govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_24-cr-00079-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
AT KNOXVILLE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) 3:24-CR-79-KAC-JEM 
 ) 
CORNELIUS BARNES, JR., and ) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER MAHONE; ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER 
 
This action is before the Court on (1) United States Magistrate Judge Jill E. McCook’s 
Report and Recommendation (“Report”) [Doc. 89], recommending that the undersigned (a) grant 
Defendant Michael Alexander Mahone’s Motion to Adopt Defendant Cornelius Barnes, Jr.’s 
Motion to Suppress [Doc. 59] and (b) deny Defendant Barnes’s Motion to Suppress [Doc. 56]; and 
(2) Defendants’ objections to that Report [Docs. 93, 94]. As set forth below, the Court ADOPTS 
relevant portions of the Report [Doc. 89], GRANTS the Motion to Adopt [Doc. 59], 
OVERRULES the Objections [Doc. 93, 94], and DENIES the Motion to Suppress [Doc. 56]. 
I. Background
1 
On July 12, 2024, law enforcement applied for; and the Honorable Hector Sanchez, Knox 
County Criminal Court Judge issued; a warrant to search the residence at “5101 Asheville 
Highway, apartment unit 1, Knoxville,” Tennessee (“Unit 1”) [See Docs. 58-1 at 9-13]. Unit 1 is 
 
1 No Defendant raises any specific salient objection to the Report’s factual findings [See Docs. 93, 
94]. So, the Court generally adopts the findings with slight modifications herein and summarizes 
the key relevant facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

PageID #: <pageID>
2 
in an apartment complex located at 5101 Asheville Highway in Knoxville, Tennessee (the 
“Apartment Complex”) [Id.]. 
A law enforcement officer signed an affidavit in support of the warrant [ See Doc. 58-1 at 
1-8]. That Affidavit provided that on April 24, 2024, law enforcement utilized a confidential 
informant to conduct a controlled purchase “of a quantity of heroin/opiate” from Khalid 
Sullivan [See Doc. 58-1 ¶ 3]. “During the controlled purchase,” law enforcement observed 
Sullivan driving a white Dodge Durango [ Id.]. That same vehicle was parked at the Apartment 
Complex on May 5, and law enforcement determined that it was a rental vehicle [Id.]. On May 8, 
the white Dodge Durango was replaced with another rental vehicle. 
On June 6, law enforcement officers were surveilling the Apartment Complex and saw 
Sullivan operating a silver Chevrolet Impala registered to him [Id.]. At that point, law enforcement 
thought that Sullivan may have borrowed the white Dodge Durango from a friend or neighbor [Id.]. 
By June 6, someone parking in the Apartment Complex had replaced the second rental 
vehicle with a third rental vehicle—a white Dodge Hornet [Id.]. This “activity drew the attention 
of law enforcement to who was actually using the rental vehicles” [ Id.]. “[F]rom training and 
experience,” the affiant-officer “kn[ew]” “that narcotics traffickers” “commonly utilize rental 
vehicles and trade them out often in attempts to thwart law enforcement detection” [Id.]. 
Law enforcement began to “conduct[] surveillance on the activity between the white Dodge 
Hornet” and Sullivan’s “silver Chevrolet Impala” [Id. ¶ 4]. Officers suspected that the Apartment 
Complex “was a base” for drug trafficking [Id.]. 
On June 7, while surveilling the Apartment Complex, officers saw two men exit 
Unit 1 [See Docs. 58-1 ¶¶ 4, 8; 62 at 2]. Those men were later identified as Defendants Mahone 

