govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-12758-0

1 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
 
COLUMBUS LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
v. 
JC MARKETING PARTNERS, INC., et al. 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 25-12758
 
 
OPINION 
 
June 16, 2026 
 
 
SEMPER, District Judge. 
 THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant 
Jenny Cheng, M.D. (“Dr. Cheng” or “Defendant”) on September 19, 2025. (ECF 19, “Motion” or 
“Mot.”)1 Defendant seeks dismissal of the six counts asserted against her for alleged violations of 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) 2, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (Count 
I); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), conspiracy to violate RICO (Count II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:33A, the New 
Jersey Insurance Fraud Protection Act (“N.J.I.F.P.A.”) (Count V); fraud (Count VI); tortious 
 
1 Dr. Christopher Wang, M.D., also filed an untimely motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on 
November 18, 2025, asserting essentially the same arguments as Dr. Cheng. (ECF 28.) Dr. Wang’s 
motion was filed pro se, and he is since represented by an attorney. However, counsel for Dr. 
Wang has not requested leave to amend the motion filed on November 18. Therefore, the Court’s 
analysis and rulings on Dr. Cheng’s Motion apply to Dr. Wang as well. 
 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides , in relevant part, that “[a]ny person injured in his business or 
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any 
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the 
cost of the suit ….” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). PageID:
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interference (Count VII); and unjust enrichment (Count VIII). (ECF 1, “Complaint” or “Compl.”) 
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 
12(b)(6), arguing Plaintiff fails to adequately plead facts connecting her to the alleged scheme. 
(See generally Mot.) Cheng also seeks dismissal of the RICO claims on the grounds that Plaintiff 
fails to meet the heightened pleading standard to allege predicate acts under Rule 9(b). (Id.) This 
Motion was decided upon the submissions of the parties, without oral argument, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, 
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3 
Columbus Life Insurance Company “Columbus Life” offers life insurance policies to 
individuals, families, and businesses looking to protect themselves from loss. (Compl. ¶ 20.) 
Columbus Life uses a national network of independent representatives, producers, and general 
agencies to find individuals who need a life insurance policy. (Id. ¶ 21.) In 2016, Defendants Jun 
Rong Chen (“Chen”) and Cui Cui Fang (“Fang”) presented themselves to Columbus Life as 
legitimate life insurance producers who owned the company Golden Cove Financial Group, Inc. 
(“Golden Cove”). (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.) Columbus Life and Golden Cove entered into a Producing General 
Agent Agreement (“PGA Agreement”) in which Golden Cove was appointed as a general agent of 
Columbus Life with authority “to solicit and submit business through Gol den Cove’s affiliated 
 
