govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cr-00069-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. Case No. 25-cr-69-1 (RCL) 
REDACTED
ERLEND OLSON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER 
Before the Court is Defendant Erlend Olson’s motion to reconsider , ECF No. 112, this 
Court’s detention order, ECF No. 30, along with the Government’s opposition, ECF No. 123, and 
Olson’s reply, ECF No. 136. The underlying circumstances that motivated this Court’s detention 
order have not changed. Olson is alleged to have orchestrated a scheme to defraud about 200 
investors and lenders of over $250 million, subjecting him to steep sentencing exposure that 
includes a potential life sentence , according to the government’s preliminary estimate. Olson is 
further alleged to have concealed over $9 million of these funds and to have lied to government 
officials to avoid paying taxes for over a decade. Most importantly, he has significant foreign ties 
and has paid to become a dual citizen of a country that offers visa -free travel to many countries 
without extradition treaties. And he has attempted to tamper with a witness during the pendency 
of this case. 
Although serious in light of the projected length of time to trial, the new information 
presented in Olson’s motion for reconsideration regarding his health conditions do not overcome 
the Court’s original reasons for keeping him detained. The motion for reconsideration and Olson’s 
request for an evidentiary hearing will therefore be DENIED. 

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I. BACKGROUND 
The Court presumes familiarity with the facts alleged in the Indictment. ECF No. 1. As 
relevant here, on March 13, 2025, Olson was charged by indictment in the District of Columbia 
with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire and Mail Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; 
five counts of Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; one count of Mail Fraud, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and four counts of Tax Evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. He was 
arrested in New Mexico and made his initial appearance at a federal court there on March 17, 2025. 
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Emergency Mot. for Revocation at 3, ECF No. 26-1. 
The government requested detention based on Olson’s flight risk and obstruction of 
justice—specifically citing the hefty sentencing exposure Olson faced if convicted, allegations that 
he lied to federal officials to evade taxes, his significant foreign tie s, and his attempts to tamper 
with witnesses. Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Emergency Mot. for Revocation at 3–17, ECF No. 28. 
After a detention hearing held on March 20, 2025, U.S. Magistrate Judge Jennifer M. Rozzoni of 
the District of New Mexico ordered Ols on detained pending trial. Order of Detention Pending 
Trial at 8, ECF No. 33. On April 4, 2025, Olson filed an emergency motion for revocation of the 
magistrate’s detention order, ECF No. 26, the government filed its opposition three days later, ECF 
No. 28, and this Court held a bond hearing the day after that. In a Memorandum Opinion issued 
on April 9, 2025, this Court denied Olson’s motion to reverse Judge Rozzoni’s detention order, 
primarily on the basis that Olson was a flight risk . Mem. Op. at 11, ECF No. 30. Since then, 
Olson has spent most of his time at the Northern Neck Regional Jail in Warsaw, Virginia. 
About two months ago, Olson filed the present motion asserting “that a number of changes 
in circumstances over the last year, in addition to additional facts that have been developed since 
that time, warrant reconsideration and revision of” this Court’s order confirming his detention. 

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Def.’s Mot. for Recons., ECF No. 112. In this motion, Olson asks for an evidentiary hearing to 
assess these changed circumstances. 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Reconsideration Standard 
The Court may reopen a detention hearing “at any time before trial if the judicial officer 
finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that 
has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions o f release that will reasonably 
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the 
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). “[I]n addition to ‘bearing’ on—having a logical relation 
to—detention, the sort of new infor mation capable of reopening a detention hearing must also 
‘bear’ materially—it must relate in some significant or essential way to the decision whether to 
detain.” United States v. Worrell, No. 1:21-cr-292-RCL, 2021 WL 2366934, at *9 (D.D.C. June 
9, 2021) (emphasis omitted). 
B. Pretrial Detention Standard 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq. , sets forth limited circumstances 
in which a defendant may be detained before trial despite the Act’s “presumption in favor of 
releasability,” United States v. Leathers , 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Act requires 
that federal courts release a defendant before trial unless a court determines, after a hearing, that 
“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure” the defendant’s appearance in 
court or the “safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). “In common 
parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the 
community.’” United States v. Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
The government must demonstrate “by a preponderance of the evidence” that pretrial 
detention is appropriate based on the defendant’s flight risk. See United States v. Simpkins , 826 

