govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-6_20-cr-00011-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
LONDON 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
          Plaintiff/Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL WALLACE, 
 
          Defendant/Petitioner. 
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No. 6:20-CR-11-REW-HAI-1 
No. 6:23-CV-181-REW-HAI 
 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
***  ***  ***  *** 
 Petitioner Michael Wallace, through counsel, filed a timely motion to vacate under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  See DE 228 (Motion).  Wallace raised four basic claims, all of which are premised 
on the allegedly ineffective assistance of his attorney, Robert Norfleet.  See generally DE 228-1 
(Petition).  First, Wallace argued that Norfleet inadequately impeached two key witnesses—Robert 
Beach and Timothy Sizemore—at trial.  See id.  at 4–10.  Second, Wallace assert ed that Norfleet 
acted deficiently in failing  to request that items  obtained in Beach’s hotel room and Sizemore’s 
vehicle be DNA tested .  See id. at 10–12.  Third, Wallace contended that Norfleet should have 
secured witness testimony from Alexus Adams.  See id. at 13–14.  And fourth, Wallace suggested 
that Norfleet did not fulfill his duty to obtain exculpatory evidence regarding law enforcement 
officer James Mayfield’s trustworthiness.  See id. at 15–16. 
On referral, United States Magistrate Judge Hanly  A. Ingram recommended that the 
undersigned deny Wallace’s motion and deny a certificate of appealability on all issues.  See  
DE 243 (Recommended Disposition).  Judge Ingram informed Wallace of his right to object to his 
recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  See id. at 14.  Wallace timely objected, see DE 249, 
and the Government responded in opposition, see DE 251.   
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For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES Wallace’s objections, ADOPTS Judge 
Ingram’s Recommended Disposition, and DENIES Wallace’s § 2255 motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On September 30, 2020 , a federal grand jury returned a t hird superseding indictment 
charging Wallace with conspiracy to deprive individuals  of their constitutional rights  under 18 
U.S.C. § 241, and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine 
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  See DE 88 (Third Superseding Indictment).  Some of t he relevant 
facts of Wallace’s criminal conduct, as summarized by the Sixth Circuit, are as follows: 
The people of Pulaski County, Kentucky, elected Wallace to serve as a constable, 
entrusting him with law enforcement authority equal to a sheriff ’s.  Due to the 
limited resources available to constables, Wallace worked primarily out of his home 
and used funds seized during arrests to pay for expenses such as vehicle 
maintenance, new uniforms, and ammunition.  The Somerset Police Department 
also provided equipment donations and permitted him to use the Department ’s 
evidence room to store items he had seized. 
 
In 2018, Wallace pulled over Danny Hughes “for no apparent reason.”  After 
Wallace found some drugs on Hughes, he planted baggies and scales, elevating the 
potential charge from possession to distribution and enabling the seizure of 
Hughes’s car. 
 
Later that year, Wallace stopped Timothy Sizemore for expired tags and called in 
Somerset officers for backup.  Wallace claimed that his K-9 had alerted for drugs, 
prompting the officers to search Sizemore’s car.  The officers thoroughly searched 
the car and failed to find any contraband.  At that point, Wallace, who did not 
participate in the initial search, approached the car saying to his fellow officers, 
“watch this shit.”  After briefly searching the vehicle, Wallace produced a pill 
bottle. . . .  
 
The FBI started an undercover sting operation.   An FBI informant contacted 
Wallace through a drug tip line and reported that a “black guy” driving a “black 
truck” at the Somerset Mall might be trafficking methamphetamine.  In accord with 
the planted tip, an FBI task force officer posing as “Kareem Pinkney” parked at the 
Somerset Mall with $11,000 in his front pocket.  Wallace and another constable 
arrived at the mall and immediately pulled Pinkney from his truck, searched his 
pockets, and looked through his phone.  Claiming that his K-9 had alerted for drugs, 
Wallace also searched Pinkney ’s truck.  Pinkney passed field sobriety tests 
administered by a Burnside police officer.  The officer told Wallace he was not 
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going to arrest Pinkney because there “wasn’t much there.”  Wallace nevertheless 
arrested Pinkney for public intoxication and booked him into jail, where he 
remained until the FBI secured his release. 
 
