govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_26-cv-02705-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
 
 
FOLASHADE O., 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
CAPTAIN TROY SCHILLING, in his 
official capacity as Jail Administrator, 
Crow Wing County Jail; DA VID 
EASTERWOOD, in his official capacity 
as Field Office Director of the St. Paul 
Field Office, Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement; DA VID J. 
VENTURELLA,
1 in his official capacity 
as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement; THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, 
in his official capacity as U.S. Secretary 
of Homeland Security; and TODD 
BLANCHE, in his official capacity as 
Acting Attorney General of the United 
States,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
Case No. 26-cv-2705 (LMP/DTS) 
 
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
HABEAS PETITION 
 
Rachel M. Engebretson, Engebretson Law Firm, P.A., Blaine, MN, for Petitioner. 
 
Jaymarie A. Miranda Mendoza, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for 
Respondents.2  
 
1  David J. Venturella is substituted in place of Todd M. Lyons pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 
 
2  When used in this Order, “Respondents” or “Government” refer to the federal 
officials named as Respondents.  Respondent Troy Schilling, the Administrator of the Crow 
Wing County Jail, has not participated in these proceedings. 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 1 of 13
2 
 
 Petitioner Folashade O.3 brings a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging 
both the legality of her detention and the procedures by which the Government seeks to 
remove her to a third country.  ECF No. 5.  Although Folashade has not met her burden of 
showing her detention is unlawful, she is entitled to greater procedural protections if the 
Government seeks to remove her to a third country.  Accordingly, her petition is granted in 
part. 
BACKGROUND 
 Folashade is a native and citizen of Nigeria who has lived in the United States for 
over 25 years.  ECF No. 5 ¶ 4.  Apart from a traffic ticket in 2014, she has remained law-
abiding during her time in the United States.  ECF No. 8- 2 at 2.  In June 2006, Folashade 
was ordered removed from the United States after overstaying her visitor visa.  ECF No. 5 
¶ 64; ECF No. 8-3.  However, Folashade was granted withholding of removal to Nigeria.  
ECF No. 8-3.  Eventually, Folashade was released on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”).  
ECF No. 5 ¶ 5.     
 On May 18, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) determined that 
Folashade could be removed to Ghana pursuant to a “Third Country National” mission.  
ECF No. 8 ¶ 5.  ICE indicates that it has coordinated with “the appropriate governmental 
and operational entities regarding [Folashade’s] placement on the scheduled mission.”  Id.  
On May 19, 2026, ICE officers arrested Folashade and served her a notice of revocation of 
 
3  The Court uses the petitioner’s first name throughout this order to comport with this 
District’s practice of using only the first name and last initial of any nongovernmental 
parties in immigration cases.  No disrespect is intended in doing so. 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 2 of 13
3 
 
her OSUP.  ECF No. 5  ¶ 6; ECF No. 8-4.  The notice states that Folashade’s OSUP was 
revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) because her “case is under review for removal to 
an alternate country.”  Id. at 1.  The notice further states that her removal “is scheduled to 
occur on or before May 28, 2026.”  Id.  That same day, ICE conducted an informal 
interview with Folashade, at which she declined to make a statement.  ECF No. 8-5.  Since 
her arrest, Folashade has been in custody at the Crow Wing County Jail in Brainerd, 
Minnesota.  ECF No. 5 ¶ 2.      
 Folashade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 21, 2026, ECF No. 1, 
and filed an amended petition the next day, ECF No. 5.  The amended petition alleges that 
Folashade’s detention violates her due process rights, federal laws and regulations 
governing revocation of an OSUP, and federal laws and regulations governing third-
country removals.  Id. ¶¶ 99–140.  As a remedy, Folashade seeks her release from 
immigration detention and an injunction against removal to a third country unless certain 
procedural protections are satisfied.  Id. at 38–39.  The Court ordered the Government to 
respond to Folashade’s amended petition no later than May 29, 2026, with any reply from 
Folashade due by June 5, 2026.  ECF No. 6.  Both the Government and Folashade timely 
provided this briefing.4  ECF Nos. 7, 13. 
ANALYSIS 
 “Congress has granted federal district courts, ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’ 
the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held 
 
