govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-24196-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
Case No. 25-cv-24196-BLOOM/D’Angelo  
 
M.O. and A.O., minor children, 
by and through their Guardian 
of the Property, ANTHONY  
ROMANO JR., 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
CITRUS HEALTH NETWORK, INC., d/b/a 
CITRUS FAMILY CARE NETWORK; 
FAMILY RESOURCE CENTER OF SOUTH 
FLORIDA, INC.; FLORIDA DEPARTMENT, 
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; 
KENYA NEELY, individually; 
MARTA TORRES, individually; 
ANTHONY CARVALHO, individually; 
NATALIE GREEN, individually; 
ANTIWONESHA JOHNSON, individually; 
MYRLANDE BREEDLOVE, individually; 
SANALEE MEIKLE, individually; 
MARLENE BAPTISTE, individually; and 
SONIA BROOKS, individually, 
 
 Defendants. 
_________________________/ 
 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon (i) Defendant Florida Department of Children and 
Families’ (“DCF”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [22], (ii) Defendants Marlene Baptiste and Sonia 
Brooks’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. [36], (iii) Defendants 
Family Resource Center o f South Florida, Inc. (“FRC”), Natalie Green, Antiwonesha Johnson, 
Myrlande Breedlove, and Sanalee Meikle’s (the “FRC Defendants”) Joint Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. [39], and (iv) Defendants Citrus Health Network, Inc., 
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d/b/a Citrus Family Care Network (“CFCN”), Kenya Neely, Marta Torres, and Anthony 
Carvalho’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. [40]. 
The Court referred the Motions to D ismiss to Magistrate Judge Ellen D’Angelo for a 
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). ECF No s. [ 28], [37], [41], and [42]. Judge D’Angelo 
issued her Report and Recommen dation, ECF No. [ 77], to which the parties filed the following 
timely submissions: 
1. Objections by CFCN, Neely, Torres, and Carvalho, ECF No. [86];  Response by M.O. 
and A.O., ECF No. [92]; 
2. Objections by the FRC Defendants, ECF No. [87];  Response by Plaintiffs, ECF No. 
[93]; 
3. Objections by Baptiste, ECF No. [88]; Response by M.O., ECF No. [91]; and 
4. Objections by M.O., ECF No. [89]; Response by Brooks, ECF No. [90]. 
For the reasons that follow, the Report and Recommendation is adopted in part and rejected 
in part. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that DCF is the state agency charged with 
ensuring the health, welfare, and safety of children in state custody; operating and overseeing the 
foster care system; performing all child protective investigations; providing substitute care services 
to children; and licensing, relicensing, and monitoring foster homes in Miami-Dade County. ECF 
No. [1- 3] ¶ 17. Defendants Baptiste and Brooks were Child Protective Investigators (“CPI”) 
employed by DCF. Id. ¶¶ 39, 43. CFCN is a private, non- governmental Florida corporation that 
acts as the lead agency for community-based care in Miami-Dade County. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11. Defendant 
FRC is a private, non- governmental Florida corporation that contracted with CFCN to provide 
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services related to foster care, including case management services to children in the custody of 
the State of Florida. Id.  ¶ 14. Defendant Green was a Case Manager Supervisor with FRC, and 
Defendant Johnson was a Case Manager and Case Manager Supervisor with FRC. Id.  ¶¶ 27, 30. 
Defendants Breedlove and Meikle were FRC Case Managers. Id. ¶¶ 26, 33. 
DCF and CFCN had a contractual relationship pursuant to which CFCN provided foster 
care services, including ensuring safe and appropriate placement of foster children, licensure and 
re-licensure of foster homes, supervising foster homes, and ensuring the h ealth and safety of all 
foster children in its care. Id . Defendant Neely was a Placement Specialist employed by CFCN. 
Id. ¶ 18. Defendant Torres was CFCN’s Director of Licensing and Placement. Id. ¶ 21. Defendant 
Carvalho was a Foster Parent Liaison with CFCN. Id. ¶ 24.  
Plaintiffs M.O. and A.O. were minor children with disabilities, including autism, who 
resided in Miami-Dade County and were placed in foster care. Id. ¶¶ 4–9, 47. Plaintiffs allege that 
as early as 2018, DCF and FRC were put on notice of deficiencies within the Southern Region 
system of foster care, due to a class action lawsuit. Id. ¶ 55. In 2019, when CFCN became the lead 
agency for foster care in the Southern Region, CFCN knew of the deficiencies within its own 
system of care. Id.  ¶ 56. In March 2019, the class action settled , requiring that the identified 
deficiencies be remedied; DCF, CFCN, and FRC knew that a Settlement Agreement was reached 
in the Class Action. Id. ¶ 57. Still, at the time of Plaintiffs’ placement in foster care, DCF, CFCN, 
and FRC had failed to remedy the identified deficiencies, resulting in harm to children, including 
Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 58. 
On April 20, 2022, DCF removed Plaintiffs from their biological parents due to concerns 
for the mother’s temporary mental health condition and the father’s early onset Alzheimer’s 
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disease. Id. ¶ 47. DCF assigned the case to CFCN to provide foster care and related services, and 
CFCN assigned FRC to provide management services. Id. ¶¶ 48, 49. 
In the process of identifying an appropriate placement, DCF, CFCN, FRC, Neely, Torres, 
Green, and Jonhson knew or should have known several facts about M.O., specifically  regarding 
her disabilities, support needs, and need for a specialized placement. Id. ¶¶ 52, 53. Similarly, DCF, 
CFCN, FRC, Neely, Torres, Green, and Jonhson knew or should have known several facts about 
A.O., specifically regarding her disabilities, support needs, and need for specialized placement. Id. 
¶ 54. 
Notwithstanding these needs, DCF, CFCN, and Neely improperly recorded M.O. as 
effectively needing very little support. Id. ¶ 59. Furthermore, DCF, CFCN, FRC, Neely, and Green 
determined that Plaintiffs ought to be placed in a traditional foster home —the lowest level of 
licensed home with no specialized training. Id.  ¶ 61. Thus, CFCN, FRC, DCF, Neely, and Green 
determined Plaintiffs could be placed at Jerry Jones’ home. Id . This placement came 
notwithstanding DCF and CFCN’s knowledge about the following allegations regarding Jones: 
• She had been the subject of multiple abuse reports, domestic disturbance incidents, 
and investigations, id. ¶¶ 62, 64; 
• She had made statements on her licensing paperwork about beating a child as a 
discipline tactic and never dealing with a child with behavioral disabilities or 
challenges, id.;  
• She had erratic behavior and severe mood swings, id.; 
• She had a previous foster child removed from her home due to verbal abuse, id. ¶ 
64(i);  
• Two prior foster children ran away from her home, id.; and 
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• Law enforcement had responded to her home seven times since it was relicensed, 
and Jones had requested the removal of at least two children from the home, id. 
Furthermore, at the time of the placement, CFCN, Neely, and Torres knew or should have 
known that Jones was a single parent, worked full time, was fostering three children—one of whom 
was developmentally delayed—and had an open abuse report, the third abuse report against Jones 
since her initial licensure. Id. ¶ 66. The day after Plaintiffs were placed in Jones’ home, DCF and 
CFCN put a placement hold on Jones due to the open abuse report that was received before 
Plaintiffs’ placement. Id. ¶ 77. 
Following Plaintiffs’ placement, CFCN, FRC, and Johnson knew Plaintiffs were not 
receiving their required therapies in Jones’ care. Id. ¶¶ 94–95. As of June 2022, CFCN, Carvalho, 
and Torres knew that Jones demanded a higher rate for fostering Plaintiffs, was complaining about 
M.O.’s needs and disabilities, and advised that she had provided notice for removal of M.O. but 
was willing to kee p A.O. Id.  ¶ 100. Even so, CFCN, Carvalho, and Torres allowed Plaintiffs to 
stay with Jones. Id. ¶ 101.  
In August 2022, FRC assigned Breedlove as the next Case Manager. Id. ¶ 112. At that time, 
Breedlove knew or should have known about M.O.’s extensive special needs, necessary therapies, 
and required medical services. Id. ¶ 113. That same month, CFCN, Carvalho, FRC, and Breedlove 
felt that Plaintiffs needed to be removed from the Jones home within thirty days; notwithstanding 
this, Plaintiffs were not removed. Id. ¶ 114. 
Then, in September 2022, as CFCN, FRC, Breedlove, and Johnson knew or should have 
known, M.O.’s therapist reported that M.O.’s weight loss over the four months spent in the Jones 
home should be assessed, along with other deficits in M.O.’s skills and functioning. Id. ¶ 125. That 
same month, A.O.’s medically necessary services stopped completely. Id. ¶ 126.  
