govinfo:USCOURTS-okwd-5_26-cv-00660-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
 
ROHON YAKI VILLEGAS-SANCHEZ, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
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Case No. CIV-26-660-D 
ORDER 
 Petitioner Rohon Yaki Villegas-Sanchez f iled a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who entered 
the United States in Septembe r 2022. At that time, Petitione r was placed into removal 
proceedings, and was released from custody on her own recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226. Petitioner has been in the custo dy of the U.S. Immi gration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) since Febr uary 11, 2026, and his remova l proceedings are ongoing. 
Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provision contained in 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). To date, Petitione r has not received a b ond hearing under 8 
U.S.C. § 1226. Rather, the government contends that Petitioner is detained pursuant to the 
mandatory detention provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not 
entitled Petitioner to a bond hearing. 
 The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Chris M. Stephens for 
initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Respondents filed a 
response [Doc. No. 9], to which Petitioner filed a reply [Doc. No. 10]. 

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 On May 26, 2026, the magi strate judge issued a Report and Recommendation [Doc. 
No. 11], recommending that the Court grant in part the Petition and order Respondents to 
provide Petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents filed a 
timely objection to the Report [Doc. No. 12]. Thus, the C ourt must “make a de novo 
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject or modify, in whole 
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). 
 Respondents object to Judge Stephens’ conclusion that § 1226(a) applies to 
Petitioner’s detention, and not § 1225(b)(2)(A ), as suggested by Resp ondents. Generally, 
Ҥ 1225 mandates detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing for the noncitizens 
to whom it applies.” Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, 
at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (citation om itted). In comparison, § 1226 provides the 
noncitizen with the opportunity for a bond hearing. Id.; see also Aranda v. Olson, No. 4:25-
cv-156-GNS, 2025 WL 3499061, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2025) (“Overall, Section 1226(a) 
provides for a discretionary authority re quiring an individualized bond determination 
before a noncitizen may be taken into custody.”) (quotation and citation omitted). 
Respondents contend that Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to 
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides: 
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien 
who is an applicant for ad mission, if the examining 
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission 
is not clearly and beyond a dou bt entitled to be admitted, the 

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alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of 
this title. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Re spondents assert that Petiti oner is an “applicant for 
admission” because he is present in the Unite d States and has not b een admitted, citing 
§ 1225(a)(1). See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (“An alien pr esent in the United States who has 
not been admitted … shall be deemed for pur poses of this chapte r an applicant for 
admission.”). 
 In previously construing § 1225(b )(2)(A), the undersigned concluded in Colin that 
the subsection “unambiguously requires that an ‘applicant for admission’ also be ‘seeking 
admission’ for the section to control.” See Colin, 2025 WL 3645176, at *4. 
 Upon consideration, the Court conti nues to conclude that § 1225(b)(2)(A) 
unambiguously requires that an “applicant for admission” also be “seeking admission” for 
the subsection to control. Here, because Petiti oner has been residing in the United States 
for many years and was present in the country when he wa s detained, Petitioner does not 
fall into the mandatory deten tion provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Colin , 2025 WL 
3645176, at *5; Valdez, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3 (“Because Petitioner has been unlawfully 
living in the United States for many years wi thout seeking admission, this provision does 
not apply to him.”); Martinez Diaz, 2025 WL 3296310, at *3 (“Here, Petitioner has resided 
in the United States for approximately twenty years … and, therefore, is not ‘seeking 
admission’ into the United States. Accord ingly, the Court finds § 1225(b)(2)(A) 
inapplicable to Petitioner.”). Accordingly, § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s detention. 

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 Having found that § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s detention, and noting no objection 
by Respondents as to their obligation to provide bond hearings for noncitizens under 
§ 1226(a), the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. See Hernandez, 
2025 WL 2996643 , at *3 (citing Jennings , 583 U.S. at 306) (“Fe deral regulations also 
provide that noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are entitled to individualized bond 
hearings.”). 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 
12] is ADOPTED in part,1 and the Petition for Writ of Hab eas Corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1] is GRANTED in part. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s “Motion to Expedit[e] Habeas 
Corpus Proceedings” [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED as moot. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a 
prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or release Pe titioner. A separate judgment 
shall be entered. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 
1 At this time, the Court declines to place the burden on the government to justify Petitioner’s 
detention pending removal proceedings. See Singh v. Grant, No. CIV-26-279-J, 2026 WL 1035100, 
at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 16, 2026) (finding a burden shift premature where “no immigration judge 
has conducted a bond hearing in Pe titioner’s case, much less allo cated the burden of proof or 
applied the particular facts of this case to that evidentiary framework”); see also Singh v. Figueroa, 
No. CIV-26-600-R, 2026 WL 1181699, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2026) (same); Gutierrez v. 
Garcia, No. 2:25-CV-001145-WJ-KRS, 2026 WL 310064, at *6 n.3 (DN.M. Feb. 5, 2026) (“In the 
absence of a statutory mandate or binding precedent requiring burden shifting, the Court declines 
to specify or alter the burden of proof at this stage.”). 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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