govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_22-cv-06274-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
H.D., et al, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
WEST ORANGE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 22-6274 (JXN)(JBC) 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
NEALS, District Judge 
This is a motion for reconsideration. On May 4, 2026, the Court affirmed Magistrate Judge 
Clark’s December 9, 2024 Order denying, in relevant part, Plaintiffs H.D. and N.A. on behalf of 
N.D.’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) motion to compel discovery from Defendant West Orange Board 
of Education (“Board”). (ECF Nos. 61, 62.) Plaintiffs now move for the Court to reconsider 
affirming Judge Clark. ( See ECF No. 66.) The Board did not file a response. The Court has 
carefully considered Plaintiffs’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons that 
follow, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statement of Facts 
At the time Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, N.D. was a ninth grader in the West Orange school 
district. (Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1.) H.D. and N.A. are N.D.’s parents. (Id. ¶ 7.) N.D. was diagnosed 
with auditory processing disorder (“APD”). ( Id. ¶ 9.) During the summer of 2019, the Board 
 
1 “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. PageID:
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offered N.D. an individualized education plan (“IEP”), which H.D. and N.A. objected to. ( Id. ¶ 
10.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege the Board forced N.D. into the IEP as “retaliation.” (Id. ¶ 11.) 
Plaintiffs filed a due process petition contesting the IEP, which proceeded before an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 2 ( Id. ¶ 16.) The ALJ held a settlement conference, which 
Plaintiffs claim resulted in an oral settlement (“Oral Agreement”). (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Plaintiffs allege 
the ALJ memorialized the terms of the Oral Agreement on the record. ( Id. ¶ 19.) However, 
Plaintiffs assert that the Board later approved a settlement document (“Approved Settlement”) that 
materially differed from the Oral Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) 
After the Board offered N.D. another IEP, Plaintiffs filed another due process petition to 
an ALJ3 and moved to enforce the Oral Agreement. (Id. ¶ 25.) The ALJ denied Plaintiffs’ motion 
to enforce the Oral Agreement in a June 9, 2022 Order. ( See Jun. 9, 2022 Order, ECF No. 1 -3 at 
*1–10.) The ALJ concluded that, based on well-established contract formation principles, “it [was] 
apparent that there was no enforceable contract formed between [Plaintiffs] and the Board during” 
the settlement conference before the ALJ. (Id. at 9.) First, the ALJ found that 
a review of the transcript and subsequent communications between [Plaintiffs] and 
[the Board] clearly establishes that the terms put on the record were not intended to 
be final. The record reveals that [the Board’s attorney] was expressly instructed by 
[the ALJ] to memorialize the terms discussed on the record into a written settlement 
agreement. During this appearance [the ALJ] also stated: “I look forward to seeing 
the settlement agreement and I look forward to getting it signed and be done with.” 
 
(Id.) The ALJ also noted that 
counsel for the Board lacks the authority to agree to a settlement agreement without 
first obtaining the Board’s approval. While [Plaintiffs] explicitly agreed to the 
terms that were put on the record, the Board did not. Board counsel sent a written 
memorialization to [Plaintiffs] on October 7, 2020, which [Plaintiffs] expressly 
rejected. 
 