In late 2019, Kayla Dobbs was returning to Pulaski County along with three friends 
after a night on the town in Lexington.  The fun ceased when the designated driver 
pulled to the side of the road to clean a passenger ’s vomit.  Wallace pulled up 
behind the car and ordered the intoxicated Dobbs to drive it to a nearby parking lot.  
Dobbs protested, saying she had been drinking.  Wallace told her to drive the car 
anyway and said she would not “get in trouble.”  As soon as Dobbs started the car, 
however, Wallace activated his lights and pulled her over.  Wallace removed her 
from the car, told her that “we can make all of this go away,” and “stuck his hand 
up [her] skirt and felt [her] butt.”  Relying on a purported alert from his ever-reliable 
K-9, Wallace searched the car.  He did not find any contraband, but proceeded to 
arrest Dobbs for DUI. 
 
In early 2020, FBI agents confronted Wallace.  He denied having any controlled 
substances in his home but consented to a search.  When asked about his safe, 
Wallace stated “[t]here’s nothing in there.”  The tangled web began to unravel when 
agents found 5.9 grams of methamphetamine in the safe, as well as nearly 30 
firearms around the property. 
 
United States v. Wallace, 51 F.4th 177, 180–81 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted).    
At trial, the jury heard testimony from, among others, Robert Beach, see DE 213 at 66–90 
(Trial Transcript—Day Two) , Timothy Sizemore, see id. at 91–107, James Mayfield, see id. at 32–
45, Andrew Salmons, see id. at 7–31, and Nicholas Taylor , see id. at 46–63.  T hese latter three 
were employed  by the Somerset Police Department  at the time of the Sizemore stop and the 
Wallace trial.  See id.  at 8, 32, 46.  Relevant to the instant matter, all five of these individuals 
provided testimony on the same general set of events. 
On direct examination, Beach stated that he had rented two hotel rooms at a Budget Inn, 
one for himself and his girlfriend, and one for  Alexus Adams.  See id. at 67–68. When Sizemore 
and Adams arrived together, Beach provided the pair with a small amount of methamphetamine , 
which they used.  See id. at 68.  Sizemore’s testimony corroborates Beach’s version of events.  See 
id. at 91–94.  Sizemore further asserted that he and Adams used all of Beach’s methamphetamine 
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while in one of the hotel rooms.  See id. at 94.  After finishing the drugs, Sizemore returned to his 
car and departed.  See id. at 94. 
But Sizemore did not get far before he was  pulled over by Constable Wallace.  See id.  
Wallace proceeded to retrieve his police dog, remove Sizemore from his vehicle, and conduct a 
search.  See id.  At that point, other officers had arrived on the scene to assist with the search , 
including Officer Mayfield, see id. at 33–34, Officer Salmons, see id. 8–9, and Officer Taylor, see 
id. at 47–50.  The trained Somerset officers searched the car thoroughly, finding nothing,  and  
Sizemore asserted that he had no drugs in his possession.  Wallace had not participated in the 
search but immediately walked to the car and managed to produce a pill bottle and a cigarette pack 
containing Percocet prescription tablets and suspected methamphetamine .  See id.  at 35, 95–96; 
DE 195 ¶¶ 10–20, at 5 –7 (Presentence Investigation Report) ; DE 194 (Sentencing Minutes) 
(adopting DE 195). 
Despite their diligent efforts,  none of the other officers had been able to find drugs in 
Sizemore’s vehicle.  See DE 213 at 9, 34–36, 48–49.  Suspicious of Wallace’s discovery, Officer 
Salmons reported the incident to his  supervisor.  See id. at 12–13.  Wallace had said “watch this 
shit” before he went and “found” the pill bottle.   
Following a five -day trial, Wallace was convicted on both charged counts.  See DE 149 
(Jury Verdict).  The Court sentence d Wallace to 140 months’ imprisonment.  See DE 196 
(Judgment).  Wallace then appealed to the Sixth Circui t, challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his drug conviction and the dangerous weapon enhancement supporting his 
sentence.  See Wallace, 51 F.4th at 181.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed in whole.  See id. at 181–83. 
Wallace proceeded to file a timely § 2255 petition.  See DE 228.  In that petition, Wallace 
asserted that his trial counsel, Robert Norfleet, rendered constitutionally deficient assistance . See 
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id.  The Government responded in opposition to Wallace’s filing, see DE 240, and Wallace filed a 
reply, see DE 242. 
On referral, Judge Ingram found that Wallace had failed to establish  the requisites of  
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) on any of the grounds offered.  See DE 243 at 13.  Judge 
Ingram recommended that the undersigned deny Wallace’s motion and deny a certificate of 
appealability (COA) on all issues.  See id.   Wallace, now pro se, has filed objections to Judge 
Ingram’s Recommended Disposition.1  See DE 249.  The Government responded in opposition to 
Wallace’s objections.  See DE 251.  The matter is ripe for judgment.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
A. Claims Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a person in custody under sentence of a federal court “may 
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence”  if that 
person “claim[s] the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation 
of the Constitution” or otherwise is subject to collateral attack.   Relevant to the present matter, a 
trial attorney’s ineffective assistance can warrant relief under § 2255 when it arises to the level of 
a Sixth Amendment violation.  See Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064–65, 2068 (1984)).  However, the petitioner 
must do more than identify a constitutional error.  The movant must establish—by a preponderance 
of the evidence —that the  error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the 
proceedings.”  Watson v. United States , 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brecht v. 
 