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In October 2022, DCF, FRC, Breedlove, and Johnson inaccurately reported to the court 
that M.O. was consistently receiving her necessary services, there were no  health concerns for 
M.O. after her last medical visit in April 2022, and M.O. and A.O. had not changed schools. Id. ¶ 
127. They also reaffirmed the appropriateness of continued placement in Jones’ home. Id. 
In November 2022, A.O. was discharged from her in- person therapy services due to her 
lack of attendance, which FRC, Meikle, Green, and CFCN knew or should have known. Id. ¶ 131. 
During a staffing meeting one day later, FRC, Meikle, Green, CFCN, Carvalho, and Torres 
discussed Plaintiffs not attending their required medical therapies and created a plan with Jones to 
coordinate transporting Plaintiffs to their appointments. Id. ¶ 132. Still, after this meeting, Jones 
refused to transport Plaintiffs to their ap pointments, and FRC, Meikle, Green, CFCN, Carvalho, 
and Torres allowed Plaintiffs to remain in her care. Id. 
Sometime before the end of 2022, CFCN and DCF became aware of a fourth abuse report 
against Jones, alleging mental injury of a child in her care; DCF closed the investigation with “not 
substantiated” findings. Id. ¶ 133.  
Between November 2022 and January 2023, CFCN, Carvalho, Torres, FRC, Meikle, and 
Green knew or should have known the following: 
• M.O. was observed with bruises and was losing her hair; 
• A.O. was refusing to visit her mother; 
• A.O. was making allegations against her mother consistent with allegations by 
Jones that her mother was sexually assaulting Plaintiffs; 
• M.O.’s behavioral services had stopped; and  
• A.O.’s services had terminated. 
Id. ¶ 134. 
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 In January 2023, as CFCN, Carvalho, Torres, FRC, Meikle, and Green knew or should 
have known, when Meikle responded to the Jones home for a visit, an unknown male opened the 
gate, the children were alone in the home, and Meikle observed Jones go into an R V on the side 
of the home where two unknown males —identified by Jones as her “backup” caregivers — were 
living. Id. ¶ 135. At this time, A.O had a bruise on her shoulder, and M.O. had an unexplained 
bruise and scar on her eye. Id.  
 Also in January 2023, CFCN, FRC, MEIKLE, and GREEN knew or should have known 
that A.O.’s ABA provider expressed difficulty providing services to A.O. due to instability and 
non-compliance with the schedule by Jones, A.O. had announced that she no longer wished to 
receive therapy, the ABA provider was not permitted to meet Jones or go to Jones’ home, and the 
ABA provided did not know where A.O. lived or who was in charge of her. Id. ¶ 136. At that time, 
A.O.’s physical condition had deteriorated, and A.O. had developed a bad temper and appeared to 
be isolating herself from anyone who knew her prior to foster care. Id.  
 In January and February 2023, CFCN, FRC, MEIKLE, and GREEN knew or should have 
known that M.O.’s ABA provider expressed similar concerns, conveying that since M.O.’s 
placement in foster care, (i) M.O. did not have any services for the first half of January, (ii) M.O. 
only received ABA services on two days in January, (iii) M.O. appeared dirty w ith poor hygiene 
and cried a lot, (iv) M.O. suffered significant weight loss, and (v) M.O.’s ABA services were only 
provided twelve out of the twenty-five hours she was allotted in February 2023. Id. ¶ 137. 
In March 2023, DCF, FRC, Meikle, and Green submitted another report to the court, again 
indicating that M.O. was in good health, that M.O. was consistently engaging in her medical 
services and therapies, and that placement in Jones’ home was appropriate. Id. ¶ 138. CFCN, FRC, 
Meikle, and Green knew that on March 29, 2023, M.O. had a neuropsychological evaluation 
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recommending that she undergo in- home therapies, that Jones learn to implement behavior 
strategies to support M.O., that M.O.’s team consult with a speech and language therapist, and that 
M.O. continue her therapies. Id. ¶ 140. Though CFCN, FRC, Meikle, and Green were required to 
comply with this evaluation, they failed to do so. Id. ¶ 141. 
Similarly, in April 2023, CFCN, FRC, Meikle, and Green failed to comply with nearly all 
the recommendations arising from A.O.’s neuropsychological evaluation in April 2023. Id.  ¶¶ 
143–44. They also knew that M.O. arrived at a supervised visit with her mother with an 
unexplained bruise on the left side of her face. Id. ¶ 146. 
In May 2023, an abuse report was received on behalf of M.O.—the fifth abuse report 
regarding a child in Jones’s care— alleging that M.O. was screaming for help at school and had a 
mark on the right side of her face near her ears. Id. ¶ 147. Baptiste, who served as a CPI for DCF, 
began an investigation, meeting with one of M.O.’s teachers. Id. ¶ 148. However, Baptiste did not 
speak with the teacher who saw the bruises, did not go to the Jones home, did not interview Jones, 
did not interview any of the other foster children in Jones’ home, and did not make any other 
attempt that day to learn how M.O. sustained her injuries. Id. The next day, CFCN, FRC, Meikle, 
Green, DCF, and Baptiste knew that another abuse report—the sixth abuse report  regarding a child 
in Jones’s care— was received, alleging M.O. was observed with bruises on both sides of her face 
on the cheek area and in front of her ear, and her left eye looked swollen. Id. ¶ 149. 
Two days after observing the bruises on M.O.’s face, Baptiste contacted the Child 
Protection Team (“CPT”) as part of a mandatory referral. Id. ¶ 151. Still, when CPT asked if any 
injuries were observed, Baptiste did not respond. Id. The next day, Baptiste went to the Jones home 
and interviewed Jones, who stated she did not know how M.O. was injured and indicated the “DCF 
should investigate the mother.” Id. ¶ 152. The day after that, CPT examined M.O., noting her 
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injuries and low body weight of 83 pounds and concluding that M.O. had been a victim of physical 
abuse. Id. ¶ 153. Still, DCF and Baptist took no further investigative action, and CFCN, FRC, 
Meikle, Green, DCF, and Baptiste allowed M.O. to return to the Jones home. Id.  
Later in May, after conducting a specialized interview of Jones, CPT again concluded that 
M.O. had been the victim of physical abuse and that M.O. and A.O. should be monitored for their 
safety in Jones’ care. Id. ¶ 155. Again, CFCN, FRC, Meikle, Green, DCF, and Baptiste allowed 
M.O. to return to Jones’ home. Id. A week later, at a court hearing, FRC and DCF failed to inform 
the court of the pattern of unexplained injuries, the two open abuse reports, that neither Plaintiff 
was receiving their therapies, or that Plaintiffs required specialized placement. Id. ¶ 157. 
In June 2023, CFCN, Carvalho, FRC, Meikle, and Green knew that M.O. had an 
unexplained black eye and looked disheveled when FRC picked up M.O. to transport her to a 
supervised visit with her mother. Id.  ¶ 160. M.O. was transported to the hospital, where doctors 
determined that M.O.’s eye injury was the result of “a direct blow.” Id. Still, upon M.O.’s discharge 
from the hospital, FRC, Meikle, Green, CFCN, and Carvalho allowed M.O. to return to the Jones 
home. Id. That same day, CFCN, FRC, DCF, Meikle, Green, and Baptiste knew another abuse 
report—the seventh abuse report regarding a child in Jones’s care —was received on behalf of 
M.O. alleging she had another unexplained bruise on her left eye. Id. ¶ 161. The next day, FRC, 
Meikle, and Green submitted a request to CFCN to change Plaintiffs’ placement due to the abuse 
reports; still, FRC, Meikle, Green, CFCN, Carvalho, and Torres failed to immediately remove 
Plaintiffs from the Jones home. Id. ¶ 163. 
Later in June 2023, Baptiste acknowledged receiving the CPT reports concluding M.O. had 
been physically abused. Id. ¶ 165. Baptiste spoke with FRC and Meikle about M.O.’s black eye, 
interviewed other foster children who reported that M.O. bruises herself by running without paying 
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attention, and determined that the perpetrator of M.O.’s injuries was “unknown,” finding no 
impending danger or threats to M.O. Id. ¶ 166. DCF and Baptiste later closed all three open abuse 
reports of physical injury as “not substantiated.” Id. ¶ 167.  
In July 2023, DCF relicensed Jones as a traditional foster parent. Id. ¶ 171. The next week, 
FRC, Meikle, and Green knew that when M.O. arrived at FRC for a supervised visit with her 
mother, she had marks, bruises, and scratches on her face and body, and when asked what 
happened to her face, M.O. began to cry. Id. ¶ 172. FRC and M.O.’s mother observed more bruises 
on M.O.’s arms, legs, and back, with M.O. being unable to explain how she sustained those 
injuries. Id. Another abuse report was received on beha lf of M.O.—the eighth such report 
regarding a child in Jones’ care and the fourth regarding M.O. specifically—this time alleging a 
two inch bruise on M.O.’s thorax, an inch-long bruise on her arm, and bruises to her knees; CFCN, 
DFC, Meikle, Green, and Brooks knew of this report. Id. ¶ 173.  
