govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-08493-0

1 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
 
DAVID ROSS, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
v. 
ESTATE OF JUDE MASSILLON; IPC 
BEVERAGE GROUP, INC.; THOMAS 
HANLEY; STRADLEY RONON 
STEVENS & YOUNG, LLP; ABC AND 
XYZ CORPS. 1-10; and JOHN and JANES 
DOES 1-10, 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 25-8493 
 
OPINION 
 
June 16, 2026 
 
 
SEMPER, District Judge. 
 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Thomas Hanley and Stradle y 
Ronon Stevens & Young LLP (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Counts III through 
VI of Plaintiff David Ross’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint. ( ECF 1, “Compl.”; ECF 6, “Motion” or 
“Mot.”) Plaintiff opposed the M otion. (ECF 10, “Opp.”) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF 13, 
“Reply”.) The Court has decided this M otion upon the submissions of the parties, without oral 
argument, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the 
reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Counts III-VI of Plaintiff’s 
Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice. PageID:
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 
This action arises out of Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent business transactions with 
Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff brings his suit against the Estate of Jude Massillon (“Estate”), 
IPC Beverage Group, Inc. (“IPC Beverage” or the “Company”), Thomas Hanley (“Hanley” or 
“Defendant Hanley”) and Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLC (“Stradley” or “Defendant 
Stradley”). ( See generally id.) Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Stradley liable for Defendant 
Hanley’s actions under a theory of respondeat superior. (Id. ¶ 5.) 
Plaintiff alleges that he , along with two others, was a Holder of Senior Secured Notes 
(“Notes”) issued by IPC Beverage and endorsed by Jude Massillon, the President of IPC Beverage. 
(Id. ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, the Estate, IPC Beverage, and Defendants enticed him and two 
other individuals to loan money to the Company. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff asserts that the Estate, IPC 
Beverage, and Defendants solicited the Holders “under the guise” that the funding would help the 
Company produce inventory for a product order placed by a national chain of stores, referred to in 
the Complaint as Big Box Store One. ( Id.) However, according to Plaintiff, the purchase order 
from Big Box Store One was “wholly bogus,” as revealed by the fact that the metadata embedded 
in the order PDF indicated that, while the purchase order was dated November 14, 2023, the PDF 
itself was created on November 20, 2023. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff further alleges that the additional 
“Big Box Store One documentation” emailed to the Holders were created by “the same dishonest 
methods.” (Id. ¶ 16.) 
 
1 The facts and procedural history are drawn from the Complaint (Compl.) and documents integral 
to or relied upon by the Complaint. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1426 (3d Cir. 1997). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts drawn from the Complaint 
are accepted as true. See Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). PageID:
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Plaintiff also claims that the Estate, IP Beverage, and Defendants falsified IPC Bank 
account statements to entice the Holders to loan the money allegedly secured by the Notes. (Id. ¶ 
17.) When the Holders advised Defendant Hanley that the statements appeared to be fraudulent, 
Defendant Hanley allegedly did nothing to vet them prior to the Holders making their loans. ( Id. 
¶ 19.) 
According to Plaintiff, in the aggregate, the Holders loaned $900,000 to IPC Beverage on 
or about December 8, 2023. (Id. ¶ 11.) In February 2024, Jude Massillon “continued to claim that 
the Big Box Store One order fulfillment was ‘ in transit, ’ that a multimedia company ordered 
200,000 units, and that IPC Beverage had received a ‘green light’ to start producing on orders from 
two supermarket chains.” ( Id. ¶ 20.) But, a ccording to Plaintiff, the Estate, IP Beverage, and 
Defendants subsequently sought to have the Holders roll their loans by procuring an additional 
purchase from a different chain store. ( Id. ¶ 21.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant 
Hanley encouraged the Holders to document an extension of the loan on behalf of IPC Beverage, 
representing that it would be easier for the m to get repaid with such an extension. ( Id. ¶ 22.) 
Plaintiff notes that Defendant Hanley then informed the Holders that Jude Massillon would lend 
IPC Beverage money to repay them, despite previous promises that they would be made whole by 
a Big Box Store Two payment during the first week of January 2025. (Id. ¶ 23.) 
While the Notes were set to mature on December 7, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that date passed 
without repayment to the Holders, resulting in an “event of default.” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff states 
that he then demanded redemption under the Notes issued by IPC Beverage Group. (Id. ¶ 10.) 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hanley and Stradley provided consistent and longstanding 
legal representation to IPC Beverage. ( Id. ¶ 8.) For example, Plaintiff claims Defendant H anley 
used Defendant Stradley’s email servers across state lines to provide legal advice and send legal PageID:
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documents to the Holders , and that other attorneys employed at Defendant Stradley worked on 
addressing other needs of IPC Beverage, such as securing its intellectual property. ( Id. ¶ 8.) 
According to Plaintiff, while Defendants allowed IPC Beverage’s corporate registry to lapse in 
March 2022, (id. ¶ 27), they re-registered the company’s trademarks even though it had not filed 
tax returns in years, nor was it registered to do business in either Delaware or New York. ( Id. ¶ 
28.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hanley was an insider of IPC Beverage, as evidenced 
by the fact that he had invested his own money into the Company from its inception. (Id. ¶ 25.) 
Plaintiff brings two breach of contract claims against IPC Beverage, alleging that, since the 
Company did not retire the Holders’ Notes, he is entitled to specific performance on the Notes 
(Count 1) and that the Company was unjustly enriched at Plaintiff’s expense (Count II). (Id. ¶¶ 
31-39.) However, at issue here is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the four counts Plaintiffs bring 
against them: (1) civil RICO claims such as racketeering, theft, mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 
and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Count III); (2) common law fraud (Count IV); (3) common 
law conversion (Count V); and (4) breach of fiduciary duty (Count VI). (Id. ¶¶ 40-77.) 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 9, 2025. (Compl.) Defendants Thomas Hanley and 
Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLC filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on September 15, 2025. (Mot.) Plaintiff opposed the 
Motion on October 23, 2025. (Opp.) Defendants filed a reply on November 10, 2025. (Reply.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Rule 12(b)(6) 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a 
count for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state PageID:
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
A complaint is plausible on its face when there is enough factual content “that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability 
requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise 
a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Id. at 789. 
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is “not 
compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions 
disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). If, 
after viewing the allegations in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff, it appears that no 
relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., No. 10-02945, 
2010 WL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010). 
B. Rule 8(a)(2) 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2) provides that any pleading including a claim 
for relief shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
“Complaints that violate Rule 8 are often referred to as shotgun pleadings.” Cambridge 
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Stihl Inc., No. 22-05893, 2023 WL 5928319, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2023) PageID:
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(internal quotations omitted). The four categories of shotgun pleadings include complaints that 
“(i) contain multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (ii) 
are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular 
cause of action; (iii) do not separate into each count each cause of action or claim for relief; and 
(iv) assert multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of them are 
responsible for which acts or omissions.” Id. S hotgun pleadings all share one common 
characteristic: the “failure to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and 
the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. This Court May Not Consider Plaintiff’s Post Host Certification i n Deciding 
the Motion to Dismiss. 
 
Plaintiff’s Opposition brief includes a certification alleging additional facts not included in 
the Complaint. ( Opp., Ex. B, “Certification” or “Cert.” ; see Compl.) While this Court may 
consider documents “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint ,” when ruling on a 
motion to dismiss, it “may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426. “It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended 
by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Pennsylvania ex. Rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 
Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, “[f]or purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may not consider the supplemental factual allegations in 
[Plaintiff’s] Certification.” McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 696 
(D.N.J. 2013) (declining to consider a plaintiff’s subsequently filed certification when ruling on a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss). As such, this Court will only evaluate the factual allegations 
described in the Complaint. PageID:
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B. Plaintiff Has Not Sufficiently Pled a Fiduciary Relationship with Defendant s 
and Fails to Plead a Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Count VI. 
 
 Defendants ask this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim against them for 
failing to “allege any facts that establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship between [Plaintiff] 
and Stradley.” (Mot. at 2.) Defendants argue that both this Court and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court have held that attorneys do not owe non- clients duties of care except under rare 
circumstances. ( Id.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that attorneys owe fiduciary duties to 
foreseeable non- clients who rely on their professional conduct, and that Plaintiff “justifiably 
relied” on Defendants’ reputation and counsel in making their loans. (Opp. at 10-11.) 
This Court concludes that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts establishing a fiduciary 
relationship with Defendants. The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim under New Jersey 
law are: “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) the breach of the 
duty imposed by that relationship; and (3) damages or harm to the plaintiff caused by said breach.” 
SalandStacy Corp. v. Freeney , No. 11-3439, 2012 WL 959473, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2012). 
“[A] fiduciary relationship exists when one person is ‘under a duty to act for or give advice for the 
benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship.’ ” In re Cendant Corp. Sec . 
Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 (D.N.J. 2001). In New Jersey, “[a] lawyer may owe a fiduciary 
duty to a non -client ‘when and to the extent that lawyer … invites the non- client to rely on the 
lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services, the non-client so relies, and the non-client is 
not … too remote from the lawyer to be entitled protection.” Speeney v. Rutgers , 673 F. App’x 
149, 156 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Petrillo v. Bachenberg , 655 A.2d 1354, 1359 (N.J. 1995)); see 
also Oestreicher v. Rutgers, No. 02-959, 2015 WL 6460423, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2015) (same). 
The Court focuses on “the non-client’s reliance on the attorney’s work or representations” 
in determining whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the existence of a fiduciary relationship PageID:
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between him and Defendants. See Oestreicher, 2015 WL 6460423, at *11. To start, Plaintiff has 
pled no facts establishing that he was Defendants’ client. He does not allege that he was 
Defendants’ client at any point in his Complaint , and also affirms Defendants’ representation of 
IPC Beverage. (See Compl. ¶ 8 (“At all relevant times, Defendants Hanley and Stradley Ronon 
provided consistent and longstanding representation to Defendant IPC Beverage .”).) Further, 
Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendants “were all fiduciaries” to him and the other Holders, and 
pleads no facts supporting any finding that Defendants should have known that he “would rely on 
them for legal advice or that such reliance was foreseeable.” See Oestreicher, 2015 WL 6460423, 
at *11. For example, Plaintiff pleads no facts suggesting that he hired or had an agreement with 
Defendants, let alone sought out legal advice, or that Defendants issued an opinion letter or 
“prepare[d] an instrument with the intent ” that Plaintiff would rely on it . See Speeney, 673 F. 
App’x at 154; Pertillo, 655 A.2d at 1359 (emphasis added). As such, the Court concludes Plaintiff 
alleges no facts establishing his reliance on Defendants’ legal work or representations, thus failing 
to allege both a fiduciary relationship and a fiduciary duty claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 Plaintiff also fails to allege any other grounds upon which Defendants owed him a 