1 While Wallace’s initial § 2255 petition and reply were filed by counsel, see DE 228 at 2; DE 242 at 9, his 
objections were filed by Stacy Wallace, his wife, who holds power of attorney, see DE 249 1, 17.  The 
Court, in this unusual posture, accepts the filing as made by Wallace via his authorized signatory.   
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Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993)); see also McQueen v. United States, 58 F. App’x 73, 
76 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).   
Notably, the petitioner “must set forth facts which entitle him to relief.  Conclusions, not 
substantiated by allegations of fact with some probability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a 
hearing,” let alone a favorable judgment.  O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 
1961) (collecting cases).  But a hearing is not required “if the petitioner’s allegations ‘cannot be 
accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions 
rather than statements of fact.’”  Arredondo v. United States , 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir. 1995)).  Wallace makes no objection 
to Judge Ingram’s recitation of the Strickland prongs, so the Court incorporates those fully. 
B. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Disposition 
In evaluating a magistrate judge’s recommendation, the Court must review de novo the 
“portions of the report or specified proposed findings” to which any party objects.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(C).  The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”  Id .  However, the Court is not required to 
“review . . . a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo  or any other standard, 
when neither party objects to those findings.”  Thomas v. Arn, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472 (1985); see also 
United States  v. Walters , 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that a failure to file 
objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation waives the right to appellate review) .  The 
Court tailors its analysis accordingly.  
 
 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Waived Claims 
Before turning to the merits of Wallace’s petition, it is necessary to identify the claims in 
his reply and objections that are procedurally barred.  First, the Court addresses Wallace’s reply.  
In his reply, Wallace argued that Norfleet was ineffective in his handling of evidence relating to 
the Government’s claims  that Wallace:  (1) fram ed Danny Hughes ; (2) illegally arrested and 
searched an undercover FBI agent ; (3) framed and  sexually assaulted Kayla Dobbs ; and 
(4) possessed methamphetamine in his home safe.  See DE 242 at 2–8.  However, Wallace failed 
to even reference these subjects in his initial petition, let alone allege that they were grounds for 
(or were examples of) an IAC claim.  See generally DE 228-1.  Wallace provides no justification 
or excuse for his failure to do so.  As a result,  Judge Ingram determined that Wallace waived all 
arguments raised for the first time in his reply.  See DE 243 at 3.  The Court, facing no objection 
to this finding, agrees and adopts Judge Ingram’s well-reasoned conclusion.  The Court will assess 
none of those topics. 
Second, the Court turns to Wallace’s objections.  Wallace dedicates multiple pages of his 
objections to issues that  he acknowledges  “the Court will not address because they were not 
included in the original motion.”  See DE 249 at 12–17.  Specifically, Wallace alleges  that the 
Government intentionally misled the jury and violated its disclosure obligations under Brady, see 
id. at 5–6, 14, that the Court provided the jury with incorrect instructions, see id. at 7, that Norfleet 
failed to investigate the text messages sent on Beach, Sizemore, and Adams’s confiscated cell 
phones, see id. at 8, that both Danny Hughes and Kayla Dobbs lied a t trial, see id. at 12–13, that 
Daryl Kegley, an FBI task force officer, engaged in misconduct during his investigation, see id. at 
14–15, and that the methamphetamine contained in his safe was tampered with by the Government, 
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see id. at 16–17.  But Wallace is, fatal to his filing, correct—a movant may not raise claims for the 
first time in an objection to a dispositive recommendation .  See Murr v. United States , 200 F.3d 
895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).  Thus, Wallace’s admittedly untimely arguments necessarily fail. 
Even setting aside these improper arguments, Wallace—in a cursory manner and without 
reference to Judge Ingram’s specific findings—does little more than re-invoke or expand upon the 
arguments initially raised in his § 2255 petition.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously 
recognized that “ [t]he filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the 
requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.”   Cole v. 
Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001)  (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 
1995)); see also Holl v. Potter, No. 1:09-CV-618, 2011 WL 4337038, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 
2011) (“Objections that merely restate arguments raised in the memoranda considered by the 
Magistrate Judge are not proper, and the Court may consider such repetitive arguments waived.”).  
And indeed, a majority of Wallace’s objections are properly classified as  “vague, general, or 
conclusory.”  Cole, 7 F. App’x at 356.  An objection of such quality is a nullity.   
That said, Wallace now appears to be proceeding pro se.  See DE 249 at 1.  As such, the 
Court will construe his new filing liberally.  See United States v. Kirkpatrick, No. 1:96- CR-81, 
2009 WL 2823658, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2009) (“Many prisoners file inartfully drafted pro 
se post-conviction motions without specifying the legal basis for the requested relief.  In an effort 
to assist pro se prisoners who are unaware of the applicable statutory framework governing post -
conviction relief, the courts often liberally construe and recharacterize such filings.”).  Still, 
Wallace does not reference a reason or explanation  for lodging his objections without the 
assistance of counsel, and the Court’s leniency for pro se filings has its limits :  a “[l]iberal 
construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf.”  Martin v. 
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Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th 
Cir. 2001)).  Thus, while the Court will consider those of Wallace’s objections that grapple with 
Judge Ingram’s careful work and build upon the claims initially raised in his  § 2255 petition, it 
will not issue  a substantive ruling on any of Wallace’s other , undeveloped and procedurally 
improper objections. 
B. Surviving IAC Claims 
The Court now turns to the merits of Wallace’s properly lodged objections.  In his  initial 
petition, Wallace alleged that Norfleet failed to :  (1)  utilize  evidence of Beach and Sizemore’s 
prior inconsistent statements  to impeach; (2) request DNA testing for the evidence  seized from 
Beach’s hotel room and Sizemore’s car; (3) secure Adams’s witness testimony, or at least request 
a continuance in order to do so; and (4)  obtain exculpatory impeachment evidence regarding 
Mayfield’s trustworthiness.  See generally DE 228.  But Wallace has not provided sufficient 
evidence for any of these grounds to support his IAC claim (as to deficiency or prejudice), and his 
objections to Judge Ingram’s recommendation are unavailing. 
In order to establish an IAC claim, the petitioner must first “ show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient.”  Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.  That is, the petitioner must establish 
that the attorney made errors so serious that they were “not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id.   The petitioner must then show that “ the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious 
as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id.   
But because it is uniquely difficult to assess an attorney’s performance after the fact, the 
Court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that . . . 
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the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”  Id. at 2065 (quoting Michel v. 
Louisiana, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955)) .  The Court will therefore  make a conscientious effort “to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. 
1. Failure to Impeach Beach and Sizemore with Prior Inconsistent 
Statements (or otherwise) 
 