Brooks, a CPI employed by DCF, began an investigation the next day. Id.  ¶ 175. Brooks 
(i) contacted M.O.’s mother, who confirmed observing the marks during a supervised visit, (ii) 
interviewed Jones, who was unaware of M.O.’s injuries, (iii) met with M.O. and took photos of 
some of the injuries, (iv) completed a Risk Assessme nt determining that M.O. was at moderate 
risk of future abuse, and (v) contacted CPT, sending black and white photos, but later failing to 
respond so that M.O. could be examined by professionals. Id.  
Two days later, CFCN, FRC, DCF, Meikle, Green, Carvalho, Torres, and Brooks knew 
about a fifth abuse report regarding unexplained injuries to M.O.—the ninth abuse report regarding 
a child in Jones’s care — alleging M.O. had fresh bruises all over her buttocks, three weeks ago 
M.O. had a bruise that appeared to be a black eye, the bruises are not consistent with the story 
being told, Jones had consistently been cutting M.O.’s hair without permission, and M.O. was 
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observed as constantly hungry. Id. ¶ 179. Due to her injuries, M.O. was transported to the hospital 
and admitted for 36 days due to bilateral bruising, a pressure ulcer, a distended abdomen (she was 
emaciated and weighed only 77 pounds), and being at severe risk for cardiovascular compromise. 
Id. ¶ 182. M.O. was diagnosed with nonaccidental trauma, physical abuse, and failure to thrive. 
Id. Three days later, DCF, FRC, and Green submitted a status report notifying the court for the 
first time of the serious abuse reports and unexplained injuries to M.O. since May 2023. Id. ¶ 185.  
In late August 2023, M.O. was discharged from the hospital and placed in a new foster 
home. Id. ¶ 187.  A week later, M.O. was placed on an extended visit with her mother. Id. ¶ 188. 
In September 2023, DCF and Brooks closed the abuse reports with verified findings of 
failure to protect, inadequate supervision, medical neglect, and substance misuse, and no indicators 
of physical injury. Id. ¶ 189. On September 10, 2023, DCF received another abuse report —the 
tenth abuse report regarding a child in Jones’s care—alleging abuse and neglect of both A.O. and 
M.O., which was closed with verified findings of inadequate supervision. Id. ¶ 191. 
In January 2024, A.O. was reunified with her mother, and Plaintiffs remain at home with 
their parents. Id. ¶¶ 193–94.  
Plaintiffs filed the first  Complaint on July 14, 2025 in state court. ECF No. [1] at 2. On 
September 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint, alleging negligence, culpable 
negligence, and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CFCN and FRC; negligence against DCF; 
and § 1983 claims against Defendants Neely, Torres, Carvalho, Green, Johnson, Breedlove, 
Meikle, Baptiste, and Brooks. See generally ECF No. [1-3]. On September 15, 2025, Defendants 
removed this case and thereafter filed the instant Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. [22], [36], [39], 
and [40]. 
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The Court referred th e Motions to Dismiss to Magistrate Judge Ellen D’Angelo for a 
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). ECF Nos. [28], [37], [41], and [42]. Judge D’Angelo 
issued her Report and Recommendation, ECF No. [77], to which four O bjections were received, 
ECF Nos. [86], [87], [88], [89]. T he Court recites Judge D’Angelo’s findings as  appropriate in 
addressing the parties’ Objections. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
In reviewing a report and recommendation, the district court may accept, reject, or modify, 
in whole or in part, a magistrate judge ’s recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “In order to 
challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, a party must file written 
objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and 
recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, 
Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted) (quoting Heath v. Jones , 863 
F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989)). The objections must also present “supporting legal authority.” 
S.D. Fla. L. Mag. J.R. 4(b). The portions of the report and recommendation to which an objection 
is made are reviewed de novo only if those objections “pinpoint the specific findings that the party 
disagrees with.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 72(b)(3). If a party fails to object to any portion of the magistrate judge’s report, those 
portions are reviewed for clear error. Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. 
Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Liberty Am. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. WestPoint 
Underwriters, L.L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
“It is improper for an objecting party to  . . . [submit] papers to a district court which are 
nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers 
submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the 
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apple’ when they file objections to a R & R.” Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 
WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors -Rate Emps. 
Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. Objections by CFCN, Neely, Torres, and Carvalho (the “Citrus Defendants”) 
i. State Actor 
In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found that “Plaintiffs’ allegations 
show state action on behalf of FRC and Citrus Defendants under the public function test.” ECF 
No. [77] at 39. Judge D’Angelo explained that the relevant statutes demonstrated that “[e]ven 
though the Florida Legislature outsourced part of the foster care services to community- based 
agencies, . . . the State retains responsibility for the quality of contracted services and programs, 
and the State ensures the services are deli vered in accordance with the law.” Id. at 40. Thus, 
multiple courts have found community-based agencies that provide foster care services in Florida 
to be state actors under the public function test. Id. (collecting cases). 
In their Objection, the Citrus Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint does not 
allege sufficient factual support for this finding. ECF No. [86] at 2. Specifically, the Citrus 
Defendants point out that while the statutory scheme makes clear that foster care services were 
traditionally performed by the state, it does not state that these services were exclusively performed 
by the state, as would be required to show state action. Id.  at 6. By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit 
has indicated in the most closely analogous case that foster parenting is not traditionally or 
exclusively a state function. Id.  at 7 (citing Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue , 241 F.3d 1341, 
1347 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
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Plaintiffs respond that highly persuasive legal authority supports a finding that the Citrus 
Defendants are state actors for § 1983 purposes. ECF No. [92] at 4 (collecting cases). The statutory 
framework makes clear that privatization of the child welfare system does not change that the state 
is ultimately responsible for ensuring appropriate care for children. Id. at 5. 
As an initial matter, the Court finds the Citrus Defendants’ argument to be a mere rehashing 
of the arguments made in their Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, the Citrus Defendants cite to the same 
case law cited in their Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. [40] at 7 (citing Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn, 241 
F.3d 1341). In this regard, this Objection is an  inappropriate argument to raise in response to a 
report and recommendation. Marlite, Inc., 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (quoting Camardo, 806 F. 
Supp. at 382).  
However, even on the merits, the Citrus Defendants’ argument fails. Contrary to the Citrus 
Defendants’ assertion, Rayburn does not control, as it dealt exclusively with foster parents, as 
opposed to foster care agencies. Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn, 241 F.3d 1341. As the Eleventh Circuit 
has not addressed the issue , the Court begins by looking to other circuits. The Sixth Circuit  has 
held that a nominally private foster care agency could be deemed a state actor based on the close 
nexus between its actions and t he regulatory scheme behind the actions. Brent v. Wayne Cnty. 
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 677 (6th Cir. 2018). Similarly, in Perez v. Sugarman, the 
Second Circuit held that private child- caring institutions could be state actors where the state 
statutory scheme made clear that the state was “responsible for the welfare of children.” 499 F.2d 
761, 765 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). And the Fourth Circuit has indicated, in the context of 
a private foster care services organization, that “the stat e’s delegation of an affirmative 
constitutional duty to [the organization’s] employees may give rise to liability under § 1983.” 
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E.R.L. by & through Doe v. Adoption Advoc., Inc., No. 21- 1980, 2023 WL 1990300, at *3 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 14, 2023) 
By contrast, the First Circuit has held that “child care and placement is not traditionally the 
exclusive prerogative of the state.” Malachowski v. City of Keene , 787 F.2d 704, 711 (1st Cir. 
1986) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has similarly indicated that private corporations that 
were “awarded a social services contract by DCF” were not state actors for § 1983 purposes. 
Schwab v. Kansas Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 851 F. App’x 110, 118 (10th Cir. 2021).  
The Fifth Circuit declined to “opine on whether, if applying the public function test, a 
private child placement agency could be considered a state actor with respect to the foster child 
placement decisions it makes pursuant to a contractual relationship wi th a state.” Hall v. Smith , 
497 F. App’x 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 
Under the facts as alleged, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged state action. 
The statutory scheme indicates: 
The Legislature finds that when private entities assume responsibility for the care 
of children in the child protection and child welfare system, comprehensive 
oversight of the programmatic, administrative, and fiscal operation of those entities 
is essential. The Legislature further finds that the appropriate care of children is 
ultimately the responsibility of the state and that outsourcing such care does not 
relieve the state of its responsibility to ensure that appropriate care is provided. 
Fla. Stat. § 409.986(b).  
Similarly, another section explains, “The Legislature finds that the state has traditionally 
provided foster care services to children who are the responsibility of the state.” Fla. Stat. § 
409.993. When these services are outsourced, “[t]he department shall retain responsibility for the 
quality of contracted services and programs and shall ensure that services are delivered in 
accordance with applicable federal and state statutes and regulations.” Fla. Stat. § 409.25575(2). 
