govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_24-cv-01369-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
ALKEIN COATES., 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
D. KEISTLER, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No.: SAG-24-1369 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Alkein Coates, who is currently incarcerated at Jessup Correctional Institution (“ JCI”), 
brings this civil rights action against “D. Keistler,” 1 alleging excessive force. ECF No. 22 at 1-3. 
On October 17, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint or, in the alternative, 
for summary judgment in his favor. ECF No. 68. Coates filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 
70), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 71). The matter is now ripe and ready for review , and no 
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025) . For the reasons discussed below, 
Defendant’s Motion shall be granted. 
I. Background 
On September 20, 2024, Coates filed an Amended Complaint which named as a Defendant 
“D. Keistler,” later identified as defendant Jeffrey Kestler. ECF No. 31 at 5. Coates asserts that on 
December 4, 202 3, Kestler used excessive force by deploying mace ag ainst him without 
justification. Id.; ECF 59 at 1. 
 
1 The Court previously dismissed all claims and defendants except Coates’ assertion that “D. Keistler” sprayed him 
with mace “without justification.” See ECF No. 31 at 5; ECF No. 65 at 1-2. Defendant explains that no one named 
D. Keister is employed in the Division of Correction. The closest name of an employee is Jeffrey Kestler. ECF No. 
68-3 at 2, ¶ 5 (Wilkins Decl.). The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the name of Defendant as Jeffrey Kestler. 
Additionally, Coates initially asserted that the incident took place on December 4, 2022, but he later amended the 
incident date to December 4, 2023. ECF No. 65 at 1-2. 

2 
 
Defendant avers that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Coates failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this case. ECF No. 68-1 at 6-7. F. Todd 
Taylor, Jr., Director of the Incarcerated Individual Grievance Office (“IGO”), avers that Coates 
did not file any grievances with the IGO regarding the December 4, 2023, incident. ECF No. 68-4 
at 1, ¶ 4. 
Defendant further asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on Coates’s claim 
because there is no evidence of a use of force or serious incident involving Coates on December 
4, 2023, and he was not working on the day of the alleged incident because he was on sick leave. 
ECF No. 68-3 ¶¶ 3, 4, and 6; ECF 68- 3 at 3-4 (duty roster demonstrating Defendant was on sick 
leave on December 4, 2023). 
II. Standard of Review 
Defendant’s Motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in 
the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Motions styled in this manner 
implicate a court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011). 
Conversion of a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d) is permissible 
where plaintiff has “actual notice” that the motion may be disposed of as one for summary 
judgment. See Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260- 61 (4th Cir. 
1998). When a movant expressly captions its motion to dismiss “in the alternative” as one for 
summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the C ourt’s consideration, the 
parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the C ourt “does 
not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261. 
Because Defendant filed the M otion as a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for 
summary judgment, Coates was on notice that the Court could treat the motion as one for summary 

3 
 
judgment and rule on that basis. Coates responded to the Motion, and the Court will rule on 
Coates’s claim under the Rule 56(a) standard where appropriate. 
Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am ., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact 
is material if it ‘might affect the o utcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Id . (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Accordingly, “the mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported 
motion for summary judgment[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). A court 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 
U.S. 650, 656- 57 (2014) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted), and draw all reasonable 
inferences in that party’s favor, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citations omitted); see 
also Jacobs v. NC. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015). At the same 
time, the court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” 
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt 
v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
The Court is mindful, however, that Coates is a self-represented litigant. A federal court 
must liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants to allow them to fully develop potentially 
meritorious cases. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But liberal construction does 
not mean a court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim. 
See Weller v. Department of Social Services , 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). A court cannot 
assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

