govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_26-cv-04607-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
CAMDEN VICINAGE 
 
 
RENE D. EDWARDS, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 v. 
 
JOSHUA M. FILER, DO, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 RENE D. EDWARDS, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 v. 
 
NEW JERSEY PAROLE BOARD, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
RENE D. EDWARDS, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 v. 
 
JEFFERSON HEALTH CARE OF 
MULTIPLE STATE, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civ No. 26-625-RMB-SAK 
Civ No. 26-1611-RMB-SAK 
Civ No. 26-4607-RMB 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
 
 
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge: 
THESE MATTERS come before the Court upon applications to proceed in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”) and Complaints filed by Plaintiff Rene D. Edwards (“Plaintiff”) in three 
separate cases: Edwards v. Filer (“Filer”), No. 26-625; Edwards v. N.J. Parole Board (“N.J. Parole PageID: <pageID>
2 
 
Board”), No. 26-1611 ; and Edwards v. Jefferson Health Care of Multiple State (“Jefferson Health 
Care”), No. 26-4607. In Filer, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel 
and Defendants in Jefferson Health Care have bafflingly filed a Motion to Dismiss.1 
After review, the Court will GRANT each of Plaintiff’s three IFP applications, but 
DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel in Filer and 
DISMISS WITHOUT PREJDUICE the three Complaints for failure to comply with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, or a 
combination thereof. The Court also WARNS Plaintiff that any future complaint deemed by 
this Court to be frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim, or seeking monetary relief against 
a defendant who is immune from such relief shall result in a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g). 
I. IFP 
Courts in the Third Circuit only grant leave to proceed IFP “based on a showing of 
indigence.” Douris v. Newtown Borough, Inc., 207 F. App’x 242, 243 (3d Cir. 2006). While IFP 
status is not reserved solely for the “absolutely destitute,” the litigant “must establish that he 
is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Hurst v. Shalk, 659 F. App’x 133, 134 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(first citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948); and then 
quoting Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989)). The litigant 
seeking IFP status must “provide the [Court] with the financial information it need[s] to make 
a determination as to whether he qualifie[s] for in forma pauperis status.” Freeman v. Edens, 
 
1 Bafflingly because this Court has had to twice instruct Defense Counsel in Filer to refrain 
from filing motions until the Court exercised its statutory duty to screen Plaintiff’s IFP 
application and, if approved, the Complaint. [Filer Docket Nos. 6, 15.] In any event, the 
Court will deny the pending Motion to Dismiss in Jefferson Health Care as moot for the reasons 
that follow. PageID: <pageID>
3 
 
