govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-23663-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

BRILL MARITIME, INC., 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
BOATS GROUP, LLC, 
 
Defendant. 
__________________________________________/ 
ORDER 
 
A boat brokerage has sued the operator of online boat advertisement platforms, alleging 
violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The Defendant now moves to dismiss all counts. After careful 
review, we GRANT the motion to dismiss. 
THE FACTS 
Our Defendant, Boats Group, LLC (“Boats Group”), operates “ the three largest online 
platforms that connect buyers and sellers of recreational boats in the U.S.” Complaint [ECF No. 1] 
¶ 2.1 These platforms, “Boat Trader, YachtWorld, and boats.com,” “are used by boat brokerages and 
dealers to advertise and sell recreational vessels to consumers.” Ibid. “Through subscription-based 
packages, sellers pay Boats Group to have their inventory listed and marketed to a broad audience of 
prospective buyers.” Ibid. “These platforms serve as critical advertising and lead -generation tools for 
boat brokerages, dealers, and other sellers throughout the U.S.” Id. ¶ 6. Our Plaintiff, Brill Maritime, 
Inc. (“Brill”), is in “the business of marketing and selling recreational marine vessels and relies heavily 
 
1 We accept the allegations of the Complaint [ECF No. 1] as true for purposes of this Order. See Dusek 
v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016) (“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, but ‘legal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no 
assumption of truth.’” (quoting Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up))). 
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on digital platforms to advertise its inventory to prospective buyers.” Id. ¶ 5. As a “boat brokerage,” 
Brill “purchases [ ] subscriptions from Boats Group to market its inventory to potential buyers.” Id. 
¶ 3. 
On August 14, 2025, Brill brought this antitrust class action against Boats Group, alleging that 
Boats Group has “willfully acquired[,] maintained[,] and expanded monopoly power in this market by 
engaging in exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct, including the serial acquisitions of its main 
competitors, unilateral price increases, restrictive contractual terms, and practices that hinder entry 
and expansion by rival platforms.” I bid. Brill “has been directly harmed by Boats Group’s conduct” 
because it “h as been forced to pay supracompetitive prices for essential marketing services with 
effectively zero viable alternatives available.” Id. ¶ 4. 
The Complaint advances five counts: Monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act Section 
2 (Count I), see id. ¶¶ 51–60; Attempted Monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act Section 2 
(Count II), see id. ¶¶ 61 –67; Monopolization in violation of Florida Antirust Law (Count III) , see id. 
¶¶ 68–72; Attempted Monopolization in violation of Florida Antitrust Law (Count IV) , see id. ¶¶ 73–
77; and Violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count V), see id. ¶¶ 78–83. 
For Counts I and II, Brill is suing on behalf of the following putative class: “All persons and entities 
in the United States who purchased subscription- based marketing and listing services from Boats 
Group between January 1, 2014 and the present, and who suffered damages as a result of Boats 
Group’s anticompetitive conduct.” Id. ¶ 36. Counts III –V are brought on behalf of only Florida 
plaintiffs. Boats Group now asks us to dismiss all five claims. See generally Motion to D ismiss (the 
“MTD”) [ECF No. 15].
2 
 