PageID #: <pageID>
3 
and Barnes [ See Doc. 62 at 2]. Knowing what we know now, “Suspect 1” in the Affidavit is 
Defendant Mahone and “Suspect 2” is Defendant Barnes. 
On June 7, Defendant Mahone entered the white Dodge Hornet and left the Apartment 
Complex [Id. ¶ 4]. He drove to a Kroger parking lot where officers observed him engage in “what 
they know from training and experience to be an obvious hand-to-hand drug transaction” [ Id.]. 
After the transaction was complete, Defendant Mahone “immediately” returned to Unit 1 [Id.]. 
A “short time later,” Defendant Mahone again left Unit 1 and entered the white Dodge 
Hornet [Id.]. He “ma[de] numerous unnecessary turns, and t[ook] numerous circuitous routes” 
“consistent with” attempting to “elude law enforcement detection” [Id.]. 
A “short time” after Defendant Mahone left Unit 1, Defendant Barnes left Unit 1 on foot 
“and conducted two separate hand-to-hand transactions with other unknown individuals who were 
also on foot” [Id.]. “[A]fter each interaction,” Defendant Barnes returned to Unit 1, “indicating” 
to the officer that Defendant Barnes was “resupplying each time he returned” [Id.]. 
At one point that day, Defendant Barnes “walked away” from the Apartment Complex and 
entered the “passenger seat of a white Honda Civic” [ Id.]. The vehicle traveled half a mile to a 
Circle K gas station [Id.]. Defendant Barnes did not enter the store at the Circle K [ Id.]. And he 
“walked further to meet the white Honda Civic than the distance to walk” straight from the 
Apartment Complex to the Circle K [ Id.]. “[F]rom training and experience,” the affiant-officer 
knew that Defendant Barnes “likely met with the occupant of the white Honda Civic to conduct a 
drug transaction” [Id.]. Defendant Mahone met Defendant Barnes at the Circle K [Id.]. And they 
traveled from the Circle K in the white Dodge Hornet back to Unit 1 [Id.]. 
On July 1, the affiant-officer noticed that there were “two new rental vehicles” in the 
parking spots at the Apartment Complex Defendants Barnes and Mahone typically used [ Id. ¶ 5]. 

PageID #: <pageID>
4 
Defendant Barnes entered and exited a rental black Chrysler Pacifica, and Defendant Mahone 
entered and exited a rental black Chevrolet Impala [Id.]. 
On July 2, Defendant Barnes left Unit 1 in a rental vehicle, picked up an unknown woman, 
and drove her directly across the street to a Kroger grocery store parking lot [Id. ¶ 6]. “The female 
exited the suspect vehicle and walked directly to the woman’s restroom” [ Id.]. She made no 
purchase while in the grocery store, and she left quickly [ Id.]. Defendant Barnes “returned 
directly” to Unit 1 “after the very brief interaction with the unknown female” [Id.]. 
Based on the affiant-officer’s “training and experience,” this “type of behavior” is 
“indicative of drug trafficking” [Id.]. And the fact that Defendant Barnes “consistently” returned 
to Unit 1 in between suspected drug transactions showed that he was “stor[ing]” “the illegal 
substance” at Unit 1 and returning to Unit 1 “to resupply” [Id.]. 
That same day, officers saw Defendant Mahone leave Unit 1 in a rental vehicle and drive 
to the same Kroger parking lot [ Id. ¶ 7]. There, he “conduct[ed] a hand-to-hand transaction with 
a male in a black SUV” [Id.]. “Immediately following,” Defendant Mahone retuned to Unit 1 [Id.]. 
Law enforcement “approached the individual in the black SUV” while he was “still parked 
in the” Kroger parking lot [ Id.]. “In plain view, the officer noticed what he knew from training 
and experience to be a small quantity of heroin” [Id.]. Law enforcement later tested the substance 
and determined that it was a “heroin/opiate narcotic” [ Id.]. Law enforcement arrested the 
individual in the SUV on an outstanding warrant [ Id.]. The individual “admitted” to purchasing 
“1 gram of suspected heroin/opiate” from Defendant Mahone that day [Id.]. 
According to the Affidavit, the affiant-officer also learned that the Knox County Sheriff 
Office (KCSO) Narcotic Unit had “conducted a traffic stop” on Defendant Barnes on January 10, 
2024 [Id. ¶ 8]. At the time of the stop, Defendant Barnes possessed “a large sum of currency with 

