govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_23-cv-20733-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
GAIA GARDENS, LLC; R & J LAND 
CARE LLC; BOB FREDETTE d/b/a 
FREDETTE LANDSCAPING; and 
RICCARDO MANCUSO, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 23-20733 (JXN)(CF) 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
NEALS, District Judge 
Before the Court is Defendant Township of Montclair’s (“Montclair”) motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs Gaia Gardens, LLC, R&J Land Care LLC, Bob Fredette d/b/a Fredette Landscaping, and 
Riccardo Mancuso’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 61.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion (ECF No. 79), and 
Montclair replied in further support (ECF No. 81 ). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court has carefully reviewed the 
Amended Complaint and the parties’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument 
pursuant to Rule 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Montclair’s motion 
to dismiss is GRANTED. 
 
1 “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. PageID:
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I. BACKGROUND2 
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with this matter, and therefore recites only 
those facts relevant to this motion. See Gaia Gardens, LLC v. Township of Montclair, No. 23-
3026, 2024 WL 5199327 (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) ; Gaia Gardens, LLC v. Township of Montclair, 
No. 23-20733, 2025 WL 2374417 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2025). 
Plaintiffs, three landscaping companies doing business in Montclair and a Montclair 
resident, challenge a Montclair ordinance that limits the use of gas -powered leaf blowers. (See 
generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 55.) For many years, through ordinance, Montclair has relegated 
the use of gas-powered leaf blowers to specific months and hours of the day. See Gaia Gardens, 
2024 WL 5199327, at *1. On August 15, 2023, the Montclair Council introduced and approved 
Ordinance O-23-31, which, among other things, prohibited the use of gas -powered leaf blowers 
within Montclair, imposed hourly restrictions on the use of electric leaf blowers, and prohibited 
the use of gas or diesel generators to power electric leaf blowers. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) On September 
26, 2023, Montclair amended Ordinance O -23-31 by Ordinance O -23-353 (“Ordinance”). (Id.; 
Am. Compl. Ex. A (“Ordinance”), ECF No. 55-1.) 
The Ordinance describes its “Purpose and intent” as follows: 
The Township of Montclair hereby finds that the use of gas-powered 
leaf blowers impairs the health and social welfare, as well as the 
peace and quality of life of persons residing and working in 
Montclair. The purpose of this chapter is to eliminate the adverse 
impact of such equipment by prohibiting its use withi n the 
Township. This chapter shall apply to all properties within the 
Township whether publicly or privately owned. 
 
The Township further finds that the practice of blowing leaves and 
other debris for property maintenance has unintended environmental 
 
2 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). 
3 Codified at Montclair Municipal Code § 219. PageID:
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and health consequences. The blowing of leaves, dust and debris, 
causes fine particulate emissions and disruption to pollinator 
habitats. Exposure to fine particulate matter may impact workers 
using this equipment, those living with respiratory conditions, 
children, as well as others, and the Township encourages 
community education regarding alternatives to such use, where 
possible. It shall be the policy of the Township to balance leaf 
blowing with mulching fallen leaves into grassy areas and moving 
leaves into flower beds to be used as organic mulch material. 
 
(Ordinance § 219-1.) 
 
