govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-02425-0

SIERRA CONNEY; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
* 
* 
* 
* Civil No. 25-2425-BAH 
STATE OF MARYLAND ET AL., 
* 
Defendant. 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
* * 
Self-represented plaintiff Sierra Conney ("Conney" or "Plaintiff') 1 brought suit against the 
State of Maryland, Assistant State's Attorney Michael Fiorenza ("Fiorenza"), Maryland Home 
Improvement Commission ("MHIC") investigator Jennifer Grimes ("Grimes"), and John Does 1-
10 ( collectively "Defendants") alleging claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Maryland state 
law. ECF 1. Pending before the Court are three motions: Fiorenza's motion to dismiss, ECF 12;2 
Grimes' motion to dismiss, ECF 14; and Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a surreply, ECF 18. 
Conney filed a consolidated response to both motions to dismiss, which also includes an informal 
request for early discovery. ECF 16. Grimes filed a reply. ECF 17. Grimes also opposes 
Conney's motion to file a surreply. ECF 20. All filings include memoranda oflaw, and Plaintiffs 
motion to file a surreply includes exhibits. 3 The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds 
1 Conney was formerly known as Sierra Arnold. ECF 1, at 1. 
2 The memorandum in support ofFiorenza's motion to dismiss is located at ECF 9-1. 
3 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF­
generated page numbers at the top of the page. 

that no hearing is necessary. See Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Accordingly, for the reasons stated 
below, Fiorenza's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, Grimes' motion to dismiss is GRANTED, 
and Conney's motion for leave to file a surreply is DENIED. Conney's informal request regarding 
discovery is DENIED. Finally, because only state law claims remain in this action, the complaint 
is DISMISSED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Conney alleges that between 2017 and 2019, she operated Arnold Construction Group and 
entered into several contracts, each with arbitration claus(ls, to perform home improvement 
projects. ECF 1, at 3-41113-14. In April of2018, Conney filed a complaint against Grimes with 
the Maryland Department of Labor's Fair Practices Division, "publicly criticiz[ing] MHIC's 
handling of minority-owned contractors." Id at 4 1 15. Grimes then "recommended criminal 
charges" against Conney in May of 2019, which Conney asserts was in retaliation for her 
complaint. Id. 1115-17. In June 2019, Fiorenza "adopted Grimes's application" for charges, and 
prosecuted Conney for acting as a contractor without a license and felony theft. Id. at 41 18, at 5 
On December 6, 2019, a state court judge made a finding of guilt against Conney and 
"imposed probation before judgment (PBJ), along with $14,108.88 in 'restitution,"' which Conney 
contends is "not tied to actual loss, but to the amount of an arbitration award issued in a private 
contract dispute." Id at 4 1 19. Then, "[i]n 2021, Judge Dana Middleton granted a motion to 
reduce restitution but failed to implement any modification." Id. at 5 1 24. During subsequent 
violation of probation ("VOP") proceedings in 2023, Judge Middleton ordered Conney to serve 60 
days of incarceration "due solely to non-payment of restitution" and "ignored active post­
conviction proceedings, evidence of Plaintiffs ongoing Chapter 7 bankruptcy [proceeding,] and 
ii 
2 

lack of willful noncompliance." Id. ,r 26. Conney asserts that the restitution order has now been 
transferred to the Central Collection Unit ("CCU"), which has negatively affected her 
creditworthiness. Id. at 6 ,r 32. Conney also alleges that between 2020 and 2024, "MHIC 
instructed complainants to circumvent arbitration and surety bond claims, funneling them instead 
to the state-managed Guaranty Fund." Id. ,r 29. She asserts that she "has been evicted, denied 
employment, and forced to place three mi.nor children under temporary custody with her 87-year­
old grandmother, all while being wrongfully stripped of her license and bond rights." Id. ,r 33. 
Conney brings eleven claims: five 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violation of her Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights (Count· 1 ); for excessive fines and punishment in violation of the 
. Eighth Amendment (Count 2); for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment (Count 3); for 
race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count 4); and for malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, and retaliatory prosecution (Count 5). Id. at 7-8. • Conney also 
brings a Monel/4 claim (Count 6); a claim of "Fraudulent Guaranty Fund Award Certification" 
(Count 7); along with state common law claims for malicious prosecution (Count 8); false arrest 
and false imprisonment (Count 9); and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") (Count 
. 10). Id. at 9-10. Finally, Conney alleges a breach of statutory duty under Md. Code Ann. Criminal 
Procedure§ 6-221 (Count 11). Id. at.10. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of compensatory and 
punitive damages, along with "an order vacating" her PBJ and the VOP findings, a "full 
expungement of Plaintiffs criminal record," a permanent injunction enjoining the CCU from 
further efforts to collect Conney's restitution debt, an order directing the MHIC "to immediately 
reinstate Plaintiffs license and strike all related disciplinary notations" from her record, and "an 
4 A Monell claim refers to a municipal liability claim pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) .. 
3 

