govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_06-cr-00710-9

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BILIAL SHABAZZ 
 
CRIMINAL ACTION 
NO. 06-710-1 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Bilial Shabazz moves for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), in consideration of his chronic kidney disease (“CKD”) and hypertension, as 
well as the length of his sentence. For the reasons that follow, his Motion will be denied. 
 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Before Shabazz’s federal conviction in the above captioned matter, he was convicted of 
several state felonies. As relevant here, in 1990, he was convicted of aggravated assault, 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2702 (for shooting someone). Two years later, he was convicted again for 
aggravated assault (this time for an altercation with correctional officers). And five years after 
that, he was convicted for robbery, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat § 3701 (for robbing a grocery store at 
gunpoint). 
After serving his time for his state court convictions, Shabazz was released to a 
residential facility which he left without authorization. He then was involved with orchestrating 
another robbery with multiple co-conspirators for which the Government charged him with 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Hobbs Act 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and using or carrying a firearm during or in relation 
to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and (c)(2). Following a jury trial, 
Shabazz was convicted of all three counts. 

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During sentencing, and in accordance with the presentencing report, the Court treated 
Shabazz’s state convictions for robbery and aggravated assault as crimes of violence. At the 
time, “crimes of violence” consisted of: 
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for 
a term exceeding one year, that— 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another; or 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2007). 
Because his state court convictions were considered crimes of violence, and because 
Shabazz was older than eighteen at the time he was sentenced, the sentencing judge treated him 
as a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. § 4B1.1(a) (2007). In part due to 
that determination, the Court calculated the Sentencing Guideline range as being 360 months to 
life imprisonment, then sentenced him to the lowest end of the guideline— 360 months’ 
imprisonment which term is up in 2033. 
 LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The compassionate release statute permits a court to modify an imposed term of 
imprisonment “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable,” only “if it finds that [] extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 
reduction,” and if “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S. § 5382(c)(1)(A)(i). So “a motion for compassionate release 
raises three questions: (1) whether there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for 
modifying an imposed term of imprisonment; (2) whether a new sentence would be consistent 

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with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and, (3) whether a new sentence would be 
consistent with any applicable policy statements.” United States v. Carter, 711 F. Supp.3d 428, 
434-35 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (citing United States v. Pawlowksi, 967 F.3d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 2020)), 
summarily affirmed, No. 24-2115 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). 
Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the power to promulgate “general 
policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), which “shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling 
reasons for sentence reduction.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The Commission’s policy statements, 
absent unusual circumstances, binding courts. Cf. United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 
375 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 DISCUSSION 
Shabazz argues that three of those policy statements—Sections 1B1.13(b)(1), 
1B1.13(b)(6), and 1B1.13(b)(5)— each warrant a reduction in his sentence. Each are addressed 
seriatim below.1 
A. Section 1B1.13(b)(1): Inadequate Medical Care and COVID-19 
Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that extraordinary and 
compelling reasons exist when “[t]he defendant is suffering from a medical condition that 
requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the 
defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). 
Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) additionally provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist 
when: 
 
1 Before bringing a motion for compassionate release, a defendant must first exhaust administrative remedies. See 
18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, the Government concedes that Shabazz has satisfied that requirement. 

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(D) The defendant presents the following circumstances— 
(i) the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at 
imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious 
disease, or (II) an ongoing public health emergency declared by the 
appropriate federal, state, or local authority; 
(ii) due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the 
defendant is at increased risk of suffering severe medical complications 
or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing outbreak of infectious 
disease or the ongoing public health emergency described in clause (i); 
and 
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner. 
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). 
Shabazz argues that his CKD and hypertension alone and in combination with the risk 
that he may contract COVID-19, justify compassionate release under Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) 
and Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). 
As for his CKD and hypertension, Shabazz’s medical records reveal that his conditions 
are being closely monitored. Those records show that in mid-2023, his glomerular filtration rate 
(“eGFR”), which measures how well his kidneys are working, has—at times —sat just below the 
normal range. But his records also reveal that, most recently, his eGFR has been well within the 
range that is considered appropriate. His blood pressure was checked at least 13 different times 
in the nine months from October 25, 2023, to July 29, 2024. 
His medical records also reveal that, at times, delays in care have been due to his own 
refusal of treatment or testing. Near the end of 2023, additional blood work was ordered to 
monitor his CKD and hypertension. Because he was fasting for Ramadan, Shabazz refused to 
have any blood drawn in March of 2024, but later requested that the bloodwork be performed. It 
appears such bloodwork was performed the following month. In June and July of 2024, Shabazz 

