govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-2_25-cv-01133-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
CRAIG M. WHITE, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE, 
 
Defendant. 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
: 

Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison 
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. 
Jolson 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Craig White was terminated from the Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”) in 
August 2021. He appealed the DLA’s decision to the Merit System Protection Board 
(“MSPB”) where he challenged his removal and alleged that he experienced 
discrimination. The MSPB upheld Mr. White’s removal and denied his allegations of 
discrimination. This action followed. 
The Government1 has moved to dismiss. (Mot., ECF No. 11.) Mr. White 
responded (Resp., ECF No. 15) and the Government replied (Reply, ECF No. 18). 
Mr. White has alternatively moved for leave to amend his complaint. (Resp., 
PAGEID # 169.) 
 
1 The Government asserts Pete Hegseth, Secretary of the United States 
Department of Defense, is the proper defendant. Should Mr. White wish to name a 
different party, he can do so in his forthcoming amended complaint. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The MSPB’s Initial Decision, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 1, is 38 
pages and contains a detailed background into the facts giving rise to Mr. White’s 
removal. (ECF No. 1-1.) That said, an overview of the pertinent facts is all that is 
necessary for this Motion. 
Mr. White was a Supervisory Career Program Specialist for the Pathway 
Internship Program at the Defense Logistics Agency’s Land & Maritime office in 
Columbus, Ohio. (ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 6.) In March 2020, a supervisor asked the 
Office of Inspector General to investigate Mr. White’s familial relationship with 
several Pathway interns. (Id.) The investigation found that Mr. White’s relationship 
improperly created the appearance of favoritism. (Id., PAGEID # 8.) 
In April 2021, the DLA recommended Mr. White’s removal on three charges: 
(1) nepotism; (2) lack of candor; and (3) conduct unbecoming. (Id., PAGEID # 9–10.) 
On August 20, 2021, DLA terminated Mr. White. (Id., PAGEID # 14.) 
On appeal, the MSPB held a hearing on March 11–13, 2024 (id., PAGEID # 5) 
and upheld the DLA’s termination decision and denied Mr. White’s allegations of 
discrimination. (Id., PAGEID # 42.) 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) “establishes a framework for 
evaluating personnel actions taken against federal employees.” Kloeckner v. Solis, 
568 U.S. 41, 44 (2012). If the action “is particularly serious” such as “a removal from 
employment[,] … the affected employee has a right to appeal the agency’s decision 
to the MSPB[.]” Id. The employee’s appeal “may merely allege that the agency had 
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insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA; but the appeal may also or 
instead charge the agency with discrimination prohibited by another federal 
statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[.]” Id. Where, as here, “an 
employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB 
and alleges that the action was based on discrimination,” he is said to have brought 
a “mixed case.” Id. 
“A federal employee bringing a mixed case may proceed in a variety of ways.” 
Id. at 45. One way is to bring the case directly to the MSPB. Id. Where, as here, the 
“MSPB upholds the personnel action … the employee again has a choice: [he] may 
request additional administrative process, this time with the EEOC, or else [he] 
may seek judicial review.” Id. Mr. White chose judicial review. 
“Section 7703 of the CSRA governs judicial review of the MSPB’s decisions.” 
Id. Section 7703(b)(2) addresses mixed cases: 
Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this 
title shall be filed under [the enforcement sections of the Civil Rights 
Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Fair Labor Standards 
Act], as applicable. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
such case filed under any such section must be filed within 30 days 
after the date the individual filing the case received notice of the 
judicially reviewable action under such section 7702. 
Id. at 45–46 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2)). “The enforcement provisions of the 
antidiscrimination statutes” listed in section 7703(b)(2) all authorize suit in federal 
district court. Id. So the proper jurisdiction for filing a mixed case is in district 
court. Id. at 56. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim 
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with sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007) (internal alteration and quotations omitted). A complaint which falls short of 
the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has explained: 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The 
plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it 
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent 
with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must 
include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a 
cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) “Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice.” Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court “construe[s] the complaint 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 
476 (6th Cir. 2007). Additionally, in reviewing such a motion a court “may consider 
the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in 