§ 219-2 of the Ordinance defines a “Gas-Powered Leaf Blower” as either “[a] leaf blower 
that is powered by an engine using gasoline or a mixture of gasoline and oil blend as fuel,” or “[a]n 
electric-powered leaf blower that is plugged into an operating generator that is powered by an 
engine using gasoline or a mixture of gasoline and oil blend as fuel.” (Id. § 219-2(b).) 
The Ordinance provides for a “Limitation on use of leaf blowers,” both electric and gas -
powered, within Montclair as follows: 
a) Gas-powered leaf blowers are not permitted to be used within 
the Township of Montclair, effective October 15, 2023. 
b) Electric leaf blowers shall be permitted throughout the year, 
subject to the following conditions: 
i) Air quality action days. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned, leaf blowers shall not be operated in 
the Township of Montclair on dates designated as “ Air 
Quality Action Days” by the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection and declared by the 
Township’s Emergency Management Coordinator. 
ii) No gas or diesel generators may be utilized to power any 
electric leaf blowers at any time. 
c) Hours of use. 
i) On weekdays between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., except 
that leaf blowers may be used by an occupant or owner 
of the premises between 9:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. 
ii) On weekends between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., except 
that leaf blowers may be used by an occupant or owner 
of the premises between 10:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. 
(Id. § 219-3.) PageID:
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On September 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (Compl., ECF No. 1) and an Order to 
Show Cause (“OTSC”) for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 
ECF No. 2). Plaintiffs alleged the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution ; Article I of the New Jersey Constitution ; the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI, § 2 of the United States Constitution; the Takings Clause of 
Article V of the United States Constitution; the Takings Clause of Article I, § 20 of the New Jersey 
Constitution; and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). (See generally Compl.) In 
their OTSC, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to restrain Montclair’s enforcement of the 
Ordinance. (See generally Mot. for Prelim. Inj.) 
On October 14, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, 
concluding Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or the threat of irreparable 
injury. (See generally Op, ECF No . 21; Order, ECF No. 22.) First, the Court found that the 
Ordinance was likely not preempted by the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et 
seq., because the Ordinance concerns traditional state health and safety regulation, is entitled to a 
presumption against preemption, and arguably complements rather than conflicts with the CAA or 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulations despite imposing an outright ban on 
gas-powered leaf blowers. (See Op. at 6–20.) Additionally, the Court determined that Plaintiffs did 
not establish that their alleged harm could not be redressed by a legal remedy or compensated with 
monetary damages. (Id. at 21–22.) 
Plaintiffs appealed on November 13, 2023 (Not. of Appeal, ECF No. 27), and the matter 
was stayed pending the outcome . (Stay Ord., ECF No. 31) . On December 23, 2024, the Third 
Circuit affirmed. See Gaia Gardens, 2024 WL 5199327, at *2. The Third Circuit reasoned that 
Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as their alleged injuries were economic and PageID:
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compensable through monetary damages, and, therefore, this Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. Id. This Court implemented the Third Circuit’s 
decision and lifted the stay. (ECF No. 45.)4 
On June 4, 2025, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend the complaint5 (Mot. for Leave, ECF 
No. 48), which Magistrate Judge Waldor (ret.) granted. (M.J. Op., ECF No. 53; M.J. Order, ECF 
No. 54). 
Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on August 20, 2025, removing all but the four 
remaining Plaintiffs and keeping only their preemption claim. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 55.) The 
Amended Complaint asserts that the Ordinance imposes a zero-emissions standard preempted by 
the CAA under theories of both implied and express preemption, violating the Supremacy Clause. 
(Id. ¶¶ 32–37.) 
On October 13, 2025, Montclair moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6), arguing that neither the CAA nor the EPA regulations expressly or impliedly preempt 
the Ordinance. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 61.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion (Pls.’ Opp’n Br., ECF 
No. 79), and Montclair replied in further support (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 81).6 This motion is now 
fully briefed and ripe for the Court to decide. 
 
4 On January 6, 2025, the Court was notified that Plaintiffs’ counsel had passed away. (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiffs retained 
new counsel at the end of March 2025. (See ECF Nos. 36, 39–41, 44.) 
5 Montclair opposed the motion (Montclair Opp’n to Leave, ECF No. 49) and filed a cross motion for attorneys’ fees 
(Mot. for Att’y Fees; ECF No. 50). Plaintiffs filed a reply in further support of their motion and responded to 
Montclair’s cross motion. (Pls.’ Reply for Leave, ECF No. 52.) 
6 On November 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and Opposition to Montclair’s motion 
to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Pls.’ Cross-Mot, ECF No. 72), which the Court denied as premature. (See Text 
Order, ECF No. 77). PageID:
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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for 
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ” For a complaint to survive dismissal 
under this rule, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, “ [a]ll 
allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit 
of every favorable inference to be drawn therefrom.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (alteration in original)(citations omitted). A court must only consider “ the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic 
documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
The Third Circuit has outlined a three-part test in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6): 
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead 
to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth. Finally, where there are we ll-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. 
 
In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 
2012) (cleaned up). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs assert that § 209(e) of the CAA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1) , both 
expressly and impliedly preempts state and local emissions standards and the enforcement thereof PageID:
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on small nonroad engines, including leaf blowers. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15; Pls.’ Opp’n Br. at 1.) In 
Plaintiffs’ telling, the Ordinance forbids the use of gas-powered leaf blowers and mandates that any 
leaf blower used in Montclair have a zero-emission electric-powered engine. (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. at 
2.) In doing so, Plaintiffs assert the Ordinance unlawfully imposes an emission standard on leaf -
blower engines. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that they sufficiently plead a violation of the 
Supremacy Clause under the CAA. (Id.) 
In support of the motion to dismiss, Montclair asserts three primary arguments against 
preemption. First, Montclair argues the Ordinance address es public health, safety, and welfare—
matters traditionally within the province of state regulation. (Def.’s Moving Br. at 1–3, ECF No. 
61-3.) Second, Montclair contends the Ordinance is not a “standard or other requirement related 
to the control of emissions” within the meaning of § 209(e) of the CAA. ( Id.) Third, Montclair 
states the Ordinance is an “in-use” and “use and operation” regulation on nonroad engines, which 
Congress has explicitly clarified is not preempted by the CAA and related EPA regulations. (Id.) 
Montclair further argues that § 209(e)(1)’s preemptive effect extends only to two categories 
of engines, neither of which includes leaf blowers. ( Id. at 15 –18.) Montclair submits that § 
209(e)(1), by its plain language, does not preempt the Ordinance. ( Id.) Indeed, Montclair asserts 
that § 209(e)(2) does not contain any express preemption language at all ; rather, it provides 
California with the opportunity to request authorization from the EPA to “adopt and enforce 
standards and other requirements relating to the control of emissions” from nonroad engines and 
vehicles, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A), and allows other states to opt-in (by application) to authorized 
California standards relating to the control of emissions, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(B). (Id. at 15–16.) 
Montclair further argues that the Ordinance falls outside the scope of implied preemption because PageID:
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the Ordinance does not enforce a “standard or other requirement relating to the control of 
emissions.” (Id. at 16.) 
Under the Supremacy Clause, courts may not give effect to “any state law, however clearly 
within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law.” Kurns 
v. A.W. Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 
666 (1962)). “In cases like the present one, courts are called upon to determine whether an act of 
Congress preempts state law. ” Id. When Congress delegates regulatory authority to an 
administrative agency, the agency’s regulations “issued pursuant to that authority” have the same 
preemptive effect as federal statutes. Treasurer of N .J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 
406 (3d Cir. 2012). 
There are three kinds of preemption: express preemption, implied conflict preemption, and 
field preemption. Kurns, 620 F.3d at 395. Express preemption means “ a federal law contains 
express language providing for the preemption of any conflicting state law.” Id. Implied conflict 
preemption arises when (a) “compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, ” or (b) 
“state law erects an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’” Treasurer of N.J., 684 F.3d at 406 (quoting Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 
F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010)). Field preemption occurs “when Congress has regulated an area so 
pervasively that it has not left room for state regulation.” Id. 
Two principles guide the Court’s inquiry. First, Congress’s intent “ is the ‘ultimate 
touchstone’ of preemption analysis.” Transource Pa., LLC v. DeFrank , 156 F.4th 351, 372 (3d 
Cir. 2025) (quoting Farina, 625 F.3d at 115). “Congress’s purpose may be apparent from the face 
of a statute.” Id. The Court may also consider the “‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ 
analyzing ‘the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme PageID:
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to affect business, consumers, and the law.’” Id. (quoting Farina, 625 F.3d at 115). Second, the 
Court presumes “Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Farina, 625 F.3d at 116 (quoting 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). This presumption against preemption “applies 
with particular force in fields within the police power of the state, but does not apply where state 
regulation has traditionally been absent.” Id. (citations omitted). 
A. The CAA Preempts State Emissions Standards 
The CAA declares it “[a] primary goal . . . to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable 
Federal, State, and local governmental actions . . . for pollution.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c). Title I of 
the CAA addresses primarily stationary sources, leaving substantial regulatory authority with the 
States. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Title II addresses moving sources —motor vehicles under § 209(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), and nonroad engines and vehicles used in construction or farm equipment 
under § 209(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e). For the latter category, Congress provided: 
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt 
to enforce any standard or other requirement relating to the control 
of emissions from either of the following new nonroad engines or 
nonroad vehicles subject to regulation under this chapter— 
 
(A)New engines which are used in construction equipment or 
vehicles or used in farm equipment or vehicles and which 
are smaller than 175 horsepower. 
 