2 The Defendant’s MTD is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. See Plaintiff’s Response in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Resp.”) [ECF No. 25]; Defendants’ 
Reply in Support of Defendants’ MTD (“Reply”) [ECF No. 29]. 
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THE LAW 
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this 
“plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556). The standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than 
an unadorned, the -defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” I d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
555). “[T]he standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence’ of the required element.” Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309–10 
(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On a motion to dismiss, “the court must accept all factual 
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Dusek v. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016). 
A
NALYSIS 
Brill is suing under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which makes it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. In other words, § 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts to 
monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. “ Section 2, in contrast to [Section] 1, ‘covers both 
concerted and independent action, but only if that action ‘monopolizes,’ or ‘threatens actual 
monopolization,’ which is ‘a category that is narrower than restraint of trade ’ in [Section] 1.” Am. 
Contractors Supply, LLC v. HD Supply Constr. Supply, Ltd., 989 F.3d 1224, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021) (first 
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quoting § 2; and then quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (cleaned 
up)). 
Our Plaintiff brings two claims under § 2: one for actual monopolization, see Compl. ¶ 54 
(“Boats Group has willfully acquired, maintained, and expanded its monopoly power through 
exclusionary conduct not based on superior products or competition on the merits .”); and a second 
for attempted monopolization, see id. ¶ 62 (“Boats Group has engaged in a course of anticompetitive 
conduct, including exclusionary acquisitions, restrictive dealing provisions, and the imposition of 
supracompetitive prices, with the specific intent to acquire, maintain, or expand monopoly power in 
the market for online boat listing and marketing services in the U.S.”). We consider each in turn. 
I. The Monopolization Claim 
“The offense of monopoly under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance 
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident. ” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
“The first element, monopoly power, is the power to control prices in or to exclude competition from 
the relevant market. ” Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc. , 364 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ). “The second element 
requires predatory or exclusionary acts or practices that have the effect of preventing or excluding 
competition within the relevant market.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001)). 
Boats Group tells us that “[t]here are three fundamental deficiencies in [Brill’s] monopolization 
claim that warrant dismissal of Count I: (1) [Brill] has failed to properly plead that Boats Group 
engaged in any exclusionary acts; (2) [Brill] has failed to properly plead a relevant market; and (3) [Brill] 
has failed to properly plead that Boats Group has monopoly power.” MTD at 22. 
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a. Brill has plausibly alleged the first prong of a monopolization claim 
We’ll start with the first prong: “the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market .” 
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “Section Two claims require harm to 
competition that must occur within a ‘ relevant,’ that is, a distinct market, with a specific set of 
geographical boundaries and a narrow delineation of the products at issue.” Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., 
Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1074 (11th Cir. 2004); see also U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule 
Indus., 7 F.3d 986, 995 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Defining a relevant product market is primarily a process of 
describing those groups of producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the 
ability—actual or potential —to take signifi cant amounts of business away from each other.”) . Then, 
“the alleged monopolist must possess enough power or potential power in this ‘ relevant market’ in 
order to harm competition.” Ibid. (citing Morris, 364 F.3d at 1293–94). The first prong, therefore, has 
two elements: a relevant market and market power. Brill has sufficiently pled both. 
i. Brill has sufficiently pled a relevant market 
At the motion -to-dismiss stage, “antitrust plaintiffs [ ] must present enough information in 
their complaint to plausibly suggest the contours of the relevant geographic and product markets. ” 
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Thompson v. Metro. Multi –
List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991)). The Supreme Court has instructed that, “in antitrust 
cases, where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged [monopolist] ,’ dismissals prior to giving 
the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.” Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. 
of Rex Hosp. , 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad . Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 
(1962)). For this reason, “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are particularly disfavored in fact-intensive antitrust 
cases,” Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., 376 F.3d at 1070, and “ dismissal of an antitrust claim for failure to 
adequately plead the relevant market can be problematic,” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 
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Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 443 (4th Cir. 2011) .3 “Cases in which dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate 
frequently involve either (1) failed attempts to limit a product market to a single brand, franchise, 
institution, or comparable entity that competes with potential substitutes or (2) failure even to attempt 
a plausible explanation as to why a market should be limited in a particular way.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 
275 F.3d 191, 200 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.). “Stated differently, dismissals at the pre -discovery, 
pleading stage remain relatively rare and are generally limited to certain types of ‘glaring deficiencies,’ 
such as failing to allege a relevant market .” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 637 F.3d at 444 (cleaned up). We 
find no “glaring deficiencies” in the Complaint at this early stage of the case. 
Brill alleges that “[t]he relevant geographic market is the United States,” Compl. ¶ 12, and that 
the relevant product market is “online marine vessel listing and marketing services,” id. ¶ 13. “This 
market comprises digital platforms that facilitate the professional listing, promotion, and sale of 
recreational boats and yachts, primarily serving licensed brokers and dealers.” Ibid. 
Boats Group says this isn’t enough. Brill, it avers, has failed to “proffer sufficient allegations 
in its Complaint to plausibly suggest the contours of the relevant geographic and product markets. ” 
MTD at 14 (citing Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1336). First, Boats Group tells us that “the relevant geographic 
market” is “artificially narrow” and “fails to correspond to the commercial realities of the industry” 
 
3 See also Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Because market 
definition is a deeply fact -intensive inquiry, courts hesitate to grant motions to dismiss for failure to 
plead a relevant product market.”); Found. for Interior Design Educ. Rsch. v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 
244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Market definition is a highly fact -based analysis that generally 
requires discovery.”); Double D Spotting Serv., Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc ., 136 F.3d 554, 560 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(noting that “courts are hesitant to dismiss antitrust actions before the parties have had an opportunity 
for discovery”); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining 
that “in most cases, proper market definition can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the 
commercial realities faced by consumers”) ; Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Atlanta , 2005 WL 8158629, at 
*13 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2005) (Pannell, Jr., J.), aff’d, 181 F. App’x 908 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, in order 
to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only allege a cognizable relevant market sufficient 
enough to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiff’s antitrust claim and the basis for that claim .” 
(citing U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 994–95)). 
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because it “encompasses only online marine vessel listing and marketing services in the United States.” 
Id. at 16; see also ibid. (arguing that the Plaintiff “never explains why buyers or sellers of marine vessels, 
even if they are physically located in the United States, could not turn to online marketplaces located 
abroad to be a sufficient substitute” and that the Plaintiff also “does not, and cannot, plausibly allege 
that such [foreign] marketplaces do not compete with marketplaces located in the United States”). But 
Boats Group imposes on Brill too high a burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Our Defendant may 
ultimately be right that the geographic market should be expanded beyond the United States. That, 
however, is a question for summary judgment. See Thompson v. Metro. Multi -List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 
1573 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The parameters of a given market are questions of fact.”). At our phase of the 
case, then , “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate [only] where the plaintiff’s description of the 
geographic market is legally inadequate and/or wholly conclusory.” Q Club Resort & Residences Condo. 
Ass’n, Inc v. Q Club Hotel, LLC , 2010 WL 11454483, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2010) (Jordan, J.). The 
Complaint pleads that “[t]he relevant geographic market is the United States,” and that “Boats Group’s 
platforms are marketed, operated, and used by sellers and buyers nationwide .” Compl. ¶ 12. This is 
neither legally inadequate nor wholly conclusory. But see Q Club, 2010 WL 11454483, at *2 (finding 
that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead the relevant geographic market where the complaint merely 
alleged that the defendant was “ one of the first premier condo hotel properties on Ft. Lauderdale 
Beach”). We therefore conclude that the Complaint “plausibly suggest[s] the contours of the relevant 
geographic market[.]” Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1336. 
Second, Boats Group argues that the Complaint “fails to allege any facts ‘plausibly suggesting’ 
the contours of the relevant product market,” because it “never explains why boat buyers do not find 
obvious alternatives like Facebook marketplace, newspapers, or other advertising to be 
interchangeable with online boat listings[.]” MTD at 17 (quoting Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1338). Again, we 
disagree. “Defining the relevant product market involves identifying producers that provide customers 
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of a defendant firm (or firms) with alternative sources for the defendant’s product or services.” Jacobs, 
626 F.3d at 1337 (cleaned up). “ The market is composed of products that have reasonable 
interchangeability.” Ibid. “Most importantly, we should look to the uses to which the product is put 
by consumers in general.” Ibid. 
Boats Group argues that Brill improperly circumscribes the market to “online marine vessel 
listing and marketing services ,” Compl ¶ 13 (emphasis added) , rather than all print and digital 
platforms, see MTD at 17 (“[Brill] asserts that traditional advertising channels and general online 
marketplaces are not interchangeable for ‘ boat listing and marketing services ’ from the seller’s 
perspective, nor does [Brill] explain why only ‘online’ marketplaces should be [in]cluded.”). 
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “[a] relevant product market can exist as a distinct 
subset of a larger product market.” Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1337 (“Within this broad market, well-defined 
submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.” (citing 
U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 995) ). The Supreme Court has outlined some “practical indicia” to help us 
determine the contours of the appropriate submarket, such as “industry or public recognition of the 
submarket as a separate economic entity, the product ’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique 
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized 
vendors.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
And the Complaint does a pretty good job of distinguishing between the online submarket 
and the broader, traditional advertising market —and of explaining why the latter isn’t an effective 
alternative: 
The platforms provide a suit of specialized tools, including marine -specific inventory 
management systems, integration with multiple listing services (MLS), customized 
sales presentation tools, contract drafting capabilities, and buyer analytics. . . . 
 