Wallace claimed that Norfleet failed to properly utilize  Beach and Sizemore’s pre -trial 
statements that allegedly conflicted with their testimony at trial.  Wallace’s claims and objections 
will be evaluated in turn, beginning first with those pertaining to Beach’s testimony, and turning 
next to those pertaining to Sizemore’s testimony. 
i. Beach’s Prior Statements 
Wallace objects to  Judge Ingram’s finding that  Norfleet’s alleged failure to impeach 
Beach’s testimony was insufficient to support his IAC claim.  See DE 249 at 3–5.  But while 
Wallace spends a significant portion of his objections recounting the prior inconsistent statements 
that Norfleet could have relied upon to impeach Beach, he failed to include those statements, with 
any detail or in any substance,  in his initial petition  or reply.  See generally DE  228; DE 242.  
Wallace has once again added new facts at an inappropriate time.  See Murr v. United States, 200 
F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Petitioner did not raise this claim in his initial § 2255 motion.  
Rather, it was first raised in his supplemental objections to the magistrate judge’s final Report and 
Recommendation. . . .  The magistrate thus never had the opportunity to consider this issue. . . .  
Hence, Petitioner’s failure to raise this claim before the magistrate constitutes waiver.” ( internal 
citations omitted)).  This was just Judge Ingram’s point in rejecting the vague impeachment theory. 
  In his initial petition, Wallace included a lone reference to Beach’s testimony at trial, noting 
that “Beach’s statements and testimony differed from the plea soliloquy [sic] he gave” in an earlier 
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criminal proceeding.  DE 228-1 at 4.  However, Judge Ingram correctly noted that “Wallace fails 
to provide any specific examples where counsel could have or should have impeached Beach.  This 
claim is insufficiently factually developed to form a basis for relief.   For any alleged failure to 
properly impeach Beach, Wallace fumbles his burden of showing both deficient performance and 
prejudice.”  DE 243 at 9–10.  Wallace offers nothing in his objection to alter  Judge Ingram’s 
analysis of the argument  raised in his initial petitio n.  As such, he has not  established that 
Norfleet’s alleged failure to impeach Beach’s testimony supports his IAC claim.  The “jail calls” 
Wallace adverts to perfectly exemplify an improper matter first raised only in an objection.   
ii. Sizemore’s Prior Statements 
Wallace alleged in his initial petition that Norfleet  failed to:  (1) properly request, obtain, 
and otherwise investigate Sizemore’s purportedly conflicting statements ; (2) use Sizemore’s 
conflicting statements to impeach him at trial; and (3) request a mistrial once the inconsistencies 
in Sizemore’s testimony became apparent.   See DE 228-1 at 5–10.  However, Judge Ingram 
carefully dispatched each of these arguments, and nothing in Wallace’s objections causes the Court 
to deviate from his conclusions. 
At trial, Sizemore testified that he and Adams entered  a Budget Inn hotel  room and 
consumed the methamphetamine that Beach had given them.  See id. at 5–7.  According to Wallace, 
Sizemore’s testimony directly contradicted claims that he had made in a prior interview with law 
enforcement – namely, that he had only dropped Adams off at the Budget Inn.  See DE 228-4 at 1 
(Sizemore Interview).  Wallace also cite d a handwritten note that was drafted  with Sizemore’s 
prior interview at some point, simply reading “needle cap wrapped in cellophane.”  See id. at 3.  
To Wallace, this  note suggest ed that Sizemore told law enforcement about contraband in his 
vehicle during the traffic stop, a fact that Norfleet did not address at trial.  See DE 228-1 at 9. 
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Wallace specifically objects to Judge Ingram’s conclusion that  Norfleet had impeached 
Sizemore’s testimony, see DE 243 at 5–9, asserting that the impeachment “simply did not happen,” 
see DE 249 at 2.  Wallace further argues that Norfleet “never asked Sizemore about why his [prior 
interview with law enforcement] did not state anything about two hotel rooms that night, [or why 
he claimed that] he simply dropped [Adams] off [with] no mention of another hotel room.”  Id.  
However, as Judge Ingram noted, the portion of the trial transcript capturing Sizemore’s testimony 
flatly contradicts Wallace’s version of events.  The cross: 
Q. Did you go inside the hotel room?  
A. The room that he rented for Alexus I did.  
Q. So you was in the hotel room?  For how long?  
A. About ten minutes, 15 tops.  
Q. Did you tell Agent Cox, on January 8, 2019, that you didn’t go into the 
hotel?  
A. I didn’t go into the room that [Beach] was staying.  I went in the room with 
Alexus.  
Q. Did you not tell him you dropped a girl off and never went inside?  
A. I didn’t go inside of the room that [Beach] was staying in.  I went inside the 
room that he rented for Alexus.  
Q. Well, you never said anything about going inside any room.  You said you 
dropped the girl off and never went inside.  
A. It’s been two year.  
Q. So it’s possible you did tell Agent Cox that?  
A. It’s possible.  
Q. Well, that’s different than what you testified under oath already.  
A. I didn’t go into Beach’s—Robert Beach’s room.  I went into a room with 
Alexus.  
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DE 213 at 99–100.  Thus, Norfleet was clearly aware of Sizemore’s earlier statements  (which 
scotches the failure to acquire theory), and indeed, he expressly used them to impeach Sizemore.  
Wallace’s objections are flatly disproven by the record. 
 Wallace also objects to Judge Ingram’s finding that Norfleet’s supposed failure to impeach 
Sizemore’s credibility with evidence of his sobriety on the night of the stop was not deficient.  See 
DE 249 at 2–3.  But Wallace is simply re-raising an argument he has already made.  See DE 228-
1 at 8–9.  Judge Ingram adequately addressed Wallace’s argument in evaluating his initial petition, 
finding that there was no strategic need  for Norfleet to try to  establish Sizemore’s purported 
sobriety: 
Sizemore was taken from the scene in custody.  [Additionally], while it is true that 
Sizemore was not charged that night with ‘driving under the influence, public 
intoxication or other violation of laws meant to protect the public,’ the fact that 
Sizemore was not formally charged with anything that night was revealed at the 
beginning of cross-examination. 
 
DE 243 at 8.  Further, counsel plainly established Sizemore as a regular user with significant issues 
of trouble in his background.  The context, of course, involves multiple Somerset officers 
corroborating a scene where Sizemore had no contraband in his car and yet Wallace alone, after 
the officers’ fruitless search, immediately produced alleged drugs from the car, after ominously 
flagging his own imminent conduct, “watch this shit.”  The sobriety angle makes little sense and 
would not have had an impact on this record.  Once again, the record helps to disprove Wallace’s 
claim and ultimately renders his objection meritless. 
Finally, Wallace objects to Judge Ingram’s conclusion that “ Sizemore’s testimony about 
Wallace planting contraband in his car was consistent with testimony from the three other officers 
at the scene.”  Id. at 10; see DE 249 at 6–7.  Wallace specifically notes that “neither Sizemore nor 
the three . . . officers ever state[d] that they saw Wallace with a pill bottle prior to him finding it.”  
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DE 249 at 6.  But Wallace misunderstands.  Judge Ingram was not asserting that Sizemore and the 
three officers had all seen Wallace with the pill bottle prior to his discovery .  Rather, he was 
suggesting that Sizemore and the three officers all provided relatively similar accounts of the stop.  
That undoubtedly is an accurate characterization, and Wallace has done nothing to dispute that 
conclusion. 
As demonstrated above, Wallace has objected  to many of Judge Ingram’s findings 
regarding Norfleet’s treatment of Sizemore’s testimony.  H owever, Wallace’s objections do not 
address Norfleet’s alleged failure to explore evidence about the needle cap purportedly found in 
Sizemore’s vehicle.  With no objection raised, the Court adopts Judge Ingram’s well -reasoned 
analysis: 
The exhibit referenced here . . . appears to be notes memorializing what one officer 
saw when Wallace became involved in the stop.  There is a line that can be 
interpreted to say, “– needle cap wrapped in cellophane.”  This appears to be the 
only reference in the record to such an item.  It is not even mentioned in Wallace’s 
own subsequent search warrant.  DE 214 at 71–72.  Given the vagueness 
surrounding this item, failure to explore it at trial does not amount to deficient 
performance.  Nor does the evidence preponderate in finding that this needle cap 
would so torpedo Sizemore’s credibility such that the result of the proceedings 
could have been different. 
 
DE 243 at 9 ( formatting of internal citations altered ).  In sum , after addressing Wallace’s 
objections, neither Norfleet’s purported neglect of the handwritten note referencing a “needle cap 
wrapped in cellophane,” nor Norfleet’s alleged failure to impeach Sizemore’s testimony, provides 
sufficient support for Wallace’s IAC claim.  The “needle cap,” really only a note reference and 
nothing more, is without impact on the tide of proof Wallace faced.  
2. Failure to Request DNA Testing  for Evidence Found in Beach’s Hotel 
Room and Sizemore’s Vehicle 
 
In his initial petition, Wallace argued that Norfleet should have requested DNA testing for 
the “drugs, empty baggies, [and] ‘needles and stuff’ located in Mr. Beach’s hotel room,” as well 
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as “the bag, pill bottle, and syringe / pieces of syringe found in Mr. Sizemore’s vehicle door.”  
DE 228-1 at 11.  Wallace asserted that such “testing would have revealed whether or not Mr. Beach 
and / or Mr. Sizemore had been in contact with the evidence.”  Id. at 10.   
While Wallace has struggled to articulate exactly how such testing would exonerate him, 
he suggested in his initial petition that the absence of Sizemore’s DNA on any one of these items 
could have been used to impeach his testimony.  See id.  at 10–11.  Judge Ingram, however, found 
that argument unavailing, concluding that i f “Sizemore had not actually used drugs the night of 
the traffic stop, but lied in his testimony that he had used drugs,” then that evidence would not 
change the result of the trial.  DE 243 at 11.  Seemingly, Wallace does not object to that conclusion.  
See DE 249 at 8–9.   As such, the Court adopts Judge Ingram’s well -reasoned conclusion with 
respect to this theory. 
But while Wallace does not dispute Judge Ingram’s analysis, he does use his objections to 
provide a novel explanation as to why DNA testing could have proven helpful  to his case. 2  See 
id.  Wallace asserts that he never planted a pill bottle in Sizemore’s vehicle; rather, the drugs that 
he discovered belonged to Sizemore.  See id. at 8.  Because of that fact, Sizemore’s DNA should 
have been present on the bottle.  See id.  Moreover, if Beach was the one who provided the drugs 
to Sizemore, then his DNA should have also been present on the bottle.  See id. 
But regardless of his actual theory, Wallace’s claim fails.  It is a “longstanding and sound 
principle that matters of trial strategy are left to counsel’s  discretion.”  Dixon v. Houk, 737 F.3d 
1003, 1012 (6th Cir. 2013).  Relying on that principle, courts routinely reject IAC claims premised 
 
2 The novelty of Wallace’s argument is likely enough to defeat it.  When a petitioner raises an argument for 
the first time in their objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation, that argument is waived.  See 
Murr, 200 F.3d at 902 n.1.  However, because Wallace at least referenced the merits DNA testing in his 
initial petition—albeit , in a n ambiguous fashion —the Court is willing to consider his argument.  See 
DE 228-1 at 10–11. 
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on an attorney’s decision to forgo DNA testing.  See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 41 F. App’x 743, 
745 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel’s failure to request DNA test was a strategic decision and did 
not rise to level of a viable Sixth Amendment claim); Common v. United States, Nos. 1:12-CR-82 
& 1:15-CV-173, 2018 WL 4604018, at *3–4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2018) (collecting cases and 
rejecting the argument that counsel was ineffective for declining to request DNA testing of firearm 
as part of larger case strategy). 
Here, Norfleet’s decision not to request DNA testing was a  reasonable strategic choice.  
True, the presence of Beach’s DNA on the pill bottle would have helped Wallace’s case.  However, 
the absence of Sizemore and Beach’s DNA would surely have further harmed Wallace’s position.  
Additionally, if Sizemore’s DNA was found on the pill bottle, but not Beach’s, then that would 
have only marginally benefited Wallace’s case.  The bottle, after all, came from a glove in the door 
pocket.  Because the Government’s theory was that Wallace planted the container in Sizemore’s 
car after interacting with and touching Sizemore, the presence of his DNA on the pill bottle would 
not have been overly surprising.  Faced with these possibilities, Norfleet could have reasonably  
concluded that the risk associated with an unfavorable test result outweighed the potential benefit 
of a positive test result.  Accordingly, his decision to refrain from  testing the container was not 
enough to support Wallace’s IAC claim.  And, in any event, the result of such testing is not 
something Wallace puts before the Court.  A result favorable to Wallace is fully speculative on 
this record.   
3. Failure to Secure Alexus Adams’s Testimony 
Wallace also alleged in his initial petition  that Norfleet failed to secure Alexus Adams’s 
testimony, thereby “depriving Defendant Wallace . . . of a fair trial.”  See DE 228-1 at 13–14.  
Wallace speculates that Adams w ould have provided key testimony that contradicted Beach and 
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Sizemore’s “unreliable” statements, particularly regarding whether Sizemore consumed meth at 
the Budget Inn prior to the traffic stop.  See id. 
Judge Ingram rejected this argument, finding that Wallace could “only speculate as to what 
Adams might have said at trial and whether this would have helped his case.”  DE 243 at 11.  Judge 
Ingram further noted that Wallace’s argument failed on procedural grounds because he had not 
submitted an affidavit by Adams stating that she was (a) available to appear at trial and (b) would 
have given testimony favorable to Wallace’s defense.  See id.   Wallace’s objection to Judge 
Ingram’s conclusion merely re-states his arguments and offers no corroborating facts (instead, only 
a non- specific, hearsay reference to an interview by counsel) as to how Adams would have 
testified. 
Wallace has not produced any new evidence, such as an affidavit,  to support his  naked 
speculation that Adams’s testimony “would clearly have impeached both Sizemore and Beach .”  
DE 249 at 10.  Lacking any such support, Norfleet’s failure to secure Adams’s testimony cannot 
support Wallace’s IAC claim.  See Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Tinsley 
has not introduced affidavits or any other evidence establishing what [uncalled witnesses]  would 
have said. . . .  In the absence of any evi dence showing that they would have offered specific 
favorable testimony, Tinsley cannot show prejudice from counsel’s strategy recommendation not 
to introduce this evidence.”); United States v. Alqsous, No. 1:16-CR-329-2, 2025 WL 896095, at 
*7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2025) ( “Alqsous has not produced any evidence, such as an affidavit, 
declaration, or interview report, to support what he claims these potential witnesses might have 
said. . . .  Instead, he merely offers his guess as to what each potential witness might have testified 
to if called at trial.  This falls short of establishing ineffectiveness.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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Wallace did tender a 302 in which Adams, per the reporting agent, admitted that Sizemore 
brought her to the hotel and that Beach planned to give Sizemore drugs or money as compensation.  
Adams claimed not to have seen any transaction because she was in Beach’s car charging her 
phone.  So, if available, she might have helped Wallace by contradicting Sizemore.  But she might 
have hurt Wallace by confirming that Beach intended to provide Sizemore a small amount of drugs.  
Nothing from Wallace establishes that  Adams would have been available for trial, and nothing 
contains her non-hearsay contribution to the facts.  Judge Ingram noted this deficit. 
And even if Wallace had supported his argument with corroborating proof, he has  not 
shown that Adams’s testimony would have likely changed the outcome at trial.  Her testimony, as 
described by Wallace, would have had no direct, probative impact on the actual substantive dispute 
at the heart of the case (i.e., whether Wallace planted the drugs in Sizemore’s car ).  Instead, it 
would have merely served as additional ammunition for impeaching Sizemore’s statements about 
entering the Budget Inn and using methamphetamine prior to  the traffic stop.  Gi ven the Court’s 
finding that Norfleet did, in fact, impeach Sizemore on this very issue, Adams’s testimony would 
have been only marginally useful.  Such proof would have done little on the  facts of the drug 
seizure.  And, of course, this merely was one troubling aspect of the full case, where authorities 
showed impropriety by Wallace as to multiple other citizen victims, an FBI informant, and in 
Wallace’s own home, where he lied to the searching agents.    
4. Failure to Obtain Exculpatory Evidence Relating to Officer Mayfield ’s 
Trustworthiness 
 
Finally, Wallace argued in his initial petition that Norfleet failed to investigate whether one 
of the Government ’s witnesses, Officer  Mayfield, was  (a) “involved in questionable activities 
preceding and during trial” and (b) had “lost his job due to untrustworthiness.”  DE 228- 1 at 15 
(emphasis added).  In support, Wallace points to Daugherty v. Somerset Police Department , 
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No. 6:21-CV-197 (E.D. Ky. filed Nov. 24, 2021) , a civil lawsuit involving an excessive force 
complaint against Mayfield and a number of other  officers in the Somerset Police Department .  
See id.  According to Wallace, Norfleet should have investigated and requested the disclosure of 
certain information relating to that lawsuit because “[i]nformation regarding Mr. Mayfield’s use 
of excessive force is exculpatory in that it affects his credibility.”  DE 228-1 at 15. 
But as Judge Ingram explained, Wallace’s arguments crack under the timeline of events .  
First, Mayfield was employed as an officer with the Somerset Police Department at the time of 
trial, making it impossible for Norfleet to inquire into  why he “lost his job.”  See DE 243 at 13 
(citing DE 213 at 32).  Second, while Mayfield testified at trial on June 16, 2021, the Daugherty 
lawsuit was not filed until a pproximately five months later.  See id. at 12 –13.  Wallace provided 
no evidence (just conjecture) that either side knew of the impending lawsuit at the time of trial, 
and gave no explanation as to why the lawsuit, which ultimately settled in 2023, would have been 
admissible for the purpose of attacking Mayfield’s truthfulness. 
In his objections, Wallace does not dispute the accuracy of Judge Ingram’s assessment .  
Rather, he asserts that the Government knew of Officer Mayfield’s “shady past” and was aware of 
an ongoing investigation into his conduct at the time of trial.  DE 249 at 10.  But even overlooking 
the fact that Wallace cannot establish Officer Mayfield was the subject of an investigation at the 
time of trial, his claim must fail.  Wallace is essentially objecting to the fact that the Government 
failed to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of their Brady obligations.  But his 
§ 2255 petition is based on Norfleet’s purportedly deficient performance, not the Government’s 
alleged wrongdoing.  To put it plainly, nothing suggests that Norfleet’s failure to investigate the 
Daugherty lawsuit, which was not yet in existence at the time of trial, could support an IAC claim. 
 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. The Court OVERRULES Wallace’s objections, DE 249; 
2. The Court ADOPTS DE 243, Judge Ingram ’s Recommended Disposition, and DENIES  
DE 228, Wallace’s § 2255 petition; and 
3. The Court further DENIES  a COA.  Wallace has not made a “substantial showing” as to 
any claimed denial of rights.  Nor has he shown that “jurists of reason could disagree with 
the . . . resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues 
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”  Miller -El v. 
Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603–
04 (2000)).  For all of the same reasons pointed out by Judge Ingram, no COA should issue.  
Wallace flyspecks counsel’s work, but Wallace’s trial counsel strategically tested the proof 
and witnesses and presented associated credibility matters to the factfinder.  That the jury 
believed the Government’s proof, a detailed, multi- aspect tale of enforcement illegality,  
does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.   
This the 15th day of June, 2025.  
 
 
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