3 The facts and procedural history are derived from the Complaint (“Compl.”) When considering 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is obligated to accept as true allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Rocks v. City of Phila., 
868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court also considers any “document integral to or explicitly 
relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997). Finally, the Court considers matters of public record and undisputedly authentic 
documents attached to Defendant’s motion to dismiss if Plaintiff’s claims are based on the 
document. See Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group LLC , 902 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 
2018). PageID:
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network of producers.” ( Id. ¶ 23.) Golden Cove received commissions when individuals they 
produced entered into policies with Columbus Life. ( Id.) On July 11, 2018, JMC Insurance 
Network, Inc. (“JMC Ins.”) succeeded Golden Cove under the PGA Agreement. ( Id. ¶ 25.) On 
March 8, 2024, JC Marketing Partners, Inc. (“ JC Marketing ”) succeeded JMC Ins. under the 
agreement. ( Id.) Fang and Chen allegedly collaborated with an extensive network of licensed 
insurance producers to procure policies for Columbus Life on behalf of JC Marketing. (Id. ¶¶ 6-
13.) These individuals include Jason Huang, Jannett Yang, Bi Jin Chen, Feng Zeng Chen, Min 
Juan Chen, Bang Liu, Yan Ping You, Hng Yan Zhang (collectively, “the Independent Producers”). 
(Id.) 
Plaintiff claims that between 2016 and 2024, Fang and Chen submitted almost 600 life 
insurance applications to Columbus Life through Gol den Cove, JMC Ins., and JC Marketing, 
which resulted in the issuing of approximately 250 policies worth over $160 million. (Id. ¶ 26.) 
Plaintiff alleges these policies resulted in over $5 million in commission for Fang, Chen, and the 
Independent Producers. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that while JC Marketing presented itself as 
legitimate insurance professionals, the company “routinely and systematically conspired with 
others, like Dr. [Christopher] Wang and Dr. [Jenny] Cheng … in order to defraud life insurance 
carriers, including but not limited to Columbus Life.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges JC Marketing targeted 
Chinese nationals who recently immigrated to the United States, and forged documents to present 
these individuals as healthy , high- net worth business professionals eligible for expensive life 
insurance policies. (Id. ¶ 33.) With respect to Drs. Cheng and Wang, Plaintiff alleges the doctors 
“conspired with Defendants to submit fraudulent medical records to Columbus Life in support of 
life insurance applications submitted through JC Marketing and its predecessors.” (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) 
Plaintiff claims this conduct included conspiring with JC Marketing to submit medical paperwork PageID:
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that falsely reflected medical appointments and procedures that never occurred or were fabricated 
to reflect inaccurate results. (Id. ¶ 48.) According to Plaintiff, Golden Cove, JMC Ins., JC 
Marketing, Fang, Chen, Dr. Cheng, Dr. Wang, and the Independent Producers form an association-
in-fact enterprise, the “JC Marketing Enterprise,” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4) and 
1962(c). (Id. ¶ 75.) 
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 3, 2025. ( Compl.) Dr. Cheng moved to dismiss on 
September 19, 2026. (Mot.) Plaintiff opposed on November 17, 2025. (ECF 27, “Opposition” or 
“Opp.”) Dr. Cheng replied on November 24, 2025. (ECF 31, “Reply.”)4 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint for failing “to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted” as required by Rule 8(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 8(a). 
For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter 
to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility 
standard “does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 
780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a plaintiff 
 
