govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-4_26-cv-00135-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
NEW ALBANY DIVISION 
 
LISETT PENA-FONT, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 4:26-cv-00135-SEB-KMB 
 ) 
SCOTT A. MAPLES, JR., ) 
SAMUEL OLSON, ) 
TODD M. LYONS, ) 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, ) 
TODD BLANCHE, ) 
 ) 
Respondents. ) 
 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Lisett Pena-Font is a noncitizen who was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement ("ICE") officials on March 17, 2026, and is detained at the Clark County Detention 
Center in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Dkt. 1; dkt. 6-1 at 5. Ms. Pena-Font now petitions the Court for 
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from custody or a bond hearing 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Dkt. 1 at 12-13. 
Ms. Pena-Font also filed a motion for leave to file a reply, dkt. 9, which the Court construes 
as a motion for belated extension of time. As the motion is unopposed, the Court grants the motion 
and considers the arguments in the reply. See dkt. 10. 
For the reasons discussed, t he Court grants the petition and orders R espondents to either 
afford Ms. Pena-Font a bond hearing or release her from custody. 
I. Background 
Ms. Pena-Font is a citizen of Cuba . She came to the United States without inspection in 
October 2022 via the Rio Grande Valley in Texas. Dkt. 1. Shortly after arriving, she encountered PageID #:
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border patrol agents, who issued a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings and released her into 
the United States on her own recognizance. Dkt. 6-1 at 5. 
 Her first encounter with ICE occurred in March 2026 after she was arrested by local police 
in Louisville, Kentucky, for a traffic offense. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 6; dkt. 6-1 at 2. An I-200 warrant (Warrant 
for Arrest of Alien) was issued and later served on March 17, 2026. D kt. 6-1 at 7. Ms. Pena-Font 
was taken to the Clark County Detention Center where she is being held without bond. Id.; dkt. 1. 
Ms. Pena-Font's removal proceedings are currently pending. The Notice to Appear charges 
Ms. Pena-Font with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as "an alien present in the 
United States without being admitted or paroled." Dkt. 6-1 at 1. The "arriving alien" checkbox is 
unmarked. Id. The immigration warrant, issued on March 17 , 2026, explicitly authorized her 
detention under § 1226 (§ 236 of the INA). Id. at 7. 
II. Discussion 
Ms. Pena-Font claims that her current detention violates the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226) because 
she has been denied access to an individualized bond hearing. Dkt. 1 at 12. She also claims her 
detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 13. Respondents argue 
that Ms. Pena-Font is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and 
that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) does not apply to her. Dkt. 6 at 1, 3-7. They argue in the alternative that, if 
the Court were to find § 1226(a) applicable to Ms. Pena-Font, the appropriate remedy would be to 
order a bond hearing. Id. at 15. 
The Court finds that Ms. Pena -Font's detention is governed by § 1226(a) and that it is 
unlawful because she has not been afforded a bond hearing. Because Ms. Pena-Font is entitled to 
habeas corpus relief on this ground, the Court does not address her due process challenge. See 
Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[C]onsistent with the principle of avoiding PageID #:
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unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking, judges are to address the statutory defense before the 
constitutional."). 
A. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225 
At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to aliens already 
present in the United States," U.S. immigration law also "authorizes the Government to detain 
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which 
involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. 
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), also 
known as "full removal," by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-
M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011). 
Section 1226(a) provides: 
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained 
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States .... 
[T]he Attorney General— 
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and 
(2) may release the alien on— 
(A) bond . . . ; or 
(B) conditional parole . . .. 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
An immigration officer makes the initial determination to either detain or release the 
noncitizen. After that initial decision has been made, "[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens 
detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detenti on." Jennings, 583 U.S. at 
306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). At that hearing, the noncitizen 
"may secure her release if she can convince the officer or immigration judge that she poses no PageID #:
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flight risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019) (citing 
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions , 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 
2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to 'establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge 
. . . that she or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national 
security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)). 
Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain 
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that immigration officers shall 
order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates 
an intention to apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged 
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or 
1182(a)(7). Id. 
Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." Section 1225(b)(2)(A) 
provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining 
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt 
entitled to be admitted , the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this 
title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien 
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether 
or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens 
subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention 
while their removal proceedings are pending. 
B. Ms. Pena-Font Is Eligible for a Bond Hearing Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 
The record reflects that Ms. Pena-Font is eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a). She 
arrived in the United States in 2022 without inspection and without parole. She subsequently PageID #:
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moved to the interior of the United States where she was served with an administrative arrest 
warrant by ICE. The Court has previously determined that considering § 1225 as a whole, the most 
natural meaning is that it applies to "arriving" noncitizens attempting to enter the United States 
rather than undocumented aliens like Ms. Pena -Font who live in the interior of the United States 
for years. See Alejandro v. Olson, 817 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677 (S.D. Ind. 2025); see also Singh v. 
Bondi, No. 1:25-cv-02101-SEB-TAB, 2025 WL 3029524, *3-5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 2025). As the 
Court has previously explained, Respondents' interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain 
meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226; (3) would 
render a recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior 
statutory interpretation and practice. See Alejandro, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 677. 
Respondents reassert the same argument previously advanced in those cases mentioned 
above and maintain that § 1225(b)(2)(A) controls because, as they argue, Ms. Pena -Font is 
"applicant for admission" into the United States. D kt. 6 at 1, 4 -6. Their position is supported 
primarily by out-of-circuit cases that are familiar to the Court. See id. at 8-13 (citing, among other 
cases, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2026), and Avila v. Bondi , 170 
F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026)). The Buenrostro -Mendez court found that "seeking admission" is a 
permissible redundancy for "applicant for admission." 116 F.4th at 503. The Avila court similarly 
held that the meanings of "applicant for admission" and "seeking admission" and the grammatical 
structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) show that "in the context of the statute the two phrases are 
synonymous." 170 F.4th at 1135. 
While t he Seventh Circuit has not definitively ruled on the subject yet, the court in 
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. determined that "seeking admission" cannot be 
logically seen as synonymous with "applicant for admission" without violating several established PageID #:
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canons of statutory interpretation. 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025). This is a decision that carries 
persuasive authority due to its procedural posture, 1 which reaffirms the Court's prior decisions 
where it applied the same established canons of statutory interpretation to facts analogous to those 
here. 
Furthermore, the reasoning in Castañon- Nava was adopted by the Second Circuit in 
Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, when it explicitly rejected the government's contention that § 1225 
controls for immigrants who are arrested in the interior of the United States and that entered 
without inspection or admission. See 175 F.4th 61, 70-72, 88 (2d Cir. 2026) ("Although divided 
panels in two other circuits have agreed with the government, . . . we respectfully find the statutory 
analysis in those decisions, which largely mirrors the government's flawed arguments in this case, 
to be unpersuasive."). The Second Circuit is joined by at least two other circuits. See Hernandez 
Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1285 (11th Cir. 2026), Lopez-Campos v. 
Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 725 (6th Cir. 2026). 
Moreover, Respondents' legal reasoning cannot be reconciled with the government's 
treatment of Ms. Pena-Font, i.e., arresting her inside the United States pursuant to an administrative 
warrant that explicitly authorized her detention under § 1226. See dkt. 6-1 (authorizing detention 
under section 236 of the INA, codified as § 1226). And the Notice to Appear does not state that 
Ms. Pena-Font is an "arriving alien" and instead lists her as an individual who is "present in the 
United States." D kt. 6 -1 at 1. Gi ven the government's treatment of Ms. Pena -Font, it cannot 
 
