govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-18588-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
ONEPORT GLOBAL LOGISTICS LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
Civil No.: 25-cv-18588 (KSH) (AME) 
 
 v. 
AMERIGO LOGISTICS LLC; CAIN 
TRUCKING INC.; WORLDWIDE FLIGHT 
SERVICES; JOHN DOES 1-5 (fictitious names 
as true identities are unknown); and XYZ 
CORPORATION 1-5 (fictitious names as true 
identities are unknown), 
 
 Defendants. 
 
OPINION 
 
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J. 
I. Introduction 
This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss (D.E. 18) brought by 
defendant Amerigo Logistics LLC (“Amerigo”), which seeks to dispose of contract and tort 
claims based on preemption by federal law. For the reasons set forth below, Amerigo’s motion 
is granted in part and denied in part. 
II. Background 
The following facts are taken from the complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of 
this motion. Plaintiff Oneport Global Logistics LLC (“Oneport”) is a cargo freight forwarder, 
meaning that it arranges for shipment of goods to customers. (D.E. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Amerigo 
is a broker that provides transportation logistics services to companies like Oneport. (Id. ¶¶ 6-9.) 
In June 2025, Oneport arranged clothing garments to be shipped from a manufacturer in 
Kenya to a customer, Haddad Apparel Group (“Haddad”), located in Dayton, New Jersey. (Id. 
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¶ 15.) The shipment was scheduled to arrive at JFK airport on or around June 11, 2025, and 
consisted of 838 cartons with an estimated value of $148,393.01. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Prior to the 
shipment’s arrival at JFK, Oneport requested a delivery rate quote from Amerigo. (Id. ¶ 18.) 
Krystal Wilson, an employee of Amerigo, sent Oneport a quote and confirmed that a 
driver was able to pick up the freight shipment when it arrived at JFK. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) In 
response, Oneport sent Amerigo an order requesting shipment to Haddad in New Jersey. (Id. 
¶ 23.) The order provided certain conditions: that Amerigo must contact Haddad through a 
representative before attempting delivery and that proof of delivery must be sent with the billing 
invoice and via email. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Amerigo arranged for defendant Cain Trucking Inc. to 
deliver the shipment to Haddad. (Id. ¶ 22.) 
On June 10, 2025, Wilson emailed Oneport that the delivery driver from Cain Trucking 
was dispatched to pick up the freight shipment. (Id. ¶ 31.) Over the next few hours, Wilson 
updated Oneport that the driver was loading the cargo into the trucks. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) At 6:57 
p.m., Wilson confirmed that the cargo was picked up at the facility owned by defendant 
Worldwide Flight Services (“WFS”) and that the delivery driver would arrive at Haddad’s 
warehouse within 15 minutes. (Id. ¶ 34.) The next email Oneport received from Wilson was at 
12:42 a.m., confirming that the shipment was successfully delivered and that proof of delivery 
would be sent out shortly. (Id. ¶ 36.) 
But Amerigo never sent Oneport proof of delivery because the cargo never made it to 
Haddad. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 40-44.) Over the next few days, Cain Trucking allegedly “sent blackmail 
calls and emails” to Oneport “demanding a payment of $10,000 for the return of the shipment.” 
(Id. ¶ 50.) On June 13, Oneport filed a police report with Port Authority of New York Police 
Department that the shipment was believed to be stolen by Cain Trucking or someone posing as PageID:
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a trucker for Cain Trucking. (Id. ¶ 54.) Oneport characterizes Amerigo as perpetuating a fraud; 
that its employee Wilson made confirmation of the delivery either knowing it was false or with 
reckless disregard of its falsity based on when the delivery confirmation was issued and the lack 
of proof of delivery from Cain Trucking. (Id. ¶¶ 31-39, see ¶ 63 (“Amerigo’s false confirmation 
of delivery was made to conceal its failure to properly monitor the shipment and constitutes an 
independent tort separate from any breach of contract.”).) 
On June 18, Oneport sent a formal claim letter to Amerigo and WFS and sent a revised 
letter on June 30 that detailed the losses stemming from the shipment’s disappearance. (Id. 
¶¶ 55-56.) Oneport claims that its damages total $378,759.59, comprising direct cargo losses 
(value of goods and loss of sale to customers) and freight and customs costs. (Id. ¶¶ 58-59.) 
Neither Amerigo nor WFS has offered compensation for the shipment. (Id. ¶ 57.) 
On December 12, 2025, Oneport filed the instant complaint against Amerigo, Cain 
Trucking, and WFS. (D.E. 1.) The complaint alleges three counts against Amerigo: fraud 
(Count One), negligent misrepresentation (Count Two), and breach of contract (Count Three). 
(Id. ¶¶ 61-95.) It alleges two counts against Cain Trucking: a claim under the Carmack 
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (Count Five) and conversion (Count Six). (Id. ¶¶ 111-131.) 
Oneport’s claim against WFS for gross negligence/breach of bailment (Count Four) was 
dismissed on January 27, 2026, when the parties stipulated to WFS’s dismissal without 
prejudice. (D.E. 13, 15.) Cain Trucking answered the complaint. (D.E. 16.) 
On February 5, 2026, Amerigo filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
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(“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), bars Oneport’s claims against it. (D.E. 18.)1 In the 
alternative, it argues that the economic loss doctrine bars Oneport’s tort claims. (Id. at 21-22.) 
Oneport opposed, primarily arguing that “[t]he FAAAA preempts claims that would regulate 
broker services, not claims that provide remedies for a broker’s intentional or reckless deception 
committed during the performance of those services.” (D.E. 20, Opp., at 8.) In reply, Amerigo 
reiterates that “imposing state common law requirements on a freight broker when 
communicating with a shipper about the status of the shipment clearly relates to and effects [sic] 
the ‘price, route, or services’ that a freight broker provides”—the test for FAAAA preemption . 
(D.E. 21, Reply, at 3-4.) 
Oneport sought leave to file a sur-reply, alleging that Amerigo’s reply brief raises “new 
legal authority and arguments” not raised in its moving brief. (D.E. 22.) Amerigo did not 
oppose. For the sake of completeness, the Court grants Oneport’s request and considers the sur-
reply brief filed. L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(6). 
III. Standard of Review 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for 
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
 