order requiring the State of Maryland to conduct an independent forensic audit of MHIC's 
administration of the Guaranty Fund." Id. at I 0-12. 
Conney filed the complaint on July 24, 2025. ECF I. Fiorenza and Grimes were each 
served in October of 2025, and they timely filed their respective motions to dismiss. ECF 12 
(Fiorenza's); ECF 14 (Grimes'). On January 8, 2026, Plaintiffs summons for the State of 
Maryland was returned unexecuted. ECF 21. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to "state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted." In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legal 
conclusions stated in the complaint and "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in 
the·complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009). A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and 
considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. ·Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd. v. Consumerajfairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). "A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for.the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
"The complaint must offer 'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of 
the elements ofa cause ofaction[J"' Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd of Educ., 698 F. App'x 745, 747 
( 4th Cir. 2017) ( quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time, 
a "complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiffs] 
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits." 
Owens v. Bait. City State's Att'ys Off, 767 F.3d 379,396 (4th Cir. 2014). 
Because Plaintiff brings this suit pro se, the Court must liberally construe her pleadings, 
holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 
4 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This leniency has its limits, though. "A court may not construct the 
plaintiffs legal arguments for h[er], nor is a district court required to recognize 'obscure.or 
extravagant claims defying the most conce.rted efforts to unravel them."' Runge v. Barton, No. 
CIVA 6:08-0231-GRA, 2009 WL 3245471, at *l (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2009) (first citing Small v. 
Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), then quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 
1277 (4th Cir. 1985)), ajf'd, 368 F. App'x 361 (4th Cir. 2010). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The State of Maryland is Immune from Suit. 
As an initial matter, the Court addresses the viability of suit against the State of Maryland. 
The State of Maryland has not been served in this action. See ECF 21 (summons for the State of 
Maryland returned unexecuted). Nevertheless, Conney's claims against the State of Maryland 
cannot proceed because the State of Maryland is immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state and its 
agencies and d.epartments are immune from suits in federal court absent state consent or 
Congressional action. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). 
"It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies 
or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. ( citing 
Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147 (1981) (per curiam)). 
While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases 
brnught in its courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 12-20l(a), it has not waived its immunity 
to suit in federal court. See id. § 12-103 (2) ("This subtitle does not ... waive any right or defense 
of the State or its units, officials, or employees in an action in a court of the United States or any 
other state, including any defense that is available under the 11th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution"). "A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it 
5 

may be sued, but where it may be sued." Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99 (emphasis in original); see 
also id. at 100 ("[A] State's waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts."). Because the State of Maryland is iinmune 
from suit in federal court, it is dismissed as a defendant in this action. 
1. Count 6 is not an available cause of action. 
Moreover, Conney purports to bring Count 6, for Monell liability, against the State of 
Maryland, theMHIC, and the CCU. ECF I, at 9. TheMHIC and CCU are not named as defendants 
in this action and, as noted, the State of Maryland and its agencies are immune from suit. See 
supra Section III.A. Under Monell, "a municipality is liable under§ 1983 if it follows a custom, 
policy, or practice by which local officials violate a plaintiffs constitutional rights." Owens v. 
Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off, 767 F.3d 379,402 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell v. Dep 't of Soc. 
Servs. a/City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). But "Monell liability is only available for 
municipalities and is not available for a state or its departments." Murrill v .. Merritt; Civ. No. 
DKC-17-2255, 2022 WL 4080308, at *10 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 2022). 
The Maryland Home Improvement Commission, or MHIC, is a state agency, housed under 
the Maryland Department of Labor, which "licenses and regulates home improvement contractors 
and salespersons·." Maryland Dep't of Lab., Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n, 
https:/ /labor.mary land.gov/license/mhic/ [https://perma.cc/P3BM-WLHB]. The Central 
Collection Unit, or CCU, is also a state agency under the Maryland Department of Budget and 
Management. Department of Budget and Management, Central Collection Unit, 
https://dbm.maryland.gov/ccu/pages/ccuhome.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z4 FD-R2KX]. Because a 
Monell claim is not available against these state agencies, Count 6 must be dismissed. 
6 