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F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) . “That preponderance must, of 
course, go to the ultimate issue: that no combination of conditions—either those set out in the Bail 
Reform Act itself or any others that the magistrate or judge might find useful —can ‘reasonably’ 
assure that the defendant will appear for trial.” United States v. Xulam , 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
To determine whether any conditions of release will reasonably assure Olson’s appearance, 
the Court must “take into account the available information concerning” the following four factors 
set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g): 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged . . . ; (2) the weight of the 
evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, 
including— . . . the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, 
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community 
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and 
record concerni ng appearance at court proceedings; . . . and (4) the nature and 
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by 
the person’s release.” 
The Court previously found that the government established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Olson’s pretrial release would pose a serious risk that he would flee. Mem. Op. at 
11, ECF No. 30. Olson presents some new evidence in his motion for reconsideration—primarily 
concerning the present state of his physical health and the projected length of time until trial. 
Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 12–13, ECF No. 112. But, as explained in the Court’s reexamination 
of the four § 3142(g) factors below, Olson has done little to mitigate the core facts that make him 
a flight risk. 
A. Nature and Circumstances of the Charged Offenses 
As the Court found in its prior order, the nature -and-circumstances factor weighs in favor 
of detention. The alleged lies at the center of the charges against Olson do not inspire confidence 

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that he will comply with the proposed conditions of release. If proven, the fraud and tax evasion 
allegations in the indictment point to Olson’s willingness to deceive not only investors but also the 
government. 
What’s more, Olson’s sentencing exposure is a relevant consideration when considering 
whether he is a flight risk. If convicted of every charge in the indictment, Olson faces a maximum 
sentence of 160 years of incarceration, and the government computes his advisory guideline 
sentence as life in prison. Mem. Op. at 4, ECF No. 30. As this Court observed in its detention 
opinion, the considerable punishment that would likely accompany Olson’s conviction is a factor 
that increases his flight risk. Id. (citing United States v. Bikundi, 47 F. Supp. 3d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 
2014); United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 41, 43 (D.D.C. 2013); United States v. Ali, 793 
F. Supp. 2d 386, 391 (D.D.C. 2011)). 
That being said, Olson fairly points out that an important circumstance of the charges 
against him is the voluminous and complex discovery involved in this case, which will include, 
among other things, substantial privilege review as well as extensive litigation as to the use of 
classified materials under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA). In fact, the Court 
has recently adopted the parties’ CIPA filings schedule, which anticipates that litigation about 
classified discovery will continue into February 2027. Given the sheer breadth of discovery that 
Olson will need to work through with his counsel, his incarceration surely places burdens on his 
ability to prepare a defense in an expeditious manner. 
But this reality is not an independent basis for reconsideration because Olson should have 
known at the time of his detention hearing that this case would involve sprawling discovery. To 
begin, Olson cannot now profess surprise about the business operations and contracts of the 
company that he founded and managed. Nor is the indictment’s scope “new information” that was 