1 As the parties agree that Amerigo acted as a broker and not a carrier (id. at 11-12; D.E. 20, 
Opp., at 6-7), the Court will not address Amerigo’s Carmack Amendment arguments. See AMG 
Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., 796 F. App’x 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that the 
Carmack Amendment provides a federal cause of action against motor carriers, not brokers). PageID:
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That pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but requires the plaintiff to 
provide the “grounds” for its “entitle[ment] to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Contentions 
that a plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal law, “directed to the face of the complaint, are 
appropriate for consideration under the standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” 
Clements v. Sanofi-Aventis, U.S., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 586, 591 (D.N.J. 2015) (McNulty, J.). 
IV. Discussion 
The FAAAA
2 contains express preemptive language, that “no State . . . shall enact or 
enforce” any law or provision having the effect of law “relating to . . . intrastate services of any 
freight forwarder or broker.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1). Similarly, subsection (c) provides: “a 
State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and 
effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight 
forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). 
“The purpose of the FAAAA’s preemption clause is to prohibit states from effectively re-
regulating the trucking industry and to promote ‘maximum reliance on competitive market 
forces.’” Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings LLC, 905 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 49 
U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6)). FAAAA preemption is interpreted broadly and occurs when a state law 
has “a connection with, or reference to . . . prices, routes, or services” of a motor carrier. Id. at 
133 (quoting Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 284 (2014)); see also Fahrenbach v. Green 
Planet Movers, 682 F. Supp. 3d 109, 112 (D. Mass. 2023) (“The ‘related to’ test is an 
 
2 Congress passed the FAAAA in 1994, effective on January 1, 1995, which included the 
predecessor to § 14501(c)(1) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11501(h)(1)). Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. 
v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665, 668 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Then in December 
1995, Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), and 
§ 11501(h)(1) was recodified as § 14501(c)(1). Id. n.1 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 103, 109 
Stat. 802, 899 (effective Jan. 1, 1996)). As such, FAAAA preemption and ICCTA preemption 
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intentionally expansive one and encompasses those state laws that have a connection to or 
reference to, either directly or indirectly, the rates, routes, and services of motor carriers and/or 
brokers.”) (citing Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013)). The 
Supreme Court has noted that “preemption occurs at least where state laws have a ‘significant 
impact’ related to Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives.” Lupian, 905 F.3d 
at 133 (quoting Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008)). 
State common law qualifies as another provision “having the force and effect of law” for 
purposes of § 14501(c)(1). Inter Metals Grp. v. Centrans Marine Shipping, 2022 WL 489404, at 
*4 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2022) (Vazquez, J.) (citing Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp., 181 F. 
Supp. 3d 250, 257 (D.N.J. 2016) (Hayden, J.)). While routine breach of contract actions based 
on state law may be maintained under the FAAAA, American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 
219, 228 (1995),
3 tort actions that would impact a broker’s rates, routes, or services are 
preempted. See, e.g., Inter Metals, 2022 WL 489404, at *1, *4 (finding that plaintiff’s claims 
that a broker acted negligently and fraudulently when an empty cargo container was delivered to 
it were preempted); Alpine Fresh, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 257 (finding that plaintiff’s “common law 
claims of negligence and breach of bailment . . . are related to the intrastate transportation of 
goods, and more specifically to [defendant’s] ‘intrastate services’ as a broker” and were 
preempted); Marx Cos., LLC v. W. Trans Logistics, Inc., 2015 WL 260914, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 
2015) (Pisano, J.) (finding that negligence claims relating to the services of a broker were 
 