No. 07-1227, 2007 WL 2406789, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2007) (citation omitted). After 
considering Plaintiff’s monthly income, lack of assets, and his monthly expenses, the Court 
finds he cannot pay the court fees and grants his virtually identical applications to proceed 
IFP. See [Filer Docket No. 1-2; N.J. Parole Board Docket No. 1-2; Jefferson Health Care Docket 
No. 1-1.] 
II. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL 
When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims that are: (1) frivolous or malicious; 
(2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a 
defendant who is immune from such relief. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for 
failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 sets forth the general rules of pleading in federal 
court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. The Rule requires “a short and plain statement of the grounds 
for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. 8(a)(1)–(2). Subsection (d)(1) additionally requires that 
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. 8(d)(1). Plaintiff should not 
mistake Rule 8 as an empty formality. “Careful pleading … is not a matter of etiquette or 
housekeeping; it is necessary to provide defendants with notice of the claims asserted against 
them and the grounds upon which each claim rests so that they can properly frame an 
answer.” Foulke v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, No. 23-2543, 2024 WL 3568841, at *12 (D.N.J. July PageID: <pageID>
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29, 2024); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
Rule 12(b)(6) tests the factual and legally sufficiency of the allegations. To survive 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Court is not 
compelled to “credit either ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ in a complaint when 
deciding a motion to dismiss.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
While the Court must construe Plaintiff’s pro se filings liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 
U.S. 89, 94 (2007), he is not exempt from complying with these federal pleading standards, 
Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010); see Owens v. Armstrong, 171 F. Supp. 3d 
316, 328 (D.N.J. 2016) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 
2013)) (“Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, ‘pro se litigants still must 
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’”). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Three Complaints 
The Complaints before the Court progressively run afoul of Plaintiff’s pleading 
obligations. In Filer, Plaintiff allegedly suffered injury when Defendants unlawfully 
discharged him from Jefferson Hospital in Stratford, New Jersey, on September 26, 2024. See 
[Filer Docket No. 1-1, at 4–10 (“Filer Compl.”).] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his PageID: <pageID>
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Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, as well as New Jersey common law.2 [Id. at 5–6.] Plaintiff immediately runs into a 
jurisdictional defect with his state law claims. 
Federal courts have an independent obligation to address issues of subject matter 
jurisdiction sua sponte and may do so at any stage of the litigation. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 
2010); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). As “[t]he party asserting jurisdiction,” Plaintiff “bears the 
burden of showing that at all stages of the litigation the case is properly before the federal 
court.” In re Nat. Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Samuel–Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
Filer explicitly asserts diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, presumably for Plaintiff’s 
state law claims. [Filer Compl. 1.] Diversity jurisdiction requires (1) that “the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and (2) that 
it “is between citizens of different States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Section 1332(a) requires 
“complete diversity,” meaning that no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any 
defendant. Zambelli Fireworks, 592 F.3d at 419 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Svcs. Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005)). “A natural person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where he 
is domiciled.” Id. (quoting Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
“A corporation is a citizen both of the state where it is incorporated and of the state where it 
has its principal place of business.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)). 
Plaintiff, a New Jersey citizen, is suing four medical personnel (the “Individual 
 
2 Filer refers to the Fourth Amendment in passing, but there is no apparent infringement of 
those constitutional protections alleged. [Filer Compl. 5.] Assuming otherwise, a Fourth 
Amendment claim would fail for the reasons that follow. PageID: <pageID>
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Defendants”) and Jefferson Hospital (collectively, “Defendants”). [Filer Compl. 1–3.] 
Initially, Defendants’ citizenship is either unclear or contradictory. See [id.] For this reason 
alone Plaintiff fails to satisfactorily allege their citizenships and does not sustain his burden 
to show complete diversity. In re Nat. Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 775 F.3d at 
574. As best the Court can discern, moreover, each of the four Individual Defendants reside 
in New Jersey and Defendant Jefferson Hospital is incorporated under the laws of New 
Jersey. See [Filer Compl. 2.] If Defendants are truly New Jersey citizens under prevailing law, 
then Plaintiff cannot rely on diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Zambelli Fireworks, 
592 F.3d at 419. And, for Plaintiff’s edification, alleging that he is “not sure of” a given 
defendant’s citizenship is inadequate. [Filer Compl. 3.] 
Liberal construction of the Filer Complaint does encompass federal question 
jurisdiction though as Plaintiff’s § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim arises under the 
Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This, in turn, could also provide the Court with 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See id. § 1367(a). Section 1983 imposes 
liability over parties who deprive a person of a federal constitutional or statutory right “under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The statute’s “under color of law” requirement is the “equivalent of state action.” Leshko v. 
Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) 
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)) (“The ultimate issue in 
determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in 
cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights 
‘fairly attributable to the State?’”). 
To avoid dismissal of his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must plead enough facts to show that PageID: <pageID>
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he suffered a deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights at the hand of a state actor. Leshko, 
423 F.3d at 339. State action exists where: “‘the private entity has exercised powers that are 
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state’; (2) ‘the private party has acted with the 
help of or in concert with state officials’; or (3) ‘the [s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a 
position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint 
participant in the challenged activity.’” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
The Filer Complaint passes none of these tests, even liberally. Plaintiff “bald[ly] 
assert[s],” Evancho, 423 F.3d at 351, that Defendants “acted under color of state law,” [Filer 
Compl. 5]. The Court cannot reasonably infer state action from such a boilerplate allegation. 
What Plaintiff depicts is certainly conduct committed by private parties that does not fall 
under § 1983’s purview. The Court will therefore dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s § 1983 
claim. Because Plaintiff’s federal claim fails—and is the only source of ascertainable original 
jurisdiction—the Court “must decline” to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law claims and also dismiss them without prejudice at this early stage in the 
litigation. Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 266 n.6 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 
F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[W]here [a court] dismisses the federal claims prior to trial or 
at the early stages of the litigation, it ‘must decline’ to exercise jurisdiction over the state law 
claims ‘unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness’ justify retaining 
that jurisdiction.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 
Plaintiff is always free to bring his state law claims in state court, although this Court 
makes no finding as to the merits or procedural posture of these claims. For the reasons 
above, the Court will dismiss the Filer Complaint without prejudice for want of federal subject PageID: <pageID>
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matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 
(ii). 
Next, while the Complaint in Jefferson Health Care ostensibly sets forth a federal 
question under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522a (the “Act”), Plaintiff fails to state a 
claim thereunder. “The Privacy Act ‘governs the government’s collection and dissemination 
of information and maintenance of its records [and] generally allows individuals to gain 
access to government records on them and to request correction of inaccurate records.’” Kates 
v. King, 487 F. App’x 704, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Perry v. Bureau of Prisons, 371 F.3d 1304, 
1304–05 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Act provides that “[w]henever any agency” fails to comply 
with any provision of the statute, “the individual may bring a civil action against the agency.” 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1). An “agency” under the Act “includes any executive department, 
military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other 
establishment in the executive branch of the Government ... or any independent regulatory 
agency.” Banda v. Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 17-5475, 2009 WL 1561442, at 
*2 (D.N.J. May 29, 2009) (quoting id. § 552(f)(1)). The Act, therefore, does not authorize suit 
against individual employees of an agency. Kates, 487 F. App’x at 706 (citing Martinez v. 
Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
As a threshold matter, the Jefferson Health Care Complaint sets forth no allegations that 
Defendants Jefferson Health Care of Multiple State and Christina Carti are governmental 
actors (nor, to the Court’s understanding, could it), let alone an “agency” as defined under 
the Act. See [Jefferson Health Care Docket No. 1, at 1–2 (“Jefferson Health Care Compl.”).] And 
even assuming otherwise, the Act would not permit suit against individual Defendant Carti. 
Kates, 487 F. App’x at 706. These defects alone compel dismissal for failure to state a claim. PageID: <pageID>
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See, e.g., Walsh v. Krantz, 386 F. App’x 334, 336 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming 
12(b)(6) dismissal of Privacy Act claims “against the School District and Cathcart because the 
Act applies only to federal agencies.”). In any event, Plaintiff practically sets forth no 
allegations to substantiate his claims, “bald[ly] assert[ing],” Evancho, 423 F.3d at 351, that 
Defendants “obtain[ed] [his] records under false pretenses” and committed an “unauthorized 
disclosure of records,” [Jefferson Health Care Compl. 2]. 
“Taken together, the Complaint in its current form simply would not provide any 
meaningful opportunity for [a proper defendant] to decipher or answer the vague allegations 
levied against them, under the Privacy Act or otherwise.” Lewis v. Zoll Med. Corp., No. 19-
19231, 2020 WL 2190435, at *3 (D.N.J. May 6, 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Court will therefore dismiss the Jefferson Health Care Complaint without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).3 
Finally, the Complaint in N.J. Parole Board is simply incomprehensible. Plaintiff only 
intelligible identifies the five Defendants: New Jersey Attorney General Jennifer Davenport, 
New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill, Executive Director of the New Jersey Parole Board 
Dina Rogers, Chairman of the New Jersey Parole Board Samuel Plumeri, Jr., and the New 
Jersey Parole Board. See [N.J. Parole Board Docket Nos. 1 (“N.J. Parole Board Compl.”), 1-1.] 
 