Traditional advertising channels, such as newspapers, or boating magazines, are not 
effective alternatives, as they lack the reach, interactivity, and buyer targeting that 
online platforms provide. General online marketplaces (e.g., Craigslist or Facebook 
Marketplace), or private broker websites are also not adequate substitutes, as they do 
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not offer the professional -grade functionalities or visibility required by commercial 
sellers. 
 
Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15. That’s more than enough for now. 
Still resisting, Boats Group counters that the “proposed product market is gerrymandered” 
because Brill “alleges no facts supporting its assertion that all of these functions are necessary to 
compete with Boats Group’s platforms, nor that a ‘specialized’ platform is necessary.” Reply at 11. 
But Boats Group cites no law for its position that the specialized features must be “necessary” in 
order to constitute a n appropriate submarket. Cf. Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 
1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he failure to make arguments and cite authorities in support of an 
issue waives it.”). And that’s probably because that isn’t the law. Instead, as we’ve seen, a plaintiff need 
only show the “practical indica” of a submarket. And that’s what our Plaintiff has done here. 
In the end, our Defendant fails “to cite any Eleventh Circuit authority for the proposition that 
a plaintiff must provide a more expansive relevant market definition in the complaint in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss. ” Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Atlanta , 2005 WL 8158629, at *13 (N.D. Ga. 
July 12, 2005) (Pannell, Jr., J.), aff’d, 181 F. App’x 908 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing U.S. Anchor , 7 F.3d at 
994–95). In any event, “in the Eleventh Circuit, the definition of a relevant market is generally a 
question of fact. Such a complex factual determination must be made at the summary judgment stage 
or at trial after the parties have had a chance to conduct discovery and present the relevant economic 
and expert evidence necessary to make such a determination. ” Ibid. We therefore find that Brill has 
“present[ed] enough information in [the] [C]omplaint to plausibly suggest the contours of the relevant 
geographic and product markets.” Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1336.
4 
 
4 At summary judgment, however, Brill will have to marshal evidence to support its market definition. 
See Plush Lounge Las Vegas LLC v. Hotspur Resorts Nev. Inc., 371 F. App’x 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2010) (“At 
summary judgment, an antitrust plaintiff asserting a claim under Sherman Act Section 2 must submit 
admissible evidence of the relevant product and geographic market that would be sufficient to sustain 
a jury verdict on the issue of market definition.”); Michaels v. Sasser’s Glass Works Inc., 662 F. Supp. 3d 
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ii. Brill properly alleges that Boats Group exercises monopoly power 
Brill likewise sufficiently alleges that Boats Group has monopoly power in the relevant market 
of “online marine vessel listing and marketing services.” Compl. ¶ 13. Monopoly power is “the power 
to control prices or exclude competition” in a given market. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391. 
“It is not necessary that the power thus obtained should be exercised. Its existence is sufficient.” Am. 
Tobacco Co. v. United States , 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) . “Market power is the ability to raise price 
significantly above the competitive level without losing all of one ’s business.” Graphic Prods. Distrib., 
Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983). “Market share is frequently used in litigation 
as a surrogate for market power for two reasons. ” Ibid. “First, market power is conceptually difficult 
to define in any given case. Second, its measurement requires sophisticated econometric analysis. ” 
Ibid. “Therefore, market power is not well suited to presentation in an adversary proceeding.” Ibid.; see 
also U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 999 (“The principal measure of actual monopoly power is market share[.]”). 
Here, Brill alleges that our Defendant “controls a dominant share of the U.S. market for online 
boat listing and marketing services, operating the three largest online platforms used by brokerages .” 
Compl. ¶ 16. Specifically, Brill observes that “Boats Group publicly claims to hold approximately 75% 
of the global market for such services.” Ibid. Recognizing that the relevant market is the U.S. boat-listing 
market, Brill reasons that, “[w]hile that figure encompasses international operations, Boats Group owns 
and operates the leading platforms used by U.S.-based boat brokerages and sellers, and no comparable 
U.S.-based competitors operate at a similar scale or reach. ” Ibid. “Boats Group’s share of the U.S. 
market,” Brill continues, “is believed to be similarly high, if not greater, tha n its global share and 
sufficient to confer monopoly power in the relevant geographic market. ” Ibid. In other words, Brill 
 