B. Fiorenza is Entitled to Prosecutorial Immunity. 
Fiorenza argues that all claims against hirri must be dismissed because he is protected by 
prosecutorial immunity. ECF 9-1, at 1. Maryland's State's Attorneys are quasi-judicial officers 
who enjoy absolute immunity when performing prosecutorial functions, as opposed to 
investigative or administrative ones. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976); see 
also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S·. 259, 273 
(1993); Nero v. Mosby, 890 FJd 106, 118 (4th Cir. 2018); Springmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211 
(4th Cir. 1997). "That decision rests on an 'important public policy' justification." Savage v. 
Maryland, 896 F.3d 260,268 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257,261 (4th Cir. 
1994)). "The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer were the prosecutor to have in 
mind his own potential damages liability when making prosecutorial decisions-as he might well 
were he subject to § 1983 liability." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Van de Kamp 
v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-42 (2009)). 
"Because prosecutorial immunity 'safeguards the process, not the person,' it applies only 
to conduct that is 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."' Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nero, 890 F.3d at 117-18). The.Court must use a 
"functional approach" to "determine whether a particular act is 'intimately associated with the 
judicial phase."' Nero, 890 F.3d at 118 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The Fourth Circuit has 
provided the following guidance: "A prosecutor acts as an advocate when she professionally 
evaluates evidence assembled by the police, decides to seek an arrestwarrant, prepares and files 
charging documents, participates in a probable cause hearing, and presents evidence at trial." Id. 
(citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Burns, 500 U.S. at493; Imbler, 424 U.S. 
at 431 ). "Actions taken by a prosecutor after a probable-cause determination has been made 
generally are classified as 'advocative' functions[.]" Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 FJd 120, 139 • 
7 

(4th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original) (citing Nero, 890 F.3d at 118). In applying this functional 
approach, courts in the Fourth Circuit consider only "'the nature of the function performed,' 
without regard to 'the identity of the actor who performed it,' 'the harm that the conduct may have 
caused,' or even 'the question whether it was lawful."' Nero, 890 F.3d at 118 (quoting Buckley,. 
509 U.S. at 269, 271). 
The only allegations against Fiorenza are that he "act[ ed] on the unlawful charges filed by 
Grimes including acting as a contractor without a license and felony theft," ECF I, at 4 ,r 18, and 
"adopted Grimes' s application and prosecuted State v. Arnold in the District and Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City," id. at 5 ,r 21 (italicization added). These allegations fall squarely within the scope 
ofprosecutorial immunity as they are unquestionably associated with judicial process. Cf Crouch 
v. City of Hyattsville, Civ. No. DKC-09-2544, 2010 WL 3653345, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 15, 2010) 
(finding a decision to initiate prosecution and the propagation of certain facts in the course of 
prosecution were "textbook examples of claims foreclosed by prosecutorial immunity"). 
Accordingly, Fiorenza enjoys prosecutorial immunity for them. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 
(holding that a prosecutor is immune from civil suit when "initiating a prosecution and in 
presenting the State's case"). 
Plaintiff, however, argues that "Fiorenza acted outside the prosecutorial function" when he 
allegedly "coordinated investigative and administrative actions before probable cause existed, 
influenced MHIC referrals, and referenced familiarity with the arbitration judge whose award 
mirrored his restitution·request." ECF 16, at 3. These facts are not alleged in the ".Omplaint. See 
ECF 1, at 4-5. Even if they were, such vague allegations would be unlikely to overcome 
prosecutorial immunity or state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Nero, 890 F.3d at 
120 n.4 (noting that conclusory allegations that lacked "specific supporting facts" were insufficient 
8 

to overcome prosecutorial immunity). Accordingly, Fiorenza's motion to dismiss is granted and 
Conney's claims against him dismissed. 
C. The Court Will Grant Grimes' Motion to Dismiss. -
Grimes argues that Conney's§ 1983 claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. ECF 14-2, 
at 8. Grimes also contends that she is immune from suit based on qualified and statutory immunity. 
Id at 17-20. She further argues that some of Conney's claims are time-barred. Id at 14--17. The 
Court concludes that all of Conney's claims against Grimes are subject to dismissal for the various 
reasons explained below. 
I. Plaintiff is barred from bringing Counts I, 5, and 8. 
Plaintiffs § 1983 due process (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count 5) claims (as 
brought against Grimes or any other defendant) are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994). In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that to bring a§ 1983 action for damages 
after a plaintiff has been convicted and/or imprisoned in the underlying criminal proceeding, the 
"plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, 
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]" 512 U.S. at 486- • 
87. If a claim "would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiffs] conviction or sentence," 
then it "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has 
already been invalidated." Id. at 487. "Through what has become known as the 'favorable 
termination requirement,' the Court ensured that § 1983 litigation would not result in inconsistent 
judgments or retrials of old state convictions through pathways other than those delineated by 
Congress." Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 804 F.3d 692,695 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Nelson v. 
Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646-47 (2004)). 
9 

