govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cr-00083-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : NO. 3:24-CR-83 (KAD) 
 : 
v. : 
 : 
KYLE PETERSEN : June 16, 2026 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/SENTENCE 
REDUCTION (ECF NO. 82) 
 
Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge: 
 Defendant Kyle Petersen has moved pro se pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for a 
sentence reduction in light of, inter alia , the low -purity level of the methamphetamine he 
possessed, an unwarranted sentencing disparity relative to a similarly situated defendant, and his 
post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts . Mr. Petersen pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, to include, inter alia, 500 grams or more 
of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine . He was 
sentenced on July 3, 2025, to a mandatory minimum period of incarceration of 120 months to be 
followed by 5 years of supervised release. See J., ECF No. 78. The Government opposes Mr. 
Petersen’s motion on the grounds that he has failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warranting a sentence reduction and because the § 3553(a) factors counsel against any such 
reduction. See Opp., ECF No. 83. Mr. Petersen has filed two additional documents, both labeled 
as memoranda in support of his motion. The Court construes ECF No. 84 as a supplemental 
memorandum to the motion for sentence reduction and ECF No. 85 as a reply brief. For the reasons 
that follow, the motion is DENIED. 

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Standard of Review 
A court may modify a term of imprisonment on compassionate release grounds in two 
circumstances: (1) upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or (2) upon motion of the 
defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the 
Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant ’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the 
receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Mr. Petersen requested a sentence reduction on January 23, 2026 which the 
Warden denied on January 30, 2026. See Mot., ECF No. 82 at 2–3. The Government agrees that 
Mr. Petersen has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Opp., ECF No. 83 at 5. 
Upon exhaustion of a defendant ’s administrative remedies, § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that 
a district court “may reduce” a defendant’s term of imprisonment “after considering the factors set 
forth in section 3553(a),” if it finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 
reduction” and “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)( A); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 
235 (2d Cir. 2020). A district court’s “reasonable evaluation of the [s]ection 3553(a) factors is ‘an 
alternative and independent basis for denial of compassionate release. ’” United States v. Jones , 
17 F.4th 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 848 F. App’x 477, 478 (2d 
Cir. 2021) (summary order)) (citing United States v. Butler, 845 F. App’x 74, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2021). 
As indicated above, Mr. Petersen pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with 
intent to distribute controlled substances. At sentencing, Mr. Petersen’s advisory guideline range 
was 87 to108 months of imprisonment. However, as he was subject to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 120 months , the advisory guideline range became 120 months . See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Only eight months after sentencing, Mr. Petersen filed the instant motion 

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wherein he essentially asks the Court to reconsider his sentence, unrestricted on a compassionate 
release motion by the mandatory minimum mandated by Congress. But in so doing, he has failed 
to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. 
Discussion 
Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
Mr. Petersen first argues that the guidelines inappropriately failed to take into account the 
purity of the methamphetamine he possessed. By failing to account for the low purity level of the 
controlled substances he possessed, he argues, the “drug weight” grossly overstated the seriousness 
of the offense. See Mot., ECF No. 82 at 4; Supp. ECF No. 84 at 2. He next argues that in a 
different methamphetamine case involving a similarly situated defendant, the sentence was 
significantly lower thus demonstrating an unwarranted sentencing disparity between himself and 
this other defendant. See Mot., ECF No. 82 at 5; Reply, ECF No. 85 at 3. Finally, he cites to his 
exceptional rehabilitation efforts. Mot., ECF No. 82 at 5; Supp., ECF No. 84 at 3; Reply, ECF No. 
85 at 4. The Court concludes that none of these circumstances, individually or in combination, 
present extraordinary or compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. 
Mr. Petersen first contends that because the offense involved “low -purity 
methamphetamine,” only 47 grams of pure methamphetamine was present rather than the total 
mixture weight of 1,171.8 grams. Mot., ECF No. 82 at 4. The Court previously addressed this 
argument when it was raised at sentencing. See Tr., ECF No. 81 at 17. The Court explained that 
the mandatory minimum sentence was “a product of the statutes” rather than the sentencing 
guidelines. Id. The Court further explained that lower purity met hamphetamine that has been 
diluted has the potential to reach many more people, which provides context for why the guidelines 
result in a higher guideline range. Id. However, whether the guideline range should have been 

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lower or the purity argument provided a basis to vary downward from the range is of no moment. 
The guideline range was still below the mandatory minimum sentence proscribed by Congress and 
Mr. Petersen was sentenced to that statutory mandatory minimum. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). In other words, whatever flaws Mr. Petersen identifies with respect to the 
guidelines, they simply had no impact on the sentence imposed. 
Further, Mr. Petersen urges this Court to rethink his sentence and to conduct an 
individualized assessment of the Section 3553(a) factors, “unconstrained” by the mandatory 
minimum required by statute. See Reply, ECF No. 85 at 2 (“The relevant question is whether the 
Court, now unconstrained by the same statutory floor in the § 3582 context, should continue to 
require service of the entire 120 months. Where the original sentence was dictated by a mandatory 
minimum rather than by unconstrained judicial discretion, that is a legitimate and weighty 
consideration in the compassionate-release analysis.”). But the Supreme Court has recently all but 
foreclosed this argument. In Rutherford v. United States, 608 U. S. ____ (2026), a defendant had 
sought a sentence reduction or compassionate release arguing that Congress’s nonretroactive 
reduction in mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provided an extraordinary 
and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner Rutherford argued that 
under the present sentencing scheme, his mandatory sentence would have been significantly lower 
and thus relied upon the statutory change (although nonretroactive) as a basis to seek a reduction 
in sentence. See id. The Supreme Court held that “[w]hen Congress declines to make a sentencing 
amendment retroactive, the fact that a preamendment sentence is longer than it would have been 
postamendment is not an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason[n]’ that ‘warrant[s] ’ a sentence 
reduction.” Id. at 8 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). In rejecting 