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unknown at the time of his detention hearing. In fact, the Court discussed this facet of the litigation 
with the parties during the hearing and the government conceded that there would “be a significant 
amount of discovery” involved. Detention Hr’g Tr. at 40:09–41:23, ECF No. 66. 
What’s also clear is that Olson knew that he was under investigation for years before his 
arrest in 2025. This means that he should have known about the possible privilege issues relating 
to documents found when his New Mexico residence and Theia’s D.C. offices were searched in 
June 2021. And he should have known about the related complications that might arise from 
Theia’s placement into receivership in October 2021. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 12, ECF No. 123. 
In sum, Olson knew at the time of his detention hearing that discovery in this case would 
greatly prolong pretrial proceedings, and the Court considered that issue. While the finer points 
of this general fact might have come into greater focus as the litigation proceeded, Olson cannot 
now raise the projected length of time to trial as an independent basis for reconsideration. 
B. Weight of the Evidence 
The weight -of-the-evidence factor likewise remains largely unchanged and, in fact, 
perhaps more strongly weighs in favor of detention today. In the detention order, the Court found 
that, while the case was still in a “preliminary stage,” it appeared that “the government ha[d] 
assembled a comprehensive body of evidence directly implicating Olson.” Mem. Op. at 5, ECF 
No. 30. The government now represents that it “has spoken to dozens of investors, all of whom 
described [Olson] as the primary purveyor of the false information material to their investments.” 
Gov’t’s Opp’n at 6, ECF No. 123. On top of that, the government states that Olson “is on numerous 
recorded calls and videos claiming that Theia had $6 billion in escrow, millions of dollars in 
monthly revenue, revenue-producing government contracts, and more than $100 million in cash-
on-hand—none of which was true.” Id. But the most notable development on this front is the fact 

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that the government obtained a guilty plea from Defendant Jospeh Fargnoli, Theia’s Chief 
Technology Officer, who agreed to cooperate and provide evidence against Olson. Fargnoli Plea 
Agreement, ECF No. 86; Statement of Offense ECF No. 87; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 6, ECF No. 123. 
The hefty weight of this evidence, when considered alongside Olson’s sentencing 
exposure, creates an incentive to flee. As explained in the detention order, and as reaffirmed 
below, Olson’s own actions give ample reason to believe that he might do so. 
C. The Defendant’s History and Characteristics 
The history-and-characteristics factor considers Olson’s “physical and mental condition, 
family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community 
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning 
appearance at court proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A). 
1. Criminal History 
In the detention decision, the Court noted that Olson has two prior convictions for driving 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs in Orange County, California , with several probation 
violations in connection with these convictions. Mem. Op. at 6, ECF No. 30. In particular, Olson 
violated the terms of his release such that his probation was revoked at least twice —resulting in 
him serving 30 days in jail, followed by an additional period of probation during which he was 
again arrested and sentenced to 45 days in jail followed by five years of probation. Pretrial Servs. 
Rep., ECF No. 26-2; Minutes, Superior Ct. of Cal., Orange Cnty., ECF No. 26-9]. These facts cut 
in favor of detention given that they tend to suggest that Olson will not comply with his release 
conditions. 
In the motion for reconsideration, Olson’s counsel acknowledges the convictions but, as to 
whether Olson violated parole, Olsen and counsel assert that they “ are unsure if this is the case 

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and are making efforts to obtain the related Orange County records.” Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 
10, ECF No. 112. “According to [Olson’s counsel’s] understanding, Mr. Olson was required to 
attend two classes, each for eighteen months, each held weekly, for a total of approximately 144 
class sessions,” and attendance reports or requests to be excused from class had to be sent “ to a 
fax machine that sometimes was unable to receive faxes. ” Id . at 11. The motion states that 
“[a]pparently” Olson “ultimately was able to resolve the issues he had relating to the requirement 
to attend these classes.” Id. at 11. 
Olson has not provide d any documentary support for his claims that he might not have 
violated the terms of his release, id., whereas these parole violations are documented in exhibits 
he himself filed with his emergency motion to reverse the magistrate’s detention decision over a 
year ago. See Pretrial Servs. Rep., ECF No. 26- 2; Minutes, Superior Ct. of Cal., Orange Cnty., 
ECF No. 26-9. Given this, as well as Olson’s counsel’s seeming lack of certainty regarding the 
facts surrounding the alleged parole violations, the Court will not deem Olson’s version of events 
as “new information capable of reopening a detention hearing.” Worrell , 2021 WL 2366934, at 
*9. 
2. Family/Community Ties & Financial Resources 
The Court has previously determined that, although Olson has familial ties to Albuquerque, 
New Mexico, his lack of stability and other tenuous circumstances suggest that he poses a 
significant flight risk. Mem. Op. 6–8, ECF No. 30. For example, the Court focused on unexplained 
gaps in his family’s knowledge of his financial position and his citizenship status , which raised 
doubts about whether his family ties will reasonably assure his continuing appearance in court. Id. 
at 7–8. The Court also observed that, before his arrest, Olson did not have stable employment and, 