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began to present with chest pain. After a sick visit, an order was placed for an ultrasound of his 
kidney to monitor the hypertension. At a subsequent ER visit for the same chest pain, his blood 
pressure was measured four times, and each measurement revealed uncontrolled hypertension. 
Shabazz was discharged the same day with a plan to change his medication and to conduct the 
ordered ultrasound. Although an earlier ultrasound had shown some renal scarring and a cyst, 
Shabazz’s medical records reveal that he refused this most recent renal ultrasound. 
Regarding COVID-19, Shabazz’s medical records reveal that he has received an updated 
COVID-19 vaccine. Further, there are currently no cases of COVID-19 at FCI Gilmer, the 
facility at which he is incarcerated. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate COVID-10 Data, Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (Jan. 29, 2025, 12:15 PM), 
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_covid19.jsp
. 
Shabazz’s medical conditions, even considering COVID-19, are not extraordinary and 
compelling reasons that warrant release. Well-controlled hypertension rarely merits such relief. 
See United States v. Teman, 2024 WL 262781, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2024) (“In the end, 
however, the decisive question is not whether [the defendant] would fare better and receive 
better care if living at home. It is how [the defendant’s] medical conditions measure against the 
demanding standards set by the Sentencing Commission for when such condition(s) are 
extraordinary and compelling so as to qualify for compassionate release.”) (emphasis in 
original); United States v. Gomez-Moreira, 2024 WL 245640, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2024) 
(“Diagnoses for chronic conditions, which are treatable by the BOP, such as diabetes, 
hyperlipidemia, and hypertension, do not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons that 
merit compassionate release.”). 
And although the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) recognizes that CKD can increase 

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the risk that an individual gets “very sick” from COVID-19, and that hypertension may 
“possibly” do the same, CDC, People with Certain Medical Conditions (May 11, 2023), 
https://www.cdc.gov/covid/risk-factors/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov
/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-Conditions.html, “District 
Courts in the Third Circuit consistently agree that an FDA-approved vaccination against 
COVID-19 lessens the risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19 such that the threat of the 
pandemic, even combined with pre-existing medical conditions, does not constitute an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.” United States v. Hannigan, 
2022 WL 815449, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2022) (collecting cases) (“Even in the era of the 
highly transmissible omicron variant, Moderna vaccination and booster shot is highly effective 
against severe illness.”); see also United States v. Gatson, 2022 WL 7857288, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 
14, 2022) (finding that being “fully vaccinated[,]” without determining that the defendant 
received a COVID-19 booster vaccination, “reduces his risk of serious illness” and affirming the 
District Court’s denial of compassionate release); United States v. Thomas, 2022 WL 296594, at 
*1, 2 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (affirming the District Court’s denial of compassionate release for a 
defendant with “high blood pressure” where “vaccination reduced the [defendant’s] health 
risks[.]”); United States v. Folk, 2022 WL 58540, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2022), cert. denied, 142 
S. Ct. 2848 (2022) (finding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
compassionate release for a defendant with hypertension). 
For the reasons set forth above, Shabazz has not demonstrated that his medical 
conditions—with or without the threat of contracting COVID-19—constitute extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for his release. 

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B. Shabazz’s Sentence Length 
Shabazz also argues that the length of his sentence in light of current sentencing law 
warrants his release. For this, he relies on Section 1B.13(b)(6) of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
which states: 
UNUSUALLY LONG SENTENCE .— If a defendant received an 
unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of 
imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered 
in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and 
compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross 
disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be 
imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the 
defendant’s individualized circumstances. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). 
 The “change in law” that Shabazz relies on is United States v. Amos, 88 F.4th 446 (3d 
Cir. 2023), which, in his view, establishes that his two state court convictions for aggravated 
assault cannot serve as predicate “crimes of violence,” a conclusion which ultimately led to an 
increase in his federal sentencing range. He makes the same argument regarding an unpublished 
district court opinion, United States v. Ruffin, 2022 WL 1485283, at *4-10 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 
2022) and his state court robbery conviction. 
 But the vehicle for an argument that state court convictions can not be treated as predicate 
crimes for a sentencing enhancement is 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not a motion for compassionate 
release. United States v. Lebron, 598 F. App’x 817, 818 (3d Cir. 2015); see also United States v. 
Henderson, 858 F. App’x 466, 469 n.2 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that defendant’s 
challenge to his classification as a career offender under the First Step Act could not qualify as 
an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release); see also United States v. 
Holmes, 2022 WL 3657180, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 2022) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that 

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[the defendant] argues that he is entitled to compassionate release because of alleged sentencing 
errors, he essentially presents another challenge to the validity of his sentences, and such 
challenges are typically brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 instead.”); United States v. Wilson, 2022 
WL 15431188, at *2 n.1 (3d Cir. Oct. 27, 2022) (per curiam) (Ҥ 3582(c)(1)(A) provides a 
mechanism to seek a reduction in the term of a sentence, not to challenge its validity.”). That 
rule “remains true where a defendant was sentenced as a career offender but could potentially no 
longer, after separate analysis, qualify as such in light of higher court holdings.” United States v. 
Griffin, 2023 WL 4208673, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2023) (collecting cases). 
Therefore, Shabazz’s argument regarding his length of sentence cannot serve as an 
extraordinary and compelling reason to justify his release. 
C. Catch-All Provision 
Finally, Shabazz argues that Section 1B.13(b)(5) justifies compassionate release. That 
guideline provides that “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances exist when: 
OTHER REASONS.—The defendant presents any other circumstance or 
combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or 
together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), 
are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4). 
 Shabazz argues that, considered together, his arguments addressed above and his recent 
rehabilitation should warrant release. Even assuming that Shabazz has been wholly rehabilitated, 
an assumption that the Government roundly disputes, “Congress has explicitly instructed that a 
defendant’s rehabilitation ‘shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason’ 
warranting compassionate release.” Carter, 711 F.Supp. at 441 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). 
And Section 1B1.13(c) prevents a court from considering Shabazz’s length-of-sentence 
argument in addressing a defendant’s Motion brought pursuant to Section 1B1.13(b)(5), the 
Guidelines’ catch-all provision. Id.; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (“Except as provided in subsection 

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(b)(6), a change in the law . . . shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an 
extraordinary and compelling reason exists . . . .”).2 
To warrant relief, Shabazz’s circumstances (other than changes in law and rehabilitation) 
must “go ‘beyond what is usual, customary, or common’ and that ‘irreparable harm or injustice 
would result if the relief is not granted.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Pollard, 2020 WL 
4674126, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2020). His circumstances—namely his medical condition s—
do not meet that high bar. “[T]he reasons enumerated by subsections b(1)-(4) are scenarios 
falling outside the experience of nearly all federal inmates, such as a terminal medical condition, 
dire family emergency, or abuse at the hands of a custodian.” Id. “[B]y any measure,” 
Shabazz’s “circumstances are not ‘similar in gravity’ to the exceptional situations enumerated in 
subsections b(1)-(4).” Id. 
 CONCLUSION 
Because Shabazz fails to establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting his 
release, his motion must be denied. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
An appropriate order follows. 
BY THE COURT: 
 S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE 
 ___________________________ 
WENDY BEETLESTONE, J. 
 
2 In other words, Shabazz’s argument predicated on Section 1B1.13(b)(6), rejected above, was the only argument in 
which a change in law could be considered. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c). That change in law may not be reconsidered in 
addressing Shabazz’s Section 1B1.13(b)(5) argument. Id. 

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