govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_21-cv-02419-4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 : 
MOHAMMAD ASLAM MIAN 
 : 
 
 v. : Civil Action No. DKC 21-2419 
 
 : 
LOANCARE SERVICING COMPANY, 
et al. : 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Presently pending and ready for resolution in this 
discriminatory lending case is the motion to vacate the judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) and request for appointment of counsel, 
(ECF No. 66), and the motion to expedite, (ECF No. 71), filed by 
Mohammad Aslam Mian (“Plaintiff”). This is Plaintiff’s eighth 
challenge to the court’s decision on April 29, 2022, (ECF Nos. 31; 
32), granting judgment on the pleadings to the defendants in this 
case. (See ECF Nos. 34; 38; 41; 45; 48; 50; 52). After the court 
denied Plaintiff’s seventh challenge, (ECF No. 59), he appealed 
the court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and subsequent 
orders to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, (ECF No. 60), which affirmed the order at ECF No. 59 and 
dismissed the appeal over all the other orders for lack of 
jurisdiction because the appeal as to those orders was untimely, 
(ECF No. 64). The issues have been briefed, and the court now 
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For 

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the following reasons, Plaintiff’s request for appointment of 
counsel will be denied, the motion to vacate the judgment will be 
denied, and the motion to expedite will be denied as moot. 
 This motion is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) because it was 
filed more than twenty-eight days after the underlying judgment. 
See In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 2 –3 (4th Cir. 1992). Rule 60(b) 
allows a litigant to obtain relief from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within “a 
reasonable time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). Where a party alleges “(1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not 
have been discovered in time . . . ; [or] (3) fraud . . . , 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” a motion 
under 60(b) must be filed within a year after the entry of 
judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), (c)(1). The judgment in this case 
was issued four years ago. (ECF Nos. 31; 32). Therefore, 
Plaintiff can only succeed under one of the remaining provisions 
of Rule 60(b) if he establishes that “(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it 
is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; 
or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any 
other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Relief 
under Rule 60(b) is “an extraordinary remedy.” Mayfield v. Nat’l 
Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4
th Cir. 

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2012) (citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 
(1950)). Moreover, “Rule 60(b) may not be used to relitigate 
claims already decided by the court.” Saunders v. City of 
Petersburg Police Dep’t, 158 F.App’x 491, 491 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 
2005) (per curiam) (citing CNF Constructors, Inc. v. Donohoe 
Constr. Co., 57 F.3d 395, 400 (4 th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). 
Because Plaintiff cannot succeed under these standards, his motion 
to vacate the judgment will be denied. 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that the final judgment issued by 
this court is void. (ECF No. 66, at 3). He points to the 
Memorandum and Order dated May 16, 2025, that Chief Judge Diaz of 
the Fourth Circuit issued in response to Plaintiff’s complaint of 
judicial misconduct against the undersigned. (Id. at 2; see also 
ECF No. 66-1). He appears to believe that the Memorandum and Order 
validates his allegations of judicial misconduct and thereby 
renders the final judgment in this case void. (ECF Nos. 66, at 2; 
66-4, at 3). Instead, the Memorandum and Order recounts 
Plaintiff’s allegations of judicial misconduct and then dismisses 
the complaint as an improper attempt to relitigate the case and, 
in any event, lacking sufficient evidence. (ECF No. 66-1, at 3–
5). Nothing in the Memorandum and Order or otherwise suggests 
that the four-year-old final judgment in this case is void. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4). 