1223, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (Altman, J.) (“[A]t summary judgment, the parties must produce evidence 
for their positions.”). 
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tells us what Boats Group advertises as its percentage of the international market, but it doesn’t really 
know what its percentage of the relevant U.S. market is. 
Picking up on this discrepancy, Boats Group says that “[t]he Complaint contains no allegations 
at all about Boats Group’s market share in the market that [Brill] contends has been illegally 
monopolized.” MTD at 18. Brill, in Boats Group’s view, merely “asks the Court to make inferences 
about Boats Group’s market share in the alleged relevant market based on purported statistics that 
relate to other geographies and are vague as to the platforms and services to which they apply. ” Ibid. 
Boats Group concludes that “[t]hese allegations are simply not enough to plausibly allege that Boats 
Group has market power.” Id. at 19. 
Although Boats Group’s argument may well prevail at summary judgment, we think that Brill 
has done just enough to survive the motion to dismiss. “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are particularly 
disfavored in fact-intensive antitrust cases.” Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., 376 F.3d at 1070.5 Brill has pled 
that Boats Group holds “75% of the global market,” and its “share of the U.S. market is believed to 
be similarly high” because Boats Group “owns and operates the leading platforms used by U.S.-based 
boat brokerages and sellers, and no comparable U.S. -based competitors operate at a similar scale or 
reach.” Compl. ¶ 16. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we must draw all reasonable inferences for the 
plaintiff. See Vargas v. Lincare, Inc. , 134 F.4th 1150, 1159 (11th Cir. 2025) (“ Again, at the motion -to-
dismiss stage, we ac cept the complaint ’s well -pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the relators’ favor.”). At this early phase of the case, then, Boats Group’s possession of 
 