4  The Court permitted Folashade to file a late revised reply brief.  ECF No. 12. 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 3 of 13
4 
 
‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”  
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) ).  The 
protections of habeas corpus extend to those in immigration detention.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001).   
I. Revocation of OSUP 
Once ICE releases a noncitizen on an OSUP, federal regulations provide the 
circumstances under which ICE may re-detain that noncitizen.  This Court has previously 
considered the framework to analyze an OSUP revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).  
See Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771 (D. Minn. 2025).  And both the Government’s 
and Folashade’s briefing refers to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13  as justifying the revocation of 
Folashade’s OSUP.  ECF No. 7 at 2; ECF No. 13 at 10–18.  But the record reflects that the 
Government invoked a different regulation—8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l )—when it revoked 
Folashade’s OSUP.  ECF No. 8-4 at 1. 
Both sections 241.4 and 241.13 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations govern 
the release of noncitizens under a final order of removal.  See Saengnakhone S. v. Noem, 
No. 25-cv-4775 (ECT/LIB), 2026 WL 34132 , at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2026).  8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4 is the “broader provision” which applies to all noncitizens under a final removal 
order unless the Government makes a specific determination at the time of release that 
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, in which 
case 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 governs.  See Quan v. Bowen, No. 5:25-cv -02546-HDV-PVC, 
2025 WL 3691858, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(1)).  The 
record is sparse as to why—and under which section—Folashade  was first released on an 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 4 of 13
5 
 
OSUP after her removal order in 2006 because neither party has submitted Folashade’s 
OSUP into the record.  All the Court has to go on is the notice revoking Folashade’s OSUP, 
which indicates that the OSUP was revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).  ECF No. 8-4 
at 1.  Because nothing in the record reflects that the Government has previously determined 
that there is “no significant likelihood” of removing Folashade in the “reasonably 
foreseeable future,” the Court concludes that the revocation procedure in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(l) applies.5  See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b)(1) (explaining that 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) applies 
to the detention of a noncitizen ordered removed “unless [the Government] makes a 
determination under this section that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future”). 
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) provides that an OSUP may be revoked when, relevant here, an 
“Executive Associate Commissioner” or “district director” determines in an “exercise of 
discretion” that “[i]t is appropriate to enforce a removal order.”  8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii).  
Upon revocation of the OSUP, the noncitizen must be “ notified of the reasons for 
revocation,” and must be provided “an initial informal interview promptly after his or her 
return to [immigration] custody to afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the 
reasons for revocation stated in the notification.”
6  8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1).  
 
5  Folashade has arguably abandoned any claim predicated on illegal detention under 
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) given that her reply briefing only argues the merits of a challenge under 
8 C.F.R. § 241.13—even after the Government submitted the notice revoking her OSUP 
under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).  Because 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) was invoked in Folashade’s petition, 
however, the Court elects to consider the merits of her claim. 
 
6  Courts have largely concluded that the revocation procedures described in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(l)(1) apply to revocations conducted under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).  See Grigorian v. 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 5 of 13
6 
 
As an initial matter, ICE complied with the procedural components of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4.  On the day she was arrested, ICE provided Folashade with a notice explaining 
that her OSUP was revoked because her case was “under review for removal to an alternate 
country,” and that removal was “scheduled to occur on or before May 28, 2026.”  ECF 
No. 8-4; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (requiring that a noncitizen “be notified of the reasons 
for revocation of his or her release”).  This notice is tailored to Folashade’s individual 
circumstances and is not mere “boiler plate language” that fails to provide her with 
adequate notice of the reasons for her re-detention.  See Herrera Castro v. Woosley, 
No. 4:26-cv-47-RGJ, 2026 WL 1507758, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 29, 2026) (citation omitted) 
(collecting cases).  ICE also afforded Folashade an opportunity to respond to the reasons 
identified in the revocation notice on that same day, at which Folashade declined to make 
a statement.  ECF No. 8-5; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (requiring an informal interview 
“promptly” after the noncitizen’s return to custody).  And, although Folashade alleges that 
her OSUP was revoked by an official who lacked authority to do so , ECF No. 5 ¶¶  114, 
121, the record reflects otherwise.  An “Executive Associate Commissioner” or “district 
director” may revoke an OSUP under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) .  But these terms are 
anachronistic: 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 refers to position titles under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, an agency made defunct by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 160 (W.D.N.Y . 2025).  However, the 
Department of Homeland Security’s post-2002 regulations explain that the position 
 
