govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_26-cv-01051-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
OVETD AMMIN AGUILAR MORALES, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 1:26-cv-01051-SEB-CSW 
 ) 
TODD BLANCHE, ) 
TODD M. LYONS, ) 
SAMUEL OLSON, ) 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, ) 
BRISON SWEARINGEN, ) 
 ) 
Respondents. ) 
 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Ovetd Ammin Aguilar Morales is a noncitizen who was arrested by U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officials on May 22, 2026, and is detained at the Clay County Jail 
in Brazil, Indiana. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 1. Mr. Aguilar Morales now petitions the Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from custody or a bond hearing pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a). Dkt. 1 at ¶ 50. 
For the reasons discussed, t he Court grants the petition and orders R espondents to either 
afford Mr. Aguilar Morales a bond hearing or release him from custody. 
I. Background 
Mr. Aguilar Morales is a citizen of Mexico. He came to the United States without inspection 
in October 1995. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 12. His first encounter with ICE occurred in May 2026 after he was 
arrested in late March 2026 by local police in Noblesville, Indiana, for operating a motor vehicle 
without a license. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 14; dkt. 9 at 2. On May 22, 2026, ICE issued a Warrant for Arrest of 
Alien and a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings, both of which were served that same day. PageID #:
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Dkt. 9-1 at 2, 6. Mr. Aguilar Morales was taken to the Clay County Jail in Brazil, Indiana, where 
he is being held without bond. Id.; dkt. 1. 
The Notice to Appear charges Mr. Aguilar Morales with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as "an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled." Dkt. 
9-1 at 2. The "arriving alien" checkbox is unmarked. Id. The immigration warrant, issued on May 
22, 2026, explicitly authorized his detention under § 1226 (§ 236 of the INA). Id. at 6. 
II. Discussion 
Mr. Aguilar Morales claims that his current detention violates the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226) 
because he has been denied access to an individualized bond hearing. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 30–41. He also 
claims his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Dkt. 1 ¶ 42–50. 
Respondents argue that Mr. Aguilar Morales is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) does not apply to him. Dkt. 9 at 6. They argue 
in the alternative that, if the Court were to find § 1226(a) applicable to Mr. Aguilar Morales, the 
appropriate remedy would be to order a bond hearing. Id. at 16. 
The Court finds that Mr. Aguilar Morales's detention is governed by § 1226(a) and that it 
is unlawful because he has not been afforded a bond hearing. Because Mr. Aguilar Morales is 
entitled to habeas corpus relief on this ground, the Court does not address his due process 
challenge. See Thomas v. Illinois , 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[C]onsistent with the 
principle of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking, judges are to address the 
statutory defense before the constitutional."). 
A. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225 
At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to aliens already 
present in the United States," U.S. immigration law also "authorizes the Government to detain 
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v. PageID #:
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Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which 
involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. 
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), also 
known as "full removal," by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-
M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011). 
Section 1226(a) provides: 
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained 
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States .... 
[T]he Attorney General— 
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and 
(2) may release the alien on— 
(A) bond . . . ; or 
(B) conditional parole . . .. 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
An immigration officer makes the initial determination to either detain or release the 
noncitizen. After that initial decision has been made, "[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens 
detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detenti on." Jennings, 583 U.S. at 
306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). At that hearing, the noncitizen 
"may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight 
risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019) (citing 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions , 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 
2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to 'establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge 
. . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national 
security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)). PageID #:
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Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain 
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that immigration officers shall 
order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates 
an intention to apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged 
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or 
1182(a)(7). Id. 
Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." Section 1225(b)(2)(A) 
provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining 
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt 
entitled to be admitted , the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this 
title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien 
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether 
or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens 
subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention 
while their removal proceedings are pending. 
B. Mr. Aguilar Morales Is Eligible for a Bond Hearing Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 
The record reflects that Mr. Aguilar Morales is eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a). 
He arrived in the United States in 1995 without inspection and without parole. He subsequently 
moved to the interior of the United States where he was arrested . The Court has previously 
determined that considering § 1225 as a whole, the most natural meaning is that it applies to 
"arriving" noncitizens attempting to enter the United States rather than undocumented aliens like 
Mr. Aguilar Morales who live in the interior of the United States for years. See Alejandro v. Olson, 
817 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677 (S.D. Ind. 2025); see also Singh v. Bondi, No. 1:25-cv-02101-SEB-TAB, 
2025 WL 3029524, *3- 5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 2025). As the Court has previously explained, PageID #:
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Respondents' interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) 
disregards the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to § 
1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and 
practice. See Alejandro, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 677. 
Respondents reassert the same argument previously advanced in those cases mentioned 
above and maintain that § 1225(b)(2)(A) controls because, as they argue, Mr. Aguilar Morales is 
"applicant for admission" into the United States. Dkt. 9 at 1, 4 -6. Their position is supported 
primarily by out-of-circuit cases that are familiar to the Court. See id. at 8-14 (citing, among other 
cases, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2026), and Avila v. Bondi , 170 
F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026)). The Buenrostro -Mendez court found that "seeking admission" is a 
permissible redundancy for "applicant for admission." 116 F.4th at 503. The Avila court similarly 
held that the meanings of "applicant for admission" and "seeking admission" and the grammatical 
structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) show that "in the context of the statute the two phrases are 
synonymous." 170 F.4th at 1135. 
While t he Seventh Circuit has not definitively ruled on the subject yet, the court in 
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. determined that "seeking admission" cannot be 
logically seen as synonymous with "applicant for admission" without violating several established 
canons of statutory interpretation. 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025). This is a decision that carries 
persuasive authority due to its procedural posture,
1 which reaffirms the Court's prior decisions 
 
