govinfo:USCOURTS-tnmd-3_25-cv-00066-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
NASG REALTY, LLC, 
NASG TENNESSEE NORTH 1, LLC, 
NASG TENNESSEE NORTH 2, LLC, 
and NASG TENNESSEE SOUTH, LLC, 
 
Defendants. 
 
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No. 3:25-cv-00066 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Before the Court is NASG Realty, LLC’s (“NASG Realty”) motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 
81), which is ripe for review. (Doc. Nos. 82, 89, 92). T he Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) brings claims against (1) NASG Realty; (2) NASG Tennessee North 1, 
LLC (“NASG North 1”); (3) NASG Tennessee North 2, LLC (“NASG North 2”); and (4) NASG 
Tennessee South, LLC (“NASG South”) (Defendants”) for violations of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. (Doc. No. 72). These claims started 
when Defendants’ former employee filed a charge of discrimination . ( Id. ¶ 13). NASG Realty 
argues that it is not a proper defendant because it was not named in the charge of discrimination, 
did not receive notice of any c harge against it , and the EEOC never alleged sole employer or 
integrated enterprise liability during the administrative process. (Doc. No. 82 at 4–5). 
i. Sole Employer or Integrated Enterprise Liability 
Under t he doctrine of sole employer or integrated enterprise liability, “courts examine 
whether two entities are so interrelated that they may be considered a ‘single employer’ or an PageID #: <pageID>
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‘integrated enterprise.’” Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “In determining whether to treat two entities as a single employer, 
courts examine the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations, i.e., common offices, 
common record keeping, shared bank accounts and equipment; (2) common management, 
common directors and boards; (3) ce ntralized control of labor relations and personnel; and (4) 
common ownership and financial control.” Id. at 993–94 (citation omitted). “None of these factors 
is conclusive, and all four need not be met in every case. Nevertheless, control over labor relations 
is a central concern.” Id. at 994 (citations omitted). 
The EEOC plausibly pleads that NASG Realty and the other Defendants operate as a single 
employer and/or integrated enterprise. The EEOC alleges that NASG Realty is the parent company 
of the remaining Defendants, all Defendants share the same Registered Agent, letterhead, mailing 
address, website, branding, logos, and email domain, (Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 12(a)–(aa)), and employment 
policies, and Defendants’ employees could transfer between Defendants. Likewise, the EEOC 
alleges centralized employment policies and administratio n, including but not limited to shared 
employment application portal; uniform policies and procedures and human resources 
management. (Doc. No. 72 ¶ ¶ 12 (n), (o), (p), (r ), (s), (t), (w), (x), (y), (z) and (aa). The Court 
accepts these factual allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Cooperrider v. Woods, 127 
F.4th 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2025) . Accordingly, the EEOC has pled plausible facts sufficient to 
support its sole employer or integrated enterprise theory. 
ii. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 
NASG Realty also argues that the EEOC failed to exhaust administrative remedies because 
it did not administratively investigate any claims against NA SG Realty before bringing this suit 
and did not name NASG Realty in the underlying EEOC Charge of Discrimination. (Doc. No. 82 PageID #: <pageID>
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at 1). “The clearly stated rule in this Circuit is that the EEOC’s complaint is ‘limited to the scope 
of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” 
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1977), disapproved 
of on other grounds by Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 
412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978). “The requirement, however, is not meant to be overly 
rigid, nor should it ‘ result in the restriction of subsequent complaints based on procedural 
technicalities or the failure of the charges to contain the exact wording which might be required in 
a judicial pleading.’” Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted). “As a result, the EEOC complaint should be liberally construed to encompass 
all claims ‘reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Id. 
“[I]t is well settled that a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title 
VII unless there is a clear identity of interest between it and a party named in the EEOC charge or 
it has unfairly prevented the filing of an EEOC charge.” Jones v. Truck Drivers Loc. Union No. 
299, 748 F.2d 1083, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). “A ‘clear identity of interest’ implies 
that the named and unnamed parties are virtual alter egos.” Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Akron, 
Inc., 899 F.2d 1473, 1481 (6th Cir. 1990). “Courts generally find an identity of interest where the 
unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge under circumstances which 
afford him an opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary 
compliance.” Romain v. Kurek, 836 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 
The former employee who filed the discrimination charge underlying this suit filed it 
against “North American Stamping Group.” (Doc. No. 82- 1 at 2). 1 The EEOC has alleged that 
 
1 NASG Realty attached the former employee’s EEOC Charge to the motion to dismiss that is 
referenced in the Amended Complaint, which the Court may consider. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate PageID #: <pageID>
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NASG Realty “was formerly known as North American Stamping Group, LLC,” (Doc. No. 72 ¶ 
(12)(u)). NASG North 1, NASG North 2, and NASG South admitted this in the answer to the 
amended complaint. (Doc. No. 87 ¶ (12)(u)). NASG Realty even filed its first motion to dismiss 
as “NASG Realty, LLC d/b/a North American Stamping Ground (‘NASG’).” (Doc. No. 8 at 1). 
There is a clear identity of interest between NASG Realty and North American Stamping Ground. 
The EEOC also alleges that all Defendants “responded collectively to administrative 
communications without distinguishment” and that “[a]ll conditions precedent to the institution of 
this lawsuit have been fulfilled.” (Doc. No. 72 ¶ ¶ 12(aa), 18 ). NASG Realty’s conclusory 
allegations do not persuade the Court otherwise. ( See, e.g., Doc. No. 82 at 5 (stating, without 
citation or support, “[The EEOC’s] integrated enterprise theory of liability was never raised at any 
time in the administrative process[.]”). Nevertheless, the EEOC engaged in conciliation efforts 
with North American Stamping Group, which, as stated, was the previous iteration of NASG 
Realty. (See Doc. No. 55 at 2–3 (citing Doc Nos. 9-1, 9-2)). On the face of the amended complaint, 
this action could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination and is within 
the scope of the underlying investigation. 
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 81) is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
____________________________________ 
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) . (citation omitted) (“When a court is presented 
with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, 
public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's 
motion to dismiss s o long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims 
contained therein.”). PageID #: <pageID>

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