govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-3_25-cr-00008-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
       FRANKFORT 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintif
f, 
V. 
WILLIA
M LEWIS BIRKLA, 
Defend
ant. 
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Case N
o. 3:25-cr-00008-GFVT-MAS-2 
OPINIO
N 
& 
ORDER 
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William Lewis Birkla contends that officers did not have sufficient justification to 
conduct the traffic stop that led to his arrest, so he wants to suppress the evidence derived from 
that stop.  [R. 87.]  Of particular note, Birkla primarily seeks suppression of any evidence of his 
presence at the scene of the traffic stop.  This poses an interesting question.  Are identity and 
presence suppressible fruits?  As explained below, the answer is “no,” and because Birkla’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were not otherwise infringed, the Court will DENY Defendant 
Birkla’s Motion.  
I 
Prior to March 3, 2025, Defendant Birkla’s co-Defendant, Arthur Widman, had been the 
target of a narcotics investigation which utilized a confidential informant.  [R. 80 at 12-13.]  
Based on intelligence gathered from the confidential informant, law enforcement expected 
Widman to travel from out-of-state to Frankfort, Kentucky to complete a narcotics transaction.  
Id. at 13.  According to the informant, on March 3, 2025, Widman called the informant and told 
him that he was in Frankfort.  Id.  The confidential informant made arrangements to purchase 
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two kilograms of cocaine from Widman in exchange for $56,000 on the evening of March 3, 
2025.  Id. at 14. 
 Helpfully, the confidential informant told law enforcement that when Widman traveled to 
Frankfort, he always stopped to dine at Cattleman’s Roadhouse.  Id.  Based on that information, 
law enforcement conducted surveillance on Widman and were able to locate him at Cattleman’s 
Roadhouse in Frankfort, Kentucky, along with the two co-Defendants in this action, William 
Birkla and Michael Arro.  [R. 87 at 2.]  A woman by the name of Jennifer Howard also 
accompanied them at the restaurant.  Id. at 2.  Law enforcement located Widman’s vehicle, a 
Dodge Ram, in the parking lot of Cattleman’s Roadhouse and noted that it sported an Illinois 
license plate.  [R. 80 at 14.]  
 After some time, the quartet left the restaurant in two separate vehicles, Howard and 
Widman in one vehicle (the Dodge Ram), and Birkla and Arro in the other (a Buick Encore).  Id. 
at 14-15.  Law enforcement noticed that the Buick similarly sported an Illinois license plate.  Id. 
at 15. Officers followed the Dodge Ram to the confidential informant’s residence, approximately 
four miles away from the restaurant.  Id.  For the duration of the journey from Cattleman’s 
Roadhouse to the informant’s residence, law enforcement observed the Buick and Dodge driving 
in lockstep and even conducting the same lane changes as they travelled.  Id.    
 Once in the vicinity of the informant’s residence, the Dodge parked nearby, and Widman 
exited the vehicle to approach the informant’s residence where officers believed he was waiting 
for the informant to return home.  Id. at 16.  Officers continued to observe the Buick and noted 
that the Buick circled the block at least two times before traveling to a gas station approximately 
a quarter of a mile away.  Id.  The Buick remained at the gas station for a few minutes with 
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neither Birkla nor Arro exiting the vehicle.  Id.  The Buick then headed back towards the 
informant’s residence, passing the residence and circling the block once more.  Id. at 17. 
 At the suppression hearing in this matter, the testifying officer, Detective Brown, stated 
that based on his training and experience, he believed the driving pattern of the Buick to be 
consistent with a “lookout” vehicle conducting countersurveillance, and he noted that sometimes 
lookout vehicles transport the narcotics in addition to counter-surveilling.  Id.  Operating under 
this belief, the officers conducted a traffic stop of the Buick.  Id. at 17-18.  Upon approaching the 
Buick, officers detected an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.  Id. at 18.  Defendant 
Arro was operating the Buick at the time of the stop, and he admitted to officers that his vehicle 
contained marijuana.  Id.  Officers then removed Birkla and Arro from the vehicle and conducted 
a frisk of their persons, confiscating only their phones at that time.  Id. at 23. 