(B)New locomotives or new engines used in locomotives. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1)(A)–(B). 
§ 209(e)(2) applies to all other nonroad engines, including the small off-road engines used 
in leaf blowers . It provides that: “Any State other than California . . . may adopt . . . standards 
relating to control of emissions from [all other] nonroad vehicles or engines ,” so long as those 
standards “are identical . . . . to the California standards.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A)–(B). § 209(e) 
does not, on its face, address State authority to regulate the use of those engines after they enter PageID:
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commerce. EPA, the agency charged with administering the CAA, has long maintained that no 
such preemption exists , explaining that “states are not precluded under 42 U.S.C. § 7543 from 
regulating the use and operation of nonroad engines, such as regulations on hours of usage, daily 
mass emission limits, or sulfur limits on fuel. ” 40 C.F.R. § 1074, subpt. A, app. A (emphasis 
added). 
B. The Presumption Against Preemption Applies 
The Supremacy Clause allows Congress to preempt state law. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). But, “because the States are independent sovereigns in 
our federal system, [courts] have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-
law causes of action.” Farina, 625 F.3d at 116 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 
(1996)). The Court’s preemption analysis, therefore, “start[s] with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Th e presumption aga inst preemption “applies with particular 
force in fields within the police power of the state, but does not apply where state regulation has 
traditionally been absent .” Farina, 625 F.3d at 116. Even where federal law has an express 
preemption clause, if it is susceptible to more than one plausible reading, the Court has “a duty to 
accept the reading that disfavors pre -emption.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC , 544 U.S. 431, 
449 (2005). 
State police power “extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, 
within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being . . . of a community.” N.J. Staffing All. 
v. Fais, 110 F.4th 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) ). 
“Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within PageID:
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the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police 
power.” Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit , 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) . Because the 
Ordinance is designed to protect the public health, welfare, and the environment, the presumption 
against preemption applies with “particular force.” Farina, 625 F.3d at 116. 
Plaintiffs argue that (1) the CAA’s distinction between Title I and Title II rebuts the 
presumption against preemption, and (2) the presumption is “irrelevant” here because the CAA’s 
preemption of mobile -source emissions is “ clear and manifest ” on the face of § 209(e) . (Pls. ’ 
Opp’n Br. at 18–21.) Plaintiffs further argue that “no rational reading” of § 209(e) “could fail to 
identify that th[e] section unambiguously preempts state regulation of mobile emissions.” (Id. at 
20.) Both arguments are unpersuasive. 
i. The Distinction Between Titles I and II 
Plaintiffs argue that the CAA’s distinction between Title I and Title II rebuts the 
presumption against preemption. According to Plaintiffs, Title I grants States the power to regulate 
stationary emissions sources, while Title II is the “principal” province of the federal government 
as to mobile -source emissions. ( See Am. Compl. at 8–10.) Plaintiffs cite Engine Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District (“EMA”), in which the Supreme Court ruled 
that a California air quality agency may not indirectly regulate vehicle emissions by restricting the 
purchase of certain vehicles, as such restrictions constitute an emissions standard under § 209(a), 
a field expressly preempted and governed by federal law. 541 U.S. 246 (2004). 
EMA does not rebut the presumption against preemption. EMA dealt with § 209(a), not § 
209(e). § 209(a) bars states from regulating “any standard relating to the control of emissions from 
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). § 209(e) is narrower and 
more textured; specifically, § 209(e)(1) reaches only three enumerated categories of equipment PageID:
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(none of which is a leaf blower), and § 209(e)(2) governs all other nonroad engines through a 
California-authorization regime. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to assume that, because EMA held that California’s fleet purchase 
rules were “standards” under § 209(a), a municipal leaf blower ordinance is also a “standard” under 
§ 209(e). Adopting Plaintiffs’ argument would require the Court to treat § 209(a), which deals with 
new motor vehicle engines, and § 209(e), which regulates nonroad engines, as interchangeable. 
They are not. Thus, the dispositive question is whether the Ordinance imposes a ‘standard or other 
requirement relating to the control of emissions’ within the meaning of § 209(e). 42 U.S.C. § 
7543(e). 
ii. § 209(e) 
§ 209(e) does not demonstrate a “clear and manifest” intent to preempt ordinances like the 
one at issue here. § 209(e) has a deliberately textured structure. § 209(e)(1) preempts only new 
engines used in three enumerated equipment categories, none of which plainly encompasses leaf 
blowers. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1). § 209(e)(2) contains no express preemption language: it simply 
allows “[a]ny State other than California . . . [to] adopt . . . standards relating to control of emissions 
from [all other] nonroad vehicles or engines,” so long as those standards “are identical . . . . to the 
California standards .” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) –(B). Because n either subsection on its face 
evidences a clear and manifest intent to displace a state’s authority to regulate the conditions of 
equipment use within its borders— a subject historically and quintessentially within the police 
power—the presumption against preemption applies. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
Plaintiffs’ cited authorities do not compel a different result. Crosby reiterates that Congress 
can preempt state law. 530 U.S. at 372. But it does not mean Congress has preempted state law 
here. Moreover, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood notes that the plain text of an express PageID:
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preemption clause is the starting point of a preemption analysis . 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). But it 
does not mean that the plain text of this express preemption clause applies to the Ordinance. The 
other cases Plaintiffs cite, Federal Housing Finance Agency v. City of Ansonia, 549 F. Supp. 3d 
242 (D. Conn. 2021) , and Pennsylvania Gen eral Insurance Co. v. Landis , 96 F. Supp. 2d 408 
(D.N.J. 2000), involved entirely different and distinct federal laws. See Ansonia, 549 F. Supp. 3d 
at 247–48 ( Housing and Economi c Recovery Act); Landis , 96 F. Supp. 2d at 413–18 (Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act) . To the extent those decisions stand for the proposition that a court 
need not invoke the presumption when text is unambiguous, Plaintiffs assume what they must 
establish: that the text of § 209(e) (2) is unambiguous as applied to the Ordinance . Plaintiffs’ 
citation to Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) , is similarly 
unavailing. There, the court noted § 209(e)(2) “does not expressly preempt any state regulation.” 
Id. at 1087 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs also frame their argument in field and conflict preemption terms. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. 
at 22–23.) Those theories offer little support to rebut the presumption against preemption in this 
case. Field preemption requires a federal regulatory scheme so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress “left no room” for the States to supplement it. Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Med. Laby’s, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). § 209(e)’s text carefully limits express 
preemption to three enumerated equipment categories and to standards on new nonroad engines, 
while preserving (e)(2)’s California-conformity regime for other categories. It is the antithesis of 
a comprehensive field occupation. 
Conflict preemption requires that compliance with both state and federal law be impossible, 
or that state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.” Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting PageID:
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Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)). No such conflict exists here, because federal 
law does not require the use of gas -powered leaf blowers anywhere ; CAA Title II regulates 
engines, not the choice to operate them. 
The Court, therefore, applies t he presumption against preemption to § 209(e) (2) and the 
Ordinance.7 The Court’s analysis proceeds on that basis. 
C. The Ordinance Is Not an Emissions Standard 
Because leaf blower engines are neither motor vehicle engines, nor “new” nonroad engines, 
§ 209(e)(2) applies. § 209(e)(2) provides that: “Any State other than California . . . may adopt . . . 
standards relating to control of emissions from [all other] nonroad vehicles or engines,” so long as 
those standards “are identical . . . to the California standards .” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) –(B). 
While § 209(e)(2) does not expressly preempt any state regulation, it does “imply a preemption.” 
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1087. If § 209(e)(2) did not displace any State “standards relating 
to control of emissions from nonroad vehicles or engines,” there would be no need to require that 
those standards be identical to California’s regulations. § 209(e)(2) thus “assumes the existence of 
a category of [regulations] that are subject to preemption.” Id. The plain text of § 209(e)(2) , 
therefore, impliedly preempts (a) any “standards relating to control of emissions from [all other] 
nonroad vehicles or engines”; (b) that are adopted by states other than California ; and (c) are not 
identical to California’s standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A)–(B). 
The Court, then, turns to the central issue : whether the Ordinance imposes a “standard or 
other requirement relating to the control of emissions” within the meaning of § 209(e). To answer 
that question, the Court looks to EMA. As the EMA Court observed, “standard” means “that which 
‘is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.’ ” 
 