3 Although Wolens was decided in the context of the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), the 
FAAAA’s preemptive language is based on, and its scope is interpreted in accordance with, the 
ADA. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-77; Mrs. Ressler’s Food Prods. v. KZY Logistics, LLC, 2017 WL 
3868703, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (Martini, J.) (Because the preemption provisions in the 
FAAAA and the ICCTA borrow language from the ADA, “the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the preemptive scope of the ICCTA and FAAAA in accordance with that of the ADA.”). PageID:
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preempted); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. DM Transp. Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 2006 WL 2871745, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. July 14, 2006) (finding “that the factual predicate of plaintiff’s misrepresentation, 
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and fraud claims expressly concern, or, at the very least, 
have a connection with, the rates plaintiff was charging” and were preempted); Deerskin, 972 F. 
Supp. at 672 (dismissing as preempted state law claims brought against shipper of interstate 
goods alleging, inter alia, common law fraud, statutory fraud, and negligence). 
Counts One and Two of the complaint assert fraud and negligence claims against 
Amerigo in that it “knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the freight shipment was 
successfully delivered to Oneport’s customer, Haddad,” or made this representation with 
“reckless disregard for its truth”; “negligently failed to verify that Oneport’s cargo was loaded 
onto the correct truck”; and “negligently failed to receive [proof of delivery] from Cain Trucking 
to confirm that the shipment was successfully delivered before making such a statement to 
Oneport.” (D.E. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 62, 66-67, 79-83.) As to its fraud claim, Oneport further alleges 
that “Amerigo’s false confirmation of delivery was made to conceal its failure to properly 
monitor the shipment.” (Id. ¶ 63.) 
As a broker, Amerigo’s services include “selling, providing, or arranging for, 
transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (defining “broker”). 
Courts have found that where a tort claim seeks to regulate a broker’s oversight of its carrier, the 
broker’s services would be impacted by state common law and the claim would be preempted. 
Inter Metals, 2022 WL 489404, at *1, *3-4 (plaintiff’s claims preempted where the broker was 
alleged to have fraudulently and negligently coordinated delivery of an empty container); Marx, 
2015 WL 260914, at *2-4 (plaintiff’s claims preempted where the broker was alleged to be 
negligent in selecting a carrier who ultimately stole the goods); cf. Yellow, 2006 WL 2871745, at PageID:
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*1-3 (plaintiff’s claims preempted where the broker was alleged to have participated in a fraud 
scheme to receive discounted freight rates, as these claims “expressly concern, or, at the very 
least, have a connection with, the rates plaintiff was charging, however unwittingly, to its 
customers”). 
Despite Oneport’s arguments, the Court is hard pressed to find that its tort claims are not 
connected to Amerigo’s broker services and would not impact these services upon a finding of 
liability. A plain reading of the complaint reveals that Oneport is challenging Amerigo’s 
oversight and monitoring of Cain Trucking during its delivery (or non-delivery) of the cargo, 
which led to an alleged theft by Cain Trucking. Providing and arranging for transportation of 
cargo, and the delivery of that cargo, are essential parts of a broker’s services and Amerigo’s 
communications and updates about delivery took place while it was acting as a broker. 
Indeed, Amerigo contends as a practical matter that imposing liability against brokers on 
these facts would “require brokers to engage in additional vetting and investigations, more 
directly control carriers, contemplate the effect the time of day may have on their exposure when 
communicating, and incur more expense to verify the accuracy of the information supplied by a 
carrier before transmitting the same to the shipper.” (D.E. 18, Motion, at 18.) Imposing 
additional state law standards—“ which may vary from state to state”—on brokers performing 
intrastate transportation services “is exactly th[e] type of variance which Congress seeks to 
preclude by means of . . . preemption.” Mastercraft Interiors, Ltd. v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 284 
F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (D. Md. 2003) (finding claims for misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment preempted under the FAAAA). 
Further, courts have found that where a tort claim seeks to “enlarge or enhance the 
bargain” found in the parties’ contract, it is preempted. Id. (“[T]his Court may enforce the PageID:
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bargain of the parties, by permitting the breach of contract action, but may not enlarge or 
enhance the bargain, vis a vis a tort action.”); see also Yellow, 2006 WL 2871745, at *3 (finding 
plaintiff’s “tort and quasi-contract claims implicate state interests external to the contractual 
relationship between the parties, thus constituting a state enforcement action ‘related to’ 
plaintiff’s ‘price’”). And here, Oneport specifically argues that Amerigo failed to “properly 
monitor the shipment” and failed to “verify that Oneport’s cargo was loaded onto the correct 
truck.” (D.E. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 63, 82.) While terms relating to Amerigo’s monitoring and 
verification duties could have been agreed to in the parties’ contract, they cannot now be raised 
as independent tort claims. Oneport’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims raise “state-