3 Insofar as Plaintiff seeks a criminal prosecution against the Jefferson Health Care Defendants 
for violating the Privacy Act, see [Jefferson Health Care Compl. 1–2], a private citizen lacks “a 
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Leeke v. 
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1981) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 
(1973)). This means that Plaintiff cannot “take law enforcement into [his] own hands” to 
enforce federal criminal law. United States v. Panza, 381 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (W.D. Pa. 1974) 
(citations omitted). Rather, “the United States Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of 
all criminal cases within his or her district.” United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1539 (3d 
Cir. 1996). And “the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring 
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 
U.S. 456, 464 (1996). PageID: <pageID>
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What Plaintiff is suing them for and in what capacity is truly unclear. Plaintiff apparently 
alleges that Defendants have failed to honor an unspecified settlement stemming from an 
unexplained grant of postconviction relief. See [N.J. Parole Board Compl., Docket No. 1-1.] 
But the Court whispers in the dark, not liberally constructs. Plaintiff falls far short of his Rule 
8 pleading obligations and consequently fails to state a claim. Simply put, the Court cannot 
discern the claims alleged, against whom these claims are specifically alleged, the supporting 
factual allegations, and, consequently, subject matter jurisdiction. The Court will dismiss the 
N.J. Parole Board Complaint without prejudice for not abiding by Rule 8, and for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) 
and (ii). 
B. The Filer Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel 
In Filer, Plaintiff seeks the appointment of pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 
because it “is [his] first motion for pro bono [counsel] which will help to close my case.” [Filer 
Docket No. 12, at 3.] The Third Circuit has outlined a “two-step process” for district courts 
to follow when exercising their discretionary authority under § 1915(g) to appoint counsel in 
civil matters. Houser v. Folino, 927 F.3d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 2019). “First, ‘the district court 
must consider as a threshold matter the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.’” Id. (quoting Tabron 
v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993)). “Second, ‘[i]f the district court determines that the 
plaintiff’s claim has arguable merit in fact and law, the court should then consider a number 
of additional factors that bear on the need for appointed counsel.” Id. As explained above, 
the Court will be dismissing the Filer Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
failure to state a claim pursuant. Finding no arguable merit in either fact or law as a threshold PageID:
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matter, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel without 
prejudice at this time in Filer. 
C. Leave to Amend 
In light of the prolific defects adumbrated above, Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days 
from the entry of this Memorandum Order to explain why this Court should grant him leave 
to file amended complaints in these three cases. Should Plaintiff not show cause, the Court 
could dismiss the Complaint in each case with prejudice, depending on the deficiency. If, 
however, he chooses to do so, Plaintiff should file each explanation on the respective docket 
and, in so doing, be very mindful of several things. 
First, Plaintiff must fulfill his obligation to assure this Court of its subject matter 
jurisdiction. In re Nat. Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 775 F.3d at 574. That, in 
most instances, comes the way of diversity or federal question jurisdiction. Of course, the 
establishment of subject matter jurisdiction requires discernible allegations and claims, thus 
its lack in N.J. Parole Board. And, based on the assertions in Filer, diversity jurisdiction appears 
inapplicable because Defendants share New Jersey citizenship with Plaintiff. 
Second, while federal question jurisdiction pursuant to § 1983 presumptively takes 
root in Filer, § 1983 imposes liability for state action, not for a private dispute. This confusion 
is to be expected from a pro se litigant untrained in the law, but not from an individual recently 
instructed by this very Court in what was effectively an identical lawsuit. About a year and a 
half ago, Plaintiff, proceeding IFP, tried to bring § 1983 claims against the same four 
Individual Defendants for the discharge incident at Jefferson Hospital. See Edwards v. Filer, 
No. 24-10205, 2025 WL 278424, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2025). Then, as now, this Court 
walked through § 1983 and its state-action limitation, finding that Plaintiff did not allege “any PageID:
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facts suggesting the existence of a state action by Defendants.” Id. at *3. Accordingly, the 
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims without prejudice and permitted the filing of a 
curative amended complaint. Id. at *4. Plaintiff elected not to do so; instead, he has now 
beset the Court with the same defective allegations in a new lawsuit a year on. The Court 
appreciates the burdens imposed by self-representation, but will not brook the reassertion of 
frivolous claims at the expense of other litigants in one of the nation’s busiest dockets. 
Similarly, Plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims against Defendants in Jefferson Health Care appear 
incurable for that suit’s private nature. 
“The ability to proceed IFP is a privilege, not a constitutional right.” Dunlap v. N.J. 
Transit Police, No. 25-16972, 2026 WL 854113, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2026) (citing Abdul-
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc)). For this reason, the Court 
warns Plaintiff that while the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, authorizes him to proceed as 
such, this Court possesses “the discretionary authority to deny in forma pauperis status to 
persons who have abused the privilege.” See Aruanno v. Davis, 168 F. Supp. 3d 711, 714–15 
(D.N.J. 2016) (collecting cases); see also Simpson v. Dep’t of Trans., No. 21-01613, 2022 WL 
617116, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2022) (“Even in cases where an indigent defendant is a non-
prisoner, courts have found abuse of the in forma pauperis privilege to be grounds for 
revocation.”) (collecting cases). 
Relevant here is the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA’s”) “three strike rule,” 
which applies equally to non-prisoners proceeding IFP like Plaintiff. The rule “limits a 
[litigant’s] ability to proceed [IFP] if [he] abuses the judicial system by filing frivolous PageID:
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actions.”4 McKelvie, 239 F.3d at 312; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Aruanno, 168 F. Supp. 3d 
at 715 (“[T]he adoption of a judicial limitation in Aruanno’s cases mirroring the PLRA’s 
‘three strikes’ provision applicable to prisoners and including its ‘imminent danger’ exception 
is necessary to create a uniform policy denying the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis to 
abusive litigants and to allocate this Court’s resources in a way that promotes the interest of 
justice.”); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam) (denying IFP status to a non-
prisoner based on the need to deter litigants from filing frivolous petitions). 
“[A] strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the entire action or appeal is (1) 
dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a claim’ or (2) 
dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to dismissals for such 
reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Byrd v. Shannon, 
715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in 
law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 
F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). For the reasons above, Plaintiffs’ three Complaints are either 
frivolous and fail to state a claim, or hue closely to it. Plaintiff should take heed of these 
precepts and the discussion above when crafting his explanations to file an amended 
complaint, if he so chooses. 
 
