 2019 on a B-2 visa. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1.) In May 2023, he married 
a United States citizen with whom he has three United States citizen children. (Id.) Petitioner is 
an asylum applicant and beneficiary of an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative, filed for him by his 
United States Citizen wife. The form I-130 as well as form I-485 (Application to Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status) and I-765 (Application for Employment Authorization). 
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.) Petitioner has no order of removal and has never been placed in removal 
proceedings. (Dkt. No. 3-3 at ¶ 3.) 
On June 15, 2026, Petitioner arrived at the asylum office for his scheduled asylum 
interview and ICE officers came into the interview room and handcuffed him. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 6.) 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
He was told he was being arrested for overstaying his visa. (Id.) An arrest warrant was presented, 
but not a Notice to Appear. (Id.) Upon his arrest, Petitioner had a “sudden, severe panic attack, 
showing signs of distress.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) Petitioner suffers from a variety of acute medical 
conditions including Type 2 diabetes, anxiety disorder, and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and takes several medications. (Id. at ¶ 2.) He requested his Zoloft (sertraline) prescription to 
help with his panic attack, but it was at home. (Id. at ¶ 6.) 
On June 15, 2026, this Petition was filed. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel provided 
notice of the Petition and a forthcoming motion for a TRO, along with a copy of the Petition, to 
Respondents’ counsel. (Dkt. No. 3-2 at ¶ 9.) The TRO was filed at 12:01 am on June 16, 2026. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 
standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 
to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in 
the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
“[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 
showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 
the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 
satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) 
(emphasis in original). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final two factors 
“merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 
An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 
only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 
U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 
irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 
longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
423, 439 (1974)). 
DISCUSSION 
Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his 
ongoing detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 
Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 
entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 
Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030–36 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (applying the three-part test 
established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) to similar circumstances). That the 
government has not sought to detain Petitioner over the past six years while his immigration 
applications have been pending reflects a determination by the government that he was neither a 
flight risk nor a danger to the community, and Petitioner has a strong interest in remaining at 
liberty unless he no longer meets those criteria. On this record, no evidence indicates that 
Petitioner no longer meets that criteria, and thus Petitioner has a strong likelihood of success on 
the merits 
Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 
temporary relief. Petitioner and his wife both have serious medical conditions and he is the 
primary caretaker for his wife. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner 
faces is an immediate and irreparable harm. Further, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation 
of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 
872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 
2012)); see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows 
inexorably from [the] conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a hearing is “likely 
unconstitutional” that he has “also carried [his] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez, 872 
F.3d at 995. 
The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 
heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 
procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 
costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 
F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 
constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been 
violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). Meanwhile, the 
potential harm to the government is minimal. The Government, at most, faces a short delay in 
detaining Petitioner if it ultimately demonstrates his detention is necessary to prevent danger to the 
community or flight. See Jorge M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071, 
2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is not “harmed in any 
legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 
Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict between 
[administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty 
concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 
F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). The balance of 
hardships thus tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor. 
A TRO immediately releasing Petitioner is appropriate to return him to the status quo. E. 
Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status 
which preceded the pending controversy.” Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1166 (W.D. 
Wash. 2025) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
That is the moment prior to Petitioner’s likely illegal detention. See Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25-
cv-00663, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining 
order requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a 
restoration of the status quo). Because Petitioner satisfies all requirements for temporary 
injunctive relief and such relief is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO Motion is granted 
as detailed below. 
Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of 
bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [Respondents] from enjoining [their] 
conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
needed to ensure that Respondents will be reimbursed for “costs and damages sustained by . . . 
hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: 
(1) Petitioner’s application is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further 
briefing and a hearing on this matter. 
(2) Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner immediately from Respondents’ 
custody and ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and a 
pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. Respondents are ENJOINED from 
removing Petitioner from this judicial district, and, if they have already transferred him, are 
ORDERED to return him to this judicial district. Respondents are PROHIBITED from removing 
Petitioner from the United States until these proceedings have terminated. 
(3) During the pendency of the habeas proceedings, Respondents are ENJOINED AND 
RESTRAINED from moving Petitioner from the jurisdiction. 
(4) Respondents shall provide a status report confirming Petitioner’s release by 3:00 p.m. 
June 16, 2026. 
(5) Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in-person at a hearing in the 
courtroom of the assigned Judge, or as otherwise ordered by that Judge, at 9:00 a.m. on June 29, 
2026, why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents SHALL file a response to 
Petitioner’s motion by no later than June 19, 2026. Respondents are DIRECTED to address in 
their response why their actions are not enjoined and in violation of the preliminary injunction 
issued in Garro Pinchi v. Noem, 813 F. Supp. 3d 973 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Any reply SHALL be filed 
by June 24, 2026. The assigned Judge may modify this schedule as appropriate. 
(6) This Order shall remain in effect until 5:00 p.m. on June 30, 2026 or as otherwise 
directed by the Court. 
// 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
This Order disposes of Dkt. No. 3. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 16, 2026 
 
 
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY 
United States District Judge 
 

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