PageID #: <pageID>
5 
no reasonable explanation of how it was acquired” [ Id.]. Defendant Barnes told KCSO that he 
was “on his way back to Detroit, MI” [Id.]. 
On July 5, both of the rental cars used by Defendant Mahone and Barnes were in Detroit, 
Michigan [ Id. ¶ 9]. By July 11, the Chrysler Pacifica had “returned to the Knoxville 
area” [Id. ¶ 10]. And it “was parked in the parking lot” of the Apartment Complex [Id.]. 
Later the morning of July 11, law enforcement saw Defendants exit the Chrysler Pacifica 
and enter Unit 1 [ Id. ¶ 11]. “Moments later,” officers observed Defendant Mahone leave Unit 1 
in the Chrysler Pacifica [Id.]. He “was gone only a few minutes before returning” [Id.]. 
“A short time later,” Defendant Mahone left Unit 1 again in the Chrysler Pacifica [Id.]. He 
made “no less than three ‘heat runs’”—“routes to confuse or throw off law enforcement 
surveillance” [ Id.]. Eventually, he entered the parking lot of a Waffle House in West 
Knoxville [Id.]. He entered the restaurant but returned to the Chrysler Pacifica quickly [Id.]. 
Then, “a brown pickup truck with three occupants back[ed] in next to” Defendant 
Mahone [Id.]. Defendant Mahone “open[ed] his [vehicle] door and engaged in a short, very brief 
interaction with the driver of the brown pick up” [Id.]. Afterward, Defendant Mahone quickly left 
the Waffle House parking lot and drove “directly back to” Unit 1 [ Id.]. The officer’s “belief 
through training and experience [was] that it is more likely than not[] that the two engaged in a 
drug transaction” [Id.]. 
The pickup also quickly left the parking lot, “only to pull into an adjacent hotel parking lot 
for approximately one minute” [ Id.]. The affiant-officer “kn[ ew] from training and experience 
that drug purchase customers will commonly immediately use the drugs that they just purchased 
or stow/hide their recently purchased contraband” [ Id.]. Officers then stopped the pickup and 
questioned the occupants [Id. ¶ 12]. No occupant mentioned “just being in the parking lot of the 

PageID #: <pageID>
6 
Waffle House or having any interaction” with Defendant Mahone [Id.]. Officers did not find any 
contraband in the pickup, but a records check revealed that two of the three occupants were “either 
drug abusers or drug dealers” [Id. ¶¶ 12-13]. 
The Affidavit represented that Unit 1 was “occupied by or under the control of” Defendant 
Barnes [ See Doc. 58-1 at 9]. The affiant-officer’s “training and experience” showed that 
individuals “involved in the storage, use, sale, delivery, or exchange of controlled substances, 
commonly keep and maintain, especially within their residences,” “items that they use to conduct 
or facilitate those activities” [Id. ¶ 2]. So, the officer believed that a search of Unit 1 would uncover 
evidence of drug possession, drug distribution, and possession of drug paraphernalia [See id. at 8]. 
The officer was right. After the warrant issued, law enforcement searched Unit 1 on July 
12, 2024. The search yielded “approximately 750 grams of methamphetamine, 474 grams of 
fentanyl, two loaded handguns, $5,047 U.S. Currency, six cellular telephones, and various items 
used to manufacture and distribute narcotics, including plastic baggies, a kilogram press, electronic 
scales, and cutting agents commonly used to dilute narcotics” [See Docs. 62 at 5, 58-1 at 16-19]. 
Defendant Barnes filed a motion to suppress “all evidence seized pursuant to a search of 
Mr. Barnes’ residence,” Unit 1 [Doc. 56 at 1]. Defendant Mahone filed a one-page motion asking 
to “adopt” Defendant Barnes’s Motion [See Doc. 59]. Defendant Mahone asserts that he “was an 
overnight guest at the residence of Cornelius Barnes Jr.” at Unit 1 and accordingly had “standing 
to join the motion to suppress” [Doc. 59 (citation omitted)]. 
After a hearing on the Motions, Judge McCook issued the Report [Doc. 89]. The Report 
recommends that the undersigned (1) grant Defendant Mahone’s Motion to Adopt and (2) deny 
the Motion to Suppress [ See Doc. 89 at 28]. As relevant to the Objections here, the Report 
specifically concluded that (1) the Affidavit established probable cause to search Unit 1, (2) the 