imposed obligations external to a contract” and impermissibly expand Amerigo’s contractual 
duties. 
Finally, as to Counts One and Two, the Court notes that on May 14, 2026, the Supreme 
Court decided Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1199 (2026). 
While that decision was pending, Oneport argued that Montgomery may potentially impact its 
tort claims and cautioned the Court from dismissing them with prejudice. (D.E. 20, Opp., at 2-
3.) Amerigo responded that the Montgomery decision would have no impact on Oneport’s tort 
claims, since Oneport does not assert a negligent hiring claim and likewise does not argue that 
the safety exception contained in § 14501(c)(2)(A) applies to save its tort claims from 
preemption. (D.E. 21, Reply, at 4-5.) Now with the benefit of the Montgomery decision, the 
Court agrees with Amerigo. 
Montgomery concerns the applicability of the FAAAA’s safety exception, which 
provides that the preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State 
with respect to motor vehicles.” 146 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)). PageID:
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There, Shawn Montgomery alleged that a broker “failed to exercise reasonable care when it hired 
Caribe Transport, which had a subpar safety rating from federal regulators, to transport goods via 
truck,” leading to a tractor-trailer accident that ultimately resulted in the amputation of 
Montgomery’s leg. Id. at 1203-05. Before Montgomery, circuits were split as to whether 
negligent hiring claims against brokers were preempted under the FAAAA or whether they were 
saved from preemption by the safety exception. Id. at 1204 n.1. 
The Supreme Court considered this circuit split and held that Montgomery’s negligent 
hiring claim fell within the FAAAA’s safety exception and was saved from preemption. Id. at 
1204-05. The Court clarified that its holding did not “swallow the FAAAA’s express 
preemption provision whole,” as “[t]he safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims: 
those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety.” Id. at 1205. It went on to clarify 
that “state laws that are related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services . . . that have no 
relationship to safety” are not saved from preemption. Id. But Montgomery’s claim—“the 
negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused injury”—is “an exercise of ‘the 
safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles’” and is saved from 
preemption by the safety exception. Id. at 1206-07. Here, as discussed, there is no negligent 
hiring claim or safety exception argument, and the complaint does not raise facts that would 
support either. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Oneport’s fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims are directly related to Amerigo’s “services” as a broker. 49 U.S.C. 
§ 14501(c)(1). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Counts One and Two on grounds of 
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However, Oneport’s breach of contract claim at Count Three is different. As discussed, a 
breach of contract claim is not preempted by the FAAAA so long as the claim is limited “to the 
parties’ bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to 
the agreement.” Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233. The Supreme Court has distinguished common law 
claims from breach of contract claims for purposes of FAAAA preemption, stating that 
“privately ordered obligations” that are agreed to in a contract “do not amount to a State’s 
enactment or enforcement of any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the 
force and effect of law.” Id. at 228-29 (citation modified). 
The complaint alleges that Oneport and Amerigo’s email exchanges from June 6 through 
9, 2025 formed a contract containing certain material terms that specified how the cargo would 
be picked up and how delivery would be made. (D.E. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 89-90.) Oneport alleges that 
Amerigo breached express terms found in the contract, including “[f]ailing to deliver [the] cargo 
to Haddad,” and that it suffered damages as a result. (Id. ¶¶ 90-94.) 
Amerigo argues that this claim should be dismissed because it includes the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and implies damages that are not outlined in the parties’ 
contract. (D.E. 18, Motion, at 20-21; D.E. 21, Reply, at 9-10.) In support, it relies on an out of 
district case, Custom Stud, Inc. v. Meadow Lark Agency, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 3d 950 (D. Minn. 
2021), where the plaintiff expressly alleged claims for breach of contract and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing— a common law obligation read into contracts. 
There, the court “decline[d] to unravel” the breach of contract claim, which would not have been 
preempted, and the breach of good faith and fair dealing claim, which would have been 
preempted as external to the parties’ bargain, and dismissed the matter without prejudice so that 
plaintiff “may attempt to clarify.” Id. at 956. PageID:
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But nowhere in the complaint does Oneport allege any breach of implied covenants. 
Rather, Oneport bases Amerigo’s breach of contract on its failure to deliver on certain material 
terms that were included in the parties’ contract. There is no separate breach of contract claim to 
unravel from any implied covenant claim, and Count Three is not preempted by the FAAAA. 
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court Amerigo’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts 
One and Two and denied as to Count Three. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion. 
 
Dated: June 16, 2026 /s/ Katharine S. Hayden 
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J. PageID:
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