govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_22-cv-02029-2

Page 1 of 7 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
DARREN HUFFMAN, 
 
 P l a i n t i f f , 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES STEEL 
CORPORATION, 
 
 D e f e n d a n t . 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge: 
 Pending before the Court is a motion for leave to maintain seal filed by Defendant 
United States Steel Corporation (USS). (Doc. 99). On June 9, 2026, USS filed its motion for 
summary judgment (Doc. 95), its memorandum in support (Doc. 96), and its supporting 
exhibits (Doc. 97). However, nine of its sixteen supporting exhibits consisted solely of an 
otherwise blank placeholder page marked “confidential.” (Docs. 97-3, 97-5 to -6, 97-8, 97-
11 to -14, 97-16). USS then file d those nine exhibits under seal (Doc. 98) and requested 
leave to maintain that seal (Doc. 99). Plaintiff Darren Huffman has consented to this 
request. Id. ¶ 18. As explained below, the Court or ders the parties to file supplemental 
briefing on the question. 
BACKGROUND 
 This case involves claims of disability discrimination and retaliation against USS 
by Huffman, one of its former employees. (Doc. 62). Huffman alleges that USS refused to 
accommodate his disability, which resulted from an injury he received on the job, refused Page ID
#<pageID>
Page 2 of 7 
 
to let him return to work, and retaliated against him. Id. After a lengthy and frequently 
contentious period of discovery ( see, e.g. , Doc. 87), the parties seem to have begun to 
cooperate to get this litigation on track (for which the Court commends them). USS has 
filed its dispositive motion, and Huffman’s response will hopefully follow. 
DISCUSSION 
Almost everyone has information they would prefer to keep private. This is no less 
true in litigation; parties seek and often secure “broad secrecy agreement[s]” for the 
purposes of discovery 1 to “expedite that process by avoiding document-by-document 
analysis.” Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys , 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002). And, 
frequently, parties will want to keep information private even after discovery ends, 
requesting to file documents under seal: that way, the Court can resolve the parties’ 
dispute without revealing information the parties would rather keep to themselves. 
But there exists an extremely well-established and longstanding presumption that 
“[d]ocuments that affect the disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to 
public view, even if the litigants strongly prefer secrecy, unless a statute, rule, or privilege 
justifies confidentiality.” In re Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2010); accord, e.g., Goesel 
v. Boley Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. , 738 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J., in chambers); Baxter 
Int’l, 297 F.3d 544; Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell , 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond , 46 F.3d 29 (7th Cir. 1995) (Eas terbrook, J., in chambers); In re 
Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J., in chambers). While the presumption 
can be rebutted, the Court cannot function as a rubber stamp and “allow[] the parties to 
 
1 So too in this case. (Doc. 34). Page ID
#<pageID>
Page 3 of 7 
 
seal whatever they want, for . . . . [t]he judge is the primary representative of the public 
interest in the judicial process.” Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 
178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, 
and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 492 (1991)). 
To rebut that strong presumption, a party must demonstrate good cause. Benson 
v. City of Indianapolis , No. 24-cv-00839, 2025 WL 3637013, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2025) 
(citations omitted). Good cause exists, for instance, to protect trade secrets, id., or if there 
exist “compelling reasons of personal privacy,” Monroe v. Baldwin, No. 18-CV-156, 2019 
WL 2409572, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 7, 2019) (quoting Goesel, 738 F.3d at 833). But “[i]t is not 
enough to merely assert that disclosure would be harmful; a party must explain how 
disclosure would cause harm.” Benson, 2025 WL 3637013, at *1 (emphasis added) (citing 
Baxter Int’l, 297 F.3d at 547). 
 USS’s motion fails to satisfy. It asks this Court to leave under seal nine exhibits: 
one “Business Labor Agreement” (BLA) between USS and its union, and eight documents 
containing Huffman’s “medical records and medical information.” 2 (Doc. 99, ¶¶ 9–10, 
13). In support of its request, USS invokes this Court’s Protective Order (Doc. 34), issued 
during discovery, which directed the parties to file under seal materials they had 
designated as “confidential” (Doc. 99, ¶¶ 6, 17). It argues that good cause exists to seal 
the exhibits concerning Huffman’s medical information because they “concern sensitive 
 
2 It also asks to be excused from the requirement of this Court’s local rules that it must file redacted versions 
of the exhibits filed under seal “to the extent red action would be impracticable, would not adequately 
protect the sensitive information at issue, or would leave the exhibits with little meaningful content.” 
(Doc. 99, ¶ 19). Page ID
#<pageID>
Page 4 of 7 
 