4 
 
III. Analysis 
Defendant raises the affirmative defense that Coates failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies. ECF No. 68- 1. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in pertinent 
part: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, 
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correcti onal facility 
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained 
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probat ion, pretrial release, or 
diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all 
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, 
and whether they allege excessive fo rce or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516, 
532 (2002); see also Chase v. Peay , 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d , 98 F. App’x 
253 (4th Cir. 2004). 
The doctrine governing exhaustion of administrative remedies has been well established 
through administrative law jurisprudence. It provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief 
until the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 
88-89 (2006). Therefore, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this Court. 
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007). In other words, exhaustion is mandatory, and a court 
ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016) (citing 
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he mandatory ‘shall’… normally 
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”) (alteration in original)). 
However, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement 
and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. Rather, the failure to 

5 
 
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants. 
See Bock, 549 U.S. at 215-216; Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th 
Cir. 2005). 
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement serves several purposes. These include “allowing a 
prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, 
reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation 
that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Bock, 549 U.S. at 219; see also 
Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that exhaustion provides prison 
officials with the opportunity to re spond to a complaint through proper use of administrative 
remedies). It is designed so that prisoners “pursue administrative grievances until they receive a 
final denial of their claim[s], appealing through all available stages in the administrative process” 
so that the agency reaches a decision on the merits. Chase, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 530; see also Gibbs 
v. Bureau of Prisons , 986 F. Supp. 941, 943- 44 (D. Md. 1997) (dismissing a federal prisoner’s 
lawsuit for failure to exhaust where he did not appeal his administrative claim through all four 
stages of the BOP’s grievance process); Booth v. Churner , 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming 
dismissal of prisoner’s claim for failure to exhaust where he “never sought intermediate or final 
administrative review after prison authority denied relief”); see also Griffin v. Bryant , 456 F.4th 
328 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing PLRA’s “strict” requirement to exhaust all available 
administrative remedies”). 
Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. Moore, 517 F.3d at 725, 729; see Langford v. Couch, 50 F. Supp. 2d 
544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The … PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion is now 
mandatory.”). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in 
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines …. ” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 

6 
 
88. This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using 
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues 
on the merits).’” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024). But the court is “obligated to ensure 
that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not procured from the action or inaction of 
prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell , 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see also 
Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that “the inmate cannot be required to 
exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials prevent inmates from using the 
administrative process”). 
The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) has an 
established “administrative remedy procedure” (“ARP”) for use by Maryland State prisoners for 
“inmate complaint resolution.” See generally Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. (“C.S.”), § 10-201 et 
seq.; Md. Code Regs. (“COMAR”) 12.07.01B(1) (defining ARP). The grievance procedure applies 
to the submission of a “grievance against an official or employee of the Division of Correction 
[DOC] ….” C.S. § 10-206(a). Regulations promulgated by DPSCS concerning the ARP process 
define a “grievance” to include a “complaint of any individual in the custody of the [DOC] against 
any officials or employees of the [DOC] arising from the circumstances of custody or 
confinement.” COMAR 12.07.01.01(B)(7). To pursue a grievance, a prisoner confined in a 
Maryland prison may file a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”) against any DOC 
official or employee. See C.S. § 10-206(a). When the ARP process provides a possible remedy, 
it must be followed and completed before an inmate may file a grievance with the IGO. However, 
if the prison has a grievance procedure that is approved by the IGO, the prisoner must first follow 
the institutional ARP process before filing a grievance with the IGO. See C.S. § 10-206(b). 
The ARP process consists of multiple steps. For the first step, a prisoner is required to file 
his initial ARP request with his facility’s “managing official,” COMAR 12.02.28.05(D)(1), which 