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 Combined, those statutory statements render this case highly analogous to Brent and Perez. 
In Brent, the c ourt’s finding of state action largely depended on the state’s “constitutional 
obligations” to ensure proper care of children. Brent, 901 F.3d at 677. The court  found that 
delegating to a private agency the following responsibilities rendered that private agency a state 
actor for § 1983 purposes: supervising foster placements, making recommendations to the court 
regarding the children’s care and custody, overseeing family visits, developing service plans, and 
providing counseling services to the children. Id. In Perez— a decision which the Second Circuit 
later re-affirmed in Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977)—the Second Circuit relied 
upon the New York statute providing that government officials “shall be responsible for the 
welfare of children who are in need of public assistance and care, support and protection” but 
permitting such officials to act “through an authorized agency.” Perez, 499 F.2d at 765 (citations 
omitted).  
 Here, Plaintiffs allege that CFCN “contracted with [DCF] . . . as an independent contractor 
to provide foster care and related services to children in the custody of the State of Florida, 
including M.O. and A.O.” ECF No. [1-3] ¶ 10. Furthermore, CFCN was responsible for, inter alia, 
licensure and re-licensure of foster homes, providing supervision and monitoring of foster homes, 
and ensuring appropriate placement of foster children. Id. ¶ 11. CFCN played a role in “identifying 
the most appropriate placement able to meet [Plaintiffs’] needs.” Id. ¶ 52. The placement decision 
for Plaintiffs was made with DCF and CFCN and its employees, with CFCN specifically approving 
the placement and determining the board rate to be paid to Jones. Id.  ¶¶ 61, 68. CFCN and DCF 
participated in joint staffing meetings with DCF to address abuse reports against Jones and Jones’ 
broader handling of the children. Id. ¶¶ 64(b), 87.  
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 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged state action by CFCN and its 
employees. The state expressly situates itself as the primary responsible party and outsources 
decisive functions to a private actor. That is sufficient to find state action, though not necessarily 
directly under the “public function” test. Instead, the finding of state action rests on a closely-
related theory identified by the Supreme Court : that a private actor “may, under certain 
circumstances, be deemed a state actor when  the government has outsourced one of its 
constitutional obligations to a private entity.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck , 139 S. 
Ct. 1921, 1929 n.1 (2019) (citing West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988)). The Eleventh Circuit 
has indicated that, in light of a foster child’s substantive due process right to safety, “[t]he state’s 
action in assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe environment places 
an obligation on state officials to ensure the continuing safety of that  environment.” Ray v. Foltz, 
370 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 2004).  
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the state has opted to outsource the 
upholding of that obligation, in part, to the Citrus Defendants. That is sufficient to find state action 
and accords with several courts within the Eleventh Circuit that have also found state action in the 
provision of foster care services . See, e.g., Smith v. Beasley , 775 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1353 (M.D. 
Fla. 2011); Woodburn v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 854 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1200 
(S.D. Fla. 2011); Crispell v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., No. 8:11-CV-1527-T-30EAJ, 2012 WL 
3599349, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2012). Of course, as the  factual record develops, the Citrus 
Defendants may well re -argue that their activities are not those of the state. However, at this 
juncture and crediting the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court overrules the 
Objection to the extent it disputes state action, adopts the recommendation of Magistrate Judge 
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D’Angelo—with the caveat that the finding of state action rests on slightly different grounds—and 
declines to dismiss the claims brought against the Citrus Defendants on the basis of no state action.  
ii. Deliberate Indifference 
In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found that Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
pled deliberate indifference for the Citrus Defendants. ECF No. [77] at 44. She explained that 
Plaintiffs allege that CFCN “knew that CPT determined multiple times that M.O. had been a victim 
of physical abuse, M.O. had a pattern of unexplained injuries, M.O. had a black eye that medical 
professionals determined was the result of a ‘direct blow,’ Plaintiffs were not receiving any of the 
medically necessary and court ordered services, and there were three abuse reports closed as non-
substantiated.” Id. at 47 (citations omitted). Moreover, despite knowing that “Plaintiffs had 
extensive special needs that required specialized care,” the Citrus Defendants “placed them with a 
single, traditional foster parent, who worked full time, already had three foster care children in her 
care, and was not ensuring Plaintiffs were receiving their medically necessary services or 
medication.” Id. at 48 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Citrus Defendants knew of the pattern 
of abuse reports against Jones, including one open report at the time Plaintiffs were placed there. 
Id. (citations omitted). All of this, according to Judge D’Angelo, gives rise to a plausible inference 
that the Citrus Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Id. 
In their Objection, the Citrus Defendants argue that “[t]he sufficiency of the allegations 
against each Citrus Defendant should be analyzed separately; the questions of sufficient 
knowledge and deliberate indifference (versus negligence) must be answered in the context of each 
defendant’s role and involvement at a given time.” ECF No. [86] at 9.  
Plaintiffs respond that the Citrus Defendants’ Objection to the form and structure of Judge 
D’Angelo’s analysis is not tantamount to an actual objection to her findings. ECF No. [92] at 9. 
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Thus, her findings should be reviewed for clear error. Id.  at 10. And there was no clear error, as 
the court correctly identified deliberate indifference. Id. at 10–15.   
First, the Court finds that the Citrus Defendants have not pointed to any substantive error 
in Judge D’Angelo’s reasoning—they do not point to knowledge attributed to the Citrus 
Defendants that was not actually alleged in the Amended Complaint, nor do they explain how 
knowledge properly attributed to the Citrus Defendants does not constitute deliberate indifference. 
As such, the Court reviews Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation for clear error. 
And here, there was no clear error. As noted above, c hildren in foster care have a 
substantive due process right to safety, and the state bears an obligation to ensure that safety. See 
Foltz, 370 F.3d at  1082 (citation omitted); Taylor By & Through Walker v. Ledbetter , 818 F.2d 
791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987); Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2003). 
A state actor can be held liable under § 1983 for depriving someone of such a federal right when 
two requirements are met. “First, the failure to act must have been a substantial factor leading to 
the violation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Second, the official having 
the responsibility to act must display deliberate indifference.” Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794. Deliberate 
indifference exists only where, in relevant part, the state actor disregards a risk of harm of which 
he or she is actually aware. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). Thus, to show deliberate 
indifference, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants: (1) were objectively aware of a risk of 
serious harm; (2) recklessly disregarded the risk of harm; and (3) the conduct was more than merely 
negligent. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). 
Here, Judge D’Angelo appropriately pointed to several alleged facts of which the Citrus 
Defendants were aware and disregarded in maintaining Plaintiffs’ placement with Jones, providing 
citations to the Amended Complaint for each allegation. That is, for each Defendant, Judge 
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D’Angelo points to several facts that each allegedly knew and actions taken notwithstanding that 
knowledge, and each finding of plausibly-alleged deliberate indifference is supported by specific 
reference to the Amended Complaint.  The Citrus Defendants do not point to findings  that are 
unsupported by the Amended Complaint. Thus, t he Court sees no reason to depart from Judge 
D’Angelo’s findings and adopts her recommendation to the extent it finds that Plaintiffs have 
plausibly alleged deliberate indifference. The Court overrules the Objection to the extent it 
disputes deliberate indifference. 
iii. Qualified Immunity 
Judge D’Angelo concluded that the Citrus Defendants have not established they are entitled 
to qualified immunity, because they are private actors. ECF No. [77] at 49. That is, while the 
“Citrus Defendants were state actors for purposes of Section 1983 liability, the analyses are 
distinct, and the finding that Plaintiffs state a claim f or liability alone does not mean these 
Defendants can claim qualified immunity.” Id.  at 50. The Citrus Defendants, Judge D’Angelo 
found, provided no historical or public polic y support for invoking qualified immunity in this 
context. Id. As such, qualified immunity did not apply to bar Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. 
The Citrus Defendants argue that Judge D’Angelo erred in conclusively establishing that 
the Citrus Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, effectively foreclosing the argument 
even as the factual record remains undeveloped. ECF No. [86] at 10. Several cases, they say, 
support the application of qualified immunity in the foster care services context. Id. at 11 –12 
(citations omitted). Thus, Defendants argue they should not be foreclosed from raising qualified 
immunity at a later stage as the facts develop. Id. at 13. 
Plaintiffs respond that the Citrus Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. ECF 
No. [92] at 15. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue “there is no ‘firmly rooted’ tradition of immunity 
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applicable to private community -based care providers of foster care and related services in 
Florida.” Id. at 16. The Citrus Defendants point only to “nonbinding and inapposite cases.” Id. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue the policy considerations for qualified immunity do not support its 
application here. Id. at 19. 
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their 
individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted). Importantly, “[n]ot all defendants who may be sued 
under § 1983 are entitled to even claim such immunity.” McDuffie v. Hopper , 982 F. Supp. 817, 
822 (M.D. Ala. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit, in Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military 
College, left open whether qualified immunity would be available in cases where the private 
defendants were being sued for not “fulfill[ing] their duties under a government contract.”  970 
F.2d 785, 796 (11th Cir. 1992). 