5 See also Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 998 
(11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that arguments about market power are “persuasive but inappropriate in 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim”); Hosp. Bldg., 425 U.S. at 746 (“[I]n antitrust cases, 
where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ dismissals prior to giving the 
plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.” (citing Poller, 368 U.S. at 
473)); Town of Norwood, Mass. v. New England Power Co. , 202 F.3d 408, 421 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[D]oubts 
about market power cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss[.]”). 
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75% of the global market, along with its ownership and operation of “the leading platforms used by 
U.S.-based boat brokerages and sellers,” Compl. ¶ 16, supports “the reasonable inference” that Boats 
Group has similar market share in the U.S. , Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And 75% is certainly enough, at 
this stage, to support a plausible claim that Boats Group has what the law characterizes as monopoly 
power over the U.S. market. See Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 
1350, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (Seitz, J.), aff’d sub nom. Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., 376 F.3d at 1065 (finding 
allegation that defendant possessed 51% of the relevant market sufficient to establish monopoly power 
at the motion-to-dismiss stage); Iris Wireless LLC v. Syniverse Techs. , 49 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1031 (M.D. 
Fla. 2014) ( finding sufficient allegations of monopoly power at the motion -to-dismiss stage where 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant controlled “50% or more ” of the relevant market) ; cf. Bailey v. 
Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A market share at or less than 50% is inadequate 
as a matter of law to constitute monopoly power.”). 
b. Brill has failed to plead the second element of a § 2 violation 
But Brill has failed to properly plead “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [the monopoly] 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.” Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71. As the Supreme Court has explained: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free -market system. 
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices —at least for a short period— is what 
attracts “ business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the 
possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by 
an element of anticompetitive conduct. 
 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
The second element of our test therefore “requires predatory or exclusionary acts or practices 
that have the effect of preventing or excluding competition within the relevant market.” Morris, 364 
F.3d at 1294 (citing Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58). “In order for a practice to be exclusionary, it must harm 
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the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58 (cleaned up). “[H]arm 
to one or more competitors will not suffice for a [§] 2 violation.” Ibid.; see also Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., 
376 F.3d at 1075 (“[C]onduct that injures individual firms rather than competition in the market as a 
whole does not violate Section Two.”). “Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against 
another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.” Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993); see also Mfg. Rsch. Corp. v. Greenlee Tool Co., 
693 F.2d 1037, 1043 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our cases have recognized that injury to a competitor need 
not always result in injury to competition. The use of unfair means resulting in the substitution of one 
competitor for another without more does not violate the antitrust laws.”). 
 Brill points to three allegedly exclusionary acts. First, it says that, twenty years ago, Boats Group 
“entrenched its monopoly position through a series of strategic acquisitions[.]” Compl. ¶ 55. Second, it 
claims that Boats Group has entered into “exclusionary contracts” that “prohibit or discourage 
brokerages from listing inventory on rival platforms.” Id. ¶ 33. Third, it insists that Boats Group 
imposed “supracompetitive pricing[.]” Id. ¶ 55. Even taken together, these three claims are insufficient 
to satisfy the second element of the Sherman Act test. 
i. The alleged acquisitions aren’t anticompetitive 
Brill alleges that Boats Group “entrenched its monopoly position through a series of strategic 
acquisitions that eliminated its largest competitors, enabled it to impose sustained supracompetitive 
pricing, and facilitated its use of exclusive dealing provisions that foreclose competitors from accessing 
necessary inventory and scale. ” Ibid. Specifically, Brill says that Boats Group’s parent company 
“consolidated control of the industry by acquiring two of its main competitors, YachtWorld.com and 
boats.com, bringing all three major players under common ownership and substantially reducing 
competition in the relevant market.” Id. ¶ 27. Then, in 2017, Boats Group “acquired YachtCloser.com, 
the leading digital contract management platform for yacht brokerages. ” Id. ¶ 28; see also Defendant’s 
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Reply (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 29] at 4 (“Boats Group secured market dominance by systematically 
eliminating its competition through a series of strategic acquisitions. Beginning in 2004 and continuing 
through 2017, Boats Group conducted an industry roll-up by acquiring its main competitors.”). 
Boats Group disagrees that these acquisitions satisfy the second prong. As Boats Group sees 
it, the acquisitions of “YachtWorld.com and boats.com [occurred] over two decades ago in 2004,” so Brill’s 
monopolization claim is “barred by the four-year statute of limitations for antitrust claims and laches 
to the extent that [Brill] relies on these acquisitions.” MTD at 11. Brill admits that “these acquisitions 
closed some years ago, ” but insists that doesn’t matter because Boats Group “only recentl y . . . 
exploit[ed] its market power to impose steep, sustained, supra -competitive price increases on its 
customer base.” Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
(“Resp.”) [ECF No. 25] at 6. But both parties miss the point. 
“Not the possession, but the abuse, of monopoly power violates [ S]ection 2.” Olympia Equip. 
Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.); see also Verizon, 540 U.S. 
at 415–16 (“The Sherman Act . . . does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its 
way of doing business whenever some other approach might yield greater competition.”) ; Colo. 
Interstate Gas Co. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 692 n.15 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act does not punish the mere possession of monopoly power.”). 
That Boats Group may have had the power to operate a monopoly twenty years ago thus isn’t 
enough to show that it engaged in illegal conduct today. Instead, Brill must demonstrate that Boats 
Group engaged in exclusionary conduct “as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 
571. “[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist ’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ 
That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. . . . [H]arm to one or 
more competitors will not suffice.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58. This focus on an anticompetitive effect is 
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essential because “it is inimical to the antitrust laws to award damages for losses stemming from acts 
that do not hurt competition.” Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 
1995). But Brill never alleges that the acquisitions themselves had an “anticompetitive effect” or that , 
when Boats Group made those acquisitions, it did so out of a desire to engage in exclusionary conduct 
or to gain monopoly power. In fact, Brill alleges that the acquisitions were merely “strategic,” Compl. 
¶ 55—in other words , that Boats Group used its “business acumen” to achieve monopoly power. And 
it’s well-settled that, “[i]f the company achieves its power through purely legitimate means, that is, 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident, 
then it has not violated the antitrust laws. ” Assoc. Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc. , 624 F.2d 1342, 
1357 n.24 (5th Cir. 1980)
6 (noting that “ growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident” doesn’t violate the antitrust laws (quoting Grinnell, 384 
U.S. at 571)).7 
In other words, accepting the Complaint’s allegations as true, the acquisitions may have resulted 
in Boats Group obtaining a monopoly. But the mere acquisition of monopoly power isn’t illegal.8 And 
 
6 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981 , are binding precedent 
in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
7 See also Gulf States Reorg. Grp., Inc. v. Nucor Corp., 466 F.3d 961, 968 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he propriety 
of mergers and asset acquisitions is measured by the competitive effects such acquisitions would have 
in the relevant market, not by the level of competition in the market for the target company or 
acquisition.”); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 527 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Competition, 
even the maintenance of monopoly, through superior business acumen is allowed under section 2.”); 
Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Can. Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261, 266 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Anti-competitive conduct is 
conduct without legitimate business purpose. Such conduct makes sense only because it eliminates 
competition. Acts which are ordinary business practices typical of those used in a competitive market 
do not constitute anti-competitive conduct violative of Section 2. The exercise of business judgment 
cannot be found to be anti -competitive.” (citations omitted)); Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc. , 924 
F.2d 1555, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991) (“ Emerging victorious from competition, however, is not illegal 
under the Sherman Act.”). 
8 In fact, Brill admits that Boats Group “only recently . . . exploit[ed] its market power to impose steep, 
sustained, supra -competitive price increases on its customer base.” Resp. at 6. Brill, in short, 
acknowledges that the acquisitions themselves didn’t violate the antitrust laws. So, while Boats Group’s 
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Brill never alleges that , as part of these acquisitions , Boats Group engaged in any anticompetitive 
conduct. Brill has thus failed to plead that Boats Group’s acquisitions amounted to “ predatory or 
exclusionary acts or practices that have the effect of preventing or excluding competition within the 
relevant market.” Morris, 364 F.3d at 1294. 
ii. Boats Group’s Contracts Aren’t Exclusive Dealing Provisions 
Brill next alleges that Boats Group used “ exclusive dealing provisions that foreclose 
competitors from accessing necessary inventory and scale. ” Compl. ¶ 55. According to Brill, “Boats 
Group reinforces its market dominance through the use of contractual restraints that functionally 
foreclose competition. ” Id. ¶ 23. “Specifically,” it says, “Boats Group’s subscription agreements 
contain exclusive dealing provisions that either prohibit or strongly discourage sellers, particularly 
brokers and dealers, from listing their inventory on competing platforms.” Ibid. In the Complaint, Brill 
cites the following exclusive dealing provisions (the “Terms”): 
24.5 Customer Responsibilities. Customer shall cooperate with Boats Group in its 
performance of the Services by, without limitation: . . . 
 