PageID #: <pageID>
7 
information in the Affidavit was not stale, and (3) even if probable cause were lacking, “the 
executing officers relied on the search warrant in good faith” [See id. at 22, 25, 27]. 
Defendants filed three objections. First, Defendants argue that the Report erred in 
concluding that the Affidavit established probable cause because there was no “nexus between” 
Unit 1 “and the alleged drug trafficking” [ See Docs. 93 at 2, 94 at 3]. Second, Defendants argue 
that the information in the Affidavit was stale at the time the warrant issued [ Id.]. Third, 
Defendants argue that the “good faith exception” does not apply [See Docs. 93 at 2, 94 at 3-4]. 
The United States opposed Defendants’ Objections [See Doc. 95]. 
II. Analysis 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” The Court considers timely 
objections de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Crim P. 59(b)(3). 
Starting with Defendants’ probable cause objection, “[p]robable cause is ‘not a difficult 
standard to meet.’” United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 773, 777 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting United 
States v. Whitlow, 134 F.4th 914, 919 (6th Cir. 2025)). “The critical question is whether there was 
a ‘fair probability’ that the officers would find evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the location to 
be searched.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). And the affidavit in support 
of the search warrant “had to establish ‘a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence 
sought.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2011)). 
A reviewing judge affords “‘great deference’ to the issuing judge’s” probable cause 
determination. United States v. Long, 155 F.4th 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States 
v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc)). The reviewing court’s role is “‘simply 
to ensure’” that the issuing judge “‘had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause 

PageID #: <pageID>
8 
existed’ when he issued the warrant.” Florence, 150 F.4th at 777 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-
39). With limited exception not applicable here, the Court reviews the facts in the affidavit in 
support of the warrant, not what could have been included. See United States v. McCarley-Connin, 
148 F.4th 808, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2025). 
 In United States v. Sanders, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting 
en banc explained that when a search warrant affidavit “adequately establishes both where a 
defendant resides as well as the defendant’s active engagement in” drug dealing, “an inference can 
reasonably be made (especially when aided by an affiant-officer’s experience) that the criminal 
suspect keeps the instrumentalities and fruits of his crime in his residence.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 
462 (cleaned up). United States v. Simmons continued along that path, confirming that “even if no 
direct evidence ties drug dealing to a home, a nexus exists based on circumstantial evidence if a 
suspect’s drug dealing is ‘ongoing’ at the time the police seek the warrant.” See 129 F.4th 382, 
387 (6th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). 
Here, the facts within the four corners of the Affidavit established a nexus between Unit 1 
and drug trafficking. First, Sanders, Simmons, and Defendant Barnes’s actions alone likely doom 
Defendants’ objection. The Affidavit sufficiently established that Unit 1 was Defendant Barnes’s 
residence [See, e.g., Doc. 58-1 at 1]. This is true even if he may have traveled to Detroit for a few 
days while under surveillance [See id. ¶ 9]. And the facts in the Affidavit, explained through the 
lens of the affiant-officer’s training and experience, were sufficient to establish that Defendant 
Barnes was actively engaged in drug trafficking. See Simmons, 129 F.4th at 387 (“An affidavit 
can . . . show ongoing drug activity through the repeated nature of the transactions,” “independent 
surveillance,” or “witness accounts corroborated by an affiant’s experience and training” (cleaned 
up)). In June and July 2024, Law enforcement watched Defendant Barnes participate in multiple 

PageID #: <pageID>
9 
transactions that experience and training indicated were hand-to-hand sales or indicative of drug 
trafficking [See Doc. 58-1 ¶¶ 4, 6]. Law enforcement did not have to conduct the transactions 
themselves or through proxies to show that Defendant was engaged in drug trafficking. 
Second, even if Defendant Barnes’s actions alone were not sufficient to establish a nexus, 
the remainder of the facts in the Affidavit fill any gap. Over two months, law enforcement 
observed Defendants Barnes and Mahone leave Unit 1, engage in both suspected drug transactions 
and one confirmed drug transaction, and then return to Unit 1 promptly after these 
transactions [See Doc. 58-1 at 4-8]. Rather than relying on “generalized assertions,” [see Doc. 93 
at 10], the Affidavit established both the affiant-officer’s relevant training and experience and his 
reasonable bases for concluding that the suspected drug transactions were in fact drug 
transactions, [see Doc. 58-1 ¶¶ 1, 4, 6]. And the one confirmed drug transaction on July 2 was 
confirmed in multiple ways: through law enforcement’s observation of the actual “hand-to-hand 
transaction,” the presence of narcotics in the purchaser’s vehicle shortly after the hand-to-hand 
transaction, and the purchaser’s admission [ See id. ¶ 7]. Law enforcement did not rely solely on 
the word of an uncorroborated informant—an officer saw the hand-to-hand transaction and 
narcotics purchased with his or her own eyes. For good measure, the affiant-officer confirmed, 
based on his training and experience, that Defendants’ pattern of “leaving and returning” to Unit 
1 showed that Defendants were using Unit 1 to “resupply” between drug transactions [ Id. at ¶ 6]. 
And the affiant-officer stated that based on his training and experience, illegal substances were 
likely “being stored” in Unit 1 [Id.]. This was enough to establish a nexus between Unit 1 and the 
evidence of drug trafficking sought. 
Moving to Defendants’ second objection, the information in the Affidavit was not stale. 
“Evidence of ongoing criminal activity will generally defeat a claim of staleness.” See United 