 At some point during the traffic stop, Jennifer Howard drove the Dodge Ram towards the 
location of the Buick traffic stop, and upon her arrival at the scene, voluntarily told officers that 
the Dodge Ram contained narcotics.  Id. at 20-21.  Officers then searched the Dodge Ram, 
finding approximately two kilograms of cocaine therein.  Id. at 21.  In light of this discovery, 
officers then detained Widman and brought him to the scene of the traffic stop.  Id. at 22.  
Officers read Widman his rights, and he indicated that he would like to speak to the officers.  Id. 
He then told officers that Birkla was “on the hook” for the narcotics because they obtained the 
narcotics from one of Birkla’s contacts.  Id. at 22-23.  Widman consented to a search of his cell 
phone which showed that Widman had been in regular contact with both Birkla and the 
informant.  Id. at 23.  Officers then arrested Widman, Howard, Birkla, and Arro and brought 
them into custody.  Id.  During a search at the police station, Birkla’s wallet, along with $748 in 
cash, were removed from his person.  Id. at 24. 
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  Subsequently, on July 17, 2025, Defendants Widman, Birkla, and Arro were federally 
indicted on charges arising out of this conduct.  [R. 1.]  Birkla faced charges of conspiracy to 
possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing 
cocaine, and aiding and abetting the same.  [R. 57.]  On December 11, 2025, the grand jury 
returned a superseding indictment charging both Birkla and Arro with one count of knowingly 
and intentionally conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; one count of knowingly and intentionally attempting to 
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846; and one count of aiding and abetting each other to knowingly and intentionally 
possess, with the intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  [R. 57.] 
 Defendant Birkla then brought the instant motion to suppress evidence of the $748 cash 
taken from his person, any officer observations of him at the scene, statements, photographs or 
video captured during the stop, and any testimony identifying him as present at the scene of the 
traffic stop.  [R. 87 at 6.]  Aside from the cash seized from Birkla’s person, Birkla primarily 
wishes to proceed as if he were never in the company of Widman, Arro, or Howard at the scene 
of the traffic stop.  See id.  He contends that the officers lacked sufficient justification to conduct 
the traffic stop of the Buick, and thus all evidence obtained as a result of this stop must be 
suppressed.  Id.  The United States, on the other hand, contends that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the Buick and a frisk of Birkla’s person, as well as 
probable cause to arrest him.  [R. 97.]  The Court addresses these arguments in turn.   
 
 
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II 
 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring a warrant based on probable cause, supported by 
oath, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Although the stop of a vehicle is considered a “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment, reasonableness does not require a warrant.  United States v. Brooks, 987 F.3d 593, 
598 (6th Cir. 2021).  Thus, a law enforcement officer may initiate a traffic stop when he 
“possesses either probable cause of a civil infraction or reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir. 2012). 
A 
 The Court begins its analysis by discussing the proper exclusionary remedy in this matter.  
Although perhaps an unnatural place to start, Birkla requests a unique remedy: suppression of 
any evidence that he was on the scene of the traffic stop.  [R. 87 at 5.]  The only physical 
evidence that Birkla wishes to suppress is the $748 in cash located on his person following his 
arrest and transport to the police station.  Id.  Birkla contends that the evidence must be 
suppressed as “derivative evidence from the illegal stop and seizure.”  Id.  But every violation of 
the Fourth Amendment does not result in suppression of evidence, so the Court finds it prudent 
to first analyze whether suppression would be warranted, even if Birkla’s contentions are correct.   
 “[T]he exclusionary rule encompasses both the ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct 
result of an illegal search or seizure’ and, relevant here, ‘evidence later discovered and found to 
be derivative of an illegality,’ the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.”  Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 
232, 237 (2012) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).  However, several 
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exceptions to the exclusionary rule render it inapplicable where its deterrence benefits do not 
outweigh its substantial social costs.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).   