24.5.3 providing Boats Group with timely access to data, information and personnel 
of Customer. Customer is prohibited, now and in the future, from any conduct that 
would imply in any way to any third party that any Customer listings originate from 
other than Boats Group. 
Ibid. As Brill reads the Terms, “[t]hese exclusive dealing clauses prevent rival platforms from gaining 
access to the scale and inventory necessary to attract users and build network effects.” Id. ¶ 24. “As a 
result,” it claims, “sellers who might otherwise consider switching platforms or dual -listing are 
contractually restricted, making multi -homing or platform -switching commercially impractical or 
outright impossible. ” Ibid. “In this context, ” Brill concludes, “exclusive contracts substantially 
foreclose access to essential competitive inputs (listings and traffic), deny rivals the scale necessary to 
 
subsequent conduct may (or may not) have violated the Sherman Act, Brill seems to concede that there 
was nothing illegal about the acquisitions themselves. 
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challenge Boats Group, and harm consumers by stifling competition on price, service, and 
innovation.” Id. ¶ 25. 
Boats Group doesn’t see it this way. It counters that the Complaint “does not point to any 
actual agreement that prevents any seller from listing a boat on any other marketplace. ” MTD at 12. 
Instead, “the provision simply prohibits customers from misrepresenting that ‘ Customer listings’ on 
Boats Group’s websites originate from some other source.” Ibid. According to Boats Group, the Plaintiff 
“does not (and cannot) allege that Section 24.5.3 has prevented any seller from listing a boat for sale 
on any other online platform.” Ibid. “Nor,” Boats Group continues, does the Complaint “even allege 
that [the Plaintiff] was ever prevented from listing inventory on other platforms [.]” Ibid. Brill, the 
Defendant concludes, “has therefore failed to plead exclusionary conduct, and its claims must be 
dismissed.” Id. at 13. We agree. 
The Terms simply don’t say what Brill claims they say. “An exclusive dealing arrangement is 
an agreement in which a buyer agrees to purchase certain goods or services only from a particular 
seller for a certain period of time.” Am. Proteins, Inc. v. River Valley Ingredients, Inc. , 2026 WL 1003330, 
at *27 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (Story, J.) (citing ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2012)); see also Indus. Equip. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 554 F.2d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 1977) (“By definition 
an exclusive dealing contract excludes potential competitors from competition with the exclusive 
dealer.”). But the Terms don’t prevent a ny broker from advertising on any third -party platform. 
Instead, they prohibit brokers from “imply[ing] in any way to any third party that any Customer listings 
originate from other than Boats Group. ” Compl. ¶ 23. In other words, a broker may list a boat with 
Boats Group and as many other platforms as it wishes. But it may not post a listing on Boats Group 
and then direct its customers to another site or advertise that the listing originates from another site. For 
example, a Boats Group listing may not direct a customer to a newspaper listing. That’s not an 
exclusive dealing provision. In determining what qualifies as an exclusive dealing provision, courts 
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generally consider “market realities” rather than “formalistic distinctions.” McWane, Inc. v. F.T.C., 783 
F.3d 814, 835 (11th Cir. 2015). “Exclusive dealing arrangements are essentially requirements contracts, 
whereby the buyer agrees to purchase exclusively the product of the contracting supplier.” Servicetrends, 
Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1994), opinion amended on reconsideration 
sub nom. Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys. , 1994 WL 776878 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 1994) (Camp, J.). 
And, as we’ve said, the Terms don’t require any broker to purchase exclusively from (or list exclusively 
with) Boats Group. 
But here’s the thing: Even if the Terms were exclusive dealing provisions, Brill’s claim would 
still fail. “As we’ve observed, exclusive dealing arrangements are not per se unlawful, but they can run 
afoul of the antitrust laws when used by a dominant firm to maintain its monopoly. ” McWane, 783 
F.3d at 832. An exclusive dealing arrangement does n’t violate the antitrust laws “unless the court 
believes it probable that performance of the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share 
of the line of commerce affected.” Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). And 
this is where Brill runs into trouble. The Complaint fails to allege any facts to show that the Terms are 
in any way anticompetitive or that they otherwise harm consumers—the very heart of a § 2 claim. Cf. 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“The [Sherman Act] directs itself not against 
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy 
competition itself.”). True, the Complaint alleges that the Terms make “multi-homing or platform -
switching commercially impractical or outright impossible” and that they “harm consumers by stifling 
competition on price, service, and innovation.” Compl. ¶ 25. But it doesn’t produce any facts to support 
this conclusory claim. As we’ve said, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must do more than 
simply offer labels or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. ” Betts v. Hall, 679 F. 
App’x 810, 812 (11th Cir. 2017) . “Absent further factual enhancement, naked assertions that the 
defendant acted unlawfully will not state a claim for relief.” Ibid.; see also Captain Jack’s Crab Shack, Inc. 
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v. Cooke, 2022 WL 4375364, at *7 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2022) (“After Twombly and Iqbal, we do not credit 
conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.”). 
“As a general rule, businesses are free to choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well 
as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing.” Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 
438, 448 (2009). “The antitrust laws allow legal monopolies to compete vigorously on the merits in 
the relevant market, even if such competition drives out competitors.” Gulf States, 466 F.3d at 967 n.3 
(citing Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71); see also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 797 F.2d at 375 (recognizing 
that “the lawful monopolist should be free to compete like everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws 
would be holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors”) . In the end, Brill has simply identified 
the “terms[ ] and conditions of [ ] dealing,” Pac. Bell , 555 U.S. at 448, that allow Boats Group “ to 
compete vigorously on the merits in the relevant market,” Gulf States, 466 F.3d at 967. Nothing more. 
iii. Price Increases Aren’t Enough to Show Harm to Competition 
Finally, Brill alleges that “Boats Group’s monopoly power has allowed it to impose steep and 
sustained price increases on its customers, including [the] Plaintiff and members of the Classes, 
without corresponding improvements in quality, service, or innovation.” Compl. ¶ 56. “This conduct,” 
Brill insists, “has harmed competition, driven several businesses out of the market, and deprived 
customers of meaningful alternatives. ” Ibid. Boats Group responds that Brill “ cannot rely on Boats 
Group’s alleged price increases by Boats Group as the basis for its monopolization claim because ‘the 
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices [,] is . . . not 
unlawful.’” MTD at 14 (quoting OJ Com., LLC v. KidKraft, LLC, 34 F.4th 1232, 1244 (11th Cir. 2022) 
(“[C]harging monopoly prices —without accompanying anticompetitive conduct —is not enough to 
state a claim under Section 2.”)). Again, we agree. 
As we’ve said, “setting a high price is not in itself anti -competitive.” Trace X Chem., Inc. v. 
Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 
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41–42, 148 (1978) ). “Section 2 does not forbid a monopolist to set profit -maximizing prices.” Ibid. 
“Such conduct is not the exclusionary conduct that violates the antitrust laws, but rather is the normal, 
rational response of a business seeking to maximize profits, sales or revenues.” Ibid. (cleaned up).9 In 
other words, “[a] natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly without excluding 
competitors by improper means is not guilty of ‘monopolizing’ in violation of the Sherman Act, and 
can therefore charge any price that it wants, for the antitrust laws are not a price -control statute or a 
public-utility or common -carrier rate -regulation statute. ” Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis . v. 
Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 13, 1995) (Posner, 
C.J.). As the Seventh Circuit has explained: 
Even if it could be said that the City possessed monopoly power, plaintiffs have not 
presented sufficient facts to meet the second requirement under § 2, anti-competitive 
behavior or abuse of market power. The mere existence of the power to control prices 
or exclude competition is not unlawful unless it is coupled with intent. By intent, we 
do not mean intent to obtain a monopoly or to capture an ongoing increase in market 
share. This of course is the aim of every business endeavor. Under § 2, intent to obtain 
a monopoly is unlawful only where an entity seeks to maintain or achieve monopoly 
 