Counts 1 and 5 imply the invalidity of Conney's conviction for acting as a contractor 
without a license. See, e.g., ECF 1, at 7 (alleging Grimes "fabricated criminal allegations"), at 8 
(alleging that "Grimes initiated criminal charges without prosecutorial authority, probable cause, 
or an indictment, using fabricated or misrepresented facts"). Plaintiff was punished with a PBJ in 
that case which, in Maryland, a "requires a finding of guilt." Dau/atzai v. Maryland, 556 F. Supp. 
3d 536, 542-43 (D. Md. 2021) (quoting Howard Cnty. Dept. of Social Servs. v. Linda J., 869 A.2d 
404,408 (Md. App. 2005)), aff'd, 97 F.4th 166 (4th Cir. 2024)). Thus, Judge Chuang of this Court 
has also previously found that "a Maryland PBJ disposition is the equivalent of a conviction for 
purposes of Heck." Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 3d 366, 379 (D. Md. 2018). As Judge 
Chuang noted: 
Although a PBJ disposition under Maryland law [] does not result in a formal 
conviction or judgment, see Powell v. Md. Aviation Admin., 647 A.2d 437, 441 
(Md. I 994), it is ... a final judicial act with an order imposing conditions of 
probation. More importantly, a PBJ, by statute, necessarily comes after a finding of 
guilt. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc.§ 6-220(b)(l) (2011) (stating that "[w]hen a 
defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of a crime, a court 
may state the entering of judgment, defer further proceedings, and place the 
defendant on probation"); Linda J., 869 A.2d at 410 ("The probation before 
judgment statute plainly requires that a determination of guilt must precede the 
granting of probation before judgment."). Because such a finding of guilt would 
necessarily .be undermined by a successful challenge to the underlying arrest, the 
Court concludes, based on the reasoning of DeLeon, that a Maryland PBJ 
disposition is the equivalent ofa conviction for purposes of Heck. See DeLeon v. 
City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 2007). 
Id. at 379. The Court agrees with Judge Chuang arid finds that Conney's PBJ required a finding 
of guilt and thus these three claims are barred by Heck. 5 
5 More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that restitution owed after the 
imposition of a Maryland PBJ is "restitution ... included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction 
of a crime"· and thus is not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3). Feyijinmi v. Cent. 
Collection Unit, 105 F.4th 662,669 (4th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added). The Court noted that while 
the "[t]he records from [the petitioner's] Maryland state court proceedings [were]n't available," it 

Conney argues that a PBJ "is not a final conviction," because "no judgment of guilt remains 
once probation concludes." ECF 16, at 4-5. Even if this characterization were true, and it is not,6 
Conney's PBJ did end in a judgment of guilt when she violated her probation in 2021. See ECF 
1, at 5; see also State of Maryland v. Sierra Shailia Arnold, Criminal Case No. 819284008 (Cir. 
Ct. Baltimore City, October 11, 2019) (Maryland Judiciary Case Search, 
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis (Under "Case Number Search," 
enter case number "819284008"; then select "Search") (last visited June 8, 2026) (reflecting a 
guilty disposition on August 6, 2021). Given that Conney's conviction for acting as a contractor 
without a license remains intact, the claims implying the invalidity of that conviction-Counts 1 
and 5-are barred by Heck and must be dismissed. 
Likewise, Conney's § 1983 and state law malicious prosecution claims (Counts 5 and 8) 
cannot proceed b.ecause Conney cannot show a favorable termination of her criminal proceedings. 
A malicious prosecution claim under Maryland law requires "that the defendant instituted or 
continued a criminal proceeding; the proceeding was resolved in favor of the accused; there was 
no probable cause for the proceeding; and the defendant acted with malice, or for the primary 
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." Burley v. Bait. Police Dep't., 422 F. 
Supp. 3d 986, 1035 (D. Md. 2019). (citing Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 130 (Md. 2000)); see 
nevertheless knew "that for [her] to be placed on probation before judgment, a court first needed 
to find her guilty." Id. (emphasis added). 
6 Conney ignores that the defendant's probation must be successfully completed in order to ensure 
that no final conviction is recorded. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-220 ( c )(2) (noting that 
"if the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms of the probation agreement ... the 
court may find the defendant guilty oftne underlying crime as a result of the violation[.]"); id. at 
(i)(l )-(3) (noting that "[ o ]n fulfillment of the conditions of probation before judgment, the court 
shall discharge the defendant from probation" and such discharge is "without judgment of 
conviction and is not a conviction for the purpose of any disqualification or disability imposed by 
law because of conviction of a crime."). 
11 

also Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257,262 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a§ 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim "incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious 
prosecutiim"). "A prosecution terminates in favor of a criminal defendant 'when any of the 
following occur: a judge discharges the accused at a preliminary hearing, refusal of a grand jury 
to indict, the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor, quashing of an 
indictment or information, acquittal, or a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or appellate 
court."' Daulatzai, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 543 (quoting Candelero v. Cole, 831 A.2d 495, 500 (Md. 
App. 2003)); see also Albertson v. Scherf, No. 2329, Sept. Term 2015, 2017 WL 2687763, at *9 
(Md. App. June 22, 2017) (explaining favorable termination means that "the judgment must 
indicate the plaintiffs innocence of the alleged misconduct underlying the offenses charged" 
(citation omitted)). Neither Conney's PBJ sentence nor her violation of probation indicate that her . . 
state criminal proceedings terminated in her favor. Daulatzai, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 543 ("Probation 
before judgment is not a favorable disposition of a criminal charge "because probation before 
judgment ... requires a finding of guilt"). Conney's malicious prosecution claims must also be 
dismissed for this reason. 
2. Counts 3 and 4 are time-barred. 
Some of Conney's § 1983 claims do not necessarily imply the invalidity of Conney's 
conviction and, therefore, Heck does not bar them. These claims include Conney's First 
Amendment retaiiation (Count 3) and race discrimination (Count 4) claims. See, e.g., Freed v. 
Herndon, Civ. No. CCB-19-599, 2020 WL 58!6497, at *7 n.5 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2020) (explaining 
that a finding that defendants assaulted a plaintiff in retaliation .for his criticisms of them "would 
not by necessity undermine the validity of his conviction for failure to obey a lawful order"). 
Nevertheless, these claims are untimely as it is clear from the face of the complaint Conney had 
12 

reason to know of any injury flowing from the alleged retaliation or race discrimination no later 
than May 2019, when Grimes allegedly filed criminal charges against her. 
"The raising of the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiffs' cause of action constitutes 
an affirmative defense and may be raised by motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), if the 
time bar is apparent on the face of the complaint." Dean v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 
474 (4th Cir. 2005) (first citing Bethel v. Jendoco Construction Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 
1978); and then citing 2A Moore's Federal Practice§ 8.28, at 8-270 (2d ed. 1948)). But if the 
time bar is so apparent, then "[t]he Court must dismiss any claim filed after the statute of 
limitations period has expired." Deramus v. Montgomery Cnty. Domestic Reis. Section, Civ. No. 
GJH-18-2337, 2019 WL 2395311, at *2 (D. Md. June 5, 2019) (citing Wenzlajfv. NationsBank, 
940 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Md. 1996)). 
"The statute of limitations for§ 1983 claims is borrowed from the applicable state's statute 
of limitations for personalcinjury actions, even when a plaintiffs particular § 1983 claim does not 
involve personal injury." Deramus, 2019 WL 2395311, at *2 (quoting Tommy Davis Const., Inc. 
v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62, 66-67 (4th Cir: 2015)). "In Maryland, the applicable 
statute of limitations is three years from the date of the occurrence giving rise to the cause of 
action." Id. (quoting Md. Code Ann:, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101). "Although the applicable state 
statute of limitations supplies the length of the limitations period in a § 1983 action, the time of 
accrual of the cause of action is a matter of federal law." Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 
178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). Generally, a "statute of limitations begins to run 'when the plaintiff 
possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his.cause 
of action."' Deramus, 2019 WL 2395311, at *2 (quoting Nassim v. Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 
951, 955 ( 4th Cir. 1995)). 
13 

Here, Conney alleges that she filed a complaint against Grimes in April of 2018 and, in 
tum, Grimes retaliated by filing a criminal charge against Conney in May of 2019. ECF 1, at 4. 
Conney also alleges "Defendants selectively enforced MHIC regulations and criminal sanctions 
against Plaintiff, an African American contractor, while white contractors with comparable records 
were not referred for prosecution or denied access to bonding/insurance remediation processes." 
Id. at 8. Thus, the injury flowing from the alleged retaliation and discrimination was Grimes' 
initiation of criminal charges in May of 2019. Cf Bratton-Bey v. Straughan, Civ. No. DKC-13-
1964, 2014 WL 359493, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2014) (drawing on Tenth Circuit precedent to 
conclude that a § 1983 retaliation claim accrues when a plaintiff learns that a criminal complaint 
was filed against him); Hanson Co. v. City of Richmond, Virginia, No. 3:22CV147 (DJN), 2022 
WL 4000415 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2022) (finding a§ 1983 race discrimination claim based on denial 
of an application for a rehabilitation credit accrued on the date that the alleged denial 
occurred), aff'd, No. 22-1909, 2023 WL 2570959 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023). Moreover, Plaintiff 
alleges that she appeared in state court and received a PBJ on December 6, 2019, and thus was 
unquestionably aware of the purportedly unlawful charges in 2019. ECF 1, at 4. Given that 
Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until July of2025-nearly six years after she was aware of her 
alleged injury and thus her retaliation and discrimination claims accrued-the three-year statute of 
limitations bars these claims. 
Conney argues, however, that the "continuing-violation doctrine defeats the limitations 
defense," and cites to National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1991), 
in support of this argument. ECF 16, at 5 n.6. Specifically, Conney asserts that "both Defendants" 
(presumably Fiorenza and Grimes) engaged in ongoing acts that each "constitute[ d] a fresh 
invasion of rights," including VOP proceedings in 2021 and 2023, Plaintiffs post-conviction 
I 
I( 14 