 Assuming for the moment that the traffic stop was not sufficiently justified by either 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the officers did not find any physical evidence of any 
crime on Birkla’s person for the duration of the stop.  [R. 80 at 23.]  Essentially, Birkla theorizes 
that if the Buick had not been stopped, then Jennifer Howard would not have driven the Dodge 
Ram to the scene and volunteered that there were drugs in the vehicle, which would not have led 
officers to detain Widman and bring him to the scene, where Widman volunteered that Birkla 
was the one “on the hook for the narcotics.”  Id. at 21-22.  Thus, Birkla asks for suppression of 
(1) any officer observation of him at the scene, (2) any statements that he was on the scene, (3) 
any photographs or video capturing him on the scene, and (4) any testimony identifying him as 
present on the scene, which he contends constitutes derivative evidence of the unlawful traffic 
stop.  [R. 87 at 5.] 
 Although neither party devoted any attention to the exclusionary implications of Birkla’s 
request, the Supreme Court has held that although “the exclusionary sanction applies to any 
‘fruits’ of a constitutional violation,” a defendant “is not himself a suppressible ‘fruit.’”  United 
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).  The Sixth Circuit has also confronted the issue of 
whether a defendant’s identity may be suppressed if the defendant’s identity was only learned 
because of a Fourth Amendment violation, holding that identity is not itself a suppressible fruit.  
United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 The Court recognizes that Birkla does not explicitly ask for his “identity” to be 
suppressed, but rather, asks for the fact that he was present at the scene of the traffic stop to be 
suppressed.  [R. 87 at 5.]  In this case, the distinction appears to be without a difference, and 
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Birkla has provided no authority that indicates that a Court may suppress the simple fact of a 
defendant’s presence at a traffic stop.  At bottom, presence at the scene of the stop does not fall 
within primary or derivative evidence because it is an observable fact that is inseparable from 
identity.  See e.g. United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
observable facts, such as presence and appearance are not suppressible fruits). 
 As a practical consideration, the Court is unsure how this remedy would actually 
function.  Say the Court granted Birkla’s requested relief, and this matter proceeded to trial.  The 
United States would be able to offer evidence that Birkla dined at Cattleman’s Roadhouse with 
his co-Defendants, got in the passenger seat of the Buick with Arro at the helm, travelled in the 
Buick to the informant’s residence, circled the block, and travelled to the gas station in the 
Buick.  None of these observations flow from any alleged Fourth Amendment violation.  
However, once the traffic stop occurs, how is the United States to explain that Birkla is suddenly 
no longer present?  Would the United States be permitted to reference a faceless second character 
in the Buick and present on the scene, or would the witnesses be required to pretend that the 
passenger of the Buick vanished without a trace?  In considering how this would play out at trial, 
the absurdity of Birkla’s request becomes apparent.  Nevertheless, the Court need not definitively 
determine whether Birkla’s identity is subject to suppression because, as explained below, his 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.  
B 
 As previously noted, a law enforcement officer may initiate a traffic stop when he 
“possesses either probable cause of a civil infraction or reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.” Lyons, 687 F.3d at 763.  Reasonable suspicion is present when a police officer has “a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
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activity.”  United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). The officer must point to “specific and articulable facts” 
that are “more than an ill-defined hunch.” United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, reasonable suspicion requires 
“considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”  United States 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  Information relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry 
includes “the officer's own direct observations, dispatch information, directions from other 
officers, and the nature of the area and time of day during which the suspicious activity 
occurred.” Campbell, 549 F.3d at 371 (internal citations omitted). 
 Further, courts do not examine each factor leading to an officer's suspicions 
independently.  Courts look at the totality of the circumstances: whether “the individual factors, 
taken as a whole, give rise to reasonable suspicion, even if each individual factor is entirely 
consistent with innocent behavior.”  Campbell, 549 F.3d at 371 (quoting United States v. Perez, 
440 F.3d 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2006)).  The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed findings of 
reasonable suspicion based on an aggregation of factors that, alone, would be insufficient.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654, 667 (6th Cir. 2016) (“two strong indicators”—
dubious travel plans and relevant criminal history—along with nervousness and inconsistent 
statements); United States v. Paulette, 457 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2006) (criminal history, suspicious 
hand movements, efforts to evade police, and presence in a high-crime area); Winters, 782 F.3d 
at 302 (nervousness, inconsistent travel plans, and an odd rental arrangement); United States v. 