 
2 ALJ Thomas Betancourt initially heard the matter. 
3 Following ALJ Betancourt’s recusal, ALJ Julio C. Morejon heard this matter. PageID:
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(Id.) Because the parties agreed that terms of the Approved Settlement differed from the Oral 
Agreement, the parties lacked mutual assent, and the Oral Agreement was unenforceable. ( Id. at 
10.) 
 Two months later, the ALJ consolidated several petitions filed by Plaintiffs in an August 
31, 2022 Consolidation Order. ( See Aug. 31, 2022 Order, ECF No. 1 -3 at *11–22.) Finally, on 
September 13, 2022, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ consolidated petitions. (See Sept. 13, 2022 Order, ECF No. 1-3 at *28–50.) 
B. Procedural History 
On October 26, 2022, Plaintiffs brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Plaintiffs appealed: (1) the ALJ’s June 9, 2022 Order 
denying Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the Oral Agreement; (2) the ALJ’s August 31, 2022 Order 
consolidating Plaintiffs’ petitions; and (3) the September 13, 2022 Order granting the Board’s 
motion for summary disposition. (See Compl.) 
The matter proceeded to discovery, where three disputes arose about the adequacy of the 
Board’s responses to Plaintiffs’ requests. (See Pls.’ Mot. to Compel., ECF No. 39; Def.’s Opp’n, 
ECF No. 40.) First, Plaintiffs sought responses to their interrogatories from two Board employees 
and a former Board member —none of whom are parties to the current action. ( See Pls.’ First 
Interrogs., ECF No. 32.) The Board’s current Executive Director of Special Services answered the 
Interrogatories and provided objections. ( See Def.’s Reply to Interrogs., ECF No. 58- 1 at *123–
25.) 
Next, Plaintiffs’ Document Request No. 1 sought all, 
Written procedures, policies, directives, rules, and protocols issued by the [Board] 
concerning the delegation of due process and dispute resolution, encompassing 
aspects such as legal authority and responsibility, delegation of authority, PageID:
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settlement authority, reporting requirements, approval process, confidentiality and 
privilege, and review and evaluation, particularly concerning special education. 
 
(Req. for Docs. at *3, ECF No. 31- 2.) The Board responded that no such documents were within 
its care, custody, or control. ( See Def.’s Opp’n at 2.) However, the Board consented to Plaintiffs 
“propounding an additional interrogatory . . . addressing this information.” (Id.) 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ Document Request No. 3 sought, 
A copy of the [Board’s] regulations, policies, practices, and procedures for special 
education, consistent with New Jersey laws and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA). This should include, but not be limited to, guidelines for 
assessments and the foundation for Individualized Education Program (IEP) 
planning, criteria for selecting members of the IEP team, and the responsibilities of 
case managers, service providers and teachers….etc. 
 
(Req. for Docs. at *3.) The Board produced “all District Policies relating in any way to special 
education.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 2.) However, the Board explained that “[n]o other documents 
responsive to Request No. 3 are in the Board’s care, custody, or control.” (Id.) 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the non- party Board employees and 
members to answer Plaintiffs’ interrogatories, to compel production of documents responsive to 
Requests Nos. 1 and 3, and to disqualify the Board’s counsel due to a purported conflict of interest. 
(See Pls.’ Mot. at 3–4.) The Board opposed. (See Def.’s Opp’n.) 
Judge Clark held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion on December 9, 2024. (See Tr., ECF No. 
58-1.) Starting with the motion to compel discovery, Judge Clark remarked that 
Interrogatory Request Number 1 sought Board written procedures, policies, 
directive, rules and protocols concerning legal authority and responsibility, 
delegation of authority, settlement authority, reporting requirements, approval 
process, confidentiality and privilege, and review and evaluation, particularly 
concerning special education. 
 
That is, frankly, overbroad. There ’s no way any person to whom that was 
directed would be able to answer that with any confidence that they were giving 
you what you need and what you are entitled to. PageID:
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(Id. at 3:16–4:1.) After the Board’s counsel stated that all documents the Board produced were 
responsive to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory, Judge Clark addressed Plaintiffs and stated: 
If [the Board’s attorney] has represented, as an officer of the Court, that he has 
given you everything that he ’s got, it’s time to move on. There is -- I mean, I am 
not even sure that there is an entitlement to discovery in this kind of a case. This is 
an administrative review of a decision by a board of education in the state court, 
and we provided a -- or we permitted discovery so that there wouldn’t be any loose 
ends. 
 
But, again, I could have forced everybody to brief the question of whether 
there’s even an entitlement to discovery here. And I am not sure what the answer 
would be. But [the Board’s attorney] agreed to provide what he has to you. He has 
represented that he’s provided what he has to you. There is nowhere else to go with 
this. I mean, I can engage in procedural niceties for another six months, and you’re 
just postponing your opportunity to make a summary judgment and have this thing 
decided by Judge Neals. So at this point, that’s where I’m going. I’m going to give 
you dates to file summary judgment motions and let the judge decide this dispute. 
 
