govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-3_26-cv-06013-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
HENRY ONOFRE ARCOS TASIGCHANA, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
LUIS SOTO, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
Civil Action No. 26-6013 (ZNQ) 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
QURAISHI, District Judge 
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s habeas petition challenging his 
prolonged immigration detention. (ECF No. 1.) Following an order to answer, the Government 
filed opposition to the petition (ECF No. 7), to which Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 8.) For the 
following reasons, Petitioner’s habeas petition shall be granted, and Petitioner shall be accorded a 
bond hearing before an immigration judge within ten days at which the Government bears the 
burden of proving that he is either a danger to the community or flight risk by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
As this Court explained in addressing Petitioner’s previous habeas petition, 
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador who crosse the border 
into the United States without admission or inspection on May 19, 
2024. Shortly after crossing the border, Petitioner was taken into 
custody by immigration officials and found inadmissibl e pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Petitioner was then initially issued an 
order of expedited removal pending the outcome of a credible fear 
interview. Following his interview on June 11, 2024, Petitioner was PageID: <pageID>
found to have a credible fear of torture if returned to his home 
country, and he was referred for full removal proceedings. 
 
 Petitioner remained in immigration detention until July 1, 
2024. On that date, Petitioner was paroled by the Government 
pursuant to its discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(d)(5)(A). . . . Petitioner remained on parole until December 6, 
2025, at which time he was taken back into custody and returned to 
detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(1). Petitioner has remained 
detained since that time. 
 
Arcos Tasigchana v. Soto, No. 25-18252, 2026 WL 266170, at *1 (Feb. 2, 2026). 
 On January 31, 2026, Petitioner was ordered removed to Ecuador by an immigration judge. 
(ECF No. 7- 12 at 4- 9.) Petitioner timely filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
which remains pending at this time. (ECF No. 7-13.) In May, the Board issued a briefing schedule 
indicating that the appellate briefs for both Petitioner and the Government would be due on June 
16, 2026. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner’s appeal thus appears to have proceeded without undue delay, and 
is pending a decision from the Board at this time. 
 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is 
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition i f the petitioner is “in custody” 
and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
In his habeas petition, Petitioner seeks to challenge his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1), which Petitioner contends has become so unduly prolonged as to amount to a denial PageID: <pageID>
of Due Process. Although this Court previously found that Petitioner is properly subject to 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) in light of his arrest shortly after crossing the border and 
parole, see Arcos Tasigchana, 2026 WL 266170, at *1-2, it does not follow that Petitioner may be 
held indefinitely without bond so long as he has yet to be removed. As this Court recently 
explained, 
Although aliens subject to detention under § 1225(b)(1) “have only 
those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by 
statute” and the Due Process clause does not provide for detailed 
review of those statutory proceedings, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) , it does not follow that 
the Due Process clause is silent as to the rights of aliens to liberty 
following prolonged detention, especially where that alien was 
previously permitted to be at liberty on parole for a considerable 
period. 
 
Courts in this District have long presumed that aliens subject 
to prolonged detention under the statute have a liberty interest in 
release from detention which requires a bond hearing. See, e.g., 
Tuser E. v. Rodriguez, 370 F. Supp. 3d 435, 442- 43 (D.N.J. 2019). 
In so doing, courts have analogized mandatory detention under 
1225(b) to the similar mandatory detention required for aliens who 
have qualifying criminal convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See 
German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 
210-13 (3d Cir. 2020). In German Santos, the Court of Appeals held 
that where an alien is subject to prolonged detention under the 
statute, that detention will eventually reach a point where it 
essentially becomes arbitrary in light of the purposes and 
presumptions underlying the statute. Id. In the context of those with 
criminal convictions subject to detention under § 1226(c), detention 
“becomes more and more suspect after five month s and in most 
cases will become “unreasonable sometime between six months and 
one year.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr., 169 
F.4th 418, 433- 34 (3d Cir. 2026). Once the length of detention 
becomes suspect, a reviewing court must consider the length of 
detention and likelihood of lengthy continued condition, the 
similarity of Petitioner’s conditions of confinement to criminal 
detention, and the Petitioner’s responsibility for the length of his 
own detention in determining whether detention has become 
arbitrary in light of the purposes of § 1226(c). German Santos, 965 
F.3d at 211. Where those factors indicate that detention has become 
arbitrary, the alien is entitled to a bond hearing at which the PageID: <pageID>
Government bears the burden of proving that further detention is 
necessary by showing that the Petitioner is a danger or flight risk by 
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 213-14. 
 
