govinfo:USCOURTS-okwd-5_25-cv-01461-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
 
ROBERT T. MAYNAHONAH, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
GARY MAYNARD, 
 
Respondent. 
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Case No. CIV-25-1461-D 
ORDER 
 This matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation 
(“Report”) [Doc. No. 8] issued by United States Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 636( b)(1)(B) and (C). The Report r ecommends dismissing the Petition 
because it is time barred. Petitioner timely objected. [Doc. No. 9]. Accordingly, the Court 
must make a de novo determination of thos e portions of the Report to which a specific 
objection is made, and may accept, modify, or reject the recommended decision in whole 
or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 
BACKGROUND 
 Petitioner, a state prisoner, brought this ac tion seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from his plea of guilty and sentence for one count of 
second-degree murder and one count of a drive-by shooting in Oklahoma County District 
Court, Case No. CF-2005-5643 (“State Matte r”). [Doc. No. 1]. On January 9, 2009, 
Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the State Matter. 
Although Petitioner was seventeen years old at the time he pleaded guilty, he was sentenced 

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as an adult rather than a juvenile. Id. Petitioner did not seek to withdraw his plea and did 
not seek post-conviction relief in the State Matter. Id. 
Judge Erwin recommends that the Petition be deemed time barred under the one-
year limitation period of 28 U.S.C § 2244(d ). [Doc. No. 8]. Judge Erwin also concludes 
that no basis exists for statutory or equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period. Id. 
 In his objections, Petitioner doe s not dispute Judge Erwin’s historical account of the 
state court proceedings; thus, the Cour t accepts this portion of the Report. 1 [Doc. Nos. 8, 
9]. However, Petitioner objects to Judge Erwin’s determination that the Petition is untimely. 
DISCUSSION 
I. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pe nalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one-
year limitations period for claims of a habeas petitioner in state custody. Rhine v. Boone, 
182 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). The one-year limitations period runs from the latest 
of: 
(A) the date on which the j udgment became final by the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for 
seeking such review; 
 
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 
application created by State action in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 
the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 
action; 
 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 
initially recognized by the Su preme Court, if the right 
 
1 Petitioner has waived further review of all issues as to which no specific objection is 
made. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review; or 
 
(D) the date on which the fact ual predicate of the claim or 
claims presented could have been discovered through 
the exercise of due diligence. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 
 The one-year limitation period generally r uns from the date the judgment became 
“final” under § 2244(d)(1)(A ), unless the petitioner alleges facts that implicate § 
2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D). See Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 Petitioner argues that his Petition was filed tim ely, as he filed it within one year of 
the Supreme Court recognizing a new cons titutional right, which was found to have 
retroactive applicability. 
 A. Section 2244(d)(1)(A). 
 The Court agrees with Judg e Erwin’s conclusion that pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), 
the Petition is untimely because Petitioner file d it over fifteen years after the limitations 
period had expired. Indeed, under § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s limitations period began to 
run from the date which the conviction became final. See Preston, 234 F.3d at 1120. If a 
defendant does not timely move to withdraw a guilty plea or file a direct appeal, Oklahoma 
criminal convictions become fi nal ten days after sentencing. See Jones v. Patton , 619 F. 
App’x 676, 678 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). 
Petitioner’s conviction became final on January 19, 2009, and the one-year habeas 
limitation expired on January 20, 2010. However, Petitioner did not file the Petition until 

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December 5, 2025, which is beyond the limitations period. Accordingly, under 
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) the Petition is untimely. 
B. Section 2244(d)(1)(C). 
 Petitioner asserts that the state court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as an 
adult as it violated the constitutional rule against mandatory adult sentences for juveniles. 
[Doc. No. 9, at p. 2]. Petitioner argues that his Petition is timely because this proposition 
relies on constitutional rights only relatively recently recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which was made retroactive by Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). 
 Section 2244(d)(1)(C) prescr ibes the limitations period to run from “the date on 
which the constitutional right asserted was in itially recognized by th e Supreme Court, if 
the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C § 2244(d)(1)(C). 
 The Supreme Court in Miller, 567 U.S. 460, and Montgomery, 577 U.S. 190, 
announced a new substantive constitutional rule retroactiv e on collateral review that 
prohibits mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders. 
 However, as Petitioner admits , he did not receive a mandatory life sentence without 
parole. [Doc. No. 9, at p. 3]. Thus, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Miller and Montgomery 
are inapplicable. Regardless, Miller was decided in 2012, and Montgomery was decided in 
2016, yet Petitioner did not file his Petitio n until 2025, which is beyond the one-year 
limitations period. Thus, Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. 
 

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 II. Jurisdiction. 
Construing Petitioner’s objection liberally, he also argues that a claim that a 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction cannot be time-barred. “Absence of jurisdiction in the 
convicting court is indeed a basis for federal habeas corpus relief cognizable under the due 
process clause.” Yellowbear v. Wyo. Attorney Gen., 525 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008). “As 
with any other habeas claim,” however, § 2254 claims predicated on the convicting court’s 
lack of jurisdiction are “subject to dismissal for untimeliness.” Morales v. Jones, 417 F. 
App’x 746, 749 (10th Ci r. 2011) (unpublished); see also Davis v. Bridges , No. 22-6107, 
2024 WL 140026, at *9 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2024) (“In the federal habeas context, challenges 
to state court convictions based on the state court’s lack of jurisdiction are essentially due 
process challenges, which are properly subjec t to AEDPA’s procedural requirements.”). 
Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the sentenci ng court did not have jurisdiction is also 
subject to the AEDPA’s limitations period, which has expired. 
III. Statutory Tolling. 
 
 Petitioner did not object to, and the Court agrees with Judge Erwin’s conclusion that 
the Petition is untimely. Indeed , 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)’s st atutory tolling provision is 
inapplicable because Petitioner did not file an Application for Post Conviction Relief. 
IV . Equitable Tolling/Actual Innocence Exception. 
 
 Petitioner did not object to , and the Court agrees with Judge Erwin’s conclusion 
that, the Petition is untimely as he did not argue that he is entitled to any equitable tolling 
or argue that he is actually innocent of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. Thus, neither 

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equitable tolling nor the actual innocence exception warrant extending his limitations 
period. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Court reviewed the Report, as well as the case record, and fully concurs in the 
Report [Doc. No. 8]. Therefore, the Court, having conducted a de novo review, finds that 
Petitioner’s objection [Doc. No. 9] should be overruled, and hereby ADOPTS the Report 
[Doc. No. 8] in its entirety.2 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner Robert T. Maynahonah’s Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED. A separate 
judgment shall be entered. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases, the Court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) 
when it enters a final order adverse to a petitioner. A COA may issue only if Petitioner “has 
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason 
could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists 
could conclude the issues presented are ade quate to deserve encouragement to proceed 
further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) . “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural 
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s unde rlying constitutional claim, a COA should 
 
2 Petitioner did not argue that the Petition was timely under either 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) or 
(D). Thus, the Court does not and need not address them. 

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issue when the prisoner shows, at least, th at jurists of reason w ould find it debatable 
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists 
of reason would find it de batable whether the district cour t was correct in its procedural 
ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Upon consideration, the Court finds the requisite standard 
is not met in this case. Therefore, a COA is DENIED. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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