Later, in Richardson v. McKnight, the Supreme Court assessed the history and purposes of 
qualified immunity, determining that they did not support extending qualified immunity to prison 
guards employed by a private, for-profit corporation that had contracted with the state to manage 
the prison. 521 U.S. 399 (1997). First, the Supreme Court concluded that, although prisons had 
historically been run by both private and state actors, no “firmly rooted” tradition of immunity 
existed for privately employed prison guards. Id. at 404–06. Second, the Supreme Court analyzed 
the purpose of qualified immunity: “(1) protecting against unwarranted timidity on the part of 
government officials, (2) ensuring that talented candidates are not deterred from entering public 
service, and (3) preventing the distraction of governmental officials by lawsuits.” Hinson v. 
Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999), amended, 205 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 
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Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408–12). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that —because of the 
influence of market forces on private employers —qualified immunity should not be extended to 
privately employed prison guards. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408–12. Still, the Supreme Court 
contemplated that qualified immunity might apply to a private entity “briefly associated with a 
government body, serving as an adjunct to government in an essential governmental activity, or 
acting under close official supervision.” Id. at 413.  
The Eleventh Circuit has not had occasion to consider the application of qualified immunity 
to ostensibly private foster care service providers in similar contexts, so the Court looks to other 
circuits. In Bartell v. Lohiser , the Sixth Circuit considered this precise issue in the context of a 
private organization that had contracted with the state for the provision of foster care services. 215 
F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit found that the not -for-profit entity, which was 
“closely supervised” by the state agency, was eligible for qualified immunity. Id. at 557. Because 
the organization’s job in making “[d]ecisions pertaining to the welfare of a child . . . require[d] the 
deliberate and careful exercise of official discretion in ways that few public positions can match,” 
the Court found particularly weighty the concern that the organization “not be over-burdened with 
encumbering litigation.” Id. At least one district court has echoed this reasoning in addressing the 
application of qualified immunity to private foster care service providers. P.P. v. City of New York, 
No. 13 CIV. 5049 CM FM, 2014 WL 4704800, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2014). 
The case law supports finding the Citrus Defendants eligible for  qualified immunity. For 
one, as a not -for-profit entity, the Citrus Defendants are not subject to competitive market 
pressures—that is, market forces cannot be counted on to draw in the most talented candidates or 
eliminate actors who display “unwarranted timidity.” Without the safe harbor of qualified 
immunity, the Court finds that the Citrus Defendants would find it much more difficult to recruit 
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talented candidates if those candidates were to be exposed to § 1983 liability. Moreover, the Citrus 
Defendants appear to fall squarely into the category of those “serving as an adjunct to government 
in an essential governmental activity” and those “acting  under close official supervision.”  
Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413. That is, the statutory scheme expressly contemplates “comprehensive 
oversight,” Fla. Stat. § 409.986(b), and contemplates the Citrus Defendants performing what 
Florida identifies as a service “traditionally” provided by the State. Fla. Stat. § 409.993.  While 
there does not appear to be a “firmly rooted” history of immunity for actors such as the Citrus 
Defendants, the purposes of qualified immunity and the broader directives of Richardson  
nonetheless support extending the defense to the Citrus Defendants.  See Brentwood Acad. v. 
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410, 439 (6th Cir. 2006), rev’d and remanded, 
551 U.S. 291, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 168 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2007) (extending qualif ied immunity even 
where no firmly rooted history existed due to public policy concerns).  
It does not follow, however, that qualified immunity applies to bar the claim. Qualified 
immunity does not apply to bar claims where it is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates [the applicable] right .” Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit has provided three different ways a plaintiff can 
show that the state of the law gave officials fair warning of a clearly established right.  
First, she can still show that a materially similar case has already been decided. 
This category consists of cases where judicial precedents are tied to particularized 
facts. In determining whether a right is clearly established under this prong, this 
Court looks to judicial decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the 
relevant state. Second, she can also show that a broader, clearly established 
principle should control the novel facts of a particular situation. The principle must 
be established with obvious clarity by the case law so that every objectively 
reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that the 
official's conduct did violate federal law when the official acted. Put another way, 
in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Third, she could 
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show that her case fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates 
[the] constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.  
 
Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal citations or quotations omitted).  
As relevant here, the Eleventh Circuit has clearly explained a foster child’s constitutional 
right “to be free from unnecessary pain and a fundamental right to physical safety.” Foltz , 370 
F.3d at 1082 (citing Taylor v. Ledbetter , 818 F.2d 791, 794–95 (11th Cir. 1987)). On multiple 
occasions, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that deliberate indifference to physical abuse and 
neglect by a state actor constitutes a deprivation of a constitutional right. Id.  at 1083. Here, the 
Court has already established that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged deliberate indifference, which 
well clears the threshold of violating a clearly -established right. As such, at this stage, the Court 
does not find that qualified immunity applies to bar the claim. Of course, if facts develop indicating 
that the Citrus Defendants were not deliberately indifferent, the Citrus Defendants may reargue 
the application of qualified immunity. Simila rly, if evidence demonstrates that the relationship 
between the State and Citrus Defendants is not as alleged, the question of the Citrus Defendants’ 
eligibility for qualified immunity may be re -raised. However, at this stage, accepting the 
allegations as true, while it appears that the Citrus Defendants are eligible for qualified immunity, 
the Court cannot say that qualified immunity applies to bar the claims against them , as the 
allegations support an inference that the Citrus Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a 
manifestly unsafe foster home.  
The Court adopts Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation and does not find that dismissal of 
the claims brought against the Citrus Defendants is warranted. Thus, the Objection, ECF No. [86], 
is overruled, and the Citrus Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [40], is denied. 
B. Objections by FRC, Green, Johnson, Breedlove, and Meikle (the “FRC 
Defendants”) 
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i. State Actor 
In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found, first, that Plaintiff’s 
allegations show state action on the part of the FRC Defendants under the public function test. 
ECF No. [77] at 39–41. In their Objection, the FRC Defendants argue that Judge D’Angelo erred 
in finding that the FRC Defendants qualify as state actor s. Specifically, in addition to making 
similar arguments to the Citrus Defendants, the FRC Defendants point out that the provision of 
foster care-like services predates the creations of  Florida’s child welfare system, so the service 
cannot be the exclusive province of the State. ECF No. [87] at 7. Plaintiffs respond that the FRC 
Defendants were correctly identified as a state actor, as FRC —a private non -governmental 
entity—assumed “a public function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the State,” 
and the individual FRC Defendants are its employees. ECF No. [93] at 6. 
As the Court explained above, the “public function” test is only one theory of state action, 
and the Supreme Court has explained that “no one criterion must necessarily be applied” to 
establish state action. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 303 
(2001). Another theory, also discussed above, focuses on circumstances in which the government 
outsources one of its constitutional obligations to a private entity. Insofar as the Eleventh Circuit 
has recognized foster children’s constitutional right to safety and the corollary obligation of the 
state to ensure that safety, the decision by DCF to outsource its activities to FRC renders FRC a 
state actor for § 1983 purposes. Accordingly, the Court need not determine whether the provision 
of foster care services is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the S tate. Judge D’Angelo’s 
finding of state action was correct, the Objection is overruled to the extent it disputes state action, 
and the FRC Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [39], is denied as to this argument. 
ii. Policy or Custom 
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Judge D’Angelo found that Plaintiffs set forth sufficient facts to support the conclusion 
that the FRC Defendants had a policy or custom responsible for Plaintiffs’ harm. As alleged in the 
Amended Complaint, the FRC Defendants “allow[ed] children with disa bilities to be placed in 
untrained foster homes, fail[ed] to provide special needs children with medically necessary 
services, and fail[ed] to comply with court orders from the dependency court.” ECF No. [77] at 
44. They also failed to employ corrective me asures after the prior class action lawsuit and 
settlement revealed deficiencies in their processes. Id. 
The FRC Defendants object that “the R&R improperly conflated the distinct roles of DCF, 
Citrus, and FRC, resulting in the imposition of duties on FRC that do not exist, particularly with 
respect to placement decisions and applicable policies and procedures .” ECF No. [87] at 9. In 
reality, the only allegation is that FRC provides case management services. Id. Plaintiffs, the FRC 
Defendants argue, point to no official FRC policy or unofficial custom that resulted in harm to 
Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs respond that their Amended Complaint alleges  how FRC caused Plaintiffs’ 
injuries. ECF No. [93] at 7. Plaintiffs assert that the  Amended Complaint  contains detailed 
allegations of customs, policies, and/or widespread practices that exposed Plaintiffs to a substantial 
risk of harm. Id. at 8. 