1 See Morales Perez v. Walsh, 2026 WL 44777, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026) ("[a]t a minimum, Castañon-Nava 
carries substantial persuasive weight. It is true that Castañon-Nava cautioned that its decision was limited to 'the 
current record.' [161 F.4th at 1061]. But the statutory-interpretation issue that the opinion resolved was one purely of 
law, and any adjustment to the factual record going forward would not likely alter the legal conclusion. In any event, 
as explained below, the Court agrees with Castañon-Nava's holding on the legal question, so there is no need here to 
definitively decide whether it is binding precedent or something short of that."). PageID #:
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where it applied the same established canons of statutory interpretation to facts analogous to those 
here. 
Furthermore, t he reasoning in Castañon- Nava was adopted by the Second Circuit in 
Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, when it explicitly rejected the government's contention that § 1225 
controls for immigrants who are arrested in the interior of the United States and that entered 
without inspection or admission. See 175 F.4th 61, 70-72, 88 (2d Cir. 2026) ("Although divided 
panels in two other circuits have agreed with the government, . . . we respectfully find the statutory 
analysis in those decisions, which largely mirrors the government's flawed arguments in this case, 
to be unpersuasive."). The Second Circuit is joined by at least two other circuits. See Hernandez 
Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1285 (11th Cir. 2026), Lopez-Campos v. 
Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 725 (6th Cir. 2026). 
Moreover, Respondents' legal reasoning cannot be reconciled with the government's 
treatment of Mr. Aguilar Morales , i.e., arresting him inside the United States pursuant to an 
administrative warrant that explicitly authorized his detention under § 1226. See dkt. 9- 1 
(authorizing detention under section 236 of the INA, codified as § 1226). And the Notice to Appear 
does not state that Mr. Aguilar Morales is an "arriving alien" and instead lists him as an individual 
who is "present in the United States." D kt. 9-1 at 2. Given the government's treatment of Mr. 
Aguilar Morales , it cannot plausibly now maintain that he is subject t o § 1225(b)(2)(A) and 
therefore categorically ineligible for discretionary release. 
Nothing in this case convinces the Court of the need to revisit its prior rulings. And 
Respondents have not cited any case that convinces the Court the Seventh Circuit will depart from 
Castañon-Nava. The Court rejects Respondents' position and instead relies on Castañon- Nava as PageID #:
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persuasive. Accordingly, the Court concludes that continued detention without consideration of 
bond violates the INA and Mr. Aguilar Morales is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). 
III. Scope of Relief 
Mr. Aguilar Morales is entitled to habeas relief because his continued detention without a 
bond hearing violates ". . . the laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The 
remaining question is the remedy, which should be "appropriate to the violation." Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). 
Mr. Aguilar Morales requests immediate release from custody or, alternatively, an 
individualized bond hearing.
2 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 50. Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas 
proceedings. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 ("Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure 
release from unlawful detention."); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining that "the 
quintessential habeas remedy" is release from custody). However, the Court finds that it would not 
be in the interests of justice to order Mr. Aguilar Morales's immediate release and instead orders 
Respondents to provide him with an individualized bond hearing as required by § 1226(a). 
IV. Conclusion 
The Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 25, 2026, 
Respondents must either: (1) provide Mr. Aguilar Morales with an individualized bond hearing 
before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release Mr. 
 
2 Mr. Aguilar Morales also asks the Court to impose on the government the burden of proof at the bond hearing. Dkt . 
1 at 13. The Court declines to do so. The Seventh Circuit has not answered the question of who bears the burden of 
proof in an administrative bond hearing, and the circuits that have answered the question have not answered in 
unison. Section 1226 is silent as to the burden of proof, so Mr. Aguilar Morales's argument must be purely 
constitutional. A bond hearing without Court-imposed instructions regarding the burden of proof may yet result in 
his release on bond, or it may result in the denial of bond for reasons unrelated to the burden of proof. Mr. Aguilar 
Morales's detention is currently unlawful because he has been deprived of a bond hearing—not because the 
government conducted a bond hearing that failed to conform to specific standards. At this point, it is prudent for the 
Court to avoid an unnecessary constitutional decision. Thomas, 697 F.3d at 613. PageID #:
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Aguilar Morales from custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision.3 Respondents must file 
documentation certifying that they have either provided Mr. Aguilar Morales with a bond hearing 
or released him from detention within two days after the hearing or his release, whichever is 
applicable. 
If Federal Respondents hold a bond hearing, the Attorney General is ordered to provide 
notice of the bond hearing to Mr. Aguilar Morales's counsel upon the scheduling of the hearing. 
The petition is denied to the extent it seeks immediate release. 
The clerk is directed to enter final judgment. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Date: _____________________ 
 
 
Distribution: 
All Electronically Registered Counsel 
 
 
 
 
3 This deadline for a bond hearing may be modified without Court involvement upon agreement of Federal 
Respondents and Petitioner. 
6/15/2026
 _______________________________ 
 SARAH EVANS BARK
ER, JUDGE 
 United States District Court 
 Southern District of Indiana PageID #:
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