7 The Court notes that, even if the presumption did not apply, the Court would nonetheless “have a duty to accept the 
reading [of the CAA] that disfavors pre-emption.” Bates, 544 U.S. at 449. PageID:
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EMA, 541 U.S. at 252–53 (quoting Webster's Second New International Dictionary 2455 (1945)). 
The “standards” referred to in § 209(e) “relate to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or 
engine.” Id. at 253. To meet those standards, “t he vehicle or engine must not emit more than a 
certain amount of a given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollution- control 
device, or must have some other design feature related to the control of emissions .” Id. A 
“standard” need not be expressed as a numerical limit at the point of manufacture; an enforcement 
mechanism that tells regulated parties they must “buy or sell only those vehicles that comply” with 
a numerical or technology specification is also a “standard.” Id. at 255. And a “standard,” the EMA 
Court found, remains “a standard even when not enforced through manufacturer -directed 
regulation.” Id. 
The premise of EMA , however, was that an underlying standard (i.e., a numerical or 
technological requirement that engines or vehicles must meet ) existed. There, state law required 
regulated entities to purchase or lease vehicles that satisfied the California Air Resources Board’s 
emission specifications. Id. at 248–49. Similarly, in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 
the rules at issue “explicitly prohibit[ed] the operation of auxiliary diesel engines ‘which emit[ted] 
levels of diesel PM, NOx, or SOx in exceedance of the emission rates’ that would result from the 
use of certain fuels.” 517 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). And in Metropolitan Taxicab Board of 
Trade v. City of New York, the preempted rules, which “effectively force[d] [taxi companies] to 
purchase hybrid taxicabs,” and had “the stated purpose of increasing the number of ‘ cleaner 
vehicles.’” 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010). 
The Ordinance , by contrast, does not impose a quantifiable emissions limit, require 
pollution-limiting equipment or after-treatment specification, or dictate engine-emissions criteria. 
Nor does the Ordinance even reference engine emissions. At most, the Ordinance notes that “[t]he PageID:
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blowing of leaves, dust and debris , causes fine particulate emissions .” (See Ordinance § 219-1.) 
And the Ordinance restricts all leaf-blower use to specific hours and days, even though electric 
leaf blower engines do not give off emissions. Accordingly, the Ordinance concerns the public-
health and quality- of-life consequences of blowing leaves rather than emissions of leaf blower 
engines. Thus, t he Ordinance , by its own terms, regulates leaf-blowing,8 not the engines that 
perform it. (See Ordinance § 219-3.) 
Plaintiffs argue nonetheless that the Ordinance is a preempted “attempt to enforce a 
standard” because, in effect, the only blowers that may be used in Montclair are those whose 
engines produce zero emissions. (Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 21–25.) This characterization does not survive 
close examination. As the Supreme Court held in EMA , the CAA preempts a use restriction only 
when it attempts to enforce an underlying “standard.” 541 U.S. at 255 (“The manufacturer’s right 
to sell federally approved vehicles is meaningless in the absence of a purchaser ’s right to buy 
them.”). Here, the Ordinance does not provide an underlying emissions standard to enforce, rather 
it restricts leaf blower use within Montclair. 
More fundamentally, § 209(e)(2) does not preempt any ordinance that regulates an activity 
simply because that activity involves an engine. To hold otherwise would mangle “Congress’s 
carefully calibrated regulatory scheme,” EMA, 541 U.S. at 255, and cast aside the presumption 
that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt” state law, Farina, 625 F.3d at 116. Even if Plaintiffs’ 
 
