govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_26-cv-01661-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
Benedict Akindutire,1  
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 26-1661 (DWF/SGE) 
MEMORANDUM 
OPINION AND ORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the Court on six motions.  Defendant Northrop Grumman 
Systems Corporation (“Northrop”) moves to dismiss part of the complaint, compel 
arbitration as to the rest of the complaint, stay the litigation, and amend the case caption.  
(Doc. No. 16.)  Pro se Plaintiff Benedict Akindutire moves to proceed under a 
pseudonym and file identifying information under seal (Doc. Nos. 3, 4, 8), to stay 
amendment of the case caption (Doc. No. 45), and for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 
No. 48).  For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part 
Northrop’s motions and denies Akindutire’s motions. 
1 Plaintiff filed under the pseudonym JLA.  For the reasons discussed below , the 
Court finds that a pseudonym is unnecessary and uses his name throughout.  The Clerk of 
Court is directed to replace “JLA, Pseudonym” with “Benedict Akindutire” on the docket. 
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BACKGROUND 
Akindutire was employed by Northrop as a Principal Engineer Quality.  (Doc. 
No. 15 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. No. 64 at 2.)  This litigation involves alleged 
discrimination and retaliation against Akindutire during his employment. 
I. Akindutire’s Employment at Northrop 
Akindutire began working at Northrop in November 2021.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 15; 
Doc. No. 64 at 2.)  His job functions included documentation integrity and contractual 
quality assurance for federal government contracts, namely Contractor Data Requirement 
List (“CDRL”), Measurement System Evaluation (“MSE”), First Article Acceptance Test 
(“FAAT”), and First Article Configuration Audit Report (“FACAR”) deliverables.  (Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16, 49.)    
Beginning in July 2023, Akindutire reported what he believed to be documentation 
deficiencies in submissions for government contracts.  (Id. ¶ 20.)  Akindutire informed 
supervisors that MSE and FAAT documentation was required for contractual compliance.  
(Id. ¶¶ 18, 26.)  He warned that incomplete documentation could result in false 
certification of claims to the government.  (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)  His supervisors, program 
manager Harsh Potlapalli and functional manager Jason Berg, told him not to pursue the 
issues further.  (See id. ¶¶ 18, 28-29.)  Berg told him not to discuss the violations with 
anyone.  (Id. ¶ 29.)  Potlapalli told him not to submit MSE documentation and to “let 
sleeping dogs lie.”  (Id. ¶¶ 19, 27-28.)   
Adverse employment actions followed Akindutire’s reports.  For the first year and 
a half of his employment, Akindutire was consistently given positive performance 
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reviews.  (Id. ¶¶ 15, 48; see also Doc. Nos. 50-1 (2022 year-end review), 50-2 (2022 mid-
year review).)  In June 2023, Akindutire was given a positive performance review that 
explicitly recognized his understanding of contractual requirements.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 48; 
see also Doc. No. 50 at 3 (2023 mid-year review).)  Then, in August 2023, following the 
reports of noncompliance, he was removed from his position on the program team.  (Am. 
Compl. ¶ 33.)  In December 2023, he received his first negative performance evaluation.  
(Id. ¶¶ 34, 53-54.)  In March 2024, Akindutire was issued a Memorandum of 
Expectations (“MOE”) which cited performance concerns.  (Id. ¶ 35; Doc. No. 64-1.2)  
The MOE listed three specific areas for improvement.  (Doc. No. 64-1 at 2.)  After thirty 
days on the MOE, Akindutire’s manager found that Akindutire had not met expectations 
and placed him on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”).  (Id. at 3; see also Am. 
Compl. ¶ 35.)  The PIP was unsuccessful.  (Doc. No. 64-2 at 2.)  On August 28, 2024, 
Northrop terminated Akindutire’s employment.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 36; Doc. No. 64-3.)  The 
termination letter specifically referenced the failed PIP as the reason for discharge.  (Doc. 
No. 64-3 at 2.)   
Akindutire alleges that these adverse actions were in part retaliation for his reports 
and in part motivated by discrimination.  (See Am. Compl. at 11.)  Akindutire is a Black 
male of Nigerian national origin.  (Id. ¶ 37.)  He alleges that a supervisor referenced his 
“culture” when questioning his learning style during disciplinary discussions.  (Id. ¶¶ 38, 
 
2  Akindutire challenges the declarati on through which the MOE and PIP were 
produced.  (Doc. No. 73 at 2-6.)  The Court does not rely on that declaration but on the 
attached exhibits, which are embraced by the complaint.  (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 53, 71.)  