(Id. at 5:20–6:14.) After denying Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery, Judge Clark turned to 
Plaintiffs’ motions to disqualify the Board’s counsel and for sanctions. He denied both, stating: 
I don’t see any grounds for granting a motion for disqualification of counsel. The 
knowledge that counsel ’s alleged to have is the knowledge that any counsel who 
handles cases at the administrative level and at the district court level would have, 
and we don’t disqualify counsel for those reasons. 
 
And I don’t see any ground for imposing sanctions on either side. I have 
every reason to believe that [the Board’s counsel] received the requests from 
[Plaintiffs], has provided what he ’s got, and it ’s time to move on to summary 
judgment motions. 
 
(Id. at 7:25–8:10.) Judge Clark then set a January 31, 2025 filing date for summary judgment 
motions. (Id. at 8:22.) Judge Clark memorialized his decision in a December 9, 2024 Order. (Dec. 
9, 2024 Order, ECF No. 47.) 
Plaintiffs timely appealed the Order, but failed to provide a transcript of the December 9, 
2024 conference. (See Sept. 15 Order, ECF No. 56.) The Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal PageID:
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without prejudice to refile with the transcript. ( Id.) Plaintiffs then refiled their appeal on October 
13, 2025. (See Pls.’ Appeal, ECF No. 58.) 
This Court affirmed Judge Clark in a May 5, 2026 Opinion and Order. (See Op., ECF No. 
61; Order, ECF No. 62.) The Court found that Judge Clark did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion 
to compel responses to Document Requests Nos. 1 and 3. Specifically, the Court determined Judge 
Clark did not abuse his discretion in concluding that Request No. 1 was “vague, spans a potentially 
enormous number of documents, has no temporal limitation, and would unduly burden the Board, 
considering the limited relevance of those documents to an IDEA appeal,” and that the Board 
provided all responsive documents to both requests. (Op. at 7–8.) 
On May 13, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. (See Pls.’ Recons. Mot., ECF No. 
66.) Plaintiffs claim the Court overlooked the following arguments, which appeared in their appeal 
as follows: 
Additionally, [the Board] failed to: 
 
• Certify interrogatory answers under oath (Rule 33(b)(3)–(5)); 
• Provide a privilege log (Rule 26(b)(5)); and 
• Produce unredacted minutes and internal communications necessary to evaluate 
the disputed settlement agreement. 
 
(Pls.’ Appeal at 4.) Plaintiffs further claim that the Court incorrectly considered those arguments 
“newly raised.” (Pls.’ Moving Br. at 4, ECF No. 66-1.) And Plaintiffs request the Court correct an 
error in stating the summary judgment deadline Judge Clark set. (Id.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration. Reconsideration is “an 
extraordinary remedy” courts grant “very sparingly.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
215 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D.N.J. 2002) (citations omitted). The Court may grant a motion for 
reconsideration if the moving party shows (1) “an intervening change in the controlling law”; (2) PageID:
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“the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion”; or (3) 
“the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Adkins v. 
Sogliuzzo, 820 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust 
Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 87 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
A motion for reconsideration “is not an appeal.” Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 
507. The moving party may not “relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence 
or allegations that could have been raised prior to entry of the original order .” Bosco v. Compass 
Grp. USA, Inc., No. 22-6909, 2026 WL 800530, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026) (quoting Martinez 
v. Robinson, No. 18- 1493, 2019 WL 4918115, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2019)). The Court will not 
grant a reconsideration motion based on “[m] ere disagreement with a decision of the District 
Court.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001). Rather, 
the Court will grant a reconsideration motion “only when ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling 
decisions of law’ were presented to the court but were overlooked.” Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. 
Supp. 2d at 507. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Viewing their motion liberally, Plaintiffs appear to argue that reconsideration is warranted 
to “correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Adkins , 820 F. App’x at 
149. A court makes a clear error of law “only if the record cannot support the findings that led to 
the ruling.” In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-699, 2025 WL 2717592, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 
2025) (quoting ABS Brokerage Servs. v. Penson Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09-4590, 2010 WL 3257992, 
at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010)). 
The record amply supports the findings that led the Court to affirm Judge Clark. As 
recounted in the Court’s May 5 Opinion, the Court may only reverse a magistrate judge’s discovery PageID:
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order for abuse of discretion. ( See Op. at 6.) A magistrate judge abuses their discretion if their 
decision “rests on an incorrect legal standard, a clearly erroneous factual finding, or a 
misapplication of the law to the facts.” TD Bank N.A. v. Hill , 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019). 
“An abuse of discretion is a clear error of judgment, and not simply a different result which can 
arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts of the case.” Allen v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 
340 F.R.D. 232, 237 (D.N.J. 2022) (quoting Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG , 502 F.3d 
212, 240 (3d Cir. 2007) ). The appealing party has the burden of demonstrating the Magistrate 
Judge’s decisions were clearly erroneous, contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. Id. “Unless 
that burden is met, the magistrate judge’s findings should not be rejected even if the district court 
could have decided the matter differently.” Id. (quoting Evans v. Emp. Ben. Plan, No. 03- 4915, 
2007 WL 77325, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2007)). 
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden then and fail to meet it now. Initially, Plaintiffs claim 
the Court overlooked three one-sentence arguments in the appeal brief; specifically, that the Board 
did not: 
• Certify interrogatory answers under oath (Rule 33(b)(3)–(5)); 
• Provide a privilege log (Rule 26(b)(5)); and 
• Produce unredacted minutes and internal communications necessary to evaluate 
the disputed settlement agreement. 
 
(Pls.’ Appeal at 4.) In their appeal, Plaintiffs did not explain why any of those arguments showed 
that Judge Clark abused his discretion. While Plaintiffs’ reconsideration brief now expands on 
those assertions, reconsideration is not the place to raise new arguments. Bosco, 2026 WL 800530, 
at *2. 
More to the point, none of Plaintiffs’ arguments lead the Court to conclude that Judge Clark 
abused his discretion as to either request. PageID:
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To start, the Board complied with the interrogatory signature requirement; both the 
individual answering the interrogatories and the attorney making objections signed certification s. 
(See ECF No. 58-1 at *129, 133.) 
Next, the record provides no grounds for the Board to produce a privilege log. To be sure, 
Rule 26 provides: 
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the 
information is privileged or subject to protection as trial -preparation material, the 
party must: 
(i) expressly make the claim; and 
(ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible 
things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties 
to assess the claim. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). “The more progressive approach to interrogatories dealing with legal 
matters is to view them in the factual context within which they arise.” Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis 
U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168, 2011 WL 5416330, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (quoting Microtron 
Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 269 F.Supp. 22, 25 (D.N.J. 1967)). “If the answer might serve 
some legitimate purpose, either in leading to evidence or in narrowing the issues, and to require it 
would not unduly burden or prejudice the interrogated party, the court should require [an] answer.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Microtron, 269 F.Supp. at 25). 
The Board raised the issue of privilege only in response to Document Request No. 1. (See 
ECF No. 58-1 at *130–31.) But Judge Clark reasonably concluded that Request No. 1 was overly 
broad, vague, spanned a potentially enormous number of documents, had no temporal limitation, 
and would unduly burden the Board, considering the limited relevance of those documents to an 
IDEA appeal. Correspondingly, an answer would not have served a legitimate purpose, and Judge 
Clark did not err in declining to require one. PageID:
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Finally, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Board should be required to state whether it withheld 
materials is meritless. As the Board repeatedly represented before Judge Clark, the Board produced 
all responsive documents. The Board cannot produce what it does not have. Judge Clark, therefore, 
did not abuse his discretion in finding that the Board did not withhold required documents from 
Plaintiffs. 
Because the record amply supports the Court’s earlier findings, reconsideration is 
unwarranted. In re Insulin Pricing Litig., 2025 WL 2717592, at *2. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 66) is DENIED. 
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 
 
 
DAT
ED: 6/16/2026 _______________________ 
 JULIEN XAVIER NEALS 
 United States District Judge PageID:
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