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instead, sometime s worked “odd jobs,” including ad hoc contractual arrangements for various 
engineering-related matters. Id. at 8 (quoting Detention Hr’g Tr. 21:4–21:13, ECF No. 66). 
What’s more, the government alleges that, in addition to his sentencing exposure and his 
outstanding tax liability, Olson faces significant civil exposure in current and future litigation 
related to notes that Theia owned that Olson personally guaranteed. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 7, ECF No. 
123. This liability, coupled with the allegation that Olson took for himself and hid about $9 million 
of the funds invested in Theia, leans in favor of finding that he is a flight risk. Nothing in the 
motion for reconsideration convinces the Court otherwise. 
3. Ties to Foreign Countries 
Of greatest relevance to the Court’s detention decision was Olson’s ties to foreign countries 
and his demonstrated willingness to circumvent travel restrictions. Mem. Op. at 8–10, ECF No. 
30. Perhaps the most concerning fact is that , in 2007, Olson paid $250,000 to become a dual 
citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis —a citizenship he still retains. Id. at 8; Citizenship Confirmation, 
Ex. 11, ECF No. 28- 1; Detention Hr’g Tr. 2 7:02–27:09, ECF No. 66. A St. Kitts and Nevis 
passport (referred to as a “SKN” passport) allows visa-free travel to more than 100 countries, 
including numerous countries with which the United States has no extradition treaties. Mem. Op. 
at 8, ECF No. 30. While Olson’s SKN passport expired in 2017, he has demonstrated that he 
knows how to flee using his citizenship. In 2015, while Olson’s ex- wife was involved in legal 
proceedings, Olson wrote in an email that surrendering her passports would “do[] little to stop her 
from fleeing” because she could “go to SKN on a private yacht” and, from there, she could “say 
she lost her passport and obtain a new one, since she is a citizen of that country.” Id. at 9 (quoting 
Email, Ex. 13, ECF No. 28- 1). Olson’s attempts to recontextualize this email does not detract 
from the fact that it evidences that he knows how to flee. 

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In fact, Olson has himself considered using his Kittitian citizenship to overcome travel 
restrictions. In June 2020, he sought to go to France for business, but Covid restrictions prevented 
travel from the United States to the European Union, so he suggested traveling to France from 
SKN as a SKN citizen. Email, Ex. 12, ECF No. 28- 1 (“I have the option of coming in from St. 
Kitts and Nevis as a St. Kitts and Nevis citizen.”). He further suggested falsely claiming to French 
authorities that he resided in Ireland with an associate. Id. (“We would need to know how carefully 
they investigate our actual home or residence on landing. John a nd I could certainly ‘reside’ at 
Paul’s house in Dublin Ireland too, if that works.”). 
Rather than meaningfully fight these facts, Olson proposes renouncing his SKN citizenship 
upon release. Olson’s counsel represents that he has sought to facilitate Olson’s renunciation of 
his citizenship by contacting the Embassy of St. Kitts and Nevis, but he has received no 
acknowledgment in response. Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 12–13, ECF No. 112. Nevertheless, 
Olson believes he can renounce his citizenship by completing a single page application form, a 
letter stating his need to renounce with an offi cial supporting document, fees for the application 
and the certificate of renunciation, his certificate of citizenship, passport photos, and his St. 
Kitts/Nevis passport. Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 18, ECF No. 112-17). But he asserts that “assembling 
this documentation would be exceptionally difficult if not impossible while [he] is incarcerated.” 
Id. 
Although the Court does not doubt Olson’s counsel’s efforts, whether Olson should be 
released based on his promise to renounce his SKN citizenship comes down to a credibility 
determination. But his word alone simply does not carry much weight. Olson provides no time 
frame for how quickly he would be able to renounce is SKN citizenship and, given the evidence 
cutting against his trustworthiness, the Court cannot rely on any professed willingness to do so. 

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Ultimately, his SKN citizenship makes the possibility of fleeing a plausible reality—and this cuts 
squarely in favor of detention. See, e.g., United States v. Amar, 300 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (D.D.C. 
2018) (finding that a defendant who was a citizen of a country with which the United States had 
no extradition treaty had a “plausible destination to which to flee”); Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 
45 (finding that a defendant’s overseas assets and contacts in Vietnam, a country which maintained 
no extradition treaty with the United States, gave her the ability to evade capture). 
4. Defendant’s Health 
Pretrial release may be appropriate when a defendant explains “why his detention would 
prevent him from obtaining adequate treatment” for his medical conditions. United States v. 
Hodge, 820 F. Supp. 3d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2026) (quoting United States v. Rebollo- Andino, 312 F. 
App’x 346, 348 (1st Cir. 2009)). This Court has not previously addressed this issue because Olson 
did not raise his health concerns as a basis for reversing the magistrate’s decision to detain him. 
In his motion for reconsideration, Olson asserts that several unaddressed health issues have 
developed during, or have been exacerbated by, his time in custody. N amely, he states that he 
suffers from atrial fibrillation, an enlarged prostate, a hernia condition, bilateral knee osteoarthritis, 
and infections in his toes and teeth. Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 4–5, ECF No. 112. 
Beginning with the atrial fibrillation, Olson represents that he was diagnosed with this 
condition before his arrest, and that his symptoms—primarily the sensation of a repeatedly skipped 
and irregular heartbeat— have worsened and become more frequent while incarcerated. Id. at 5. 
He similarly states that he was diagnosed with an enlarged prostate before his incarceration began, 
and that this condition has worsened such that he is no longer able to urinate while standing up, is 
unable to void completely, and is in near-constant physical discomfort as a result. Id. His hernia 
apparently causes an obvious pointed protrusion of a portion of his stomach, visible upon physical 

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examination. Id . And he reports that his bilateral knee cartilage is turning into bone due to 
osteoarthritis, which affects his mobility and forces him to use a walker to get around. Id. As for 
infections, he reportedly has two infected toes and two infected teeth. Def.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 
136. To address these issues, Olson asserts that he “has filed well over a dozen reports regarding 
his need for medical care and attention,” but he alleges that “[h]is complaints have gone 
unanswered.” Def.’s Mot. for Recons. 5, ECF No. 112. 
The government, on the other hand, counters by arguing that the Northern Neck Regional 
Jail, where Olson is detained, is able to meet his medical needs. 
 
 
 
. And while Olson states that the prison requires him “to fill out a form in order to 
request medical treatment,” Def. ’s Mot. for Recons. at 4, ECF No. 112, 
 
 
. The records of his visits with medical staff, 
which span from May 13, 2025, to April 27, 2026, do not indicate that his health conditions have 
worsened during his time in prison such that they present new challenges to activities of daily 
living. 
In his reply, however, Olson casts doubt on the government’s portrayal of his health needs. 
In particular, he states that after he filed the present motion, he received referrals to a podiatrist, 
urologist, orthopedist, dentist and cardiologist, “[n]ot one of [which] has occurred.” Def.’s Reply 
at 3, ECF No. 136. 