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62.)  Additionally, Akindutire identifies three non-Black engineers who participated in the 
same contractual compliance functions but who faced no adverse employment action:  
Tim Spears, Jon Podolske, and Terry Koch.  (Id. ¶¶ 39, 64.)  At least two of those 
comparators reported to the same supervisor.  (Id. ¶ 40.)  One of those engineers, Koch, 
reported similar compliance concerns.  (Id. ¶ 65; see also Doc. No. 36 at 8 (identifying 
Koch).)  Further, Akindutire alleges that a supervisor expressed preference for a non-
Black engineer to assume the responsibilities taken away from Akindutire.  (Id. ¶ 61.)    
II. Procedural Posture  
Akindutire signed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
Charge of Discrimination (the “EEOC Charge”) on September 13, 2024.  (Doc. No. 20 
at 2; see Am. Compl. ¶ 12.)  The EEOC Charge alleged that Akindutire was subjected to 
different terms of employment and held to different standards than his non-Black 
counterparts.  (Doc. No. 20 at 2.)  The Charge also alleged that he complained about the 
discrimination but nothing was done in response.  (Id.)  The EEOC issued Akindutire a 
notice of right to sue.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 14; Doc. No. 2 at 2.)  He commenced this action 
within ninety days.  (See Doc. No. 1.)  Akindutire alleges discrimination in violation of 
Title VII (Count I), retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count II), retaliation in violation 
of the False Claims Act (Count III), retaliation in violation of the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Act (Count IV), and discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act (Count V).  (Am. Compl. at 11.)   
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III. Arbitration Agreement  
Upon hiring, Northrop required Akindutire to sign onboarding documentation.  
(Doc. No. 64 at 2-3.)  Akindutire electronically signed the necessary documents, 
including the Agreement Regarding At-Will Employment, Arbitration of Disputes, 
Intellectual Property Rights, and Procurement Integrity contract (the “Arbitration 
Agreement”).  (Doc. No. 22-1 (documenting Akindutire’s electronic signature); Doc. 
No. 23 (the agreement).)  The Arbitration Agreement stated:   
I agree to submit disputes between me and the company to final and 
binding arbitration in accordance w ith CTM H200:  USHR 2-32, (the 
“arbitration program”), which is inco rporated into this agreement by 
reference.  I will accept an arbitrator’s  award under the arbitration program 
as the final, binding, and exclusive de termination of such disputes, subject 
to the standards of review set forth in  the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-16, or other applicable law.  I have read the arbitration program, a 
copy of which has been provided to me with this agreement.  
 
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, I AGREE TO SUBMIT ALL 
CLAIMS COVERED BY THE ARBI TRATION PROGRAM TO FINAL 
AND BINDING ARBITRATION U NDER THAT PROGRAM.  BY 
DOING THIS, I AM GIVING UP ANY RIGHT TO HA VE SUCH 
CLAIMS DECIDED BY A COURT OR JURY .  
 
(Doc. No. 23 ¶ 4.)   
The human resources manual incorporated by reference is the Arbitration and 
Mediation manual (the “Manual”).  (Doc. No. 23-1.)  The Manual thoroughly describes 
the arbitration process.  Specifically, the Manual states that the arbitration program 
“covers and applies to any claim, controversy, or dispute, past, present, or future:  
[w]hich in any way arises out of, relates to, or is associated with your employment with 
the company, the termination of your employment, or any communications with third 
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parties regarding or related to your employment.”  (Id. at 3.)  Examples of claims that are 
covered are provided, including claims for “[u]nlawful discrimination or harassment, 
including but not limited to discrimination or harassment based on race, sex, religion, 
national origin, age, disability, or any other status as protected and defined by applicable 
law,” “[u]nlawful retaliation,” and “[a]ny violation of applicable federal, state, or local 
law, statute, ordinance, or regulation.”  (Id.)   
Claims which are exempted from arbitration include any claim “[a]s to which an 
agreement to arbitrate such claims is prohibited by law.”  (Id.)  Namely, “no employee is 
required to arbitrate any claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort 
related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including assault and battery, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, or negligent hiring, 
supervision, or retention.”  (Id.)  The Manual explains that such exemption “is intended 
to implement the provisions of Public Law 111 P.L. 118, popularly known as the Franken 
Amendment, and shall be interpreted and applied consistently with the scope of the 
Franken Amendment.”  (Id.)   