This Court agrees that, at a certain point, detention under § 
1225(b)(1) will become so prolonged that it becomes arbitrary and 
Due Process will require a bond hearing. Tuser E., 370 F. Supp. 3d 
442-43. The question that remains, then, is at what point detention 
will become suspect. Although in the § 1226(c) context, detention 
will become arbitrary only after cresting five months, that length of 
time is based on the concept that the court can essentially presume 
that an alien convicted of qualifying crimes is a flight risk or danger 
to the community for the length of time it ordinarily would take to 
complete removal proceedings. German Santos , 965 F.3d at 209-
10. The alien’s criminal history is in that context providing the basis 
for the presumption which places a limits o n his liberty interests in 
the § 1226(c) context. 
 
Aliens detained under § 1225(b)(1) are not held based on a 
criminal history [.] The statute instead relies chiefly on the 
presumption that an alien with no clear right to admission into the 
United States is a flight risk and may therefore be detained for the 
relatively limited period of time required for him to receive an 
expedited order of removal. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). 
Such proceedings are clearly intended to be considerably shorter 
than the general removal proceedings to which criminal al iens 
already in the United States are subject under § 1226(c), and the 
presumptive basis for mandatory detention under the statute is 
considerably weaker than that applicable to criminal aliens as it is 
based solely on the lack of legal status rather than past misdeeds. It 
therefore follows that detention under § 1225(b)(1) should become 
suspect far sooner than detention under § 1226(c). 
 
Martinez Olivo v. Soto, No. 26-2122, 2026 WL 1265500, at *2-3. In light of the lesser justification 
for prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1), this Court has found that detention in a jail -like 
detention facility for several months following a lengthy period of parole within the United States 
is sufficient to warrant the granting of a bond hearing. Id. 
Like the petitioner in Martinez Olivo, Petitioner in this matter has been detained in a jail-
like detention facility for an extended period of time following the end of his parole – at this point 
well over six months. Although it appears that Petitioner’s appeal of his removal order should PageID: <pageID>
now be fully briefed in light of the schedule entered by the BIA, Petitioner’s detention without 
bond is likely to continue for a significant period while that appeal remains pending before the 
Board in light of the significant number of appeals the Board is currently facing. As there is no 
evidence that Petitioner has in any way prolonged or otherwise delayed his removal proceedi ngs 
and appeal other than by merely choosing to exercise his right to file an appeal with the Board, 
this Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention without bond has become so prolonged that 
it can no longer satisfy Due Process based solely on the presumption that he is a flight risk based 
on the manner of his entry in to the United States. Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond 
hearing has thus become so prolonged as to become arbitrary , and Petitioner is therefore entitled 
to a bond hearing under the Due Process clause. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213-14. Petitioner’s 
habeas petition shall therefore be granted, and he shall be provided such a bond hearing within ten 
days at which the Government bears the burden of proving he is a danger or flight risk by clear 
and convincing evidence.
1 
 
 
1 Should Petitioner be granted release on bond, such a release shall not be construed as an 
admission into the United States for immigration purposes, and such release provides no legal 
status to remain in the United States which Petitioner did not already possess. Release on bond 
would also not prevent the Government from eventually taking Petitioner into custody for the 
purposes of executing a final removal order should Petitioner’s appeal be denied by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. PageID: <pageID>
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED, 
and Petitioner shall be provided a bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of 
demonstrating danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence within ten days. An 
appropriate order follows. 
 
Date: June 16, 2026 
 s/ Zahid N. Quraishi 
 ZAHID N. QURAISHI 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID: <pageID>

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