govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_96-cr-00539-11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DARRYL COLEMAN 
 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
CRIMINAL ACTION 
 
 
 
NO. 96-539-01 
MEMORANDUM 
Bartle, J. November 24, 2025 
 Before the Court is the pro se motion of defendant 
Darryl Coleman for early termination of his supervised release 
or in the alternative, reduction of supervision. The Government 
opposes the motion. 
 Defendant along with 21 other defendants were charged 
in a superseding indictment in 1997 with conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In 
addition, defendant was charged with: (1) bribing a public 
official (18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)); (2) engaging in a continuing 
criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848(a)); (3) seven counts of 
using a telephone to facilitate a drug felony (21 U.S.C. § 843 
(b)); and (4) conspiracy to launder monetary instruments (18 
U.S.C. § 1956(h)). Defendant was the leader of a giant drug 
organization involved in excess of 150 kilograms of cocaine. 
 He went to trial and was convicted by a jury on all 
counts. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment pursuant 
to what were then the mandatory sentencing guidelines. The 

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Court of Appeals affirmed. See United States v. Coleman, 191 
F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Pursuant to later statutory changes, Coleman moved for 
a reduced sentence. On August 29, 2023, the Court granted the 
motion and reduced his sentence to time served, that is a 
sentence of approximately 27 years. The court imposed 5 years 
of supervised release. It is scheduled to terminate in the 
summer of 2028. 
 In support of his motion, defendant maintains that he 
has complied with all the terms and conditions of his supervised 
release. He further stresses that he is employed as a cook, has 
a strong work ethic, and is committed to public service. He has 
volunteered to feed the homeless and assisted firefighters 
during the recent fires in Altadena, California. He also states 
he has provided catering services at various businesses in that 
state. 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) provides: 
 
 (e) Modification of conditions or 
revocation. The court may, after considering 
the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), 
(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) – 
 
 (1) terminate a term of supervised 
release and discharge the defendant released 
at any time after the expiration of one year 
of supervised release, pursuant to the 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure relating to the modification of 
probation, if it is satisfied that such 

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action is warranted by the conduct of the 
defendant released and the interest of 
justice. 
 
 The factors outlined in § 3553(a) which the court must 
consider are: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the defendant’s history and 
characteristics; (2) the need to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, 
protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant, and provide him with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner; (3) the kinds of 
sentence and sentencing range established 
for the defendant’s crimes; (4) pertinent 
policy statements issued by the United 
States Sentencing Commission; (5) the need 
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct; 
and (6) the need to provide restitution to 
any victims of the offense. 
 
United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 A term of supervised release is almost always a 
component of any sentence where imprisonment is imposed. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5D.1.1. In 
contrast to imprisonment, “the primary purpose of supervised 
release is to facilitate the integration of offenders back into 
the community rather than to punish them.” United States v. 
Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2012)(quoting United States 
v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011)). Supervised 

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release is designed to fulfill “rehabilitative ends, distinct 
from those served by incarceration.” United States v. Johnson, 
529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). Accordingly, when considering a 
modification or termination of supervised release, the court, 
pursuant to § 3583(e) does not consider the sentencing factors 
outlined in § 3553(a)(2)(A): “to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense.” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 
_______, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025); 
 Our Court of Appeals has made clear that the district 
court does not need to find “an exceptional, extraordinary, new, 
or unforeseen circumstance” in order to modify or terminate a 
person’s supervised release. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53. 
Nonetheless, mere compliance with the requirements of supervised 
release and becoming an employed, law-abiding citizen is not in 
and of itself a sufficient basis to alter the terms of 
supervised release. While the court must consider the factors 
found in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), 
(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7), it need not make specific findings 
as to each. Id. at 52-53. 
 It is commendable that defendant has turned his life 
around. He is now employed and has done good works to help 
others. It cannot be forgotten, however, that he led a vast 
drug organization that caused significant harm and upended the 

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safety and welfare of the people of Philadelphia. The court 
needs more time to assure itself that defendant will continue on 
his present path as a useful and productive citizen. The five 
years of supervised release set by the court were and still are 
appropriate. 
 After considering all the factors required under 
§ 3583(e)(1), defendant has not established that his conduct 
after release from prison, albeit laudable, and the interest of 
justice warrant that the court grant early termination of his 
supervised release or in the alternative a reduction in 
supervision. Accordingly, defendant’s pending motion will be 
denied. 
 

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