The Manual also explains that the arbitration requirements survive the 
employment relationship.  (Id. at 4.)  Arbitration applies “to any covered claim whether it 
arises or is asserted during or after termination of [the employee’s] employment with the 
company.”  (Id.)   
Finally, the Manual explains the rights to injunctive relief pending arbitration:  
“[t]o the fullest extent permitted by law in the jurisdiction where the arbitration is held 
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. . .  either party retains all rights to seek a preliminary injunction or other provisional 
relief to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of the arbitration.”  (Id.)  
The Manual was updated at the end of 2023.  (Doc. No. 23-2 at 2.)  The relevant 
terms did not change as a result of that update.  Akindutire was not required to sign new 
employment contracts indicating assent to the terms of the updated Manual.  (See Doc. 
No. 22-1.)  However, both the Manual and its updated version specified that “[b]y 
accepting or continuing employment, employees covered by this Program agree to submit 
any covered claims to binding arbitration, rather than to have such claims heard by a 
court, jury, or government agency.”  (Doc. No. 23-1 at 4; Doc. No. 23-2 at 4.)  Akinditure 
continued to work at Northrop for another eight months after the updated Manual was 
issued.   
DISCUSSION 
There are various overlapping motions before the Court.  The Court begins with 
the merits of Akindutire’s Title VII claims.  (See Doc. No. 16.)  The Court then turns to 
the arbitrability of his non-Title VII claims and Northrop’s request to stay the litigation 
pending arbitration.  (See id.)  The Court then turns to Akindutire’s motion for 
preliminary injunction seeking emergency relief in the form of reinstatement.  (See Doc. 
No. 48.)  And, finally, the Court ends with the motions relating to Akindutire’s ability to 
proceed under a pseudonym and to file identifying information under seal.  (See Doc. 
Nos. 3, 4, 8, 16, 45.)   
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I. Motion to Dismiss 
A. Legal Standard  
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in 
the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the 
light most favorable to the complainant.  Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 
1986).  In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory 
allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), 
or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v. City of 
Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).  A court may also consider certain matters 
outside of the pleadings, including matters of public record or materials embraced by the 
complaint.  See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007).  Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must 
contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”  Id. at 555.  As the Supreme Court reiterated, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster 
under Twombly.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555).  In sum, this standard “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
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B. Title VII Exhaustion 
As a preliminary issue, Title VII claims require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.  To bring a Title VII claim in court, an employee must first file a charge with 
the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(1); see also, e.g., Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 898 
(8th Cir. 2024).  Each discrete discriminatory action must be alleged in a charge to be 
properly exhausted.  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-14 
(2002).  However, a plaintiff may bring claims that grow out of or are reasonably related 
to the substance of the administrative charge.  E.g., Ringhofer, 102 F.4th at 898-99.   
Akindutire was issued a notice of his right to sue based off the EEOC Charge.  The 
EEOC Charge alleged discrimination which is now the basis of Count I, so Akindutire’s 
discrimination claim was properly exhausted.  However, the EEOC Charge did not 
address retaliation.  And because the EEOC Charge was filed after his termination, it is 
not reasonably related to the charge.  See Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 
672-73 (8th Cir. 2006).  Akindutire’s Title VII retaliation claim was not properly 
exhausted and is therefore dismissed.3  Further, the 300-day statute of limitations to bring 
 
3  Akindutire filed a supplemental brief in which he argued for the first time that he 
met exhaustion requirements by filing a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”).  (See Doc. No. 73 
at 14-18.)  However, the OFCCP complaint was not mentioned in his amended complaint 
and will therefore not be considered by the Court.  See Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 
944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting that courts cannot consider facts not in or 
embraced by the complaint at the motion to dismiss stage).  Moreover, even for pro se 
litigants, the Court need not consider completely new arguments in response briefing, let 
alone supplemental briefing.  E.g., Jones v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 541, 549 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (explaining that arguments raised for the first time in reply briefing are 
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a retaliation claim has expired, so the claim is dismissed with prejudice.4  See, e.g., 
Perkins v. City of Minneapolis, No. 23-cv-3810, 2025 WL 331858, at *6 (D. Minn. 
Jan. 29, 2025) (dismissing a Title VII claim with prejudice because the statute of 
limitations had expired). 