medical and disability-related information, including Plaintiff’s medical history, 
treatment, diagnoses, medications, physical limitations, work restrictions, and disability-
related records,” such that “[p]ublic disclosure of those records would unnecessarily 
expose private medical information that is not appropriate for unrestricted public 
access.” Id. ¶ 12. And it argues that g ood cause exists to seal its BLA because (a) it was 
marked “confidential,” (b) it “contains confidential business, operational, labor-relations, 
employee-benefit, staffing, rate-of-pay, protocol, grievance, and termination information 
that is not generally available to the public,” (c) it “may contain trade secrets,” and (d) its 
disclosure “could cause competitive and business harm to USS and its union employees.” 
Id. ¶ 13. 
 Although it acknowledges the presumption that documents submitted to the 
federal courts should be open to public vi ew, USS argues that an order maintaining the 
seal on these nine exhibits is necessary. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. It disavows any “improper purpose” 
or intention to “unjustifiably interfere with the public’s right of access.” Id. ¶ 15. Instead, 
it is concerned with the “injustice” that would be suffered by USS and the parties should 
the Court refuse to grant its motion—an injust ice which it characterizes as “manifest.” 
Id. ¶ 16. To avoid this manifest injustice, the Court must seal from public view some 452 
pages of evidence upon which USS relies in its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 98; 
Docs. 95–97, 100). USS calls this request “narrowly tailored.” (Doc. 99, ¶ 15). 
 But how would disclosure of these document s lead to the “manifest injustice” USS 
and (presumably) Huffman fear? This, to borrow from Judge Frank Easterbrook in Baxter 
International, is not explained. “Why is this sort of [manifest injustice] (whatever it may Page ID
#<pageID>
Page 5 of 7 
 
be) a legal justification for secrec y in litigation? Not explained.” Baxter Int’l, 297 F.3d at 
547. Although USS provides tw o citations in its motion (Doc. 99, ¶ 14 (first citing In re 
Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2010); and then citing McIntosh v. Wexford Health Sources, 
Inc., No. 17-cv-00103, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29548, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2023)), it only 
cites them for the rule statement that the presumption of public view exists but can be 
overridden for “good cause.” Id. What constitutes good cause? Why is good cause found 
here? And why does good cause exist to seal the entirety of each of the nine exhibits? 
Again, the Court leans on Judge Easterbrook: “Not explained.” 3 Ultimately, the Court 
cannot simply rely on USS’s assertions of confidentiality; if these documents are “vital to 
claims made in litigation,” then “they must be revealed,” Baxter Int’l, 297 F.3d at 547. 
 The Court wishes to give the parties an opportunity to explain with the requisite 
specificity why these exhibits should be filed under seal. To that end, the Court invites 
the parties to do so. Each party is welcome to file a supplemental brief on or before June 
29, 2026 . Each party’s brief should “analyze in detail, document by document, the 
propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations. Motions that represent serious 
efforts to apply the governing rules will be entertained favorably . . . . Motions that 
simply assert a conclusion without the required reasoning, however, have no prospect of 
 
3 It is not enough that the documents were subject to a protective order, see Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 
397 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002), or that their contents are subject to HIPAA protections, Benson v. City of 
Indianapolis, No. 24-cv-00839, 2025 WL 3637013, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2025) (citing Mitze v. Saul, 968 F.3d 
689, 693 (7th Cir. 2020)), or even that they are private medical records, e.g., Finnegan v. Baldwin, No. 20-CV-
00218, 2021 WL 365782, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2021). Even for private medical information, more is required 
than the bare assertion of confidentiality or a desire to keep such information private. E.g., Benson, No. 24-
cv-00839, 2025 WL 3637013, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2025) (first citing Williams v. Billington, No. 22-CV-1300, 
2024 WL 492110, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2024); then citing Finnegan, 2021 WL 365782, at *3; and then citing 
Westedt v. Franklin, No. 15-CV-129, 2016 WL 2997504, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 23, 2016)). Page ID
#<pageID>
Page 6 of 7 
 
success.” Baxter Int’l , 297 F.3d at 548. In particular, th e parties should focus on the 
portions of the exhibits that are likely to be material to the judicial resolution of this 
dispute (meaning, at a minimum, any portions that have been or are likely to be cited by 
either party in their statements of materi al facts and responses thereto). Absent an 
extraordinarily compelling reason, private information that is “material to issues before 
the court” must be made public. Benson, 2025 WL 3637013, at *2 (first citing Williams v. 
Billington, No. 22-CV-1300, 2024 WL 492110, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2024); then citing 
Finnegan v. Baldwin , No. 20-CV-00218, 2021 WL 365782, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2021); and 
then citing Westedt v. Franklin, No. 15-CV-129, 2016 WL 2997504, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 23, 
2016)). 
If there are portions of the nine exhibits that are likely to remain immaterial to the 
disposition of this case, the parties should identify those portions. See Goesel, 738 F.3d 
at 833 (“[T]he presumption of public access ‘applies only to the materials that formed the 
basis of the parties’ dispute and the district court’s resolution’; other materials that may 
have crept into the record are not subject to the presumption.” (quoting Baxter Int’l, 297 
F.3d at 548)). Such exhibits co uld remain under seal with a co py filed publicly that kept 
the immaterial portions redacted. F ED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e)(1); cf. Westedt, 2016 WL 2997504, 
at *1 (hybrid disposition of a motion to seal based on materiality to the court’s 
disposition). 
 For these reasons, the Court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE its ruling on USS’s motion 
for leave to maintain seal (Doc. 99) and DIRECTS the parties to file supplemental briefs 
consistent with this opinion on or before June 29, 2026 . Failure to do so may result in Page ID
#<pageID>
Page 7 of 7
denial of USS’s motion and the unsealing of the exhibits. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 15, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge Page ID
#<pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight