govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-5_26-cv-03809-2

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
JANE DOE, 
 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LELAND 
STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, et 
al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 

 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO PROCEED 
ANONYMOUSLY; DENYING 
ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE 
OVER-LENGTH BRIEF; AND 
STRIKING NONCOMPLIANT BRIEF 
 
[Re: ECF Nos. 57, 111, 112] 
 
 
 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed anonymously. ECF 
No. 57 (“Mot.”). The Stanford Defendants oppose the motion. ECF No. 106 (“Opp.”). 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to file an unnoticed motion for leave to proceed 
anonymously on May 7, 2026. ECF No. 29. After Plaintiff filed her motion on May 22, 2026, the 
Stanford Defendants moved to extend their deadline to respond to the motion, which the Court 
granted on May 29, 2026. ECF No. 82. The Stanford Defendants filed their opposition on 
June 12, 2026. 
The next day, on June 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed an “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE AN OVER-LENGTH REPLY BRIEF ON THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY GIVEN THE DEFENDANTS 75 PAGE DECLARATION 
AND 800 PAGES OF EXHIBITS THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT YET SEEN; FOR AN ORDER 
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANTS TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURTS EARLIER ORDER.” 
ECF No. 110. Plaintiff then filed a fifteen-page reply brief. ECF No. 111. 
II. LEAVE TO FILE OVER-LENGTH REPLY BRIEF 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Despite the Court’s admonition that further abuses of Civil Local Rule 7-11 “may result in 
the imposition of sanctions,” ECF No. 71, Plaintiff has filed a fifteenth administrative motion for 
miscellaneous relief pursuant to Rule 7-11, requesting that she permitted to file a reply brief three 
times in excess of the Court’s five-page limit. See Standing Order re Civil Cases § IV.A.4. 
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that the noncompliant reply brief is “narrowly tailored,” it 
contains pages upon pages of invective against opposing counsel that are wholly unrelated to the 
merits of the motion: 
There are many colorful—oh so colorful—words that the Plaintiff can 
and wants to employ to describe the defendants’ opposition to the 
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously. One word 
that comes up to the Plaintiff is that defense counsel is a “gangrenous” 
attachment [sic] to t he proper institution of law (and that she is a 
“conwoman-with-a-law-license”), but apparently because that word 
is unpalatable to defense counsel and her subjective ears and 
apparently because our District Courts are apparently in the business 
of regulating and compelling and commandeering people of this 
Nation to speak in “dulcet phrases,” see NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982), where the dulcetness of a 
certain phrase is measured according to the ears of our new queen —
Her Majesty Khyrstyn Rhayannon McGarry —and because laws of 
this Nation can only exist on her royal decree and consent , 
apparently, the Plaintiff cannot use that word —and must be 
compelled by this Court to speak in other ways she does not —and 
need not—want to speak. So here are other words the Plaintiff can 
come up with: “oppressive,” “vexatious,” asinine, and frivolous. 
Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 
1997). Hopefully, they are dulcet enough for our new Queen. And if 
not, let this Court impose upon a sentence of punishment [sic] on the 
Plaintiff for speaking in a language unlikeable to those in political 
power—i.e., Her Majesty the Queen McGarry. 
ECF No. 111 at 5 (internal footnote omitted). 
 The Court admonishes Plaintiff that the Court will not tolerate further immaterial, 
inflammatory language in Plaintiff’s filings. Contrary to Plaintiff’s apparent belief that “this 
Court cannot compel the Plaintiff [to] speak in certain ways” “unless the Plaintiff’s speech 
presents an evident danger to this Court,” ECF No. 111 at 5 n.1, the Court has inherent authority 
to strike inflammatory and vulgar language from its filings and to enforce a baseline level of 
decorum. By choosing to litigate her case in this forum, Plaintiff has assented to the Court’s 
exercise of such discretion, which, up until now, the Court has used extraordinarily lightly. 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Having failed to establish good cause, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an over-length 
reply brief is DENIED, and the noncompliant reply brief is STRICKEN. The Court will not 
accept further briefing from Plaintiff and will adjudicate the motion on the merits. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 requires “the title of the complaint must name all the 
parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). This rule reflects the “paramount importance of open courts” such 
that the “default presumption is that plaintiffs will use their true names.” Doe v. Kamehameha 
Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010). “As a general rule, the 
identity of the parties in any action, civil or criminal, should not be concealed except in an unusual 
case, where there is a need for the cloak of anonymity.” Brnovich v. Biden, No. 21-cv-01568-
PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 7630109, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2021) (quoting United States v. Stoterau, 
524 F.3d 988, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
“In this circuit, we allow parties to use pseudonyms in the unusual case when 
nondisclosure of the party’s identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment, injury, 
ridicule or personal embarrassment.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 
1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000). To test whether use of a fictious name is appropriate, courts ask whether 
“the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s 
interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068; see also Kamehameha, 596 F.3d at 1042 
(explaining that in determining whether to grant leave to proceed anonymously, courts should 
consider the severity of the threatened harm alleged by the plaintiff if anonymity is not allowed, 
the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s fears, the plaintiff’s vulnerability to such harm, the prejudice 
to the opposing party, and the public interest). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff argues that anonymity is necessary to preserve her privacy because her identity as 
a transgender woman is a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature.1 Mot. at 8–9. The 
 
1 Because the Court concludes that the use of a pseudonym is appropriate to preserve matters of a 
highly sensitive and highly personal nature, the Court need not and does not reach Plaintiff’s 
argument that California’s Safe at Home Act confers a right to proceed anonymously in federal 
court. See Mot. at 3–8. 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Court agrees. Courts have routinely held that public identification of an individual’s LGBTQ+ 
identity raises privacy concerns “support[ing] an exception to the general rule of disclosure.” Doe 
v. United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (collecting cases). Here, 
disclosure of Plaintiff’s transgender identity without her consent would constitute an invasion of 
her privacy and may expose her to both social and physical harm. While there is a strong public 
interest in knowing parties’ identities, there is an equally strong public interest in encouraging 
resolution of legal disputes on the merits and in ensuing access to the courts for all members of the 
community. There is minimal prejudice to the Stanford Defendants because, as they concede, they 
are aware of Plaintiff’s identity and are able to readily discern instances where they may attack her 
credibility “by pointing to the numerous contradictory factual assertions in her various court 
filings.” See Opp. at 8. To the extent that granting leave to proceed anonymously creates a 
discovery burden, the Stanford Defendants have demonstrated that they are capable of seeking 
relief from the Court. See ECF No. 73. 
V. ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
(1) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed anonymously is GRANTED. 
(2) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an over-length reply brief is DENIED. 
(3) Plaintiff’s noncompliant reply brief is STRICKEN. Plaintiff’s administrative sealing 
motion is DENIED AS MOOT. 
(4) This order terminates ECF Nos. 57, 110, 112. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 15, 2026 
 ______________________________________ 
BETH LABSON FREEMAN 
United States District Judge 

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