C. Title VII Discrimination Claim  
In Count I, Akindutire alleges that Northrop discriminated against him on the basis 
of race and national origin in violation of Title VII.  (Am. Compl. at 11.)  Title VII 
prohibits discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).  To state a claim under Title VII for discrimination, a plaintiff must show 
that he “(1) is within the protected class, (2) was qualified to perform the job, (3) suffered 
an adverse employment action, and (4) has facts that give rise to an inference of 
discrimination.”  Takele v. Mayo Clinic, 576 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2009).  The first three 
elements are undisputed.  (See Doc. No. 18 at 10-12.)  Akindutire is a Black male of 
Nigerian national origin, who had satisfactory performance reviews, but was 
subsequently terminated.  See, e.g., Smith v. Mayo Clinic, 158 F. Supp. 3d 764, 770 
 
generally not considered); see also Jackson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 131 F.3d 143, at *2 
(8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam unpublished table decision) (declining to consider a new 
argument from a pro se litigant raised in supplemental briefing).  The OFCCP-exhaustion 
theory is dismissed as improperly raised. 
4  Even if the Court considered the OFCCP complaint, which was timely filed, the 
OFCCP complaint was closed.  (See Doc. No. 70-1.)  And Akindutire abandoned that 
complaint with the EEOC when he filed the EEOC Charge.  See generally Hussey v. 
Vantage Fin., LLC, No. 24-cv-3679, 2025 WL 2336980, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2025) 
(discussing abandonment of EEOC claims).  There is no open retaliation complaint for 
Akindutire to pursue. 
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(D. Minn. 2016).  The question for the Court is whether the facts as alleged give rise to 
an inference of discrimination.  Such an inference can be shown in a variety of ways, 
including more favorable treatment of similarly-situated employees not in the protected 
class, biased comments from a decisionmaker, failure to follow internal policies, or 
shifting explanations of the employment decision.  See, e.g., Grant v. City of Blytheville, 
841 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussing the flexible evidentiary standard).   
The complaint identifies three engineers (Spears, Podolske, and Koch) who 
worked on the same contracts and did not face adverse employment actions, at least one 
of whom (Koch) reported similar compliance concerns.  Allegations regarding Spears and 
Podolske are irrelevant because they did not report any compliance concerns and 
therefore did not engage in similar conduct.  However, the allegations that Koch 
participated in FAAT, FACAR, and related compliance, reported to the same supervisor, 
and reported compliance concerns is sufficient pleading to establish that Akindutire was 
similarly situated to Koch.  See Edmonds v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch. Dist. 1, 
368 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1339 (D. Minn. 2018) (“A similarly situated employee is one who 
is not a member of the protected group and who dealt with the same supervisor, was 
subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or 
distinguishing circumstances.” (citation modified)).  The complaint further alleges that 
Koch faced no disciplinary action, yet Akindutire did, which establishes differential 
treatment between similarly-situated employees.  See, e.g., Carter v. Pulaski Cnty. 
Special Sch. Dist., 956 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Employees are similarly 
situated only when they are similarly situated in all relevant respects and are involved in 
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or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways.” (citation 
modified)).  The facts as pled create an inference of discrimination based on favorable 
treatment of a similarly-situated employee.   
Akindutire has pled sufficient facts to sustain a Title VII racial discrimination 
claim.  The Court need not consider Akindutire’s other examples of alleged 
discrimination.  Northrop’s motion to dismiss is denied as to Count I.   
II. Motion to Compel Arbitration  
A. Legal Standard 
A motion to compel arbitration is evaluated under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure either as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or as a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment, depending on whether the Court considers matters outside of the 
pleadings.  Seldin v. Seldin, 879 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 2018); City of Benkelman v. 
Baseline Eng’g Corp., 867 F.3d 875, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2017).  The parties have presented 
and the Court has considered matters outside of the pleadings,5 so the Court treats this 
motion as one for summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also City of 
Benkelman, 867 F.3d at 882. 
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a); Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996).  A 
party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must demonstrate the 
 
5  Neither the Arbitration Agreement nor th e incorporated Manual were embraced by 
the complaint.  (See Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)  
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existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial.  Krenik v. 
County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).  “[A] genuine issue of material fact 
exists if:  (1) there is a dispute of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of 
the case; and (3) the dispute is genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for either party.”  RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th 
Cir. 1995).  The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably 
drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Weitz Co. v. 
Lloyd’ s of London, 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009). 
B. Analysis  
A district court’s role in a motion to compel arbitration is limited to determining 
(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement 
encompasses the dispute.  9 U.S.C. § 2; see also, e.g., Foster v. Walmart, Inc., 15 F.4th 
860, 862 (8th Cir. 2021).  These “threshold questions of arbitrability are for a court to 
decide, unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence the parties intended to commit 
questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.”  Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v. FJM Props. 
of Willmar, LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014).  The question of whether a valid 
agreement exists is governed by state law; the question of whether a dispute falls within 
the scope of that agreement is governed by federal law.  Donaldson Co. v. Burroughs 
Diesel, Inc., 581 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2009). 