9 Courts are in near-universal agreement that charging higher prices—even excessive prices—doesn’t 
violate the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, 
and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is . . . not unlawful[.]”); Cont’l Cablevision of Ohio, 
Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Co. , 715 F.2d 1115, 1121 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Even assuming that the pole rates 
were unreasonable, this would not in itself be conclusive of an anticompetitive purpose or effect. 
Moreover, and of critical importance, we are persuaded that the rates established by defendants were 
not designed ‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’” 
(quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948))); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 
F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (“But unless the monopoly has bolstered its power by wrongful actions, 
it will not be required to pay damages merely because its prices may later be found excessive. Setting 
a high price may be a use of monopoly power, but it is not in itself anticompetiti ve.”); Chicago Pro. 
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (“A high 
price is not itself a violation of the Sherman Act.”); Gibson v. Cendyn Grp., LLC, 148 F.4th 1069, 1087–
88 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 2026 WL 1052046 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2026) (“True, increased prices can serve 
as evidence of ‘a substantial anticompetitive effect’ in the context of certain agreements. But that does 
not mean an individual firm ’s independent choice to charge higher prices itself harms competition. 
Here, Plaintiffs confuse cause and effect —higher prices can be a possible result of anticompetitive 
behavior, but charging a higher price by itself is not anticompetitive.”); BanxCorp v. Bankrate, Inc., 847 
F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[P]rice increases, without more, do not constitute supracompetitive 
pricing.”); Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] firm’s 
comparatively high price may simply reflect a superior product.”). 
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power by anticompetitive means. As such, the Sherman Act does not prohibit an entity 
possessing market power from simply raising prices in order to increase revenues. For 
a § 2 violation, more is needed. 
 
Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 2000) (first citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 
100, 107 (1948); and then citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 612 (1977)). In our 
case, Brill alleges nothing more than Boats Group’s acquisition of monopoly power and its decision 
to increase prices. “Insofar as [Brill] paid high prices because [Boats Group] was a monopolist, its 
claim must fail because [Boats Group] was not shown to be an illegal monopolist; a lawful monopolist 
can charge what it wants.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 65 F.3d at 1415. 
iv. Conclusion 
In sum, while Brill has successfully alleged that Boats Group has a monopoly on online boat 
advertising, the Complaint lacks any factual allegations of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the only 
factual allegations Brill advances about how Boats Group maintains its monopoly is the assertion that 
Boats Group provides “ integrated services, such as BoatWizard (a marketing and customer 
relationship management tool) and YachtCloser (a service providing standardized contracts and 
closing tools”—tools the Plaintiff itself describes as “making Boats Group indispensable to industry 
participants[.]” Compl. ¶ 29. In other words, the Complaint plausibly alleges only that Boats Group’s 
“growth or development [is] a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.” Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71. That’s just not enough. 
II. Attempted Monopolization 
In Count II, Brill alleges that Boats Group attempted to monopolize in violation of § 2. See 
Compl. ¶¶ 61–67. “[A] claim for attempted monopolization under § 2 . . . [requires] three things: ‘(1) 
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to 
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.’” Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. 
Estee Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456). “The 
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attempted monopolization claim is thus harder to maintain and prove than the monopolization claim.” 
Am. Contractors Supply, LLC v. HD Supply Constr. Supply, Ltd., 2020 WL 10467232, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 
26, 2020) (Brown. J.), aff’d, 989 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2021). 
In Boats Group’s view, “[b]ecause Export has failed to sufficiently allege its monopolization 
claim, its attempted monopolization claim also fails.” MTD at 22. And that’s right. Brill, after all, hasn’t 
met the first element of this claim because it hasn’t plausibly alleged that Boats Group “has engaged 
in predatory or anticompetitive conduct [.]” Duty Free Ams., 797 F.3d at 1263. Brill identifies what it 
says are two kinds of anticompetitive conduct: the “restrictive dealing provisions” and the imposition 
of “supracompetitive prices[.]” Compl. ¶ 62. As we’ve discussed, however, Brill doesn’t come close to 
plausibly alleging that either Boats Group’s Terms or its pricing is illegal. And “[c]onduct that does 
not constitute ‘willful acquisition or maintenance’ of monopoly power (thus precluding establishment 
of the offense of monopolization) cannot constitute the ‘predatory or anticompetitive conduct’ required 
to establish the offense of attempt to monopolize.” Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 
698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983) ; see also Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law at 321 (observing that 
“conduct lawful for a monopolist must, a fortiori, be excluded as a basis for the attempt offense”); 
McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co. , 858 F.2d 1487, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988) (“A distinction between a 
monopolization claim and an attempt to monopolize claim is that proof of specific intent is required 
for attempt claims.”); Rebotix Repair LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2021 WL 1227593, at *7 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 8, 2021) (Covington, J.) (“[T]he only arguable distinction between monopolization and attempted 
monopolization in this case is that attempted monopolization requires a plaintiff to show the 
defendant’s specific intent to monopolize.” (citing Restore Robotics, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc. , 2019 
WL 8063989, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019) (Frank, J.))); Abbey Steam Specialty Co. v. Armstrong Int’l, 
Inc., 1987 WL 46895, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 1987) (Hall, J.) (“B oth the ‘willful acquisition or 
maintenance’ element of monopolization and the ‘specific intent to monopolize’ element of an 
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attempt to monopolize require a showing of exclusionary conduct by the defendants.”); Am. Contractors 
Supply, 2020 WL 10467232, at *9 (“Without a showing of predatory or anticompetitive conduct, ACS 
thus cannot succeed on an attempted monopolization claim, which requires the same elements of a 
monopolization claim plus a specific intent. ”). Because, in short, our Plaintiff has failed to plausibly 
allege that Boats Group engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct , its attempted 
monopolization claim necessarily fails. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456 (noting that “it is generally 
required that to demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove [ ] that the defendant 
has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct”). 
III. The State-Law Claims 
The Plaintiff’s § 2 claims were the only mechanism by which we could exercise original 
jurisdiction over this case. Without that claim, the Complaint includes only state -law claims between 
two Florida residents. 
“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, a district court should typically dismiss the 
pendant state claims as well.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (noting that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a state -law claim where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction”). “Although the district court has discretion, concerns of federalism—namely, of feder al 
courts of limited jurisdiction weighing in on state law—counsel in favor of dismissing state -law claims 
after the federal claims are dismissed.” Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., Fla., 55 F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 
2022). “We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the 
federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th 
Cir. 2004). “The Supreme Court has also put a thumb on the scale: ‘In the usual case in which all 
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to 
exercise [pendent] jurisdiction[.]’” Silas, 55 F.4th at 866 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 
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343, 350 n.7 (1988)). “A district court, exercising its already broad discretion, will rarely err by declining 
supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims that supported its jurisdiction are dismissed.” Ibid. ; 
see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims 
are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims 
should be dismissed as well.”). We’ll follow the Supreme Court’s admonition and decline to exercise 
our discretionary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over the Plaintiff’s remaining state -law 
claims here.
 
We therefore DISMISS without prejudice Counts III–V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff must do better in its amended complaint. “Experience teaches that, unless cases 
are pled clearly and precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket 
becomes unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court ’s ability to 
administer justice.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Tr. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366–67 (11th Cir. 
1996). To avoid these problems, we’ll give the Plaintiff one more chance to replead its claims. 
*** 
 After careful review, therefore, we ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows: 
1. The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 15] is GRANTED. 
2. The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
3. If the Plaintiff wants to file an amended complaint, it must do so by June 30, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
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DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on June 16, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
 _________________________________ 
 ROY K. ALTMAN 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
cc: counsel of record 
 
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