4 The pertinent section of the PLRA provides that: “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil 
action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner 
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an 
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). PageID:
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS, on this 16th day of June 2026, hereby: 
1. ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP applications [Docket Nos. 1-2] in Edwards v. Filer, No. 
26-625; Edwards v. N.J. Parole Board, No. 26-1611; and Edwards v. Jefferson Health Care 
of Multiple State, No. 26-4607, are GRANTED; and it is further 
2. ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall SEAL the Complaints [Docket Nos. 1] 
in Edwards v. Filer, No. 26-625; Edwards v. N.J. Parole Board, No. 26-1611; and Edwards 
v. Jefferson Health Care of Multiple State, No. 26-4607, because attached to each 
Complaint are Plaintiff’s personal medical records and private information; and it is 
further 
3. ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel [Docket No. 12] in 
Edwards v. Filer, No. 26-625, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further 
4. ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5] in Edwards v. Jefferson 
Health Care of Multiple State, No. 26-4607, is DENIED AS MOOT and WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE; and it is further 
5. ORDERED that the Complaints [Docket Nos. 1] in Edwards v. Filer, No. 26-625; 
Edwards v. N.J. Parole Board, No. 26-1611; and Edwards v. Jefferson Health Care of Multiple 
State, No. 26-4607, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further 
6. ORDERED that Plaintiff shall, if he elects to do so, SHOW CAUSE on each 
respective docket within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Memorandum Order 
explaining why this Court should grant him leave to file an amended complaint in 
each of his three cases; and it is further PageID:
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7. ORDERED that if Plaintiff chooses not to show cause, then the Court could, 
depending on the deficiency, dismiss the respective Complaint with prejudice; and 
Plaintiff is further 
8. WARNED about his obligations proceeding IFP and that any future complaint filed 
in that capacity deemed by this Court to be frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim, 
or seeking monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief shall 
result in a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and it is finally 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mail Plaintiff a copy of this 
Memorandum Order at his mailing address of record. 
 
 
 /s/ Renée Marie Bumb 
 Renée Marie Bumb 
 Chief United States District Judge PageID:
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