govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_24-cr-00079-5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
AT KNOXVILLE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) 3:24-CR-79-KAC-JEM-1 
 ) 
CORNELIUS BARNES, JR., ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Before the Court are (1) Defendant Cornelius Barnes, Jr.’s “Motion to Dismiss Count Six 
of the Indictment” [Doc. 60]; (2) United States Magistrate Judge Jill E. McCook’s Report and 
Recommendation (“Report”) [Doc. 87], recommending that the undersigned deny that Motion to 
Dismiss; and (3) Defendant’s Objections to the Report [Doc. 88]. Because United States v. 
Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) is binding precedent and Defendant failed to show that he 
is not dangerous, his Second Amendment challenge to Count Six falls flat. As set forth below, the 
Court (1) ADOPTS and ACCEPTS the Report’s recommendation [Doc. 87], (2) OVERRULES 
Defendant’s Objections [Doc. 88], and (3) DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 60]. 
In May 2012, Defendant was sentenced for (1) receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, 
(2) carrying or possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony, and 
(3) second degree home invasion [ See Doc. 64-1 at 4, 6 (Judgments)]. In May 2022, Defendant 
was sentenced for possessing a firearm as a felon, habitual offender, fourth offense [ See id. at 
10 (Judgment)]. The facts underlying this conviction are concerning. In 2019, Defendant entered 
a home around 11:25 p.m. “armed with a silver handgun” and “announced a hold up” [ See Doc. 
64-2 at 3 (police report)]. Defendant then “began robbing everyone inside” [ Id.]. A victim PageID
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reported that Defendant made the victim “strip down to his briefs” and stole “$300 (US Currency),” 
an “I-Phone 7, and car keys” from the victim [Id.]. It was also reported that two individuals were 
shot during the robbery—a victim and Defendant [Id.]. Defendant was treated for a gunshot wound 
at a nearby hospital [Id.]. 
A grand jury has now indicted Defendant for dealing significant amounts of 
methamphetamine and fentanyl (Counts One, Two, Three, and Four) “from on or about June 7, 
2024, through on or about July 12, 2024” [See Doc. 13]. The grand jury also indicted Defendant 
for possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count Five), and possession of 
firearms as a felon “on or about July 12, 2024” (Count Six), in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) [Id. at 3]. 
Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the Indictment,” raising a Second 
Amendment challenge [Doc. 60]. The United States opposed [Doc. 64]. Thereafter, Judge 
McCook held a hearing on the Motion, where Defendant was able to introduce evidence and make 
arguments [See Doc. 76]. Judge McCook then filed the Report [Doc. 87]. The Report ultimately 
recommends that the undersigned deny the Motion [Doc. 60] because Defendant’s prior criminal 
“history shows he is dangerous” [Doc. 87 at 8]. 
Defendant filed timely objections [Doc. 88]. He specifically objects to (1) the Report’s 
reliance “on Williams,
”[see id. at 3], (2) the facial constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as 
assessed in Williams, [ see id. at 5], and (3) the Report’s conclusion that applying Williams, 
Defendant’s “prior convictions are sufficient to categorically define him as 
‘dangerous,’” [see id. at 2]. 
The United States responded [Doc. 90]. It argues that the Report “[1] correctly applied PageID
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controlling Sixth Circuit precedent, [2] thoroughly considered Defendant’s criminal history and 
the conduct underlying his prior convictions, and [3] properly concluded that Defendant failed to 
carry his burden of demonstrating that he is not dangerous” [See Doc. 90 at 1]. 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), “[a] judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(C). If a Party makes a timely objection under Section 636(b)(1)(C) and that objection 
is not “frivolous, conclusive[,] or general,” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986), 
“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 
findings or recommendations to which [the] objection is made,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. 
Crim P. 59(b)(3) (“district judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s 
recommendation”). 
The Second Amendment enshrines a fundamental, individual right. See Dist. of Columbia 
v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago , 561 U.S. 742, 
791 (2010). But that right “is not unlimited.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Under United States 
v. Williams, the Court must “first ask whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text’ covers [the 
defendant’s] conduct.” See 113 F.4th at 648 (quoting N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 
U.S. 1, 24 (2022)). “If so, then the Constitution presumptively protects it,” and the Court “ask[s] 
whether the modern regulation is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition has historically 
embraced.” Id. 
Defendant challenges the constitutionality of Williams [See Doc. 88 at 3]. But Williams is 
published, binding Sixth Circuit precedent. See Darrah v. City of Oak Park , 255 F.3d 301, 309 
(6th Cir. 2001) (a “prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of PageID
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the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc 
overrules the prior decision.” (cleaned up)). And it binds this district court in the Sixth Circuit. 