To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that “the 
alleged constitutional harm is the result of a custom or policy.” Brennan v. Headley, 807 F. App’x 
927, 937-38 (11th Cir. 2010). “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality 
or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the 
municipality. A custom is a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of 
law.” Groover v. Israel, 684 F. App’x 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sewell v. Town of Lake 
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Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)). “In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a policy or 
custom, ‘it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice.’” Martin v. Wood, 
648 F. App’x 911, 914 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). This so-called “Monell” liability has 
been extended to private parties performing municipal functions. Buckner v. Toro , 116 F.3d 450, 
452 (11th Cir. 1997). 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a widespread policy or custom  of 
FRC’s that is responsible for Plaintiffs’ harms. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that, notwithstanding 
its knowledge of the class action lawsuit and settlement, FRC, among others, “failed to remedy the 
lack of sufficient placements and provision of services, there was still a failure to maintain an even 
remotely adequate number and variety of foster homes and other placements for the number of 
children in the system and their needs, and there was still a failure to provide medically necessary 
therapeutic and behavioral services to children served by DCF, CFCN, and FRC in the Southern 
Region.” ECF No. [1-3] ¶ 58. This led to Plaintiffs not having their placement and services needs 
met and exposed them to harm while in foster care. Id . Later, FRC, among others, is alleged to 
have determined that the Jones home was an appropriate placement for Plaintiffs despite 
knowledge that the home was not adequate. Id. ¶ 65. At other times, FRC is alleged to have failed 
to provide required information to Jones, failed to remove Plaintiffs from the home, failed to ensure 
Plaintiffs were receiving medically necessary services as required by a court order, failed to 
convene a staffing when required, and failed to adequately respond to at least nine abuse report s 
regarding a child in Jones’ care (including five abuse reports regarding M.O.). Id.  ¶¶ 70, 72, 73, 
74, 179. 
Plaintiffs also allege FRC’s policies and customs that led to the above-described actions—
indeed, they allege at least six separate policies, customs, or widespread practices. See id. ¶¶ 248–
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255. The FRC Defendants may well, with greater discovery, seek to prove that their role was 
limited to “case management services,” but at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff’s allegations 
are to be taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn from them. Under this standard , 
Plaintiffs’ allegations are plainly sufficient to state a claim against FRC. As a result, the Objection 
is overruled, and the Court adopts Judge D’Angelo’s Report and Recommendation.  
iii. Deliberate Indifference 
 In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently 
alleged that Defendants Breedlove and Johnson acted with deliberate indifference; specifically, 
Judge D’Angelo found that Breedlove and Johnson “knew of the risk of serious harm from a failure 
to properly care for Plaintiffs, particularly in light of their medical and developmental needs, and 
despite this knowledge, failed to ensure they received adequate care and services.” ECF No. [77] 
at 47. As to FRC, Meikle, and Gr een, Judge D’Angelo similarly found that those Defendants 
“knew that CPT determined multiple times that M.O. had been a victim of physical abuse, M.O. 
had a pattern of unexplained injuries, M.O. had a black eye that medical professionals determined 
was the result of a ‘direct blow,’ Plaintiffs were not receiving any of the medically necessary and 
court ordered services, and there were three abuse reports closed as non- substantiated.” Id. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, they left M.O. in the Jones home. Id. at 48. Beyond this, despite 
knowing Plaintiffs needed specialized care, FRC, Meikle, and Green “placed them in a home with 
a non-specialized foster parent who had a pattern of abuse and openly refused to provide the 
necessary care for M.O. and A.O.” Id . Judge D’Angelo found that t hose allegations support an 
inference of deliberate indifference.  
 The FRC Defendants object that Plaintiffs’ allegations against Green, Johnson, Breedlove, 
and Meikle do not support an inference of deliberate indifference, because the allegations fail to 
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show “subjective knowledge” of a risk and “deliberate disregard” of that risk. ECF No. [87] at 11. 
Moreover, FRC Defendants argue that Judge D’Angelo erred in attributing to FRC Defendants 
defects in the placement of Plaintiffs, for which the FRC Defendants were not responsible. Id.  at 
12. Finally, even if it is taken as true that Breedlove, Johnson, Green, and Meikle were aware of 
the substantial risk, insofar as they did not have an ability to affect placement, they cannot be held 
to be deliberately indifferent. Id. 
 Plaintiffs respond that they have adequately pled FRC and Green’s direct role in the 
placement of M.O. and A.O. in the Jones home. ECF No. [93] at 9–10. The FRC Defendants ignore 
the numerous allegations in the Amended Complaint of their knowledge of the s ubstantial risk of 
harm and role in initiating and/or maintaining Plaintiffs’ placement in the Jones home. Id. 
 The Court finds the Objection is due to be overruled. The Amended Complaint sufficiently 
alleges that Breedlove, Johnson, Green and Meikle each independently knew of a substantial risk 
of harm to Plaintiffs. To begin, Breedlove is alleged to have known of M.O. and A.O.’s disabilities, 
ECF No. [1-3] ¶ 113, to have completed a home visit during which concerning events occurred, 
id. ¶ 117, to have transported M.O. to a doctor’s appointment where her weight loss was noted, id. 
¶ 121, and to have known that Jones had no experience in dealing with children with significant 
disabilities and was not equipped to do so, especially as a single foster parent with four other 
children in the home, id. ¶ 183. Still, Breedlove failed to ensure a specialized home for Plaintiffs, 
failed to recognize Jones as an inadequate placement, and failed to remove Plaintiffs from the 
Jones home even when Jones complained that M.O.’s needs were too much for her to handle. Id. 
¶ 329. 
 According to Plaintiffs, Johnson similarly knew of Plaintiffs’ special needs, id. ¶¶ 53, 54, 
knew that A.O. appeared “nervous and anxious” during a home visit, id. ¶ 72, knew Jones would 
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leave the children outside for extended periods of time, id. ¶ 79, knew A.O. did not receive a 
recommended psychiatric evaluation, id. ¶ 84, knew that Jones sometimes forgot to give Plaintiffs 
their medication, id. ¶ 86, knew that M.O. was not consistently receiving medically necessary 
services, id. ¶ 97, and fundamentally knew that Jones had no experience in dealing with children 
with significant disabilities and was not equipped to do so, especially as a single foster parent with 
four other children in the home, id. ¶ 183. Nonetheless, Johnson failed to ensure a specialized 
home for Plaintiffs, failed to recognize Jones as an inadequate placement, and failed to remove 
Plaintiffs from the home despite multiple contraindications. Id. ¶ 318.  
 Green, Plaintiffs allege,  similarly knew of Plaintiffs’ special needs, id. ¶¶ 53, 54, knew 
Plaintiffs were not receiving required therapies, id. ¶¶ 130, 132, knew of injuries to M.O. and 
challenges with A.O., id.  ¶ 134, knew of Jones’ “backup” caregivers, id. ¶ 135, knew of at least 
eight abuse reports regarding a child in Jones’ care, id. ¶ 173, knew of M.O.’s weight loss, id. ¶ 
153, and knew that Jones had no experience in dealing with children with significant disabilities 
and was not equipped to do so, especially as a single foster parent with four other children in the 
home, id. ¶ 183. Still, Green failed to ensure a specialized home for Plaintiffs, failed to recognize 
Jones as an inadequate placement, and failed to remove Plaintiffs from the home despite multiple 
contraindications. Id. ¶ 307.  
Finally, Meikle is alleged to have known Jones was not taking Plaintiffs to medical and 
therapy appointments, id. ¶ 132, knew of Jones’ “backup” caregivers and injuries to M.O., id. ¶ 
135, knew of M.O.’s weight loss and that she had been identified by professionals as the victim of 
physical abuse, id. ¶ 153, knew of at least eight abuse reports regarding a child in Jones’ care, id. 
¶ 173, and knew that Jones had no experience in dealing with children with significant disabilities 
and was not equipped to do so, especially as a single foster parent with four other children in the 
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home, id. ¶ 183. Notwithstanding this, Meikle failed to ensure a specialized home for Plaintiffs, 
failed to recognize Jones as an inadequate placement, and failed to remove Plaintiffs from the 
home despite multiple contraindications. Id. ¶ 340. 
 All of these allegations support an inference of deliberate indifference, and while the FRC 
Defendants may dispute that they had the ability to affect the placement of Plaintiffs, at the motion 
to dismiss stage, the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs allegation that the FRC Defenda nts had that 
ability. Thus, the Court overrules the Objections and adopts  Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation.  
The FRC Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [39], is denied to the extent it is premised on 
Plaintiffs failing to state a claim of deliberate indifference.  
iv. Qualified Immunity 
 In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found that the FRC Defendants were 
not entitled to qualified immunity because they are private actors and had not pointed to historical 
or public policy support for applying qualified immunity to them. ECF No. [77] at 49–50.  