1 See Morales Perez v. Walsh, 2026 WL 44777, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026) ("[a]t a minimum, Castañon-Nava 
carries substantial persuasive weight. It is true that Castañon-Nava cautioned that its decision was limited to 'the 
current record.' [161 F.4th at 1061]. But the statutory-interpretation issue that the opinion resolved was one purely of 
law, and any adjustment to the factual record going forward would not likely alter the legal conclusion. In any event, 
as explained below, the Court agrees with Castañon-Nava's holding on the legal question, so there is no need here to 
definitively decide whether it is binding precedent or something short of that."). PageID #:
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plausibly now maintain that she is subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore categorically ineligible 
for discretionary release. 
Nothing in this case convinces the Court of the need to revisit its prior rulings. And 
Respondents have not cited any case that convinces the Court the Seventh Circuit will depart from 
Castañon-Nava. The Court rejects Respondents' position and instead relies on Castañon- Nava as 
persuasive. Accordingly, the Court concludes that continued detention without consideration of 
bond violates the INA and Ms. Pena-Font is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). 
III. Scope of Relief 
Ms. Pena-Font is entitled to habeas relief because her continued detention without a bond 
hearing violates ". . . the laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The 
remaining question is the remedy, which should be "appropriate to the violation." Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). 
Ms. Pena-Font requests immediate release from custody or, alternatively, an individualized 
bond hearing. Dkt. 1 at ¶ ¶ 11, 71. Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas 
proceedings. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 ("Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure 
release from unlawful detention."); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining that "the 
quintessential habeas remedy" is release from custody). However, the Court finds that it would not 
be in the interests of justice to orde r Ms. Pena -Font's immediate release and instead orders 
Respondents to provide her with an individualized bond hearing as required by § 1226(a). 
IV. Conclusion 
Ms. Pena -Font's motion for leave to file, dkt. [9], construed as a motion for belated 
extension of time to file a reply, is granted. 
The Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 25, 2026, 
Respondents must either: (1) provide Ms. Pena-Font with an individualized bond hearing before PageID #:
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an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release Ms. Pena -
Font from custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision. 2 Respondents must file 
documentation certifying that they have either provided Ms. Pena -Font with a bond hearing or 
released her from detention within two days after the hearing or her release, whichever is 
applicable. 
If Federal Respondents hold a bond hearing, the Attorney General is ordered to provide 
notice of the bond hearing to Ms. Pena-Font's counsel upon the scheduling of the hearing. 
The petition is denied to the extent it seeks immediate release. 
The clerk is directed to enter final judgment. 
SO ORDERED. 
 Date: _________________ 
 
 
 
 
Distribution: 
All Electronically Registered Counsel 
 
 
2 This deadline for a bond hearing may be modified without Court involvement upon agreement of Federal 
Respondents and Petitioner. 
6/15/2026
 _______________________________ 
 SARAH EVANS BARK
ER, JUDGE 
 United States District Court 
 Southern District of Indiana PageID #:
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