See id; see also Nat’l Institutes of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, 145 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2025) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“judges are duty-bound to respect ‘the 
hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Constitution and Congress.’” (quoting Hutto 
v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982))). So, this Court faithfully applies Williams. And Williams 
forecloses Defendant’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1). See 113 F.4th 
at 657; see also United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2024). 
That leaves Defendant’s as-applied challenge. Under Williams, “our nation’s history and 
tradition” generally “demonstrate that Congress may disarm individuals they believe are 
dangerous.” 113 F.4th at 657. But the defendant “must have a reasonable opportunity to prove” 
that he does not “fit the class-wide generalization.” Id. at 661. The defendant bears the burden 
“to show he’s not dangerous.” See id. at 662. The Court focuses “on each individual’s specific 
characteristics.” Id. at 657. “That necessarily requires considering the individual’s entire criminal 
record.” Id. The Court may consider “other judicially noticeable information” too. Id. at 660. 
“[C]ertain categories of past convictions are highly probative of 
dangerousness.” Id. at 657. “[C]rimes against the person,” like “murder, rape, assault, and 
robbery,” “speak directly to whether an individual is dangerous.” Id. at 658. “It is hard to see how 
someone who commits such a dangerous and violent act may overcome the presumption that they 
are dangerous.” Id. At a minimum, crimes against the person provide “strong evidence that an 
individual is dangerous.” Id. And the individual’s burden to show otherwise “would be extremely 
heavy.” Id. Other crimes that “pose a significant threat of danger” and “often lead[] to violence,” PageID
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like burglary, “put someone’s safety at risk, and thus [also], justify a finding of 
danger.” Id. at 659, 663. 
Here, Defendant has failed to show that he is not dangerous. His entire “specific 
characteristics” show a pattern of committing violent crimes that “put someone’s safety at 
risk.” Id. The facts underlying Defendant’s most recent 2022 conviction acutely demonstrate his 
dangerousness. Defendant unlawfully entered a home armed with a firearm, instructed a victim to 
“strip down to his briefs,” robbed that victim at gunpoint, and shot another victim [ See Doc. 64-2 
at 3 (police report)]. Defendant was shot too [See id.]. Defendant ultimately pleaded to possession 
of a firearm as a convicted felon, habitual offender, fourth offense [ See Doc. 64-2 at 
10 (Judgment)]. But the facts supporting that conviction show that Defendant committed an actual 
crime against the person. And he has not put forth evidence showing that he is no longer 
dangerous. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 662. 
Even if the Court only considered Defendant’s “criminal record,” limiting itself to the 
judgments of conviction, Defendant has failed to show that he is not dangerous. See Williams, 113 
F.4th at 657-58. In 2012, Defendant was convicted of (1) receiving and concealing a stolen 
firearm, (2) carrying or possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony, 
and (3) second degree home invasion [See Doc. 64-1 at 4, 6 (Judgments)]. Unlawfully entering an 
individual’s home “pose[s] a significant threat of danger,” “often leads to violence,” and “put[s] 
someone’s safety at risk,” “justify a finding of danger.” See Williams, 113 F.4th at 659, 663. Even 
more so when the person unlawfully entering the home is armed [ See Doc. 64-1 at 4, 6 
(Judgments)]. In 2019, Defendant again possessed a firearm as a felon, another crime that placed 
others at risk of danger (even setting aside the actual danger and violence that resulted) [See id. at PageID
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10 (Judgment)]. A few years later, in 2024, Defendant was allegedly conspiring to distribute large 
quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl [See Doc. 13]. “Drug trafficking is a serious offense 
that, in itself, poses a danger to the community.” See Williams, 113 F.4th at 659. And Defendant 
allegedly possessed firearms in furtherance of the drug trafficking conspiracies, making an already 
dangerous situation readily deadly [See Doc. 13 at 2-3]. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 659, 663. 
And Defendant has not met his burden to show that he was not dangerous on or about July 
12, 2024 when he allegedly possessed a firearm. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 658. An individual 
with “numerous violent felonies” is “exactly the type of individual our history and tradition allow 
Congress to disarm.” See United States v. Parham , 119 F.4th 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation 
omitted). The Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that the Court cannot consider certain 
“convictions due to their age.” See United States v. Taylor, 165 F.4th 1029, 1036 (6th Cir. 2026) 
(considering convictions that were “12 years old at the time of” indictment). And the age of 
Defendant’s convictions does not change the analysis given Defendant’s pattern of dangerous 
behavior over time. In the end, Defendant did not meet his burden to show that he was not 
dangerous at the relevant time. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 663. 
As set forth above, the Court (1) ADOPTS and ACCEPTS the Report’s 
recommendation [Doc. 87], (2) OVERRULES Defendant’s Objections [Doc. 88], and 
(3) DENIES Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the Indictment” [Doc. 60]. 
 SO ORDERED. 
KATHERINE A YTZER 
United States District Judge 
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