4 Dr. Wang filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on November 18, 2025. (ECF 28, “Wang 
Motion” or “Wang Mot.”) Plaintiff opposed Dr. Wang’s Motion on December 22, 2025. (ECF 34, 
“Wang Opposition” or “Wang Opp.”) Because Dr. Wang’s briefs make essentially the same 
arguments as Dr. Cheng’s brief, his filings are not cited in this Opinion. PageID:
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must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of 
[his] claims.” Id. at 789. 
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 
Phillips v. Ctny. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is “not 
compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions 
disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). If, after 
viewing the allegations in the complaint most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that no relief 
could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., No. 10-2945, 2010 
WL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010). 
B. Pleading a RICO claim under the Rule 9(b) Standard 
The text of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To prove a claim under § 1962(c), a plaintiff first must show “ (1) conduct 
(2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 
2004)). The first two elements are evaluated under the Rule 8(a) pleading standard described 
above. See Bell v. Dave, No. 21-11816, 2022 WL 2667017, *6 (D.N.J. July 11, 2026). The Court 
now clarifies the pleading standard for elements three and four, which requires a plaintiff to allege 
racketeering activity under the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). Id. PageID:
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The RICO statute defines a pattern of racketeering activity as “at least two acts of 
racketeering activity … within 10 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). These two acts are known as 
“predicate acts” or “predicate offenses.” See Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“[N]o defendant can be liable under RICO unless he participated in two or more predicate 
offenses sufficient to constitute a pattern.”). When the predicate acts asserted are mail and wire 
fraud, as in this case, “plaintiffs are subject to the heightened pleading standard for fraud set forth 
in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which states that ‘a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud.’” Hlista v. Safeguard Properties, LLC, 649 F. App’x 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Rule 9(b)). However, “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally.” Accordingly, Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff allege “all of the 
essential factual background that would accompany the first paragraph of any newspaper story—
that is, the who, what, when, where, and how of the events at issue.’” U.S. ex rel. Bookwalter v. 
UPMC, 946 F.3d 162, 176 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Moore & Co., P .A. v. Majestic Blue 
Fisheries, LLC , 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016)). Therefore, Plaintiff must plead with 
particularity at least two instances of fraud committed by Defendant to satisfy elements three and 
four of a civil RICO claim. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. RICO Claim (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) (Count I) 
Count I alleges RICO violations against all Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
(Compl. ¶¶ 75, 76.) Dr. Cheng argues Plaintiff failed to adequately plead facts showing she 
“participated in the alleged enterprise or engaged in racketeering activity.” (Mot. at 7.) She also 
asserts Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege fraud as a predicate act under Rule 9(b). (Reply at 8.) 
Plaintiff argues the allegations in the Complaint against Dr. Cheng are sufficient to establish her PageID:
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involvement in the JC Marketing Enterprise, and Defendant cannot dispute the existence of the 
enterprise. (Opp. at 6- 7.) The Court will first analyze whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 
Defendant participated in two predicate acts of fraud. 
Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to meet the Rule 9(b) standard in alleging mail and wire 
fraud because the paragraphs in the Complaint pertaining to fraud either fail to mention Defendant, 
or only assert conclusions unsupported by facts . (Mot. at 19.) Plaintiff argues the Complaint 
satisfies the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) because it alleged the “scheme uses mail 
and wire communications” and Defendant is a vital part of the scheme, despite not physically being 
the one to mail the falsified documents to Columbus Life. (Opp. at 11.) The Court finds Plaintiff 
failed to show Defendant engaged in mail or wire fraud with the requisite particularity. 
To plead wire fraud as a predicate act, a plaintiff must show “(1) the existence of a scheme 
to defraud; (2) the use of the mails … in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme; and (3) culpable 
participation by the defendant, that is, participation by the defendant with specific intent to 
defraud.” U.S. v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has adequately plead facts 
showing the existence of a fraudulent scheme which used electronic communications to defraud 
it. (Opp. at 11.) However, the Complaint fails to plead facts showing Defendant participated in 
the falsification of the records sent to Columbus Life for the purpose of furthering the scheme. As 
noted by the court in Dobson, “the relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant acted knowingly 
in making any misstatement, but whether she did so with respect to the overarching fraudulent 
scheme.” Dobson, 419 F.3d at 237. It is insufficient to allege misrepresentations were made to 
Columbus Life without specifying the nature or subject of the alleged fraud. See Hlista, 649 F. 
App’x at 221. (“[T]he plaintiff must plead or allege the date, time and place of the alleged fraud PageID:
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or otherwise inject precision or some measure of substantiation into a fraud allegation.”) (quoting 
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
Plaintiff argues it has “adequately pled common law fraud against Dr. Cheng even under 
the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).” (Opp. at 17.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff 
failed to satisfy the Rule 9(b) standard because the Complaint “rel[ies] instead only on blanket 
legal labels … while grouping Dr. Cheng with the other defendants and their actions.” (Reply at 
8.) In support of the fraud allegations against Defendant, Plaintiff cites to Paragraphs 1, 47, 48, 
68, 70, and 82(g). (Opp. at 17.) The Paragraphs are presented in relevant part below: 
Paragraph 1: …JC Marketing and the other Defendants formed an illegal enterprise 
and used it to abuse Columbus Life’s confidences by, among other things, 
intentionally submitting fraudulent applications, falsifying medical records, and 
falsifying signatures ... Defendants’ fraudulent conduct breached JC Marketing’s 
contract and its affiliated producers’ contracts with Columbus Life. Moreover, 
Defendants’ conduct violates the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 
(“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961- 1968, the New Jersey Insurance Fraud 
Prevention Act, N.J.S.A. 17:33A, et seq., and has resulted in Defendants being 
unjustly enriched at Columbus Life’s expense. 
Paragraph 47: In order to place larger face -amount policies, Fang, Chen, Huang, 
and Yang also regularly conspired with physicians, including Dr. Wang and Dr. 
Cheng, to create and submit falsified records of primary care visits to Columbus 
Life. 
Paragraph 48: In fact, Yong Liang, Dr. Cheng, Dr. Wang, and other third parties 
routinely conspired with Defendants to submit falsified medical records to 
Columbus Life—e.g., that purposefully described medical examinations, tests, and 
visits that either n ever took place, or were falsified in order to defraud Columbus 
Life into issuing policies it would not otherwise issue. 
Paragraph 68: …Fang electronically submitted medical records to Columbus Life 
purporting to reflect that Yue Yin Zheng sat for a paramedical examination by Yong 
Liang on or around December 11, 2022, and that Yue Ying Zheng received regular 
primary care checkups by Dr. Cheng in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, which 
records Fang, Yang, Yong Liang and Dr. Cheng knew to be falsified—i.e., because 
they described physical exams some or all of which never took place and/or did not 
accurately describe Yue Yin Zheng’s health … Yue Yin Zheng was not seen by Dr. 
Cheng as indicated (the records appear falsified). PageID:
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Paragraph 70: …On August 29, 2019, Yan Ping You faxed Columbus Life medical 
records purporting to reflect visits by Zuogun Shi with his primary care physician, 
Dr. Cheng, in 2018 and 2019, which Yan Ping You (and Dr. Cheng) knew to be 
falsified—because some or all of those visits did not take place and/or the records 
did not accurately describe Zuogun Shi’s health. … Zuogun Shi was not under the 
regular care of Dr. Cheng (the records appear falsified). 
Paragraph 82(g): Dr. Cheng served as the purported primary care physician in 
connection with at least a dozen JC Marketing policies and, in doing so, knowingly 
and actively misrepresented and falsified the insureds’ health information and 
medical records. 
(See Compl. ¶¶ 15, 28, 47, 48, 68, 70, 75, 76, 82(g).) The six paragraphs listed above are primarily 
composed of conclusory allegations against Dr. Cheng. Paragraph 1 does not mention Dr. Cheng 
and provides a general overview of the claims included in the Complaint rather than specific 
allegations that Dr. Cheng committed mail or wire fraud. (Id. ¶ 1). Paragraphs 47 and 48 rely on 
the conclusory assertion that Dr. Cheng “conspired” with the co-defendants, or the co-defendants 
conspired with her. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 48.) Simply alleging a defendant “conspired” with others, without 
more is a conclusory statement that fails even the less stringent Rule 8(a) pleading standard, let 
alone Rule 9(b) . See Saucedo v. J. Fletcher Creamer & Sons, Inc ., No. 19- 00247, 2022 WL 
22896092, at *4 (D.N.J. July 25, 2022) (holding a complaint that alleged “Defendants also violated 
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d) by conspiring with others” without additional facts, failed to sufficiently plead 
a RICO conspiracy); see also, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] bare assertion of conspiracy will 
not suffice.”); Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We further reject 
bare statements that the Defendants purportedly ‘conspired and agreed among themselves[.]’”). 
Plaintiff’s Complaint is not saved by the fact several paragraphs allege Defendant 
conspired with the JC Marketing Enterprise to submit fraudulent or falsified medical records 
regarding specific policies. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 68, 70, 82(g).) Defendant is roped into the conduct of 
Fang, Chen, and the Independent Producers without facts showing Defendant knew the records 
were falsified or Defendant engaged in the falsification. ( Id. ¶¶ 68, 70.) These barebone PageID:
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allegations do not inform the Court of enough facts to raise the allegations above a speculative 
level. Paragraph 82(g) is the only paragraph to state with certainty that it was actually Dr. Cheng 
who falsified documents—the rest of the paragraphs leave the possibility open that it was Fang, 
Chen, or one of the Independent Producers who actually falsified information. (See id. ¶¶ 15, 28, 
47, 48, 65, 68, 70). Still, Paragraph 82(g)’s allegation that Defendant “knowingly and actively 
misrepresented and falsified the insured’s health information and medical records,” (id ¶82), fails 
Rule 9(b) because there is no allegation of what medical information was falsified. “[A] plaintiff 
must plead or allege the date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or 
some measure of substantiation into a fraud allegation.” Hlista, 649 F. App’x at 221. These 
allegations also fail to demonstrate Defendant had a role in directing the affairs of JC Marketing. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to include “facts to support the conclusion that Dr. Cheng 
failed altogether to perform exams or else misreported her findings.”5 (See Mot. at 10.) The Court 
accepts as true that the documents were misreported, but no facts suggest this was done by Dr. 
Cheng. This is materially different from the allegations asserted against the Independent 
Producers, who Plaintiff alleges entered into contractual agreements with Columbus Life, 
submitted life insurance policies through JC Marketing, and received commissions for their 
dishonest services. (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26.) 
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant knew medical records submitted to Columbus Life 
were false, (id. ¶¶ 68, 70) , fail to satisfy any pleading standard. I t is true that Rule 9(b) allows 
 
5 Additionally, this Circuit has held that professionals who perform their own services, even if later 
found to be deficient, do not necessarily open themselves to liability under the RICO statute. See 
In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 371 (“[T]he Supreme Court found that an outside 
accounting firm did not ‘conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct’ of a farmer 
cooperative’s affairs when it prepared and presented audit reports … that allegedly failed to 
disclose all of the information necessary to assess the solvency of the cooperative.”). PageID:
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knowledge to be plead generally , however, the Rule does not dispose of the requirement that 
knowledge must satisfy the Rule 8(a) pleading standard. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 (“Rule 9(b) 
requires particularity when pleading fraud or mistake, while allowing … knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally. But ‘generally’ is a relative term. In the 
context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the particularity requirement applicable to fraud or 
mistake.”) (cleaned up). Under this standard, Plaintiff still has the burden of pleading facts that 
bring allegations of knowledge above a speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court 
concludes that the allegations that Defendant knew JC Marketing submitted false medical 
documents or falsified them herself are too speculative to satisfy Rule 9(b). Thus, Plaintiff fails to 
establish that Defendant engaged in two predicate acts of fraud, and cannot establish a RICO claim 
against Defendant. Count I of the Complaint must be DISMISSED without prejudice against 
Defendant.
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B. RICO Conspiracy Claim (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) (Count II) 
In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant conspired to violate § 1962(c) 
“[b]y and through each of Defendants’ close business and contractual relationships with one 
another, and their close coordination in the affairs of the Enterprise.” (Compl. ¶ 97.) Defendant 
argues it is impossible for Plaintiff to establish a § 1962(d) claim when a § 1962(c) claim has not 
been pled. (Mot. at 20.) Plaintiff argues Count II is well-pled, and the Complaint “describes the 
general composition of the conspiracy” in which Defendant had an “instrumental” role by serving 
 
6 Since Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate fraud under Rule 9(b), Count V I of the Complaint 
alleging fraud by all Defendants is dismissed against Dr. Cheng. Because the allegations against 
Dr. Wang are essentially identical to the allegations against Dr. Cheng, Count s I and V I are 
dismissed against Dr. Wang as well. All claims that are dismissed against Dr. Cheng are also 
dismissed against Dr. Wang. PageID:
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as the purported “primary care physician in connection with at least a dozen JC Marketing 
Policies.” (Opp. at 14- 15.) Plaintiff also notes that this Circuit has held that a court need not 
always find a defendant violated § 1962(c) to establish a conspiracy claim. (Id.) 
The Court agrees that a conspiracy claim can sometimes stand without a violation of 
§ 1962(c). See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, No. 04-5184, 2007 WL 1062980, at *14 
(D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2007) (“[A] particular defendant need not have violated the substantive provision 
in order to be liable himself or herself under the conspiracy provision, so long as some other 
defendant is liable under the substantive provision.”) . In Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 
2001), the Third Circuit clarified that a § 1962(d) claim may proceed against a defendant who has 
not been shown to commit a predicate act if a co -defendant is held liable under the substantive 
RICO provision, “ a RICO conspiracy defendant need not himself commit or agree to commit 
predicate acts … one who opts into or participates in a conspiracy is liable for the acts of his co -
conspirators which violate section 1962(c) even if the defendant did not personally agree to do, or 
to conspire with respect to, any particular element.” However, to be liable under § 1962(d), the 
defendant must have “purposefully and knowingly directed at facilitating a criminal pattern of 
racketeering activity” even if they do not satisfy every element of the substantive provision. Knit 
With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 08-4221, 2011 WL 891871, at *9 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2011), 
aff’d sub nom. The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., 625 F. App’x 27 (3d Cir. 2015). As previously 
discussed, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show Defendant’s knowledge of the scheme 
or that the medical records in question were falsified. Therefore, the conspiracy claim under 
§ 1962(d) cannot stand, and must be DISMISSED without prejudice. PageID:
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C. N.J.I.F.P.A. Claim (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:33A) (Count V) 
Defendant argues that if Plaintiff fails to establish a federal claim under § 1962, the Court 
must dismiss the claims asserted under state law. (Mot. at 20.) Defendant claims that the state law 
claims should be dismissed because the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the claims, and 
the considerations of judicial economy weigh against retaining jurisdiction. (Id. at 20-21.) 
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Court need not rely on supplemental jurisdiction in 
this matter. Plaintiff states in the Opposition that there is complete diversity in this matter because 
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, Columbus Life is a corporate citizen of Ohio, and no 
defendants in this matter defeat complete diversity. (Opp. at 16.) These facts are also asserted in 
the Complaint. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 17.) Defendant presents no other basis to dismiss the N.J.I.F.P.A. 
claims in the Motion or Reply. ( See generally Mot., Reply.) Therefore, Defendant’s M otion to 
Dismiss Count V of the Complaint is hereby DENIED. 
D. Tortious Interference Claim (Count VII) 
Defendant argues that Count VII must be dismissed against her because the Complaint fails 
to specify which tortious acts she specifically performed through improper group pleading. (Mot. 
at 23.) Plaintiff responds that the tortious interference claim is well- pled against Defendant 
because the Complaint allege s “the Defendants – which include Dr. Cheng – had knowledge of 
those contracts and intentionally induced breaches by participating in the scheme.” (Opp. at 19.) 
The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim of tortious interference. 
Count VII of the Complaint relies heavily on group pleading. (Compl. ¶ 150.) “Defendants 
intentionally, maliciously, foreseeably, directly, and proximately, without justification, and through 
illegal means induced and facilitated the Independent Producer s’ breaches of their contract ….” PageID:
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(Id.) Count VII also relies on portions of the Complaint th at this Court has already held fail to 
state a claim against Defendant because no facts support she had knowledge of the Enterprise or 
actually falsified medical records. (Opp. at 19, citing to Compl. ¶¶ 47-48, 68, 70, 82(g), 146, and 
150.) This Court has held that complaints that “refer to the actions of ‘Defendants’ generally, and 
do not otherwise provide enough information to satisfy Rule 8 ” must be dismissed. Chamblin 
Grp. Real Est. Ventures LLC v. Pina, No. 23- 22655, 2025 WL 1135223, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 
2025); see also, Freeman v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC , No. 24- 8181, 2025 WL1248935, at *3 
(D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2025) (dismissing an a mended complaint because it “fail[ed] to specify any of 
Defendants’ misconduct with enough specificity … [i]nstead, the Amended Complaint exclusively 
feature[ed] group pleading”). 
Plaintiff’s argument that “[Defendant’s] falsified records were essential to the placement 
of the policies that breached the Independent Producers’ contractual obligations” is unavailing. 
(Opp. at 19.) Paragraph 82(g) alleges Defendant helped the JC Marketing Enterprise submit “at 
least a dozen” policies to Columbus Life out of allegedly 600, about 250 of which actually resulted 
in policies being established. The Court is not persuaded these allegations show Defendant’s 
alleged conduct was “instrumental” to the scheme. (See Compl. ¶¶ 26, 82(g).) Therefore, Count 
VII of the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant. 
E. Unjust Enrichment Claim (Count VII) 
Similar to the tortious interference claim, Plaintiff asserts it has “conferred benefits on Dr. 
Cheng” and that Dr. Cheng has “retained the benefits of … participation [in the JC Marketing 
Enterprise] and financial advantages of continued involvement” by relying on group pleading. 
(Opp. at 20; id. ¶¶ 152-57.) The heart of the unjust enrichment claim is that Defendant received 
“millions of dollars in commissions, the fruits of which have benefited all Defendants directly or PageID:
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indirectly.” (Compl. ¶ 153.) This allegation is adequate as to the JC Marketing Defendants, 
because Plaintiff specifically alleged and demonstrated through its exhibits that it entered contracts 
to provide JC Marketing with commissions. (See id. ¶¶ 23, 24, 31; ECF No. 1, Exhibits A-I.) 
However, Plaintiff has not shown, nor has it alleged with the required level of plausibility, 
that Defendant received payment out of the commissions offered to the JC Marketing Defendants 
or received any other form of payment . Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege a claim for unjust 
enrichment, which requires some showing of a benefit retained by the Defendant . See Stewart v. 
Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 (D.N.J. 2012) (“ To establish a claim 
for unjust enrichment under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show both that defendant received a 
benefit.”) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment must be DISMISSED without 
prejudice. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count VII is hereby GRANTED. 
IV . CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 19) is GRANTED as 
to Counts I, II, V , VII, and VIII. Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as to Count VI. Counts I, II, V , 
VII and VIII are hereby DISMISSED , without prejudice, against Dr. Cheng and Dr. Wang. 
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an a mended complaint within 30 days of this Opinion. An 
accompanying Order will follow. 
/s/ Jamel K. Semper . 
HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER 
United States District Judge 
 
 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Andre M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J. 
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