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is defined by COMAR 12.02.28.02(B)(14) as “the warden or other individual responsible for 
management of the correctional facility” and defined under C.S. § 1-101(m) “as the administrator, 
director, warden, superintendent, sheriff, or other individual responsible for the management of a 
correctional facility.” Moreover, the ARP request must be filed within 30 days of the date on 
which the incident occurred, or within 30 days of the date the prisoner first gained knowledge of 
the incident or injury giving rise to the complaint, whichever is later. COMAR 12.02.28.09(B). 
The second step in the ARP process occurs if the managing official denies a prisoner’s 
initial ARP or fails to respond to the ARP within the established time frame. The prisoner has 30 
days to file an appeal to the Commissioner of Correction. COMAR 12.02.28.14(B)(5). 
If the Commissioner of Correction denies an appeal, the prisoner has 30 days to file a 
grievance with the IGO. COMAR 12.02.28.18; C.S. § 10- 206(a); COMAR 12.07.01.05(B).
2 
When filing with the IGO, a prisoner is required to include copies of the following: the initial 
request for administrative remedy, the warden’s response to that request, a copy of the ARP appeal 
filed with the Commissioner of Correction, and a copy of the Commissioner’s response. COMAR 
12.07.01.04(B)(9)(a). 
If the grievance is determined to be “wholly lacking in merit on its face,” the IGO may 
dismiss it “without a hearing ….” C.S. § 10- 207(b)(1); see also COMAR 12.07.01.06(B). An 
order of dismissal constitutes the final decision of the Secretary of DPSCS for purposes of judicial 
review. C.S. § 10-207(b)(2)(ii). However, if a hearing is deemed necessary by the IGO, the hearing 
is conducted by an administrative law judge with the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings. 
See C.S. § 10-208; COMAR 12.07.01.07–.08. The conduct of such hearings is governed by statute. 
See C.S. § 10-208; COMAR 12.07.01.07(D); see also Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t, § 10-206(a)(1). 
 
2 If the Commissioner fails to respond, the grievant shall file an appeal within 30 days of the date the response was 
due. COMAR 12.07.01.05(B)(2). 

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A decision of the administrative law judge denying all relief to the inmate is considered a 
final agency determination. C.S. § 10-209(b)(1)(ii); COMAR 12.07.01.10(A)(2). However, if the 
ALJ concludes that the inmate’s complaint is wholly or partly meritorious, the decision constitutes 
a recommendation to the Secretary of DPSCS, who must make a final agency determination within 
fifteen days after receipt of the proposed decision of the administrative law judge. See C.S. §§ 10- 
209(b)(2), (c); COMAR 12.07.01.10(B). 
The statute provides for judicial review. C.S. § 10-210. But “[a] court may not consider 
an individual’s grievance that is within the jurisdiction of the [Inmate Grievance] Office or the 
Office of Administrative Hearings unless the individual has exhausted the remedies provided” in 
C.S. §§ 10-201 through 10-210. 
In support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant provides the Declaration of F. Todd Taylor, 
Executive Director of the IGO, aver ring that Coates did not file an y grievances with the IGO in 
2023 or 2024, which could have timely addressed the matters asserted in the instant complaint. 
ECF No. 68- 4 at 1, ¶ 4. Exhaustion is excused “if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was 
prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Coates, however, must show that 
administrative remedies were not available. Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed. App'x 660, 663 (4th Cir. 
2011); Stohl v. Eastern Reg'l Jail, No. 1:14-cv-109, 2015 WL 5304135, at *7 (N.D.W. Va. Sep. 8, 
2015) (granting motion to dismiss and refusing to credit conclusory allegation that grievances were 
discarded). In his response in opposition, Coates asserts that he was “deprived of remedy process” 
but solely claims he was “deprived of food, water and other necessities.” ECF No. 71 at 1. He 
offers no explanation, sworn statements, or other evidence describing how he was deprived of an 
opportunity to file a grievance about the incident during the 30-day window after it occurred. 
Because Coates failed to rebut Defendant’s evidence that he did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies prior to filing this case, and because he has failed to demonstrate that 

9 
 
remedies were not available to him, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant ’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment is granted.3 The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 
A separate Order follows. 
 
Dated: 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Stephanie A. Gallagher 
 United States District Judge 
 
3 As Coates failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court need not address Defendant’s remaining arguments 
regarding his presence at the facility on December 4, 2023. 
June 15, 2026
/s/

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