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Opinion

govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_22-cv-00287-3

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 2025-08-25

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:49:35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
MARTIN RUSSELL DIAMOND, 
 
 P l a i n t i f f , 
 
 v. 
 
ODETAYO ODEDERE, 
 
 D e f e n d a n t . 
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1:22CV287 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
LORETTA C. BIGGS, Senior District Judge. 
Martin Russell Diamond (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Odetayo Odedere (“De fendant”). (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff 
alleged causes of action against Defendant st emming from an alleged deprivation of his 
constitutional rights during an incident that occurred during his incarceration. (Id. at 4.) This 
case was tried before a jury on December 16-17, 2024, and a jury verdict was rendered in favor 
of Plaintiff with an award of punitive damages, and nominal damages. (ECF Nos. 113; 114.) 
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial as to Damages. (ECF No. 117.) For 
the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a “Complai nt for Violation of Ci vil Rights” after an 
incident that occurred on April 12, 2021, at Southern Correctional Institution. (ECF No. 1 at 
1, 4.) Plaintiff’s Complaint named four Defendants—Defendants Parker, Euote, Crisco, and 
Odedere—and asserted claims regarding excessive force and failure to intervene in violation 

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of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 21–26.) Following disc overy and dispositive 
motions, (ECF Nos. 29; 49), the case was set for trial. (ECF No. 52 at 1.) 
On November 14, 2024, Defendants Parker , Euote and Crisco reached a settlement 
agreement with Plaintiff. (M inute Entry dated November 14, 2024.) Leaving Defendant 
Odedere as the only remaining Defendant. (Id.) The trial in this case began on December 16, 
2024, and lasted two days. (Text Order dated December 16, 2024; ECF No. 113.) On 
December 17, 2024, the jury entered a verdict. (ECF No. 114 at 1.) The jury found that 
Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evid ence that (1) Defendant violated Plaintiff’s 
Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force and (2 ) that Defendant committed a 
battery against him. ( Id.) A judgment was then entered in accordance with the jury verdict 
awarding punitive damages in the amount of $10,000. (ECF No. 122.) On January 17, 2025, 
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for a New Trial as to Damages. (ECF No. 117.) 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A party may challenge a verdict under Rule 59, but it is an “extraordinary remedy which 
should be used sparingly.” Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th 
Cir. 1998). Whether to grant a new trial “rests within the soun d discretion of the trial court 
but such discretion must not be arbitrarily exercised.” City of Richmond v. Atl. Co. , 273 F.2d 
902, 916 (4th Cir. 1960). A district court must grant a new trial if: (1) the verdict is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, (2) is based upon ev idence which is false, or (3) will result in a 
miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the 
direction of a verdict.” Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 
(4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

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“A jury verdict may be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial when it is not 
possible to reconcile the findings. Likewise, a new trial is appropriate if the verdict is against 
the clear weight of the evidence.” Jones v. Southpeak Interactive Corp. of Deleware, 777 F.3d 658, 
674–75 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting TransDulles Cent., Inc. v. USX Corp., 976 F.2d 219, 227 (4th Cir. 
1992). A district court must however, and should have, both practical and theoretical respect 
for the fact-finding and truth-seeking functions of the civil jury. Ledford v. Gibson, 648 F.Supp. 
326, 328 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 10, 1986). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial as to Damages pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
(ECF No. 117 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that the we ight of the evidence at trial proved that he 
suffered an actual injury from Defendant’s violations and that the jury’s finding of zero dollars 
in compensatory damages is against the weight of evidence and will result in a miscarriage of 
justice. (ECF No. 118 at 5, 7–8.) Defendan t counters that the evidence demonstrated that 
Plaintiff refused to comply with prison guards, th erefore he was aware of the risk of injuries 
that could occur, and that the testimony during trial supports that Plaintiff was still able to use 
his hands for activities such as exercising. (ECF No. 127 at 4, 5–6.) 
The central question before the Court is whet her the weight of Plaintiff’s evidence at 
trial regarding compensatory damages was such th at a reasonable jury could not find that he 
suffered no compensatory damages. “[T]he basic purpose of § 1983 damages is to compensate 
persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Memphis Cmty. 
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
No compensatory damages can be awarded for the violation of a right, absent proof of actual 

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injury. Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978). Howe ver, compensatory damages do not 
automatically flow from a finding of a constitutional violation. 
On the issue of compensatory damages, th is Court instructed the jury to award 
sufficient damages for injuries that a party has actually suffered or which he is reasonably likely 
to in the near future. The Court specifically instructed the jury on the difference between 
economic and non-economic damages. 
At trial Plaintiff presented no evidence of economic damages. Plaintiff presented no 
medical expenses, or lost wages. Further, Plai ntiff testified that he was able to continue 
working while incarcerated, and th at he planned to work after his release. This Court finds 
that the jury’s determination to award Plaintiff zero dollars in economic damages is not against 
the weight of the evidence, based upon information that is false, nor a miscarriage of justice. 
See Atlas Food Sys., 99 F.3d at 594. 
Regarding non-economic damages, the Court also finds that the jury verdict was 
supported by the evidence presented at trial. Although Plaintiff presented evidence from his 
physical therapist, Melissa Manning, she could not testify to Plaintiff’s pain or suffering beyond 
their last session on September 22, 2021. Manning testified that Plaintiff only reported pain 
when he moved his fingers, reported that he was able to do exercises like pushups, and that as 
of their last session he was reporting his pain as a 4/10. 
The other evidence presented at trial on non-economic damages was from Plaintiff 
himself. Plaintiff testified that he still experiences pain when he bends his hand and when he 
holds things. However, he also testified that he handwrites letters to his family and lawyers. 
Further, as stated above, he testified that he is still able to work. In viewing the evidence as a 

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whole, this Court finds that a reasonable ju ry could find that Plaintiff suffered no 
compensatory damages. 
Although Plaintiff states that there was ample evidence presented to award 
compensatory damages, “[t]his argument fails to recognize that the jury may well have 
disbelieved [plaintiff] and his witnesses’ test imony about the injuries he allegedly incurred 
during this beating.” Denny v. Hinton , 1190 WL 34233 at *2 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished). 
Further, a reasonable juror could have found a constitutional violation in Defendant’s actions, 
while also finding that Plaintiff’s actions were a contributing factor in his injuries, if they found 
he was in fact injured at all. See Kane v. Lewis, 604 F. App’x 229, 234 (4th Cir. 2015) (“A plaintiff 
asserting a constitutional tort under § 1983 must [] satisfy the familiar element of proximate 
causation.”); see also Adams v. NaphCare, Inc., 2:16-cv-229, 2015 WL 10455885, at * 3 (E.D. Va. 
2016) (“[I]n most cases the issue of proximate cause is a factual question for the jury.”) 
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the Jury Verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence, based upon information that is false, nor that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
See Atlas Food Sys., 99 F.3d at 594. The jury’s verdict he re supports the finding of liability on 
both of Plaintiff’s claims and the award of punitive damages and nominal damages. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial as to 
Damages, (ECF No. 117), is DENIED. 
This, the 25th day of August 2025. 
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs 
Senior United States District Judge 

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