proceedings in 2024, continued CCU collections, and "MHIC's post 2020 Guaranty-Fund 
certifications." Id. at 5. As the Fourth Circuit noted in National Advertising, "[a] continuing 
violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original 
violation." Nat'/Advert., 947 F.2d at 1166 (citing Wardv. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 
1981)). "In general, '[t]o establish a continuing violation ... the plaintiff must establish that the 
unconstitutional or illegal act was a ... fixed and continuing practice."' Id. at 1166-67 ( quoting 
Perez v. Laredo Junior College, 706 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 
(1984)). "The challenged action must be repeated within the statute of limitations period." Id. at 
1167. 
While Conney claims that she continues to suffer ill effects resulting from Grimes' 
allegedly retaliatory or discriminatory conduct, see ECF 1, at 6 ("Plaintiff has since been evicted, 
denied employment, and forced to place three minor children under temporary custody .... "), she 
does not allege that Grimes engaged in any continuing acts during the limitations period that would 
trigger the continuing violation doctrine. Cf Jiggetts v. Baltimore City Police Dep 't, Civ. No. 
ELH-18-3430, 2019 WL 3017065, at *9 (D. Md. July 9, 2019) (finding plaintiff's theory of 
delayed accrual based on argument that "the conditions that defendants created by arresting [him] 
still exist" without merit). Because the complaint only involves acts allegedly conducted by 
Grimes in 2019 and not any "fixed or continuing practice," Nat'/ Advert., 947 F.2d at 1166, the 
continuing violation doctrine does not save these claims. Accordingly, Counts 3 and 4 are time­
barred and shall be dismissed. 
3. Count 2 is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
The Court construes Conney's Eighth Amendment claim as brought against all Defendants, 
including Grimes, based on the allegation that "Defendants, under color of Jaw, incarcerated 
Plaintiff solely for non-payment of restitution[.]" See ECF 1, at 7. The Eighth Amendment 
15 

prohibits the imposition of "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. Const. 
amend. VIII. Conney's Eighth Amendment Claim rests on the allegation that Judge Middleton of 
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City "incarcerated Plaintiff solely for non-payment of restitution 
without first conducting a constitutionally required inquiry into her ability to pay," violating "the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines and cruel or disproportionate punishment." 
ECF 1, at 7; see also id at 5. Through this claim, Conney essentially attempts to collaterally attack 
Judge Middleton's state court ruling; however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits her from 
doing so. 
Through the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court has "formulated a general rule 
which distinguishes general constitutional challenges to state laws and regulations over which 
federal courts have jurisdiction from requests for review of specific state court decisions over 
which they have no jurisdiction." Henderson v. Maynard, Civ. No. JFM-10-2815, 2011 WL 
1769827, at *2 (D. Md. May 9, 2011). "If the constitutional' claims presented to a United States 
District Court are inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision, "then the District Court is 
in essence being ·called upon to review the state court decision." D. C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 
460 U.S. 462,483 n.16 (1983). "This the District Court may not do." Id. The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state­
court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 
court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries 
Corporation, 544 U.S. 280,284 (2005). As such, "[i]fthe source of the alleged injury is the state 
court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will apply to divest the district court of 
jurisdiction." Henderson, 2011 WL 1769827, at *2. As Count 3 of Conney's complaint is 
"inextricably intertwined" with the Maryland state court judge's decision to sentence Conney to 
16 

incarceration for non-payment of fines, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim under Rooker­
Feldman. Count 2 must be dismissed as to all Defendants. 
4. Counts 7 and 11 are not cognizable causes of action. 
Grimes argues that neither "Fraudulent Guaranty Fund Award Certification" (Count 7), nor 
a claim under Md. Code Ann., Criminal Procedure§ 6-221 (Count 11) are cognizable causes of 
action. ECF 14-2, at 17. Conney does not attempt to rebut this argument in her opposition. See 
ECF -16, at 3-6. "In failing to respond to this argument[,] Plaintiff concedes the point." Stenlund 
v. Marriott Int'!, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 874, 887 (D. Md. 2016). Nevertheless, the Court agrees 
that Conney has failed to establish cognizable causes of action for these claims. 
Section 6-221 of the Criminal Procedure article establishes a state court's authority to 
"suspend the imposition or execution of a sentence and place the defendant on probation on the 
conditions that the court considers proper," Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-221, and makes no 
mention of a private cause of action. And with respect to Count 7: to the extent that Plaintiff 
wishes to challenge the MHIC's decision to make certain payouts from the Home Improvement 
Guaranty Fund, see ECF 1, at 6 ( challenging certain Guaranty Fund payouts), this Court does not 
have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state administrative agencies. Wall v. Kiser, 21 F.4th 
266, 273 ( 4th Cir. 2021) ("[F]ederal courts do not directly review state administrative proceedings, 
just as they do not directly review state court judgments."). As such, Counts 7 and 11 are 
dismissed. 
17 

