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govinfo:USCOURTS-txsd-4_24-cv-01206-0

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas · 2026-06-16

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:18:36

., 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
HOUSTON DIVISION 
JORGE GONZALEZ, § 
§ 
§ 
§ 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
§ Civil Action No. 4:24-CV-01206
§ Criminal Action No. 4:20-CR-0453
§
§ 
§ 
ORDER 
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Amended Motion to 
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civil Document No. 
3, Criminal Document No. 57). Having considered the motion, submissions, and 
applicable law, the Court determines that the Petitioner's motion should be denied.1
I. BACKGROUND
On September! 7, 2020, Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") was charged 
in a one-count indictment with possession of a controlled substance, fifty grams or 
more of metharnphetamine, with the intent to distribute in violation of Title 21, 
1 The Court notes Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing on the limited 
issue of whether Gonzalez received ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense 
counsel's alleged failure to file a timely notice of appeal. See United States' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Petitioner's 28 US. C. • § 2255 Motion and Request for a Limited 
Evidentiary Hearing, Document No. 60 at 20. Considering the Court's findings herein, the 
Court determines that the Government's request should be denied as moot. 
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). 2 On May 14, 2021, Gonzalez plead 
guilty to the one count with which he was charged.3 On November 19, 2021, this 
Court sentenced Gonzalez to a total term of imprisonment of210 months, with five 
years of supervised release to follow.4 On September 19, 2022, Gonzalez filed his 
notice of appeal. 5 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
appellate counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), arguing that the appeal presented no non-frivolous issues to adjudicate. In a 
per curiam decision, the Fifth Circuit remanded Gonzalez's appeal, instructing this 
Court to allow Gonzalez to file an amended motion for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.6 On April 29, 2024, Gonzalez moved,pro se, to vacate, set aside, or correct 
his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.7 
2 See Indictment, Criminal Document No. 1 at 1-2. 
3 See Minute Entry for Re-Arraignment Proceedings, Criminal Document No. 22 at 
1. 
4 See Judgment, Criminal Document No. 36 at 1-6. 
5 Pro Se Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Notice of Appeal, Criminal Document No. 38 
at 1. 
6 Order of United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Criminal Document 
No. 51. 
7 See Pro Se Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, 
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, Criminal Document No. 
57 at 1-19. 
2 
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IL STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional 
rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct 
appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United 
States v. Mimms, 43 F.3d 217,219 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Vaughn, 
955 F.2d 367,368 (5th Cir. 1992)). Even if a defendant alleges a constitutional error, 
he may not raise an issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both 
cause for his procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the error. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152; 167 (1982); see also United States v. Acklen, 47 F.3d 
739, 742 (5th Cir. 1995). A petitioner must show "cause" to explain the reason why 
the objection was not made at trial or on direct appeal and show "actual prejudice" 
was suffered from the alleged errors. Frady, 456 U.S. at 167. To prove "cause," a 
petitioner must show an external obstacle prevented him from raising his claims 
either at trial or on direct appeal. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991). To 
prove "actual prejudice," the petitioner must show he has suffered an actual and 
substantial disadvantage. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. 
To succeed under the "cause" and "actual prejudice" standard, a petitioner 
must meet a "significantly higher hurdle" than the plain error standard required on 
direct appeal. Id. at 166. This higher standard is appropriate because once the 
petitioner's chance to direct appeal has been exhausted, courts are allowed to 
3 
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presume the petitioner was fairly convicted. Id. at 164; see also United States v. 
Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cit. 1998) (presuming defendant to be fairly 
and finally convicted after direct appeal). Ineffective assistance.of counsel, if shown 
and applicable, will satisfy the requisite cause and prejudice. Acklen, 47 F.3d at 742. 
Additionally, a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is properly brought for the 
first time in a § 2255 motion, United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 
1991) (en bane). 
III. LAW & ANALYSIS 
Gonzalez moves, pro se, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on five grounds: (1) Gonzalez's counsel was ineffective in 
failing to file a notice of appeal ("Claim One"); (2) Gonzalez's counsel "was . 
infective in failing to seek deviation from the Guidelines to ensure his offense level 
was calculated for methamphetamine mixture rather than actual methamphetamine" 
("Claim Two"); (3) Gonzalez's counsel "was infective in failing to object to upward 
variance." ("Claim Three"); ( 4) Gonzalez's counsel failed to object to an upward 
variance "due to prior charges for which guilt was not established" ("Claim Four"); 
and (5) Gonzalez's counsel "was ineffective because he failed to object when the 
4 
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Court hampered his right to allocute" ("Claim Five"). 8 In response, the Government 
contends that Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing, and notes for the Court the Supreme Court's strong guidance that courts 
"indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The 
Court construes all prose filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 
(2007). Accordingly, the Court will consider, in tum, each of Gonzalez's claims. 
A Claim One 
Gonzalez first contends that his defense counsel, Mr. Walter McNab Miller, 
IV, was ineffective by failing to file a notice of appeal. The Court analyzes an 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a § 2255 motion under the two­
prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United 
States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 598 (5th Cir. 2001). The movant must show his 
counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial to prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; Willis, 273 F.3d at 598. To 
show deficiency, the movant must show his counsel's assistance was outside a broad 
range of what is considered reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. To establish 
8 See Pro Se Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Motion Under 28 US. C. § 2255 to Vacate, 
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, Criminal Document No. 
57 at 13-18. 
5 
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prejudice, the petitioner "must demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."' Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Thus, when a petitioner challenges his 
conviction, this issue is whether "a reasonable probability exists that the jury would 
have had a reasonable doubt as to guilt." Hernandez v. Johnson, 213 F.3d 243, 249 
(5th Cir. 2000). "This is a heavy burden which requires a 'substantial,' and not just 
a 'conceivable,' likelihood of a different result. United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 
599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012). "Counsel's errors must be 'so serious as to deprive the 
[petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."' Harrington, 562 U.S. at 
104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The movant must prove both prongs of 
the analysis: counsel tendered deficient performance and the movant suffered 
prejudice. Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1997). 
Here, the Court has considered.Claim One and noted Gonzalez's contention 
that Mr. Miller was ineffective by failing to file an appeal after the sentencing 
hearing in this case. The Government notes for the Court Gonzalez's willing and 
voluntary plea of guilty at the Court's May 19, 2021 Re-Arraignment Hearing, in 
which Gonzalez signed a plea agreement with the Government, on the record, in 
which he waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence 
6 
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on any ground other than for ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government 
further notes for the Court that Gonzalez entered a plea of guilty after affirmatively 
answering a plethora of inquiries from the Court to ensure his plea was made 
knowing and voluntarily. Gonzalez now brings a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel against Mr. Miller for failing to file an appeal, despite Gonzalez's express 
understanding, on the record, that he waived his right to appeal at the Court's May 
19, 2021 Re-Arraignment Hearing. Having considered the foregoing, the Court finds 
that Gonzalez has failed to show Mr. Miller's decision not to file a notice of appeal . 
was either deficient or prejudicial as required under binding Fifth Circuit precedent. 
Thus, the Court finds that Claim Orie should be denied. The Court now turns to 
address Claim Two. 
B. Claim Two 
Gonzalez contends that his attorney was ineffective by "failing to seek 
deviation from the Guidelines to ensure his offense level was calculated for 
methamphetarriine mixture rather than actual methamphetamine. "9 In response, the 
Government notes for the Court a swath of binding precedent from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirming the use of the Federal Drug Tables 
9 See Pro Se Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Motion Under 28 US.C. § 2255 to Vacate, 
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, Criminal Document No. 
57 at 14. 
7 
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distinction between actual methamphetamine and methamphetamine mixtures in 
sentencing guideline calculations. See United States v. Molina, 469 F .3d 408, 413-
14 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the sentencing disparity created by the ten to one 
ratio between actual methamphetamine and a substance containing 
methamphetamine is not irrational or arbitrary and does not violate the Due Process 
Clause); see also United States v. Alcala, 668 Fed. Appx. 83 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(affirming the usage of the Federal Drug Equivalency Tables for Schedule I and II 
stimulants); see also United States v. Foulks, 747 F.3d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(noting that "[i]n the case of a mixture or substance containing ... methamphetamine, 
use the offense level determined by the entir~ weight of the mixture or substance, or 
the offense level determined by the weight of the ... methamphetamine ( actual), 
whichever is greater."). 
The Government also contends that Gonzalez fails to demonstrate how his 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a downward variance, 
because this Court had already made clear at the Sentencing Hearing that the 
imposed sentence of210 months of incarceration was an appropriate term in light of 
the relevant sentencing factors. Having considered the foregoing, the Court finds 
that Gonzalez has failed to show Mr. Miller's decision not to move for a downward 
variance at sentencing was either deficient or prejudicial as required under binding 
8 
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Fifth Circuit precedent. Thus, the Court finds that Claim Two should be denied. The 
Court will now consider Claims Three and Four. 
C. Claims Three and Four
Gonzalez further contends that Mr. Miller was ineffective by failing to object
to an upward variance Gonzalez believes was imposed by this Court. In response, 
the Government contends that such objection would be frivolous, as this Court 
sentenced Gonzalez within the guideline range. 
A review of the Final Presentence Investigation Report in this matter reveals 
that Gonzalez's guideline range was between 188 and 235 months of incarceration. 10 
The Court further notes the actions taken at the November 19, 2021 Sentencing 
Hearing, in which the Court considered the possibility of implementing an upward 
variance in this case, but ultimately sentenced Gonzalez to a term of 210 months of 
incarceration, a sentence well within the guideline range. 11 Therefore, the Court 
finds that Gonzalez cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to the imposition of an upward variance that was never imposed, or that he was 
prejudiced by such alleged failure. Thus, the Court finds that Claim Three and Four 
should be denied. The Court will now consider Claim Five. 
10 See Final Presentence Investigation Report, Criminal Document No. 28 at 16.
11 See Transcript of November 19, 20 21  Sentencing Hearing, Criminal Document
No. 47 at 1-15. 
9 
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D. Claim Five 
Gonzalez's last contention is that Mr. Miller "was ineffective because he 
failed to object when the court hampered his right to allocute."12 Gonzalez further 
contends that the Court interrupted Gonzalez and refused to allow counsel to offer 
evidence. The Government contends that Mr. Miller was not ineffective for failing 
to object when this Court, allegedly, prevented Gonzalez from discussing his 
pending state court charges at sentencing. A review of the transcript of the 
Sentencing Hearing in this case reveals that the Court did not prevent Gonzalez or 
defense counsel from discussing relevant information during sentencing. 13 The 
Court notes the unambiguous language in the transcript, showing that: (1) Mr. Miller 
was provided an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence; and (2) Gonzalez 
was permitted to speak, at length, with the assistance of Mr. Miller.14 The Court 
further notes that the Court at no point stated in any way, shape, or form, that 
Gonzalez was precluded from discussing his pending felony charges in state court at 
sentencing. Having considered the foregoing, the Court finds that Gonzalez has 
12 See Pro Se Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Motion Under 28 US. C. § 2255 to Vacate, 
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, Criminal Document No. 
57 at 17. 
13 See Transcript of November 19, 2021 Sentencing Hearing, Criminal Document 
No. 47 at 1-15. 
14 Id. 
10 
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failed to show that Mr. Miller's actions during Gonzalez's allocution was either 
deficient or prejudicial as required under binding Fifth Circuit precedent. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby 
ORDERS that Petitioner Jorge Gonzalez's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set 
Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civil Document No. 3, 
Criminal Document No. 57) is DENIED. 15
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this _/j_ day of June, 2026.
<P-�� DAVID HITTNER 
United States District Judge 
15 A district court may deny a certificate of appealability, sua sponte, without 
requiring further briefing or argument. Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 
2000). After careful review of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court concludes 
reasonable jurists would not find its assessment of the claims debatable or wrong. See Slack 
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 ("To obtain a COA under§ 2253(c), a habeas prisoner
must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration
that ... includes showing that reasonable jµrists could debate whether ... the petitioner
should have been resolved in a different manner .. .. "). Because Gonzalez does not allege
facts showing his claim could be resolved in a different manner, a certificate of
appealability will not be issued.
11 
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