 The FRC Defendants object , first, that the Report and Recommendation erred i n its 
reasoning because Plaintiffs made essentially no on -point argument in rebuttal to the FRC 
Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, so the Court’s logic in denying them qualified 
immunity was not based on any “issue” raised by Plaintiffs. ECF No. [87] at 14–15. Plaintiffs’ 
counterargument should therefore be deemed waived. Id. at 15. Moreover, none of the cases cited 
by Judge D’Angelo addresses the application of qualified immunity to a private social worker in 
contexts similar to the present case. Id. at 16. By contrast, the law is clear that the FRC Defendants 
should be entitled to assert qualified immunity. Id. at 17. 
 Plaintiffs respond, first, that because the FRC Defendants raised a qualified immunity 
defense, it was proper for Judge D’Angelo to analyze it regardless of the focus of Plaintiffs’ 
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opposition. ECF No. [93] at 16. And on the merits, Plaintiffs argue that there is no “firmly rooted” 
tradition of immunity exists in the child welfare context, nor do policy arguments support 
extending immunity to the FRC Defendants. Id. at 18. 
 Plaintiffs’ inapt response to the FRC Defendants’ qualified immunity argument does not 
mean the Court is precluded from performing its own analysis of whether qualified immunity 
applies. To the contrary, the Court is obliged to determine whether qualified immunity applies to 
bar a claim once it is raised as a defense, and the Eleventh Circuit has permitted district courts to 
consider the issue entirely sua sponte . Lillo ex rel. Est. of Lillo v. Bruhn, 413 F. App’ x 161, 162 
(11th Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court  considers the role of qualified immunity in the context of this 
case. 
 For the same reasons described above, the Court finds that the FRC Defendants are eligible 
to assert qualified immunity, but given the sufficient allegations of deliberate indifference, the 
doctrine does not bar the claim against them.  Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged deliberate 
indifference by Breedlove, Johnson, Green, and Meikle. For the same reasons that the Court finds 
they appear to have been deliberately indifferent, the Court finds that they would have violated 
Plaintiffs’ clearly established rights—namely , the substantive due process right to safety in a foster 
home. As such, while the Court finds Breedlove, Johnson, Green, and Meikle eligible for qualified 
immunity, the Court cannot say that it applies to bar Plaintiffs’ claims.  
 The Court agrees with Judge D’Angelo’s ultimate conclusion and does not find that 
dismissal of the claims brought against the FRC Defendants is warranted . Thus, the Objection is 
overruled and FRC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [39], is denied.  
C. Objections by Baptiste 
i. Deliberate Indifference 
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In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found that qualified immunity did 
not apply to bar Plaintiffs’  claim against Baptiste. ECF No. [77] at 26 –27. Judge D’Angelo 
explained that because it is clearly established that foster children have a constitutional right to be 
free from unnecessary pain and to have physical safety, Baptiste’s alleged deliberate indifference 
precludes the  application of qualified immunity at this stage. Id.  at 27. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
allege that Baptiste received an abu se report regarding M.O. and observed her with injuries, 
received another abuse report, knew that professionals had concluded M.O. was a victim of 
physical abuse, received another abuse report, knew of another professional conclusion that M.O. 
was a victim of physical abuse, and knew that M.O. came out of Jones’ home with visible injuries. 
Id. at 28–29. Nonetheless, M.O. remained in Jones’ home for more than thirty days while Baptiste 
was involved with her investigation. Id. at 30. That demonstrates actual knowledge of a substantial 
risk of physical harm to M.O. in the Jones home, which is enough at this stage of the litigation. Id. 
at 30–31. 
 In her Objection, Baptiste argues that Judge D’Angelo’s Report and Recommendation did 
not determine that Baptiste knew that Jones or someone in the Jones home was the source of the 
abuse, and such a conclusion is required as a matter of law. ECF No. [88] at 3. Tha t is, the 
allegations do not show that Baptiste actually drew the inference that M.O. was at a substantial 
risk of physical harm in the Jones home. Id. at 4. At most, the allegations amount to mere 
negligence or carelessness. Id . Fundamentally, Pl aintiff’s allegations amount to inferences 
Baptiste should have drawn, not inferences she actually did draw. Id. at 7. 
 Plaintiffs respond that they sufficiently pled deliberate indifference by Baptiste so as to 
avoid dismissal. ECF No. [91] at 8. Plaintiffs assert that “deliberate indifference may be 
established not only through actual knowledge of a risk of harm, but also through allegations 
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sufficient to raise an inference that [Baptiste] knew there was a substantial risk of harm to M.O. in 
the Jones foster home and deliberately disregarded that risk.” Id. at 12. A complaint that pleads 
specific facts sufficient to justify an inference is sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss that 
argues that the complaint fails to allege that the defendants actually drew the inference. Id. 
 The Court begins by recounting the factual allegations relevant to Baptiste, a Child 
Protective Investigator. 
• On May 1, 2023, Baptiste knew that an abuse report was received regarding M.O. and that 
this was the fifth abuse report regarding a child in Jones’ care; still, she did not remove 
Plaintiffs from the Jones home. ECF No. [1-3] ¶ 147. Though she began an investigation, 
she did not speak with the teacher who had actually observed the bruises, did not go to the 
Jones home, did not interview Jones, did not interview any other foster children in Jones’ 
home, and did not attempt to learn how M.O. sustained her injuries. Id. ¶ 148.  
• On May 2, 2023, Baptiste knew that another abuse report was received regarding injuries 
to M.O., the sixth abuse report regarding a child in Jones’ care; still, Baptiste allowed 
Plaintiffs to remain in Jones’ care, taking no meaningful investigative steps. Id. ¶¶ 149–50.  
• On May 3, 2023, Baptiste contacted the Child Protection Team because a referral was 
mandatory but failed to report M.O.’s injuries when asked. Id. ¶ 151.  
• On May 4, 2023, Baptiste spoke with Meikle who expressed no concerns for M.O. in the 
Jones home, interviewed foster children in the Jones home who reported that M.O. harms 
herself and trips when walking, and interviewed Jones who claimed she did not know how 
M.O. was injured. Id. ¶ 152. When M.O. was twice concluded by the Child Protection 
Team to be a victim of physical abuse, Baptiste allowed M.O. to return to the Jones home. 
Id. ¶¶ 153, 155.  
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• On June 16, 2023, Baptiste knew of another abuse report regarding unexplained injuries to 
M.O. and knew that this was the seventh abuse report regarding a child in Jones’ care; still, 
Baptiste allowed M.O. to return to the Jones home and failed to investigate the new injuries 
or take protective action. Id. ¶¶ 161, 162. 
• On June 26, 2023, Baptiste acknowledged receiving and reviewing the Child Protection 
Team’s report which concluded that M.O. had been physically abused, spoke with multiple 
individuals, and allowed Plaintiffs to remain in Jones’ home. Id. ¶ 165. 
• On June 27, 2023, Baptiste completed a Family Functioning Assessment, concluding—in 
relevant part—that M.O. was safe and there were no impending threats to her. Id. ¶ 166.  
• On June 28, 2023, Baptiste closed the three open abuse reports with “Not Substantiated” 
findings because no one could determine how the bruises occurred and allowed Plaintiffs 
to remain in Jones home. Id. ¶ 167. 
• At all relevant times, Baptiste knew that Jones had no experience dealing with children 
with significant disabilities and was not equipped to deal with a child with behavioral 
challenges like M.O.’s, especially as a single foster parent with four other fos ter children 
in the home. Id. ¶ 183. 
 Still, time and time again, Baptiste allegedly failed to ensure a specialized home for M.O., 
failed to recognize Jones as an inadequate placement, and failed to remove M.O. from the home 
despite multiple contraindications. Id. ¶ 350. 
 As Baptiste correctly points out, to establish deliberate indifference, “the official must both 
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
“Whether a[n] official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject 
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to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842. 
A jury may, therefore, “conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact 
that the risk was obvious.” Id. In such a case, an official “would not escape liability if the evidence 
showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or 
declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist[.]” Id. at 843 n.8. 
 At the motion to dismiss stage, the alleged failure of an official to take action in the face 
of an “obviously dire condition” is sufficient to state a claim. Foster v. Maloney , 785 F. App’x 
810, 816 (11th Cir. 2019). That is, the allegation of facts that support an inference of a substantial 
risk of harm and the allegation that the official knew of such facts are  sufficient at the motion to 
dismiss stage.  
 Here, the Court has already counted the multiple rounds of unexplained injuries, reports of 
abuse of children in the Jones home, and deficiencies in Jones’ care of which Baptiste was alleged 
to be aware. Though there is no allegation that Baptiste knew the injuries were produced by Jones 
or someone in particular in the home, those factual allegations plausibly support an inference that 
the Jones home was a source of substantial risk of harm. Consider the Supreme Court’s analysis 
in Farmer:  
Nor may a prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing 
that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not 
know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific 
prisoner who eventually committed the assault. The question under the Eighth 
Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, 
exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage to his future 
health, and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or 
multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive 
risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation 
face such a risk .... If, for exampl e, prison officials were aware that inmate “rape 
was so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep [but] 
instead . . . would leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest 
the guards’ station,” it would obviously be irrelevant to liability that the officials 
could not guess beforehand precisely who would attack whom. 