5. Grimes is.entitled to statutory immunity for Counts 8. 9. and 10. 
To the extent that Plaintiff intended to bring any of her state law tort claims against Grimes, 
those claims would fail because Grimes enjoys statutory immunity from these claims.7 Grimes is 
an employee of the MHIC, which, as previously noted, is a state agency. 
"A state employee is immune from prosecution for such torts arising from an employee's 
acts performed 'within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence."' 
Bahreini v. Zsebedics, Civ. No. PX-23-1357, 2024 WL 692860, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 20, 2024) 
(quoting Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 307 (Md. 2004)), ajf'd, No. 24-1411, 2026 WL 74586 (4th 
Cir. Jan. 9, 2026); see also Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b); Md. Code Ann., State 
Gov't § 12-105. "Malice is 'characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing 
and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud."' Bahreinei, 2024 WL 692860, at *5 (quoting Lee, 
863 A.2d at 311). "Gross negligence is defined as 'an intentional failure to perform a manifest· 
duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another."' Id 
(quoting Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699, 717 (Md. 2007)). Conclusory allegations of gross 
negligence or malice are not sufficient to bring claims outside of the immunity provisions of the 
MTCA. See Boyer v. ·State, 594 A.2d 121, 131 (Md. 1991); see also Mang v. City of Greenbelt, 
Md., Civ. No. DKC-11-1891, 2012 WL 115454, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2012) ("Plaintiffs asserting 
malice are held to a high pleading standard that may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations." 
(quoting Ames v. Harford Cnty. Civ. No. RDB-09-1929, 2010 WL 1791547, at *4 (D. Md. May 
4, 2010))). 
7 The immunity afforded under the Maryland Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") encompasses not only 
ordinary torts, but also intentional torts like Conney's IIED claim (Count 10). Lee v. Cline, 863 
A.2d 297, 310 (Md. 2004); see also McDaniel v. Arnold, 898 F. Supp. 2d 809, 849 (D. Md. 2012) 
("Moreover, statutory immunity under the MTCA applies to both negligence and intentional 
torts."). 
18 

As an investigator for the MHIC, Grimes is indisputably a state employee. ECF I, at 2. 
Although Conney makes the conclusory allegation that "Defeµdants . . . initiated criminal 
proceedings with malice," id. at 9, she fails to allege any facts outside of this conclusory assertion 
that would bring her claims outside of the immunity provisions of the MTCA. MedSense, LLC v. 
Univ. Sys. of Maryland,420 F. Supp. 3d 382, 397 (D. Md. 2019) ("Where a plaintiff advances 
claims alleging malice, the complaint should contain well-pied facts showing ill-will or evil or 
wrongful motive to be sufficient to take a claim outside of immunity and non-liability provisions 
of the MTCA. "). For example, Plaintiff generally alleges that Grimes "reopened previously closed 
regulatory complaints, mischaracterized complainants, and recommended criminal charges .... " 
Id. at 4. She also alleges that Grimes submitted a statement of charges in May 2019 and "falsely 
identif{ied] complainants as 'elderly' individuals rather than business entities," and "misstat[ed] 
the contract and payment fact acts which served to establish false probable cause and inflame 
judicial bias." Id None of these facts, taken as true, suggest that Grimes acted with any "evil or 
rancorous motive influenced by hate." Nero, 890 F.3d at 127. As such, Conney fails to meet the 
high bar of sufficiently alleging malice to overcome Grimes' statutory immunity. Cf Kelly v. 
Miller, Civ. No. ELH-20-2531, 2022 WL 2703827, at *28 (D. Md. July 12, 2022) (finding malice 
sufficiently alleged where defendants were "accused of participating in the brutal, deliberate, and 
unprovoked use of violence against [the plaintiff], and thereafter covering up the circumstances"); 
Mang, 2012 WL I 15454, at *5 (finding malice sufficiently alleged where the complaint alleged 
that the defendant officers "punched and beat Michael Mang repeatedly causing a fractured nose 
and numerous bruises" (alteration and emphasis omitted)). 
Moreover, Conney makes no mention of gross negligence in her complaint and raises it for 
the first time in her opposition, asserting without citation to the complaint that Grimes' conduct 
19 