8 Comparable actions have been brought in New Jersey asserting claims against townships under alternative 
constitutional grounds. In New Jersey Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Township of Maplewood, plaintiffs claimed 
that Maplewood ’s ordinance ’s restrictions on gas -powered leaf blowers for commercial entities violated equal 
protection and constituted improper regulation under both the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions. An amendment to 
the ordinance rendered Plaintiffs’ claims moot, and the court dismissed the action. The court denied plaintiffs’ request 
for attorneys’ fees. No 17-8820, 2022 WL 1224942 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2022). PageID:
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expansive interpretation of § 209(e)(2) were plausible, which it is not, the Court must nonetheless 
“accept the reading [of § 209(e)(2)] that disfavors pre-emption.” Bates, 544 U.S. at 449. 
In sum, t he Ordinance regulates leaf blowing, not leaf blower engine emissions. The 
Ordinance does not require that leaf blower engines “must not emit more than a certain amount of 
a given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollution- control device, or must have 
some other design feature related to the control of emissions.” EMA, 541 U.S. at 253. Nor does it 
enforce a standard dictating the same. Montclair enacted the Ordinance to protect its residents from 
the adverse health and environmental effects of leaf blowing, not the emissions generated by leaf 
blower engines, which is well within its police power. N.J. Staffing All., 110 F.4th at 209; Huron 
Portland Cement, 362 U.S. at 442. The Court, accordingly, presumes Congress did not intend for 
CAA § 209(e)(2) to preempt the Ordinance. Farina, 625 F.3d at 116. 
D. Dismissal with Prejudice 
The Third Circuit ordinarily requires district courts to grant leave to amend a deficient 
complaint “unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 
(3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver , 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). After the Court denied 
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. (See Am. 
Compl.) Because the CAA does not preempt the Ordinance, Plaintiffs’ legal theory of preemption 
retained within the Amended Complaint is fatally defective. This is a defect another pleading 
cannot cure. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs leave to amend and dismisses with prejudice 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Montclair’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 61) is GRANTED, 
and Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 55) is DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate 
Order accompanies this Opinion. 
DATED: 6/16/2026 _________________________ 
 JULIEN XAVIER NEALS 
 United States District Judge PageID:
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