Bondi, No. 25-cv-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *6–7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) 
(collecting cases). 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 6 of 13
7 
 
previously referred to as “district director” now refers to the position of  “field office 
director.”  8 C.F.R. § 1.2; see Gazazyan v. Bondi, No. 5:25-cv-02599-SRM-DTB, 2025 WL 
3898484, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025).  Here, the revocation notice was signed by 
David B. Easterwood, an Acting Field Office Director.  ECF No. 8-4 at 2.  Because a “field 
office director” is a “district director” under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2), Folashade’s OSUP was 
revoked by an authorized immigration official.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. 
That leaves Folashade ’s substantive argument that her re-detention is unlawful 
because there is no change in circumstances that renders her removal to a third country 
reasonably foreseeable.  ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 7, 69, 101, 116.  That argument might have merit 
had the Government revoked Folashade’s OSUP pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), under 
which the Government bears the burden of demonstrating “changed circumstances that 
make removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”  Roble, 803 F. 
Supp. 3d at 772.  But Folashade’s OSUP was revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l), ECF 
No. 8-4, under which the Government need only show that, in an “exercise of discretion,” 
it is “appropriate to enforce a removal order,” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii).  Unlike 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.13(i), which requires the Government to prove  that a very specific  change in 
circumstances has occurred, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) grants the Government “broad discretion” 
to revoke an OSUP  and does not require a specific finding of changed circumstances.   
Tran v. Baker, No. 1:25-cv-01598-JRR, 2025 WL 2085020, at *4 (D. Md. July 24, 2025); 
see, e.g., Fuentes v. Ripa, No. 3:26-cv-134-MMH-PDB, 2026 WL 717982, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 16, 2026) (describing the Government’s “wide discretion to detain, release, or revoke 
an alien’ s supervision” under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)); Morales Sanchez v. Bondi,  
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 7 of 13
8 
 
No. 5:25-cv-02530-AB-DTB, 2025 WL 3190816, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025)  
(explaining that the Government is “broadly authorized to exercise its discretion to revoke 
[a noncitizen’s] release pursuant to 8 CFR § 241.1(l)(1), and 8 CFR § 241.4(l)(2)”).   
When the Government has taken steps to effectuate a long-delayed removal, ICE 
may exercise its discretion to revoke an OSUP pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) to enforce 
the removal order.  See Tran, 2025 WL 2085020, at *4 (finding revocation under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(l) permissible when ICE has submitted the noncitizen’s case to her native country 
for issuance of a travel document); Doe v. Easterwood, No. 25 -cv-196 CJW -KEM, 
2025 WL 4093531, at *8 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 5,  2025) (finding revocation under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(l) permissible when ICE was in the process of securing a travel document for 
removal).  Here, the Government has taken steps to effectuate Folashade’s removal to a 
third country: it accepted her into a “Third Country National” mission for removal to Ghana 
and is presently coordinating with “the appropriate governmental and operational entities 
regarding [Folashade’s] placement on the scheduled mission.”  ECF No. 8 ¶ 5.  Indeed, the 
notice of revocation contemplated that Folashade’s removal would occur “on or before 
May 28, 2026,” suggesting that the Government believed that Folashade’s removal would 
occur imminently.
7  ECF No. 8-4 at 1.  Folashade cites no authority suggesting that 
 
7  The Court recognizes that Folashade was not removed from the United States by 
May 28, 2026, but it is unclear whether that is a result of the Government’s inability to 
remove her, or the Court’s May 28, 2026 order prohibiting Folashade’s removal from this 
District until her habeas petition was adjudicated.  See ECF No. 3. 
 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 8 of 13
9 
 
revocation of an OSUP under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii) is inappropriate under similar 
circumstances.8   
That said, while the Government’s discretion is broad, it is not boundless.  It may 
very well be inappropriate to revoke an OSUP if the Government has taken no steps to 
effectuate a long-delayed removal, or if the petitioner demonstrates that the chances of that 
removal are vanishingly small.  That is not the case here, however.  Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the Government lawfully revoked Folashade’s OSUP pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(l)(2)(iii) and, consequently, Folashade’s constitutional, statutory, and regulatory 
claims premised on this argument fail.9 
II. Third-Country Removal     
Folashade’s remaining claims challenge her proposed removal to Ghana.  In 
essence, she alleges that the Government is seeking to remove her to a third country without 
providing her the opportunity to invoke the protections required by the third-country 
 
8  Folashade requests an evidentiary hearing on her petition, asserting that her petition 
relies on “disputed facts.”  ECF No. 13 at 25–26.  The only relevant fact that is arguably 
disputed is whether Folashade was initially released on an OSUP under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 
or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.  But Folashade (and the Government) had the opportunity to enter 
the OSUP into the record but did not.  Given that Folashade did not submit the OSUP with 
the petition or during briefing on the petition, and that her briefing does not even recognize 
that her OSUP was revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l), the Court does not believe an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary or appropriate to resolve this petition. 
 
9  That is not to say that Folashade may be detained indefinitely.  Within approximately 
three months of revoking the OSUP , ICE must conduct a custody review, which entails 
notification to Folashade, the scheduling of an interview, and “a final evaluation of any 
contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as 
determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.”  8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(3).  And 
if Folashade’s detention extends to six months without removal in sight, she may bring a  
claim pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).   
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 9 of 13
10 
 
removal statute, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), 
and the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 123–40.  She 
brings three counts related to this argument: a statutory claim under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, see id. ¶¶ 123–30; a statutory claim under FARRA, see id. ¶¶ 131–34; and 
a due process claim, see id. ¶¶ 135–40.   
Although the Government responds to Folashade’s statutory claims, it does not 
address Folashade’s due process claim as it relates to third-country removal.  Compare id. 
¶¶ 135–40, with ECF No. 7 at 10–12 (addressing Folashade’s third-country removal 
statutory claims but failing to address the due process claim).  That alone warrants relief 
for Folashade on this claim.  See Estephanny P . v. Bondi, No. 26- cv-198 (ECT/JFD), 
2026 WL 115067, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2026) (holding that the Government “waived 
any challenge” to a habeas petitioner’s arguments by failing to respond to the arguments in 
its briefing).  That is particularly so because Folashade’s due process claim is “far from 
frivolous.”  Jaime D. B. v. Easterwood, No. 26-cv -891 (MJD/DTS), 2026 WL 578754, 
at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 592854  
(D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2026).  Indeed, courts around the country have determined that the 
procedures currently provided by the Government to noncitizens like Folashade  to 
challenge their removal to a third country on fear -based grounds are constitutionally 
inadequate.  See Romero v. Ladwig, No. 25-1106-JWD-EWD, 2026 WL 1146824, at *13 
(M.D. La. Apr. 21, 2026); Mohammad J. N. v. Mullin, No. 26-cv -1963 (MJD/DJF), ECF 
No. 15 at 16–17 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2026); Mendoza Palacios v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-648-
ABA, 2026 WL 933319, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2026); Mbaba v. Perez, No. 5:26-cv -70, 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 10 of 13
11 
 
2026 WL 917484, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2026); Le v. Bondi, No. C25-2454- KKE, 
2026 WL 309239, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5, 2026); Sagastizado v. Noem, 802 F. Supp. 3d 
992, 1009 (S.D. Tex. 2025).  In the absence of a specific objection from the Government 
on Folashade’s due process claim in Count 7, the Court concludes that Folashade is entitled 
to relief on that claim.10 
Folashade seeks several forms of relief to remedy the due process violation, 
including: (1) giving her written notice of removal to a third country 10 days prior to the 
removal; (2) providing her with a reasonable fear interview if she states a fear of removal; 
(3) reopening her removal proceedings if she states a reasonable fear of removal; and (4) if 
the Government determines that she fails to state a reasonable fear of removal, providing 
her 15 days to file a motion to reopen her removal proceedings.  ECF No. 5 at 39.   Again, 
the Government offers no objection to this proposed framework, and courts evaluating 
habeas petitions like Folashade’s have adopted a similar framework to ameliorate the 
procedural due process infirmities resulting from the Government’s current procedures .  
 
10  Although the parties do not raise the issue of curtailment of the Court’s jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), to the extent the statute applies, the Court concludes that it has 
subject-matter jurisdiction to grant relief to Folashade because her claim presents a “purely 
legal question.”  Jama v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 329 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2003). 
Specifically, Folashade’s due process claim does not require the Court to evaluate anything 
about her particular factual circumstances, but rather asks whether, as a matter of law, the 
Government’s procedural protections provided to noncitizens being removed to a third 
country comport with the Due Process Clause.  Accordingly, the due process claim presents 
an “abstract question and answering it does not require consideration of [Folashade’s]  
circumstances, apart from merely recognizing the fact (necessary for standing) that [she] 
fac[es] imminent removal” to a third country.  Nicholas L. L. v. Barr, No. 19-cv-02543 
(ECT/TNL), 2019 WL 4929795, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2019).  
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 11 of 13
12 
 
See Pacheco v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-01176-PAB, 2026 WL 1223414, at *4 (D. Colo. May 5, 
2026); Kumar v. Wamsley, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1073 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Y.T.D. v. 
Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01100 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2675760, at *9–12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 
2025).  Consistent with the above cases, the Court concludes that Folashade’s “proposed 
process is proportional to the need to ensure a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue” 
a fear-based claim of removal to Ghana.  Kumar, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 1073 (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Applying that procedure here, the Government has now notified Folashade that it 
seeks to remove her to Ghana.  Accordingly, the Government must provide Folashade with 
a reasonable fear interview if she states a fear of removal within 10 days of this Order.  See 
8 C.F.R. § 208.31.  If the Government determines that Folashade states a reasonable fear 
of removal to Ghana, then the Government must move to reopen her removal proceedings 
for her to present a claim for withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the CAT 
to an immigration judge.  If the Government determines that she does not have a reasonable 
fear of removal to Ghana, then the Government must allow Folashade 15 days to file a 
motion to reopen her removal proceedings before removing her.11   
 
11  To the extent that Folashade requests that the Court impose these procedures on any 
third-country removal to which Folashade may be subject, the Court declines to do so, as 
any challenge to removal to a country other than Ghana is not ripe at this time.  See Tran v. 
Bondi, No. C25-01897-JLR, 2025 WL 3140462, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025).  
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 12 of 13
13 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Folashade O.’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5) 
is GRANTED in part;  
 
2. The Government is ENJOINED from removing Folashade to Ghana without 
providing her with meaningful notice and opportunity to assert a fear -based 
claim before an immigration judge.  Specifically: 
 
a. The Government must provide Folashade with a reasonable fear 
interview if she states a fear of removal within 10 days of this Order; 
 
b. If the Government determines that Folashade states a reasonable fear 
of removal to Ghana, then the Government must move to reopen her 
removal proceedings for her to present a claim for withholding of 
removal or deferral of removal under the CAT to an immigration 
judge; 
 
c. If the Government determines that Folashade does not state a 
reasonable fear of removal to Ghana, then the Government must allow 
Folashade 15 days to file a motion to reopen her removal proceedings 
before removing her; and 
 
3. In all other respects, Folashade’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus (ECF No. 5) is DENIED. 
 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
Dated: June 16, 2026 s/Laura M. Provinzino   
 Laura M. Provinzino 
United States District Judge 
 
CASE 0:26-cv-02705-LMP-DTS     Doc. 14     Filed 06/16/26     Page 13 of 13

Passage view · GavelSight