fiduciary duty. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED 
as to Count VI. Count VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
C. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Conversion Claim in Count V. 
Defendants also ask this Court to dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s C omplaint for failing to 
allege the elements of a conversion claim. (Mot. at 14-15). Defendants assert that Plaintiff pleads 
no facts explaining how or when Defendants took possession of funds loaned by Plaintiff to IPC 
Beverage, or how Defendants used the funds for their benefit. ( Id. at 14.) In response, Plaintiff PageID:
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argues that Defendant Hanley’s “dual role as an attorney and shareholder gave him practical 
control over the transaction.” (Opp. at 13.) 
In New Jersey, conversion is the “unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of 
ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition 
or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” CHEP USA v. H&M Pallets, LLC , No. 23-20986, 2024 
WL 124672, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2024) (internal citations omitted). Conversion consists of “(1) 
the existence of property, (2) the right to immediate possession thereof belonging to [the] plaintiff, 
and (3) the wrongful interference with that right by [the] defendant.” Austar Int ’l Ltd v. 
AustarPharma LLC, 425 F. Supp. 3d 336, 357 (D.N.J. 2019). “Conversion requires a defendant 
to exercise ‘dominion and control’ over another’s property.” IDT Domestic Telecom, Inc. v. 
Crumpler, No. 22-1947, 2023 WL 1360404, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2023) ; see also McAdam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 771 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Conversion is essentially the 
wrongful exercise of dominion and control over the property of another in a manner inconsistent 
with the other person’s rights in that property.”). 
Plaintiff does not plead any facts alleging that Defendants themselves exercised control 
over Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff claims that the Estate, IPC Beverage, and Defendants 
“falsif[ied] documentation sufficient to entice” him and the Holders to “invest great sums of money 
in Defendant IPC Beverage, ” “converted the monies that Plaintiff (and the Holders) loaned to 
Defendant IPC Beverage for their own use ,” and “attempted to have Plaintiff (and the Holders) 
roll their loans by further falsifying docume ntation sufficient to do so.” (Compl. ¶¶ 66-68.) 
However, at no point does Plaintiff allege that Defendants Hanley and Stradley specifically 
possessed, let alone controlled, the money he loaned to IPC Beverage. Plaintiff thus fails to plead 
a claim of conversion. See Marketvision/Gateway Research, Inc. v. Carter , 2012 WL 762317, at PageID:
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*2 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2012) (holding that a plaintiff’s complaint did not establish a conversion claim 
because it did not plead facts supporting a finding that the defendant himself exercised control 
over the plaintiff’s property); see also Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP , 222 A.3d 649, 661-2 (N.J. 
2020) (holding that a plaintiff did not plead a conversion claim because the defendant law firm did 
not exercise independent dominion or control over the plaintiff’s funds simply by receiving the 
funds in its trust account ). As such, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conversion claim 
is GRANTED. Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
D. Plaintiff Fails to Plead Civil RICO (Count III) or Common Law Fraud (Count 
IV) with the Specificity Required Under Rule 8(a)(2). 
 