1. Validity of the Arbitration Agreement 
Through the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), Congress established a strong 
federal policy favoring arbitration.  See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
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482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).  The FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  This provision reflects “both a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration, and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of 
contract.”  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citation 
modified).  “[A] court will enforce an arbitration agreement unless a party can show it 
will not be able to vindicate its rights in the arbitral forum.”  Siebert v. Amateur Athletic 
Union of the U.S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038 (D. Minn. 2006) (citing Green Tree 
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).  
Because arbitration agreements are contracts, there must be mutual assent of the 
parties.6  Foster, 15 F.4th at 863.  Under Minnesota law, a party’s assent to a contract is 
judged by the party’s objective, rather than subjective, intent.  Siebert, 422 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1039; Riley Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Shuck, 704 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).  
Akindutire electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement after being presented with the 
terms.  That affirmative action expressed assent to arbitration.  See Jordan v. Best Buy 
Co., No. 24-cv-1066, 2025 WL 580894, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2025) (discussing assent 
to internet contracts).  Further, that signature indicated that he read and understood that 
 
6  The Arbitration Agreement is governed by Virginia law, per the choice-of-law 
provision.  (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 14.)  However, the parties both use Minnesota law in briefing.  
(See Doc. No. 18 at 19-23; Doc. No. 38.)  The Court therefore applies Minnesota law 
when determining the validity of the agreement.  Regardless, the outcome would be the 
same under Virginia law.  See, e.g., Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc., 661 S.E.2d 404, 409 
(Va. 2008) (requiring mutual assent and explaining that mutual assent is determined by 
outward expressions of the parties’ intentions).   
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the Arbitration Agreement incorporated the Manual.  The Manual was provided to 
Akindutire and explained the details of the arbitration program.  See Halbach v. Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] writing may 
incorporate another document if the terms of the incorporated document are known or 
easily available to the contracting parties.”).  By signing the Arbitration Agreement, 
Akindutire agreed to be bound by the Manual.  Cf. Donelson v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 999 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding that plaintiff agreed to terms 
incorporated by reference into the arbitration agreement).  Additionally, by continuing 
employment after the Manual was updated, Akindutire expressed assent to the updated 
terms.  See Zhang v. UnitedHealth Grp., 367 F. Supp. 3d 910, 914-15 (D. Minn. 2019) 
(finding that continued employment is consideration for employment contract terms and 
explaining that unilateral modification of employment terms is permitted).  Even if the 
updated Manual had made substantive changes to the arbitration requirements, Akindutire 
would still be bound by those new terms.   
Akindutire posits various arguments regarding validity of the Arbitration 
Agreement.  First, he argues that he was given the documents without any ability to 
modify terms, and he therefore did not assent to the terms.  This argument fails because 
Akindutire chose to agree to the terms in exchange for employment.  Second, Akindutire 
argues that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because the purposes of the False 
Claims Act and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act would be frustrated by private 
arbitration.  Neither law bars arbitration explicitly and Akindutire agreed to a clear waiver 
of the right to public proceedings by signing the Arbitration Agreement.  Given the FAA’s 
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strong policy favoring arbitration, the Court finds that those claims may be arbitrated.  
Third, he asks for discovery to determine the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement.  
Everything the Court needs to determine enforceability has already been presented.  None 
of Akindutire’s arguments hold water.   
There is a valid arbitration agreement between Akindutire and Northrop.  The 
Court now turns to whether the dispute at hand falls within the scope of that agreement. 
2. Application of the Arbitration Agreement  
A party can only be compelled to submit to arbitration in situations in which they 
agreed to be subject to an arbitration agreement.  See Parm v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 
898 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2018).  But when a valid arbitration agreement exists, as it 
does here, a court must “liberally construe” it, “resolving any doubts in favor of 
arbitration.”  Id. (quoting Unison Co. v. Juhl Energy Dev., Inc., 789 F.3d 816, 818 (8th 
Cir. 2015)).  Only if it can be said with “positive assurance that the arbitration clause is 
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute” will a court find that 
the dispute falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  3M Co. v. Amtex Sec., Inc., 
542 F.3d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting MedCam, Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972, 975 
(8th Cir. 2005)).  In deciding whether a dispute falls within the scope, courts first ask 
whether the arbitration clause is broad or narrow.  Fleet Tire Serv. of North Little Rock v. 