Campbell, 511 F. App'x 424 (6th Cir. 2013) (visible nervousness, history of drug charges, and 
“an unusually strong smell of air freshener”). 
 
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1 
 Under Terry v. Ohio , a seizure short of a full arrest may be justified by less than probable 
cause.  392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968).  Instead, officers may conduct an investigatory seizure based on 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Id.  Birkla contends that the stop of the Buick cannot 
be characterized as a Terry stop because the officers approached the Buick with guns drawn, 
which Birkla refers to as a “felony stop” conducted with arrest-level force.
1  [R. 80 at 50.]  The 
United States maintains that the traffic stop was a brief investigatory stop requiring only 
reasonable suspicion.  See id. at 59-60. 
 While there is no bright line at which a seizure becomes an arrest, Courts have considered 
several factors relevant, including (1) the conduct of the police, (2) the characteristics of the 
particular defendant, and (3) the physical surroundings of the encounter.  United States v. Grant, 
920 F.2d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1990).  Many of the cases in which this issue arises concern the 
duration or extent of the restraint on the defendant’s liberty.  For example, in United States v. 
Richardson¸ the Court found that the seizure amounted to an arrest when the defendant was 
placed in the back of a patrol car while officers searched his storage locker and truck.  949 F.2d 
851, 857-58 (6th Cir. 1991).  The Court emphasized the movement of the defendant from his car 
to another location constituted a significant restraint on his liberty.  Id.  Additionally, an officer 
may not extend a Terry stop “longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” or 
the stop may ripen into an arrest.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).   
 Neither concern is relevant here.  First, once the officers confirmed that Birkla was 
unarmed, he was permitted to stand away from the Buick and was not handcuffed or otherwise 
 
1 At one point in the suppression hearing, Birkla conceded that “[h]ow they stopped him really is. . 
.irrelevant.”  [R. 80 at 53.]  Although this may be construed as a withdrawal of his argument, in the interest 
of thoroughness, the Court addresses this issue.  
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restrained.  Thus, his liberty was not unduly restrained during the stop.  Additionally, Birkla does 
not contend that the duration of the stop amounted to an arrest.  Nor could he, because once Arro 
admitted to possessing marijuana in the Buick, this provided officers with probable cause to 
search the vehicle and thus secure the scene by briefly limiting both Birkla and Arro’s 
movements.  See United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2004); Maryland v. Wilson, 
519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997).  The time between the initial stop and Arro’s admission was 
undisputedly brief, and thus, the only inquiry here is whether the use of force alone, namely the 
officers approaching the vehicle with guns drawn, converted the traffic stop into a de facto arrest. 
 To be clear, use of force may indeed ripen a Terry  stop into an arrest.  See United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86.  However, “when police officers reasonably fear that suspects 
are armed and dangerous, they may order the suspects out of a car and may draw their weapons 
when those steps are ‘reasonably necessary for the protection of the officers.’”  Houston v. Clark 
Cnty. Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 814-15 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States 
v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993).  Notably, Birkla does not contend that the officers 
did not reasonably draw their weapons when approaching the vehicle; he only contends that in 
doing so, the stop became a de facto arrest.  [R. 80 at 50.]   
 Nevertheless, Detective Brown testified that in his experience, drug traffickers typically 
carry firearms to protect themselves and their narcotics.  Id. at 18-20.  Detective Brown 
specifically testified that the officers had knowledge that the instant transaction involved two 
kilograms of cocaine, which he described as a “significant amount” for the Frankfort area.  Id. at 
19-20.  Thus, he noted that a drug trafficker carrying that amount of cocaine, would likely “not 
want to be robbed” and thus may be carrying a firearm for protection.  Id. at 20.  With these 
safety concerns in mind, the officers approached the Buick with guns drawn, but as soon as 
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Birkla and Arro were removed from the vehicle, and the officers dispelled their belief that Birkla 
and Arro may be armed, the officers placed their firearms back in their holsters.  Id. at 45-46.   
 With that backdrop, the Court finds that the officers reasonably drew their weapons when 
conducting the stop of the Buick and did not conduct a “de facto arrest” of Birkla.  The Supreme 
Court has held time and time again that the interest in officer safety is “both legitimate and 
weighty.”  Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)).  