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The requirements of Rule 60(b)(5) also have not been met. 
Plaintiff can only attempt to argue that another reason justifies 
relief using Rule 60(b)(6), under which he must show “extraordinary 
circumstances,” a reason for relief that does not fall in the first 
five categories, a meritorious claim, and no unfair prejudice to 
the defendant. Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 500–01 (4 th Cir. 
2011) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 
U.S. 847, 863 n.11, 864 (1988); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. 
Gray, 1 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1993)). Extraordinary truly means 
extraordinary; “relief . . . under this rule is no easy task.” 
Bartch v. Barch, 721 F.Supp.3d 380, 382 (D.Md. 2024). “And if the 
reason asserted for the Rule 60(b)(6) motion could have been 
addressed on appeal from the judgment,” the motion should be 
denied. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501 (citing Dowell v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4
th Cir. 1993); Burnley, 
988 F.2d at 3). Plaintiff fails to allege any extraordinary 
circumstances or meritorious claim, and reopening the judgment 
four years later on Plaintiff’s eighth challenge to it would 
unfairly prejudice the defendants. Additionally, many of his 
arguments could have been raised on appeal, he did in fact appeal, 
and his appeal was adjudicated. To avoid any residual confusion 
on Plaintiff’s part that might prompt subsequent filings, the court 
will offer a brief discussion of the issues Plaintiff raises. 

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First, Plaintiff contends that his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to due process were violated. (ECF No. 66, at 2-
3). He states that under these amendments, “notices are required 
to be issued and witnesses are [required to be] taken,” and these 
requirements were not met in prior proceedings. (Id.). Plaintiff 
misunderstands the requirements of due process. Due process is 
absent where a party is not given proper notice of the proceeding 
or is not given an opportunity to be heard at said proceeding. 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 
(1950); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Plaintiff 
was given proper notice of the defendants’ motions when he was 
served, and he was given an opportunity to respond by the court. 
He does not identify any procedural defect that could constitute 
an extraordinary circumstance for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(6). 
Second, Plaintiff refers to his affidavit, in which he asserts 
claims of racial discrimination, judicial misconduct, due process 
violations, fraudulent misrepresentation, untimely filings by the 
defendants, “Maryland Commercial Law” violations, trespassing, and 
harassment. (ECF No. 66-4, at 2-4). This court has already 
rejected many of these claims numerous times. Specifically, this 
court has already determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to 
forbearance and cannot assert a racial discrimination claim, (ECF 
Nos. 31, at 7-13; 35, at 2-3; 39, at 3 & n.1; 49, at 1-2; 51, at 
2; 58, at 3), denied Plaintiff’s “Commercial Law” claim under the 

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Maryland Consumer Protection Act , (ECF No. 31, at 13-15), and 
denied Plaintiff’s claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and 
untimely filings, (ECF Nos. 31, at 16-19; 35, at 2, 4; 47, at 2-
3). Also, as explained above, Plaintiff cannot rely on judicial 
misconduct or due process violations to obtain relief from this 
judgment. Finally, Plaintiff seems to argue for the first time 
that the placement of the “Abandoned House” sign in his yard 
constituted trespassing and harassment. (ECF No. 66-4, at 4). 
But a plaintiff cannot amend his complaint through prejudgment 
briefing, much less postjudgment briefing. See S. Walk at 
Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 
713 F.3d 175, 184 (4
th Cir. 2013). The time has long passed to 
assert new claims in this case. Whether Plaintiff believes his 
arguments regarding these claims justify relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) or otherwise, they are not successful. 
Finally, Plaintiff again requests the appointment of counsel, 
stating that he is eighty-five years old and has impaired hearing 
and eyesight. (ECF No. 66, at 3). As stated in this court’s 
memorandum opinions dated December 9, 2022, (ECF No. 51, at 2), 
and May 25, 2023, (ECF No. 58, at 3-4), the appointment of counsel 
in civil cases is governed by the in forma pauperis provision, 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e). Because Plaintiff paid the full filing fee when 
he filed his complaint, appointment of counsel is not available. 
(ECF Nos. 51, at 2; 58, at 3-4). The Fourth Circuit affirmed 

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denial of appointment of counsel in this case. (ECF No. 64-1, at 
2). 
Because Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment will be 
denied, Plaintiff’s motion to expedite is moot. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff’s motion to expedite will be denied. 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the 
judgment will be denied, his request for appointment of counsel 
will be denied, and his motion to expedite will be denied as moot. 
A separate order will follow. 
 
 /s/ 
 DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 
 United States District Judge 

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