Oliver Rubber Co., 118 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1997).  If the clause is broad, a court must 
send a claim to arbitration “as long as the underlying factual allegations simply touch 
matters covered by the arbitration provision.”  Parm, 898 F.3d at 874 (quoting Unison 
Co., 789 F.3d at 818).  If the clause is narrow, the court must decide if the dispute 
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involves an agreement collateral to the arbitration clause.  Fleet Tire, 118 F.3d at 621.  
Plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of proving that a dispute does not fall within the scope of 
an agreement.  Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91. 
The Arbitration Agreement states that it applies to “ALL CLAIMS COVERED BY 
THE ARBITRATION PROGRAM.”  (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 4.)  The Manual further explains 
that arbitration is required for “any claim, controversy, or dispute, past, present, or future 
which in any way arises out of, relates to, or is associated with” employment at Northrop.  
(Doc. No. 23-1 at 3.)  These statements constitute broad language.  See Fleet Tire, 118 
F.3d at 621 (finding that the phrase “relating to” “constitutes the broadest language the 
parties could reasonably use”); Parm, 898 F.3d at 872, 874-75 (finding that a clause 
which covered claims “arising out of or relating to” the agreement was clearly broad).   
With this broad language in mind, the Court must consider whether Akindutire’s 
claims, and the underlying factual allegations, “touch matters covered by the arbitration 
provision.”  Parm, 898 F.3d at 875 (quoting Unison Co., 789 F.3d at 818).  This case far 
surpasses that bar.  Akindutire’s claims involve action he took as an employee at 
Northrop and Northrop’s responses.  Further, the claims squarely fall within the examples 
of unlawful discrimination and retaliation in the Manual.  It does not matter that 
Akindutire has since been terminated and therefore has no current relationship with 
Northrop.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 
1290 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The language of the agreement is broad and the term ‘arising out 
of’ contemplates that for some controversies the arbitration agreement will survive the 
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employment relationship.”).  Akindutire’s non-Title VII claims are clearly within the 
scope of the Arbitration Agreement.   
Akindutire contends that his claims fall within the Franken Amendment exception 
to the Arbitration Agreement.  The Franken Amendment limits federal funding to 
contractors who require arbitration of Title VII claims related to sexual assault and sexual 
harassment.  Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 
§ 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-55 (2009).  It was enacted in response to the rape of a 
federal contractor’s employee.  See Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory Arbitration 
and Sexual Harassment Claims:  #MeToo- and Time’ s Up-Inspired Action Against the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2653, 2669-72 (2019) (discussing the 
Franken Amendment and its history).  It was not intended to cover discrimination claims 
based on race or national origin.  See id. at 2672.  Both the text of the Franken 
Amendment and the Manual provision incorporating the amendment clarify that the 
exception is only for claims relating to sexual assault and sexual harassment.  
Akindutire’s claim does not involve either, so the Franken Amendment is inapplicable.   
Having determined that the Arbitration Agreement between Akindutire and 
Northrop is valid and that the dispute is within the scope of the agreement, the Court 
grants Northrop’s motion to compel arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 4.  Counts III, IV , and V of 
the amended complaint shall be arbitrated.   
The arbitrated claims are stayed pending arbitration.  Additionally, the parties 
agree that the non-arbitrated claims should also be stayed.  (See Doc. No. 18 at 24-25; 
Doc. No. 38 at 11.)  The Court stays Count I pending arbitration. 
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III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
Akindutire asks the Court for a preliminary injunction reinstating him to his 
position at Northrop.   
A. Relief for Counts III-V 
When claims are arbitrable, a district court does not have power to grant injunctive 
relief.  Merrill Lynch, 726 F.2d at 1292.  The reason is that the judicial inquiry necessary 
may require consideration of the merits which should be left to the arbitrator.  Id.; see 
also Manhattan Grp., LLC v. Automoblox Co., No. 10-cv-3918, 2010 WL 5625960, 
at *4-7 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2010).  There is an exception to that rule when the parties 
have contemplated injunctive relief in their arbitration agreement.  Merrill Lynch, 726 
F.2d at 1291-92.  This exception only applies if the agreement includes “qualifying 
contractual language,” clear language allowing a court to grant injunctive relief without 
addressing the underlying merits of the arbitrable dispute.  Manion v. Nagin, 255 
F.3d 535, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 
36 F.3d 46, 47 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (defining “qualifying contractual language”).   
Here, the Manual does consider injunctive relief.  Parties retain the right to seek a 
preliminary injunction “to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of arbitration.”  