Specifically in the context of a traffic stop, the Supreme Court has noted that “danger to an 
officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the 
driver in the stopped car.”  Wilson¸ 519 U.S. at 414.  And in the context of narcotics 
transactions—which the officers reasonably believed Birkla to be involved in—a stop “may give 
rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence.”  Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981).  As such, the Court finds that the officers reasonably approached 
the Buick with weapons drawn and did not prolong that use of force such that the investigatory 
stop was converted into an arrest.  Accordingly, the Court finds the reasonable suspicion 
standard applicable to the instant traffic stop. 
2 
 The Court next addresses whether the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion.  
In the context of a traffic stop, “an officer must possess either probable cause of a civil infraction 
or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”  United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir. 
2012) (citing Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004)).  
Although a less exacting standard than probable cause, reasonable suspicion “requires more than 
a mere hunch.”  United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir 2008).  Rather, the 
officers must point to “specific and articulatable facts, which, taken together with rational 
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inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” detaining the defendant.  United States v. Ellis¸ 
497 F.3d 606, 612-13. 
 Here, the officers based their suspicion of Birkla on the following facts: (1) the officers 
knew of Widman’s prior drug trafficking conviction and plans to engage in a drug transaction on 
March 3, 2025; (2) Birkla and Arro were seen associating with Widman on March 3, 2025, and 
exited Cattleman’s Roadhouse with Widman and Howard; (3) both vehicles had Illinois plates 
and traveled “in tandem” for over four miles, even completing the same lane changes before 
arriving at the informant’s residence; (4) when Widman exited his vehicle to walk to the 
residence, the Buick slowed and then continued around the block, making several laps, but never 
straying far from the informant’s residence; (5) the Buick made a brief stop at a gas station, but 
neither occupant exited the vehicle, at which point it traveled back toward the residence to 
continue making laps around the block; and (6) officers knew, from training and experience, that 
many drug dealers travel with a lookout vehicle.  [See R. 80.] 
 Birkla contends that all of these facts are consistent with innocent behavior and cannot be 
aggregated into reasonable suspicion.  [R. 87 at 3-4.]  At bottom, Birkla contends that the 
officers found him and Arro “guilty by association” and piggybacked their suspicion of Birkla 
and Arro off of their suspicion of Widman.  [R. 80 at 56-57.]  Birkla attempts to point the 
Court’s attention to facts which, in his opinion, demonstrate a lack of particularized suspicion.  
Id.  Chiefly, Birkla contends that all of the above conduct is “innocent” and thus cannot be 
aggregated to rise to reasonable suspicion.  Id. 
 However, Birkla’s theory ignores the totality of the circumstances standard.  While it 
may be true that these facts in isolation would not give rise to particularized suspicion, the Court 
must view these facts not in isolation, but in totality.  United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 588 
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(6th Cir. 2001) (“[The Court] must determine whether the individual factors, taken as a whole, 
give rise to reasonable suspicion, even if each individual factor is entirely consistent with 
innocent behavior when examined separately.”).  Sure, exiting a restaurant with a known drug 
trafficker, riding in a car with a license plate from the same state as said drug trafficker, or even 
traveling four miles on the same roadway as a drug trafficker may not alone serve as the basis for 
reasonable suspicion.  But in the instant matter, these facts did not occur in isolation, and the 
Court may not view them that way in determining whether the officers possessed reasonable 
suspicion. 
 Birkla also contends that because the officers did not have prior knowledge of either 
Birkla or Arro, the officers could not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.  [R. 87 
at 4.]  But the fact that officers may not have known exactly how the Buick was involved in the 
transaction does not make their inference, based on past experience, an unsupported “hunch.”  
The purpose of an investigatory stop is to make “reasonable inquiries” which either confirm or 
dispel the officer’s reasonable suspicions.  United States v. Butler, 223 F.3d 368, 374 (6th Cir. 
2000).  As such, courts “cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty. . .where none exists.”  