Defendants finally ask this Court to dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint for 
failing to “specify and distinguish between” the alleged misconduct of Defendants, the Estate, and 
IPC Beverage under Rule 8(a)(2) and “set forth any specifics” of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct 
and racketeering activity under Rules 8(a)(2) and 9(b). (Mot. at 16-17.) Plaintiff argues that the 
Complaint specifically pleads Defendants’ roles in the racketeering and fraud claims, and that the 
elements of the claims are pled with the requisite specificity. (Opp. at 13-20.) 
As described above, Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” such that the defendant has “fair notice of what the … claim 
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere 
“conclusory allegations against defendants as a group” that “fail[] to allege the personal 
involvement of any defendant” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Galicki v. New 
Jersey, No. 14 -169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015). Relatedly, va gue and 
conclusory allegations do not satisfy Rule 8’s pleading standards even if they are made with respect 
to specific defendants. See Vita v. Vita, No. 21-11060, 2021 WL 3634521, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 
2021); Cambridge Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5928319, at *2. PageID:
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 Under Rule 8(a)(2) , a plaintiff must allege facts that “establish each individual 
[d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct alleged.” See Galicki, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2. When 
several defendants are named in a complaint, a plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants “who 
occupied different positions and presumably had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct” without 
specifying “which defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct.” Falat v. Cnty. of Hunterdon, 
No. 12- 6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013). A complaint that contains 
“impermissibly vague group pleading” will be dismissed “because it does not place Defendants on 
notice of the claims against each of them.” Id.; Baldeo v. City of Paterson, No. 18-5359, 2019 WL 
277600, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2019) (quoting Sheeran v. Blyth Shipholding S.A., No. 14- 5482, 
2015 WL 9048979, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015)). Here, Plaintiff fails to plead specific facts as to 
Defendants involvement in a civil RICO conspiracy and common law fraud. While the Complaint 
identifies each defendant in the lawsuit , (Compl. ¶ 2), its civil RICO and fraud allegations group 
the Estate, IPC Beverage, and Defendants Hanley and Stradley together, failing to specify the 
offenses attributable to or actions taken by Defendants . For example, with respect to the RICO 
claims in Count III, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that “Defendants [the Estate, IPC Beverage, Hanley, 
and Stradley] … intentionally misrepresented material facts to Plaintiff ” and that “Defendants 
fraudulently introduced Plaintiff (and the Holders) to invest $900,000.” (Compl. ¶¶ 42- 43.) 
Relatedly, with respect to the common law fraud claims in Count IV, Plaintiff broadly alleges that 
“Defendants misled Plaintiff (and the Holders) by falsifying documentation sufficient to entice 
them to invest great sums of money …,” and that “Defendants further attempted to have Plaintiff 
(and the Holders) roll their loans by further falsifying documentation sufficient to do so ….” ( Id. 
¶¶ 59-60.) The Complaint pleads no facts distinguishing the specific acts of Defendants Hanley 
and Stradley from the Estate and IPC Beverage with respect to misrepresenting material facts to PageID:
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Plaintiff, enticing the Holders to make $900,000 loans, or falsifying documentation. (See id. ¶ 17 
(“Defendants … utilized (falsified) IPC Beverage bank account statements ….” ), id. ¶ 14 
(“Defendants enticed the Holders into making loans in the first place.”), id. ¶ 21 (“Defendants 
utilized a similar deception when seeking to have the Holders roll their original loans ….”) .) 
Lastly, Plaintiff’s statement that “Defendant Hanley utilized Defendant Stradley Ronon 
email servers to … send legal documents to the Holders” is a vague allegation that insufficiently 
supports his otherwise conclusory claim that Defendants, the Estate, and IPC Beverage “us[ed] 
interstate wires, the internet (via email), and U.S. mail to facilitate and conceal their theft and 
misrepresentations.” ( Id. ¶¶ 8, 44) . Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts as to how, or 
whether, Defendant Hanley and Stradley used the email servers to facilitate theft or 
misrepresentations. See Vita, 2021 WL 3634521, at *1 (holding that a plaintiff’s complaint failed 
to plead facts sufficient to support a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 
Rule 8(a) because it “contained only vague and conclusory allegations, with no specific allegations 
of what Defendants did to breach the covenant”). 
 In short, the Complaint does not sufficiently “give the defendants adequate notice of the 
claims against them” and fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)’s pleading requirements. See Cambridge Mutual 
Fire Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5928319, at *2 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts IV -V of Plaintiff ’s Complaint against them pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 8(a) is GRANTED.2 Counts IV -V of Plaintiff ’s Complaint are 
DISMISSED without prejudice. 
 
2 Defendants also moved to dismiss Counts IV-V of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 9(b)’s 
heightened pleading standard. (Mot. at 16- 21.) Given that the Court grants Defendants’ Motion 
under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 8(a), the Court refrains from engaging in Rule 9(b) analysis at this 
time. PageID:
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above , Counts III-VI of Plaintiff ’s Complaint are DISMISSED 
without prejudice with respect to Defendants Hanley and Stradley. Plaintiff has 30 days to file an 
amended complaint in accordance with this Opinion. An appropriate order follows. 
 
 
/s/ Jamel K. Semper . 
HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER 
United States District Judge 
 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Michael A. Hammer, U.S.M.J. 
Parties PageID:
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