(Doc. No. 23-1 at 4.)  This is qualifying contractual language because it specifies the 
relief available.  See Manhattan Grp., 2010 WL 5625960, at *5-6 (differentiating 
between language creating a mere right to seek injunctive relief and language specifying 
relief to which parties are entitled).  Contrast Peabody Coalsales, 36 F.3d at 47-48 
(compelling injunctive relief because the contract specified that parties would continue 
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performance of their respective obligations pending dispute resolution), with Manion, 255 
F.3d at 538-39 (affirming denial of injunctive relief because the contract gave only a 
general right to injunctive relief).  The Court does not need to consider the underlying 
merits of the arbitrable claims in order to enforce the status quo.   
However, Akindutire’s procedural adequacy is not the end of the Court’s inquiry.  
Akindutire is only entitled to relief that enforces the status quo.  The status quo is his 
termination.  Akindutire has not been employed by Northrop for almost two full years.  
To reinstate him would disrupt current operations and undo the termination that occurred 
before he filed suit.  Cf. Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 707 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of reinstatement because plaintiff’s termination was the 
status quo).  Akindutire is not entitled to injunctive relief on the arbitrated claims.   
B. Relief for Count I  
As to the remaining, non-arbitrated claim, the Court denies the request because 
Akindutire has not shown that justice requires his reinstatement.  The Court considers 
four factors in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction:  (1) the threat of 
irreparable harm to the moving party; (2) the balance between this harm and the injury 
that granting the injunction would inflict on the nonmoving party; (3) the moving party’s 
likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) the public interest.  Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. 
C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc).  No one factor is 
determinative.  The central question is whether justice requires preserving the status quo 
until the merits are determined.  Id.  A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary 
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remedy,” and the moving party bears the burden to establish these factors.  Watkins Inc. v. 
Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). 
“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically 
because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.”  Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’ s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009); Mgmt. Registry, 
Inc. v. A.W. Cos., 920 F.3d 1181, 1183 (8th Cir. 2019).  The harm cannot be speculative—
it must be “certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need 
for equitable relief.”  Iowa Utils. Bd. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th 
Cir. 1996).  Loss of reputation and goodwill can constitute irreparable harm.  United 
Healthcare Ins. Co. v. AdvancePCS, 316 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 2002).   
Akindutire alleged that he faces professional harms but put forth no specific 
examples sufficient to establish irreparable harm.  He did not point to any specific job 
opportunity he lost because of his termination, nor did he point to any example of how 
his reputation has been tarnished.  (See Doc. No. 51 ¶¶ 33-38.)  These general fears are 
too speculative to establish threat of irreparable harm.  Cf. Watkins, 346 F.3d at 846 
(finding plaintiffs’ general allegations about lost business goodwill failed to establish 
irreparable harm).  It was Akindutire’s burden to prove irreparable harm and he has failed 
to do so.  See Roudachevski, 648 F.3d at 706-07.   
Moreover, his harms are compensable with monetary damages.  Akindutire 
identifies lost salary and lost health insurance, retirement, and other employment benefits 
as financial harm.  (Doc. No. 51 ¶ 36.)  These are exactly the types of financially 
compensable harms that make a preliminary injunction inappropriate.  E.g., Wells Fargo 
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Ins. Servs. USA, Inc. v. King, No. 15-cv-4378, 2016 WL 299013, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 
2016) (“By definition, lost profits are ‘reparable’ through money damages.”).  Similarly, 
the reputational harms and lost advancement opportunities are compensable monetarily.  
Cf. Carhart v. Smith, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1061 (D. Neb. 2001) (finding that 
reputational harms from employment termination could be adequately addressed after 
trial).  Plaintiff has not shown that reinstatement is necessary today.   
The absence of irreparable harm alone is enough reason to deny a motion for 
preliminary injunction.  Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114 n.9; Watkins, 346 F.3d at 844.  
Because Akindutire cannot show irreparable harm, the Court need not analyze the 
remaining factors.  The Court respectfully denies his motion. 
IV . Motions Regarding Plaintiff’s Identity  
 Lastly, Akindutire moves to proceed under a pseudonym and to file documents 
under seal.  (Doc. Nos. 3, 4, 8.)  He argues that publication of his identity would risk 
professional reputational harm, such as inability to find new employment.  In opposition, 
Northrop moves to amend the case caption to include Akindutire’s name.  (Doc. No. 16.)   
There is a strong presumption against use of a pseudonym in litigation.  See 
Cajune v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 194, 105 F.4th 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2024).  The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure dictate that a complaint must name all parties.  Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(a).  
Further, there is a First Amendment interest in the public identification of parties.  See 
Doe v. Zinke, No. 17-cv-2017, 2018 WL 1189341, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2018).  
However, the Court may allow a party to proceed pseudonymously if the “need for 
anonymity outweighs countervailing interests in full disclosure.”  Cajune, 105 F.4th 
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at 1077.  Factors relevant to that inquiry include the sensitivity of the information, 
potential prejudice to the defendant, and the public interest.  Id.; see also Doe v. Innovate 
Fin., Inc., No. 21-cv-1754, 2022 WL 673582, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2022).   
This case does warrant such treatment.  Akindutire’s claims are typical of an 
employment discrimination and retaliation case, and such cases are generally not pursued 
under a pseudonym.  Zinke, 2018 WL 1189341, at *2 (denying motion to proceed with a 
pseudonym for gender-based employment discrimination and retaliation claims).  Even 
accepting that reputational harms are heightened in the government contract industry, 
such harms do not outweigh interests in public litigation.  Cf. Innovate Fin., 2022 
WL 673582, at *3 (allowing use of a pseudonym because the case involved allegations of 
sexual abuse and harassment).  Akindutire argues that his race and national origin 
constitute sensitive information requiring extra protection, but he has not shown a 
likelihood of harm motivated by racial animus.  Cf. Cajune, 105 F.4th at 1078 (finding 
that general references to harm were insufficient to establish a compelling fear of future 
harm, even when the plaintiffs seeking anonymity had alleged past physical harm).  
Further, Akindutire faces no retaliation specific to pursuing this case.  Indeed, he claims 
that the retaliation already occurred when Northrop terminated him; he cannot be 
terminated twice.  Akindutire has not overcome the presumption for public litigation.  
Akindutire’s motions to proceed under a pseudonym are denied and Nortrop’s motion to 
amend the caption is granted.  For the same reasons, Akindutire’s motions to file 
information under seal are likewise denied.   
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 Additionally, Akindutire requests that any case caption amendment be stayed until 
arbitration is complete.  (Doc. No. 45.)  He argues that the caption amendment should not 
occur before other procedural hurdles are met, specifically a decision on the validity of 
the Arbitration Agreement.  As discussed above, the Court currently has sufficient 
information to determine the validity of the Arbitration Agreement and found that it is 
valid.  That justification is moot.  Further, amending the case caption should not wait 
until arbitration closes.  Judicial efficiency is best served by addressing administrative 
matters as soon as practicable.  Amending the caption is practicable now.  Akindutire’s 
motion to stay the amendment is denied.   
CONCLUSION 
The Court dismisses Akindutire’s Title VII retaliation claim but Akindutire’s Title 
VII discrimination claim survives.  The Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement is 
valid and applies to the dispute at hand, and therefore compels the non-Title VII claims to 
arbitration.  Akindutire is not entitled to injunctive relief pending arbitration.  
Akindutire’s requests for anonymity are denied.  Finally, this matter is stayed pending 
resolution through arbitration.   
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that: 
1. Defendant Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation’s motion to dismiss 
(Doc. No. [16]) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 
a. The motion is GRANTED as to Count II. 
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b. The motion is respectfully DENIED as to Count I. 
2. Plaintiff Benedict Akindutire’s claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII 
(Count II) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  
3. Defendant Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation’s motion to compel 
arbitration (Doc. No. [16]) is GRANTED. 
4. This matter is STAYED pending resolution via arbitration. 
5. Plaintiff Benedict Akindutire’s motions to proceed under a pseudonym 
(Doc. Nos. [3], [4]) are respectfully DENIED.  
6. Plaintiff Benedict Akindutire’s motions to file identifying information 
under seal (Doc. Nos. [3], [8]) are respectfully DENIED.  
7. Defendant Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation’s motion to amend the 
case caption (Doc. No. [16]) is GRANTED. 
8. Plaintiff Benedict Akindutire’s motion to stay any requirement to amend the 
case caption (Doc. No. [45]) is respectfully DENIED.  
9. The Clerk of Court is directed to replace “JLA, Pseudonym” with “Benedict 
Akindutire” on the docket.   
10. Plaintiff Benedict Akindutire’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 
No. [48]) is respectfully DENIED.  
 
Dated:  June 9, 2026    s/Donovan W. Frank    
DONOV AN W. FRANK 
United States District Judge 
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