PageID #: <pageID>
10 
States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, officers observed Defendants engage 
in suspected and actual drug trafficking across two months [ See Doc. 58-1 at 4-8]. And on July 
11—just one day before the warrant issued—officers observed Defendant Mahone travel evasively 
before engaging in suspected drug trafficking, starting at Unit 1 and returning to Unit 1 [See Doc. 
58-1 ¶ 11]. Considering the circumstances, the fact that officers did not find actual narcotics in 
the pickup of the suspected purchasers is not dispositive. The suspected purchasers made a pit 
stop at a hotel parking lot before officers approached them, and the affiant-officer explained that 
based on his training and experience, “drug purchase customers will commonly immediately use 
the drugs that they just purchased or stow/hide their recently purchased contraband” [ Id. ¶ 11]. 
And even if the July 11 actions were not enough, the confirmed hand-to-hand drug trafficking on 
July 2 coupled with Defendants’ actions thereafter precludes the information in the Affidavit from 
being stale [See Doc. 58-1 ¶¶ 7, 11]. See United States v. Tisdale, 980 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th Cir. 
2020) (concluding that even one month is “not enough time for information to go stale” when there 
is an “ongoing” conspiracy and “ample evidence of drug trafficking connected to the [searched] 
address”); United States v. Perry , 864 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that “drug sales 
two to fifty-one days before” a warrant issued were “recent enough” to avoid staleness there). 
Finally, even if probable cause were lacking, the good faith exception would apply. Under 
the good faith exception, “suppression is not an available remedy when officers conduct a search 
in good faith reliance on a judicially authorized warrant.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 468 (citing United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909, 922 (1984)). Defendants argue that the Affidavit was “bare 
bones,” an exception to the good faith exception [ See Docs. 93 at 14, 94 at 10]. A bare bones 
affidavit is one that is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 468 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). That 

PageID #: <pageID>
11 
“moniker” is generally “reserved” for an affida vit that is “either completely devoid of any nexus 
between the illegal activity and the place to be searched” or “merely state[s] suspicions, or 
conclusions, without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge.” Id. (cleaned up). 
The Affidavit was not bare bones. The Affidavit connected both suspected and confirmed 
drug trafficking to Defendants’ start at and prompt return to Unit 1 [See Doc. 58-1 ¶¶ 4, 6, 7, 11]. 
“Evidence that one leaves a residence, engages in a drug transaction, and then returns to the 
residence plainly demonstrates a sufficient nexus with the location.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463 
(cleaned up). And the Affidavit reasonably explained how the affiant-officer’s experience and 
training led him to (1) identify the suspected drug trafficking and (2) believe that evidence of drug 
trafficking would be found at Unit 1 [See id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 11]. So, law enforcement justifiably relied 
on the judicially-authorized warrant. And even if the Affidavit lacked probable cause, the good 
faith exception would apply. 
III. Conclusion 
As stated above, the Court ADOPTS relevant portions of the Report [Doc. 89], GRANTS
Defendant Mahone’s Motion to Adopt [Doc. 59], OVERRULES Defendants’ objections to the 
Report [Doc. 93, 94], and DENIES the Motion to Suppress [Doc. 56]. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
KATHERINE A YTZER 
United States District Judge
 
KATHERINE A. CRYRYRYRYRYRYRYYYRYYRYYRYRYRYYRYRYYYYYYRYYRYYYRYYYYYYRYYYRYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYRYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYRYRYYYYYYYRYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYRYYYYYYRYRYYYYYYYRYYYYRYRYYYYYRYYYRRYYYRYYYRYYYYYYRYYYYRYYYYYRYYYYYRRRYYYYRRYTZZZZZZZZZZZZZZTZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZEEEEEREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
United States Districtcttttcttttcttttttttttttttttcttcttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJudududududuududuuuudududududududududududududduddudududuuuududdddduuuduudddduduuduuddduudddddduudddddduuddddddddddduuudddddduudddddddddddddddddddddgggggggeggggggggggggggggg

PageID #: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight