govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_25-cv-01665-2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
 
 
Chad Lee Monson, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
Renville County, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
No. 25-cv-1665 (KMM/DJF) 
 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the Court on De fendants Renville County and Ned Wohlman’s 
Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 10.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted. 
BACKGROUND 
 In 2018, after being convicted of various  federal firearm-related crimes, Plaintiff 
Chad Lee Monson was sentenced  to 36 months’ imprisonment  and a subsequent term of 
supervised release. (Dkt. 11 at 2.) In 2020, Mr. Monson was released from prison and 
placed at the Renville County Jail, where he participated in a residential reentry program. 
(Dkt. 41 at 2.) He alleges that during that time, Mr. Wohlman, who is the Renville County 
Jail administrator, as well as Scott Hable and Brenda Mort, 1 denied him access to an 
attorney and the Renville County Law Library. ( Id.) Mr. Monson also alleges that 
 
1 To be more precise, the Amended Complaint names “the United States Bureau of 
Prisons, Residential Re-entry Program per Brenda Mort” as a defendant. (Dkt. 41 at 1.) As 
noted below, the Court previously ordered dism issal of the claims against the “Bureau of 
Prisons Residential Reentry Program,” Brenda Mort, and Scott Hable as frivolous. To the 
extent that Mr. Monson seeks to add them as defendants by pleading the same allegations 
before the Court dismissed them, he is not permitted to do so. 
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Mr. Wohlman “discontinued all legal help, insurance claims, accounting meetings and law 
enforcement meetings,” and that Renville Co unty “refused to pe rmit federal prisoners 
access to the same[.]” (Id.) These are the entirety of his factual allegations.  
 In April 2025, Mr. Monson initiated th is action by filing a Complaint raising 
due-process claims under the Fifth and Fourte enth Amendments. (Dkt. 1 at 3.) Relevant 
here, the Court ordered dismissal of the claims against the “Bureau of Prisons Residential 
Reentry Program,” Brenda Mort, and Scott Habl e as frivolous. (Dkt. 4 at 4 ¶ 1.) It also 
dismissed Mr. Monson’s claims under the Fift h Amendment for failure to state a claim. 
(Id. ¶ 2.) The remaining claims were permitted to move forward for service of process. On 
October 27, 2025, Mr. Wohlman and the Renville County Jail filed the Motion to Dismiss 
that is currently before th e Court. (Dkt. 10.) However, after briefing on the Motion was 
complete, Mr. Monson retained counsel and moved to amend his Complaint, and he was 
permitted to do so. (Dkts. 38–39.)  
With very little explanation, the Amended Complaint alleges a “deprivation of civil 
rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments” 2 as to Mr. Wohlman 
and Mr. Hable, asserts a Bivens3 claim against the Bureau of Prisons, and contends that the 
County’s actions were “in violation of Monell.”4 (Dkt. 41 at 2 (cleaned up).) Mr. Monson 
further alleges that “[a]s a result of Defendants’ actions,” he “lost [his] home” and “suffered 
 
2 The Court understands Mr. Monson’s Fifth- and Fourteenth-Amendment claims 
to be restatements of the due-process claims raised in his original Complaint. 
3 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
4 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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a home robbery,” costing him over $1.1 million. ( Id. (cleaned up).) As remedies, 
Mr. Monson seeks “monetary relief against the individua l prisoners in excess of 
$1,000,000,” punitive damages, and injunctive relief requiring “the Bureau of Prisons and 
Renville County requiring them to permit federal prisoners to access attorneys and a law 
library.” (Id. at 2–3.)  
On April 9, 2026, the Court issued an order stating that  it would “treat the motion 
to dismiss the original complaint as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint” and took 
the Motion under advisement without requiri ng additional briefing. (Dkt. 42.) The Court 
addresses the Motion now. 
DISCUSSION 
To survive a motion to di smiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
allegations to state a claim to reli ef that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City of St. 
Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The allegations must “raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In appl ying this standard, courts mu st assume that all factual 
allegations in the complaint are true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cole v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc. , 105 
F.4th 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 2024 ). However, courts “need not ac cept as true a plaintiff’s 
conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Ingram v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Corr., 91 F.4th 924, 927 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 
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714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019)). Stated otherwise, there must exist “more than a sheer possibility 
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 
 Having carefully reviewed the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that 
Mr. Monson’s conclusory allegations do not establish “more than a sheer possibility,” see 
id., that Defendants violated his due-process ri ghts. To adequately plead a substantive 
due-process claim, Mr. Monson “must allege actions by a government official which 
‘violated one or more fund amental constitutional rights ’ and were ‘shocking to the 
contemporary conscience.’” C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Schs., 591 F.3d 624, 634 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2007)). This is a very 
high bar concerned with conduct “so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely 
careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse of official 
power[.]” Id. (quoting Golden ex rel. Balch v. Anders , 324 F.3d 650, 652–53 (8th Cir. 
2003)). And a procedural-due-process claim re quires Mr. Monson to allege a protected 
liberty or property interest and “that the defendant deprived him of such an interest without 
due process of law.” Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1114 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Marler 
v. Mo. State Bd. of Optometry, 102 F.3d 1453, 1456 (8th Cir. 1996)).  
 Neither a substantive nor a procedural due- process claim is adequately pled in the 
Amended Complaint. The entirety of the allegations ar e that Mr. Wohlman “refused to 
permit [Mr. Monson] to see an attorney or use the Renville County Law Library during the 
time [he] was incarcerated,” and that Mr. Wohlman “discontinued all legal help, insurance 
claims, accounting meetings and law enforc ement meetings.” (Dkt. 41 at 2.) Even 
construing these vague statements and any inferences that can be drawn from them in the 
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light most favorable to Mr. Monson, these conclusory statements are insufficient to 
establish a due-process claim that is “plausible on its face.” Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397. For 
example, there are no allegations describing  the circumstances under which Mr. Monson 
was denied access to an attorney or the law library or explaining how he suffered a relevant 
injury as a result. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (noting that “an inmate 
cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library 
or legal assistance program is subpar in so me theoretical sense” because there is no 
“abstract, freestanding right to a la w library or legal assistance”); see also Pilgrim v. 
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (conclu ding that dismissal was appropriate 
where “[p]laintiffs failed to allege any litigation-related detriment” resulting from a denial 
of meaningful access to the courts). And, even if Mr. Monson’s suffering a “home robbery” 
and losing his home are somehow relevant inju ries (Dkt. 41 at 2), it remains unclear how 
Mr. Wohlman’s alleged conduct caused these harms. See Pilgrim, 92 F.3d at 416 (“In order 
to state a claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, . . . plaintiffs must plead and 
prove prejudice stemming from the asserted violation.”). His claims against Mr. Wohlman 
must therefore be dismissed.5 
 
5 In the absence of any plausible claim that Mr. Monson’s constitutional rights were 
violated, the Court need not conduct furthe r analysis on whether Mr. Wohlman, in his 
official capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity. See Watkins v. City of St. Louis , 102 
F.4th 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024) (“To overcome qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss 
stage, a plaintiff must plead facts showing,” among other things, “that the official violated 
a statutory or constitutional right[.]” (quotation omitted)). 
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 Mr. Monson’s claim against Renville Co unty is likewise untenable. His sole 
conclusory allegation is that the County “refused to permit federal prisoners access to the 
same [resources] in violation of Monell.” (Dkt. 41 at 2.) Under Monell, “[a] municipality 
can be liable under § 1983 if an ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature 
caused a constitutional tort.’” Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691)). But, “absent a constitutional violation by a [county] 
employee, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability for the [County].” Whitney v. City of 
St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018). Having concluded that none of the individual 
defendants violated Mr. Monson’s rights, his Monell claim against the County must also 
be dismissed.6 
Finally, Mr. Monson alleges that his Ei ghth-Amendment rights were violated. 
However, the Amended Complaint does not include  any, let alone suffi cient, allegations 
for the Court to deduce the nature of the alleged violation. The Eighth-Amendment claim 
is dismissed as well. 
 
6 In his Response, Mr. Monson contends that Defendants’ arguments about his 
failure to state a plausible Monell claim is “premature” because there remains a question 
of fact regarding what “the jail’s policy with respect to permitting federal prisoners access 
to attorneys and to a law library” was. (Dkt. 25  at 4.) He further stat es that there are “no 
affidavits . . . to refute [his] claim that he was denied ac cess to an attorney and to the law 
library.” ( Id.) His arguments do not consider his burden to plead “sufficient factual 
allegations to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397. 
Relevant here, “[e]ven if a plaintiff cannot identify the full scope of an alleged custom or 
policy, the key to surviving dismissal is that the ‘complaint must allege facts which would 
support the existence of an un constitutional policy or custom.’” Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 728 , 122 F. Supp. 842, 867 (D. Minn. 2015) (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. 
Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003 )). Mr. Monson has failed to do 
that here, so his Monell claim must be dismissed. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendan ts’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) is GRANTED, 
and this matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
Date: June 15, 2026     s/Katherine M. Menendez    
Katherine M. Menendez  
United States District Judge  
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