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The Court takes seriously Olson’s health concerns, but his medical records do not indicate 
that his physical condition has drastically changed since his arrest. They do, however, reveal that 
he has received some treatment and testing for his most serious issues. For example, as Olson 
himself acknowledges, a doctor in May 2025 proscribed Flomax for his prostate condition. In 
addition, labs were recently taken to monitor Olson’s PSA and a prison physician gave him a 
referral to a urologist. Id. His recor ds further indicate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court does not discount the possibility that the prison has at times been slow to provide 
care or that the care provided is less robust relative to the options available outside the prison 
context. And the Court is mindful that the projected length of time until trial is not only long but 
also nebulous. Nevertheless, the weight of the other considerations discussed in this opinion 
marshal in favor of detention. 
D. Danger to the Community 
In the detention order, the Court recognized that while the danger-to-the-community factor 
has “minimal relevance” in cases where the government is requesting detention based on the risk 
of flight, see Bikundi , 47 F. Supp. 3d at 137, the fact that Olson has attempted to tamper with 
witnesses or otherwise impede the government’s investigation further supports his detention. As 

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at least one court has recognized, obstruction of justice constitutes a type of danger to the 
community. See United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
witness tampering in a white-collar case could support a finding of dangerousness under the 
§ 3142(g) factors). 
The government has produced excerpts of a conversation between Olson and a potential 
witness over Signal, an encrypted messaging application, in which Olson engaged in witness 
tampering. Gov’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 15, ECF No. 28-1. For example, he assisted in drafting a statement 
to be provided to the government. Id. (suggesting that the witness should say “in writing” that the 
“counterparty represented that he had the necessary fungible assets set aside and earmarked for the 
program to which he had committed w ith us and it was verified by our trusted staff in- country”). 
He suggested several times that the witness ask for immunity to “delay” the investigation . Id . 
(“[I]f you want to ‘delay’ things with the IRS, one way to do it is to have your lawyers state to 
them that you are ‘generally supportive’ which does not mean anything other than . . . ‘if you want 
to interview [my client], you must provide him immunity’ . . . . You really have to get a lawyer to 
call them and insist on immunity… it’s the only way to delay.”). He even implied that he would 
“[w]ithout question” make sure that the wi tness’s legal fees were paid . Id. Although Olson 
couched many of his statements by saying things like he was “in no way offering . . . any advice 
nor suggesting in any way that [the witness] thwart any efforts by DoJ in any way whatsoever,” 
these communications read as if Olson was attempting to influence the witness. Id. 
Relatedly, in an email to another potential witness , Olson suggested that a possible buyer 
of Theia’s assets would not want to work with those who cooperated with the investigation. Def.’s 
Opp’n, Ex. 14, ECF No. 28-1. Using suggestive language, Olson stated the buyer “will likely give 
opportunity to those who supported him closing and getting everyone paid,” while “[c]onversely” 

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those who make it “more difficult to keep [Theia’s] core team intact . . . would not be people [the 
buyer] would want to work with in the future.” Id. Though qualifying the message by emphasizing 
that its recipient should follow the advice of counsel, their conscience, and the law, Olson passively 
stated that “it would be suggested by some that those who get subpoenas from [the lead 
investigator] exercise their due process rights according to the best and proper way that preserves 
their potential future with all things that could become very posi tive.” Id. The Court views this 
communication as an obvious attempt to manipulate the potential witness. 
Olson offers no new information to explain away his attempts at witness tampering. While 
the Court does not consider this factor a wholly independent basis for its decision, these facts 
nonetheless weigh in favor of detention, as the Court previously held. 
* * * 
In sum, Olson has not presented new information warranting reopening his detention 
hearing. Meanwhile, the government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that 
pretrial detention continues to be appropriate based on the defendant’s flight risk. 
Accordingly, h aving reconsidered the evidence and arguments concerning Olson’s 
detention, the Court affirms its prior holding: “The scope of [ Olson’s] alleged fraudulent activity 
in connection with the charged offenses, the substantial period of incarceration that he faces if 
convicted, his unstable situation in Albuquerque and his alleged overseas ties, and his attempt at 
witness tampering, when consi dered together, favor pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(f)(2).” Mem. Op. at 11, ECF No. 30. Indee d, it continues to be true that no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(e)(1). 

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Olson shall remain in custody pending trial and his motion for 
reconsideration will be DENIED. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion 
shall issue. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date: ___ <.._/i..:....,, '{ ...... /_-z..G. __ 
Royce C. Lamberth 
United States District Judge 
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