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petitioner’s “all-things-considered” argument which would permit the district court to consider the 
postamendment sentencing disparity, the Court stated: 
The implications of this argument are sweeping. Indeed, its logic extends well 
beyond nonretroactive sentencing amendments to disagreement with the length of 
any punishment on the books. Take a judge who believes that a mandatory 
minimum is unduly harsh. Could she treat the severity of the sentence as an 
“extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release? Petitioners 
refused to rule out this possibility at oral argument. . . . Yet “[i]t is the legislature, 
not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” 
 
Id. at 15 (alterations in original; omission added). 
“Treating the severity of a mandatory penalty as a reason for compassionate release rejects 
Congress’s judgment that the punishment fits the crime.” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) ). Accordingly, the Court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of Congress and does not reconsider the length of Plaintiff’s sentence based upon 
an “unconstrained” analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. 
Mr. Petersen next raises an alleged sentencing disparity between his sentence and that of 
another defendant in the Northern District of New York. See J., United States v. Gil, No. 
1:25-
 cr - 00110 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) . “In imposing a sentence, the district court is required 
to consider, among other things, ‘ the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.’ ” United States 
v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). 
“Although the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct is a factor 
district courts must consider” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) when imposing a 
sentence, “that provision does not require a district court to conform its sentence to 
any single other sentence adduced by a defendant.” United States v. Halloran, 821 
F.3d 321, 341 (2d Cir. 2016); see also id. (upholding a district court’s decision not 
to consider “the two- year sentence imposed upon former Virginia Governor Bob 
McDonnell in an unrelated bribery case in the Eastern District of Virginia”). 
Indeed, the “primary purpose” of § 3553(a)(6) is “to reduce unwarranted sentence 

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disparities” on a nationwide level. United States v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 120, 123 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 
United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 314 (2d Cir. 2018). 
Mr. Petersen’s argument premised on Mr. Gil’s sentence is meritless. 
Even if this argument were not foreclosed by Sampson, Mr. Petersen has not demonstrated 
that he and the other defendant , Mr. Gil, are similarly situated. He asserts only that Mr. Gil also 
sold low-purity methamphetamine pills and was sentenced to 51 months incarceration. See Mot., 
ECF No. 82 at 5. There is a dearth of information regarding Mr. Gil’s criminal history, the amount 
of controlled substances in his possession, or any other information regarding the myriad of factors 
that would inform an appropriate sentence. See ECF Nos. 82, 84–85; see also18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
Mr. Petersen’s mere assertion that they are similarly situ ated is insufficient. As such, Mr. Gil’s 
sentence provides no support for a sentence reduction here. 
Finally, Mr. Peterson relies on his rehabilitative efforts. Although rehabilitation may be 
considered in conjunction with other extraordinary and compelling factors, none have been 
demonstrated here. And post-sentencing rehabilitation alone is insufficient to warrant a sentence 
reduction, particularly only eight months after sentencing. See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 238 
(“[r]ehabilitation . . . alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 
For all of these reasons, Mr. Petersen has not demonstrated any extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for a reduction in his sentence. 
Section 3553(a) Factors 
Because Mr. Petersen has failed to demonstrate any extraordinary and compelling reason 
to reduce his sentence, the Court need not, indeed cannot, conduct an independent analysis of the 
statutory factors when deciding his motion. Rutherford, slip op. at 13–14 (“Before determining 

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the extent of a reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors, a court must first ensure that a movant is 
part of the ‘limited class of prisoners’ who are ‘eligible’ for such a reduction. . . . And whether a 
prisoner is eligible depends on whether he can offer ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons that 
‘warrant’ compassionate release, not on the § 3553(a) factors.” (citations omitted)).1 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Petersen’s motion for compassionate release /sentence 
reduction, ECF No. 82, is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 16th day of June 2026. 
 /s/ Kari A. Dooley 
KARI A. DOOLEY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
1 Even if Mr. Petersen had identified an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, given the 
entirety of the record in this case, an analysis of the section 3553(a) factors would not counsel a lower sentence than 
was imposed. Mr. Petersen was also sentenced, at the same time, in a companion case in which he faced a violation 
of supervised release, having previously been federally prosecuted for narcotics trafficking. While the Court had the 
discretion to impose a concurrent sentence on the supervised release violation, thus capping the combined sentence at 
the mandatory minimum 120 months, the Court chose to impose a consecutive sentence for a total effective sentence 
of 138 months of incarceration in order to “achieve an appropriate sentence in combination.” Tr., ECF No. 81 at 
21– 22. 

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