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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 –44 (internal citations omitted). Consistent with Farmer, Plaintiffs need 
not allege that Baptiste drew the inference that Jones or any particular individual in the home 
would specifically cause harm to Plaintiffs. Instead, Plaintiffs need only allege that Baptiste drew 
the inference that the Jones home was a s ubstantial risk of harm, and they have done so, alleging 
that Baptiste knew of multiple injuries and physical harm to M.O., knew of multiple reports of 
abuse of children in the Jones home, knew M.O. had been concluded to be a victim of abuse, and 
knew of deficiencies in Jones’ care. That is sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss that argues 
the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Baptiste actually drew the relevant inference. As such, 
the Objection is overruled, and the Court adopts Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation.  
D. Objections by M.O. 
In her Report and Recommendation, Judge D’Angelo found that Plaintiffs had not 
sufficiently alleged that Brooks knew about a substantial risk of harm and acted with deliberate 
indifference. ECF No. [77] at 31. Judge D’Angelo found that the allegations against Brooks 
pointed to negligence or carelessness more than deliberate indifference and the Plaintiffs had not 
alleged sufficient relevant knowledge by Brooks. Id. at 32. 
M.O. objects to Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation that Brooks’ Motion to Dismiss be 
granted. ECF No. [89]. Specifically, M.O. argues that the Amended Complaint alleges her 
constitutional right to reasonable safety in the Jones home and alleges Brooks’ deliberate 
indifference to harm being experienced by M.O. Id.  at 10. M.O. points to allegations in the 
Amended Complaint that Brooks knew  of the seven abuse reports regarding children in Jones’ 
care, investigated some of the abuse reports, knew of multiple injur ies to M.O., knew of and was 
concerned by M.O.’s weight loss, and “knew of ongoing concerns that Jones was not taking foster 
children to medical appointments, was braiding children’s hair too tightly, and was depriving 
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children of air conditioning in South Florida.” Id.  at 15 –16. Notwithstanding this knowledge, 
Brooks: 
(1) failed to interview the FRC visitation supervisor who also observed the bruises 
on M.O. on July 7, 2023; (2) failed to interview any of the other foster children 
placed in the Jones foster home; (3) failed to contact the FRC case management 
team; (4) failed to contact the lead agency CFCN; (5) failed to immediately respond 
to CPT regarding her observations of M.O.’s physical condition; and (6) failed to 
ensure that M.O. was immediately examined by CPT and receive immediate 
medical care and treatment. 
 
Id. at 16–17. All of this is sufficient to infer deliberate indifference so as to overcome qualified 
immunity. Id. 
 Brooks responds by, first, pointing out that Plaintiffs’ allegations make clear that Brooks 
was assigned to investigate just two days before M.O. was ultimately removed from the Jones 
foster home. ECF No. [90] at 4. That timeframe, combined with the actions Brooks took during it, 
cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. Id . Moreover, Plaintiffs admit that Brooks 
“should have” known of a substantial risk of harm, rather than alleging that she actually did know 
of such a risk. Id. at 5. 
 Again, in analyzing this issue, the Court finds it helpful to recount the allegations made 
against Brooks.  
• On May 12, 2022, Brooks is first alleged to have participated in a staffing meeting on the 
Jones foster home, at which time she knew that Jones “would not transport children to 
medical appointments and felt that it was not her job, [] was braiding the children’s hair 
too tightly, and [] would turn the air conditioner off during the day to force the children to 
go outside.” ECF No. [1-3] ¶ 87.  
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• On July 11, 2023, Brooks is alleged to have known of another abuse report regarding M.O., 
the eighth abuse report regarding a child in Jones’ care and the fourth regarding M.O. Id.  
¶ 173. The report alleged multiple bruises to M.O. Id. 
• On July 12, 2023, Brooks began an investigation, contacting M.O.’s mother who confirmed 
observing injuries to M.O., visiting the Jones foster home and interviewing Jones (who had 
five foster children in her home at the time and had asked for M.O. to be removed), met 
with M.O. and observed her to be thin and appearing younger than her age, completed Risk 
Assessment determining that M.O. was at Moderate Risk for future abuse, and contact CPT 
but did not respond to CPT’s follow-up inquiries. Id. ¶ 175.  
• On July 14, 2023, Brooks responded to CPT, advising that M.O. only had scratches to her 
hand and knee and that Brooks was more concerned about M.O.’s weight. Id. ¶ 177.  
• Also on July 14, 2023, Brooks knew that the ninth abuse report regarding a child in Jones’ 
care was received, the fifth regarding M.O. since May 1, 2023. Id. ¶ 179. The report alleged, 
among other things, fresh bruises to M.O.’s buttocks, an apparent black eye, that Jones had 
been cutting M.O.’s hair without permission, and that M.O. had been observed hungry. Id.  
• At all times, Brooks knew that Jones had no experience in dealing with children with 
significant disabilities like Plaintiffs’, was not equipped to deal with a child with behavioral 
challenges as significant as M.O.’s, and was a single foster parent working full time with 
four other foster children in the home. Id. ¶ 183. 
• On July 20, 2023, Brooks participated in a staffing regarding the open abuse reports, at 
which time it was reported that a specialized home was being sought for M.O. Id. ¶ 186. 
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• On September 8, 2023, Brooks close the abuse reports with verified findings of failure to 
protect, inadequate supervision, medical neglect, and substance misuse, and no indicators 
of physical injury. Id. ¶ 189. 
Still, Brooks failed to immediately respond to the July 11, 2023 abuse report, failed to immediately 
remove M.O. from the Jones home on July 12, 2023, failed to respond to CPT after initially 
contacting them on July 12, 2023, and generally failed to perform investigative action on the case 
between July 12, 2023 and July 14, 2023. Id. ¶ 360. 
 The question, then, is whether these allegations—taken as true— could support a finding of 
deliberate indifference so as to overcome a qualified immunity defense. The Court finds that they 
can. It is not clear from the Amended Complaint when Brooks first became involved in the 
investigation of Plaintiff’s treatment, but it is clear that by July 11, 2023, Brooks was assigned to 
the case as a Child Protective Investigator. Id. ¶ 173. At that time, Brooks knew of allegations of 
bruises to M.O.’s thorax, arm, and knees. Id. Moreover, Brooks knew that this was the eighth abuse 
report regarding a child in Jones’ care and the fourth abuse report regarding M.O. in the span of 
approximately two months. Id. By July 12, 2023, Brooks had met with M.O. and therefore knew 
her to be thin and appearing younger than her age. Id . ¶ 175. She completed a Risk Assessment 
and determined that M.O. was at Moderate Risk for future abuse. Id.  
 Ultimately, the Court finds that such information taken together supports an inference of 
actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm. At the very least, the Court finds plausible the 
inference of deliberate indifference where Brooks knew of injuries to M.O., knew of her thinness, 
knew that a risk existed of future abuse, and nonetheless allowed M.O. to return to the home for 
at least three more nights before she went to the hospital.  
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 Of course, as the factual record develops, it may become clear Brooks was not deliberately 
indifferent, such that qualified immunity applies to bar claims against her. However, at the motion 
to dismiss stage, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing all inferences 
in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds the conclusion of deliberate indifference plausible. Thus, the 
Court rejects Judge D’Angelo’s Report and Recommendation in this regard, sustains the 
Objection, and denies the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [36], to the extent it operates with respect 
to Brooks. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:  
1. The Report and Recommendation, ECF No. [ 77], is ADOPTED IN PART and 
REJECTED IN PART.  
2. The Citrus Defendants’ Objections, ECF No. [86], are OVERRRULED.  
3. The FRC Defendants’ Objections, ECF No. [87], are OVERRULED. 
4. Baptiste’s Objections, ECF No. [88], are OVERRULED. 
5. M.O.’s Objections, ECF No. [89], are SUSTAINED. 
6. The Florida Department of Children and Families’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 
[22], is DENIED. 
7. Marlene Baptiste and Sonia Brooks’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [36], is  
DENIED. 
8. Family Resource Center of South Florida, Inc., Myrlande Breedlove, Natalie 
Green, Antiwonesha Johnson, and Sanalee Meikle’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 
[39], is DENIED. 
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9. Citrus Health Network, Inc., Anthony Carvalho, and Kenya Neely, Marta Torres’ 
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [40], is DENIED. 
10. Defendants shall file their Answers to the Amended Complaint by June 26, 2026. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on June 15, 2026. 
 
 
_____ ___________________________ 
BETH BLOOM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Copies to: 
 
Counsel of Record 
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