govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_25-cv-02824-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
 
 
United States of America, ex rel., Troy K. 
Scheffler, Relator, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
Golden Shovel Agency, LLC, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
No. 25-cv-2824 (KMM/LIB) 
 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 On July 10, 2025, Plainti ff-Relator Troy K. Scheffler initiated this action under the 
False Claims Act by filing a Complaint pro se.1 (Dkt. 1.) He then retained counsel and filed 
an Amended Complaint on October 21, 2025. ( See Dkts. 7, 9.) Mr. Scheffler alleges that 
Defendant Golden Shovel Agency, LLC unla wfully obtained fede ral funding under the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) Act 2 by submitting 
fraudulent information to the government. (Dkt. 9 ¶ 38.) The matter is now before the Court 
on Golden Shovel’s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 13.) For the reasons discussed below, the 
Motion is granted in part, though Mr. Scheffler is afforded leave to amend. 
 
1 A lawsuit brought under the False Claims  Act is also known as a qui tam action. 
Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 986 n.1 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A qui tam action is one in which 
a private plaintiff sues on behalf of the government under a statute that awards part of any 
penalty recovered to the plaintiff and the remainder to the government.”).  
2 Pub. L. No. 116-136, 13 4 Stat. 281 (2020). The CARE S Act enabled qualifying 
businesses to receive fo rgivable loans to offset disruptions attributable to the COVID-19 
pandemic. (Dkt. 9 ¶ 10.) 
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DISCUSSION 
 To survive a motion to di smiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
allegations to state a claim to reli ef that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City of St. 
Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Ci r. 2014) (quotation omitted). The facts alleged in the 
complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In applying this standard, courts must assume that all 
factual allegations in the complaint are true  and construe all reas onable inferences from 
those facts in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving party. Cole v. Grp. Health Plan, 
Inc., 105 F.4th 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 2024). 
Golden Shovel raises two arguments for dism issal. First, as a procedural matter, 
Golden Shovel points ou t that Mr. Scheffler’s original complaint was filed pro se, in 
violation of the rule that qui tam actions cannot  be brought by pro se parties. (Dkt. 15 at 
10–11.) United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6–7 (8th Cir. 1951) (prohibiting unrepresented 
plaintiffs from bringing qui tam actions); see also Walsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 75 
F. Supp. 3d 256, 263 (D.D.C. 2014) (“It is  well-settled that a qui tam action may not be 
brought by a pro se plaintiff.”) (citing cases) (cleaned up). However, Golden Shovel cites 
no cases suggesting that the error with the original complaint, which has now been 
corrected, is grounds for dismissal.  
In support of its argument, Golden Shovel relies primarily on Jones ex rel. Jones v. 
Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 401 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2005 ), but it is inapposite. In 
Jones, a non-attorney, who also was the administrator of an estate, filed a 
medical-malpractice suit on behalf of the estate. Id. at 951. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
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district court’s dismissal of the suit because the relevant state law “prohibit[ed] a person 
who is not a licensed attorney and who is ac ting as an administrator . . . from practicing 
law” on behalf of the estate. Id. (quotation omitted); id. at 952 (noting that the district court 
relied on reasoning in a decision by the state supreme court, which the Eighth Circuit was 
“not bound by” but adopted anyway). Jones is not instructive here.  
Golden Shovel also cites United States ex rel. Davis v. Hennepin County, where the 
court dismissed a qui tam action brought by a pro se relator who “had over a year since the 
initial Complaint was filed, and nearly seve n months since the Government declined 
intervention, to secure legal representation” but failed to do so. No. 15-cv-2671, 2016 WL 
10747256, at *2 (D. Minn. July 8, 2016). If anything, Davis stands for the idea that a case 
can continue even if it was originally filed by a pro se relator, as long as counsel is secured 
in a timely manner. But here, Mr. Scheffler  retained counsel and filed an amended 
complaint within four months of filing hi s initial complaint. B ecause Mr. Scheffler 
promptly cured the defect, the Court declines  to dismiss the action on this procedural 
ground.3 
 Second, Golden Shovel argues that Mr. Sc heffler fails to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted because the website “A ction 4 Liberty” publicly disclosed the 
information brought forth by Mr. Scheffler, and the omitted allegations amount to an 
 
3 Golden Shovel raises concerns about whether the government would have declined 
to intervene if Mr. Scheffler had not initiated this action pro se. (See Dkt. 15 at 11–12 n.1.) 
However, the government has had many months to intervene since Mr. Scheffler retained 
counsel and has not done so.  
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“admi[ssion] that [Mr. Scheffler] is not an original source[.]”4 (Dkt. 15 at 4; id. at 12–17.) 
The False Claims Act states in relevant part  that the Court “shall dismiss” an action “if 
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged . . . were publicly disclosed . . . 
from the news media, unless . . . . the person bringing the action is an original source of the 
information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii). The original-source exception 
applies in two situations—where the relator either (1) prior to 
a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(A), has voluntarily 
disclosed to the Government  the information on which 
allegations or transactions in a claim are based; or (2) who has 
knowledge that is in dependent of and mate rially adds to the 
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has 
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before 
filing an action under this section. 
 
United States ex rel. P aulos v. Stryker Corp., 762 F.3d 688, 692 (8 th Cir. 2014) (cleaned 
up) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)). 
Here, even assuming that “Action 4 Liberty” constitutes “news media” as 
contemplated by the statute, Mr. Scheffler plausibly asserts that the original-source 
exception applies. Specifically, Mr. Scheffler claims he had knowledge that is independent 
of and materially adds to the transactions that were publicly disclosed by Action 4 Liberty 
 
4 In support of this argument, Golden Sh ovel relies on factual allegations made in 
the original Complaint that were omitted from the Amended Complaint and urges the Court 
to do the same. The Court declines to do so  and exclusively considers the allegations 
contained in the Amended Complaint in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. See In re Wireless 
Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig. , 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is 
well-established that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders 
the original complaint without legal effect.”). But even if the Court considered the facts 
from the original complaint, which are likely admissions made by Mr. Scheffler, it would 
not change the Court’s conclusions at this stage. 
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in the form of non-public deposition testim ony and that he voluntarily provided the 
information to the government prior to filing this action. (See Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 26–27, 33; Dkt. 22 
at 3, 19–20.) Unfortunately for Mr. Scheffler, those allegations are set forth in a Declaration 
attached to his Response opposing the Motion to Dismiss, and not as part of the Amended 
Complaint. Therefore, the Court grants Golden Shovel’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint as drafted. But M r. Scheffler will be afforded leave to amen d the Amended 
Complaint.5 See Arias v. Raimondo, No. 2:13-cv-904-TLN-EFB, 2014 WL 4638361, at *2 
(E.D. Cal. June 26, 2014) (“If a complaint fails to state a plausible cl aim, a district court 
should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 
(quotation omitted and cleaned up)). If the amendment incorporates the same facts included 
in Mr. Scheffler’s declaration,  it will then state a claim, and this case can proceed to a 
pretrial conference. 
ORDER 
 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13) is GRANTED in part; and 
2. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend the Amended Complaint. The 
Second Amended Complaint must be filed on or before June 29, 2026. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
5 To be clear, the Court does not purpor t to resolve the significant factual 
discrepancies across the pleadings highlighted by Golden Shovel. The Court’s conclusion 
that the allegations described are sufficien t to state a claim is  far removed from any 
assessment of whether Mr. Scheffler will prevail on that claim. 
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Date: June 15, 2026     s/Katherine M. Menendez    
Katherine M. Menendez  
United States District Judge  
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