"constitutes malicious and grossly negligent conduct, defeating Maryland Tort Claims Act 
immunity." ECF 16, at 4. Because the facts in the complaint do not rise to the level of malice or 
gross negligence, Conney is entitled to statutory immunity from Conney's state law claims. 
Counts 8, 9, and 10 will be dismissed against Grimes on that basis. 
D. Conney's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply (ECF 18) is Denied. 
Conney moves to file a surreply and argues that Grimes "raises new factual assertions, new 
legal arguments, and new grounds for dismissal." ECF 18, at I. Surreplies are generally 
disfavored under the Local Rules of this Court. See Loe. R. 105.2(a) (D. Md. 2025) ("Unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court, surreply memoranda are not permitted to be filed."); see also 
Roach v. Navient Sols., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 343, 351 (D. Md. 2015). Surreplies may only be 
permitted "when the moving party would be unable to contest matters presented to the court for 
the first time in the opposing party's reply." Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (D. 
Md. 2003), aff'd, 85 Fed. App'x 960 (4th Cir. 2004). Where "the arguments made by Defendants 
in their reply brief are merely responses to new arguments made by Plaintiffs in their response," a 
surreply is not appropriate. Aguilar v. LR Coin Laudromat, Civ. No. RDB-11-2352, 2012 WL 
1569552, at *2-3 (D. Md. May 2, 2012). 
The Court concludes that a surreply is not warranted here because Grimes' reply is merely 
responsive to the arguments raised in Conney's opposition brief. For example, Conney contends 
that a surreply is needed because Grimes advanced a "new and substantially expanded Heck v. 
Humphrey argument." ECF 18, at 2 (italicization added). However, Grimes' argument related to 
Heck is responsive to the arguments raised by Conney in her opposition. See e.g., ECF 17, at 3 
("Plaintiff now argues that she's 'challeng[ing] the falsification ofa charging document"' (citing 
ECF 16, at 4 n.5)). Given that Grimes does not raise any new matters in her reply that would 
justify a surreply, Conney's motion to file a surreply is denied. Cf Barnes v. Costco Wholesale 
20 
' 
' ' 

Corp., Civ. No. JKB-18-3377, 2019 WL 4933070, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2019) ("[R]esponsive 
arguments in a reply do not warrant a surreply. "). 
E. John Does 1-10 
The only remaining Defendants in this action are John Does 1-10, who are allegedly 
unidentified "employees or agents of the State" and are unserved. ECF 1, at 3. Count 7, 
"Fraudulent Guaranty Award Certification," appears to be a claim brought against the Doe 
defendants. ECF 1, at 9 (alleging that "MHIC and its agents knowingly certified false eligibility 
for Guaranty Fund payouts"). As previously noted, this claim is not viable because it asks this 
Court to impermissibly review acts of a state administrative agency. See Supra Section III.C.4. 
The only other surviving claims in this action that could be brought against the Doe defendants are 
Conney's state law claims for false arrest (Count 9) and IIED (Count 10). 
As the reqiaining claims all arise under state law and there does not appear to be an 
independent basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction,8 the Court 
will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 9 and 10. District courts '.'may 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" under certain circumstances, including when "the 
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3). "[A] district court has inherent power to dismiss the case or, in cases removed from 
' ' 
State court, to remand, provided the conditions set forth in § 1367(c) for declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction have been met." Hinson v. Norwest Fin. SC, Inc., 239 FJd 611,617 
(4th Cir. 2001). "Among the factors that inform this discretionary determination are convenience 
and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and 
8 Conney is a citizen of Maryland, ECF 1, at 1, and she alleges that "all parties reside ... in 
Maryland," id at 2. 
21 

considerations of judicial economy." Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit has recently emphasized that "[a]s a general rule, 'when a 
district court dismisses all federal claims in the early stages of litigation ... it should decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over any· remaining pendent state law claims by dismissing those claims 
without prejudice."' Poppleton Now Cmty. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Lq Cite Dev., LLC, 175 F.4th.455, 464--
65 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting Henderson v. Harmon, 102·F.4th 242,251 (4th Cir. 2024)). This case 
is stiU in its infancy as not all of the defendants have been served, and the case has not proceeded 
to discovery. Accordingly, because all federal claims have been dismissed, the Court will decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the Doe 
defendants. 9 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Fioreza's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Grimes' motion 
to dismiss is GRANTED. Conney's informal request for issuance of Rule 45 subpoenas and early 
discovery is DENIED. Conney's motion for leave to file a surreply is DENIED. The Court 
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and so the 
complaint is DISMISSED. 
A separate implementing order will issue. 
Dated: June 15, 2026 /s/ 
Brendan A. Hurson 
United States District Judge 
9 Given that Conney's complaint will be dismissed, her informal request for issuance of Rule 45 
subpoenas and early discovery, ECF 16, at 6, is necessarily denied. 
22 

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