the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long 
as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained 
therein.” Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Dismiss 
Mr. White appeals both the MSPB’s decision on his removal and his 
discrimination allegations. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The Government argues Mr. 
White’s Complaint should be dismissed because he has failed to meet the pleading 
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Mot., PAGEID # 99.) 
In a mixed case, the district court “reviews both the lawfulness of the 
personnel action and the discrimination claim – though under different standards.” 
Ornelas v. Mullin, No. 25-cv-0916, 2026 WL 1256934, *4 (S.D. Calif. May 7, 2026). 
As for a personnel action, “the district court’s review is deferential.” Id. The 
Court “shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, 
findings, or conclusions” that are: 
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; 
(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 
having been followed; or 
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence[.] 
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). But Mr. White has failed to identify what portion of the MSPB’s 
decision violated section 7703(c). Instead, he merely states, “significant facts 
… were omitted and facts … were not properly contextualized[,]” and that “the law 
was not properly applied to the relevant facts.” (Compl., PAGEID # 2.) Mr. White’s 
conclusory statements do nothing to guide the Court’s review. See, e.g., Holmes v. 
Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., No. 3:22-cv-364, 2024 WL 2132427, *3 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 
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2024) (Newman, J.) (“Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief or identified which 
portion(s) of the MSPB decision he seeks to have the Court review.”). 
As for a discrimination claim, it “shall be filed” under the enforcement 
sections of the Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Fair 
Labor Standards Act, as applicable. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). Once filed, “the employee 
… shall have the right to have the facts subject to trial de novo” by the district 
court. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). There is no “rigid pleading standard for discrimination 
cases.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). That said, a plaintiff 
must, at the very least, give fair notice of the basis for his claims. See id. at 514. 
Mr. White has not done that here. To start, the face of the Complaint does not 
even identify what type of discrimination claim(s) he is bringing and instead points 
to the “voluminous” record below. (Compl., PAGEID # 1.) And the MSPB’s decision 
attached to the Complaint only provides analysis into why it found Mr. White’s Title 
VII claim was without merit. It does not, however, “give the defendant fair notice of 
what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 
555 (internal alteration and quotations omitted). To do that, Mr. White needs to 
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to 
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
B. Motion for Leave to Amend 
In the alternative, Mr. White requests leave to amend his Complaint. (Resp., 
PAGEID # 169.) The Government argues Mr. White’s request should be denied 
because he is represented by counsel. (Reply, PAGEID # 186.) 
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the Court should freely give 
leave for a party to amend its pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a)(2). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted, Rule 
15(a) supports the “principle that cases should be tried on their merits” and not on 
technicalities, and thus “assumes ‘a liberal policy of permitting amendments.’” Inge 
v. Rock Fin. Corp., 388 F.3d 930, 937 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Moore v. City of 
Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986)). Several factors influence whether the 
Court should allow a party to amend its pleading including “undue delay in filing, 
lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure 
to cure deficiencies by previous amendment, undue prejudice to the opposing party, 
and futility of the amendment.” Seals v. Gen. Motors Corp., 546 F.3d 766, 770 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 The statutory and regulatory scheme governing a mixed case appeal is a 
complex procedural maze. If Mr. White were denied leave to amend his Complaint, 
the Court would be deciding his case on a procedural technicality and not the 
merits. Furthermore, an amended complaint would not prejudice the Government 
at this early stage of litigation. 
 Accordingly, the Court will allow Mr. White leave to amend his Complaint to 
give him an opportunity to allege sufficient factual matter, that if accepted as true, 
would state a claim to relief. Because the Court is allowing Mr. White to amend his 
Complaint, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is MOOT. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is 
MOOT. Mr. White is ORDERED to file an Amended Complaint within 14 days of 
the date of this Opinion and Order. The Government shall file their Answer or 
responsive pleading in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If Mr. White does not file an Amended Complaint by the noted deadline, the 
Court will sua sponte reconsider this Opinion and Order based upon the 
Government’s Motion to Dismiss. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison 
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
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