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).  “Rather, they must permit officers to make 
‘commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’”  Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 
376, 380-81 (2020) (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125).  The objective and articulable facts set 
forth above supported the officers’ belief that the Buick was either the lookout vehicle or the 
vehicle transporting the narcotics and gave rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.  
As such, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the officers conducted a traffic stop of 
the Buick.  
 
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C 
 Having concluded that the officers had a proper basis to conduct a traffic stop, the Court 
next considers “whether the degree of intrusion. . .was reasonably related in scope to the 
situation at hand, which is judged by examining the reasonableness of the officials’ conduct 
given their suspicions and the surrounding circumstances.”  United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 
345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993)).  
Birkla asserts that even if the traffic stop was valid, the subsequent detention and frisking of 
Birkla’s person were not reasonable.  [R. 87 at 4.]  Essentially, Birkla contends that the officers 
did not have reasonable suspicion of either him or Arro, but rather, based their suspicion of them 
off of the intelligence the officers had on Defendant Widman.  Id.  
 At the outset, the Court notes that the officers did not seize any evidence from Birkla’s 
person during this initial pat down.  [R. 80 at 23.]  Rather, the cash and personal items identified 
in Birkla’s motion were seized after Birkla’s arrest, upon his arrival at the police department.  Id. 
at 23-24.  Thus, with nothing to suppress, the Court does not need to address the constitutionality 
of the search.  See e.g., United States v. Slaten, 5:11-cr-131-KKC, 2012 WL 2374241 (E.D. Ky. 
June 22, 2012) (denying motion to suppress as moot because the government did not seize or 
intend to introduce the challenged evidence). 
 Birkla also contends that he was unlawfully detained during the traffic stop, again 
asserting that the officers did not have any particularized suspicion of either him or Arro.  [R. 87 
at 4.]  As explained above, the officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the traffic 
stop.  Further, once the officers stopped the Buick and approached, they noticed an odor of 
marijuana emanating from the vehicle, and Arro admitted to possession of marijuana therein.  [R. 
80 at 29-20.]  The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that when an officer detects marijuana 
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emanating from a vehicle, this alone suffices to give the officer probable cause to search the 
vehicle.  See United States v. Crumb, 287 F. App’x 511, 514 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 
Sixth Circuit has consistently held “the detection of a narcotic’s odor, by itself is sufficient to 
establish probable cause to conduct a lawful search of the vehicle.”) 
 Furthermore, during a traffic stop, “an officer may order passengers out of the vehicle 
pending the completion of the stop.”  United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 
2016) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997)).  Additionally, officers “do not 
need independent justification to remove the driver or passengers from the vehicle.”  Id.  To that 
end, officers did not need any justification beyond the reasonable suspicion that justified the 
initial stop to briefly detain Arro and Birkla while conducting the search of the vehicle.  As such, 
the Court finds that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, and in any event, no evidence was 
recovered during the stop. 
D 
 Finally, Birkla argues that his arrest lacked probable cause.  [R. 87 at 5.]  “A warrantless 
arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the arrest is in public 
and there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”  
United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2006).  Probable cause “is not a high bar.”  
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018).  It requires an assessment of the events 
leading to an arrest, and from that perspective, the Court asks “whether an objectively reasonable 
officer would conclude that there is a ‘probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.’”  
Fisher v. Jordan, 91 F.4th 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57).  Probable 
cause “requires more than a reasonable suspicion but less than a preponderance of the 
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evidence—and far less than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Fisher , 91 F.4th at 425 (quoting 
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).  
 Birkla contends that officers had no evidence that Birkla had committed any crime 
because no drugs were found on him, no money exchanges were observed, and no surveillance 
was conducted, among other things.  [R. 87 at 5.]  Birkla asserts that officers arrested him based 
on his “mere presence in the Buick and a small amount of cash” which he contends is 
insufficient to rise to probable cause.  Id.  However, the record indicates otherwise.  
 Looking to the facts known to the officers prior to the arrest, in addition to the facts that 
justified the traffic stop of the Buick, the officers also had statements from Howard and Widman 
implicating Birkla, as well as text messages between Birkla and Widman.  [R. 80 at 20-22.]  
After Howard drove the Dodge to the scene of the traffic stop on her own accord and volunteered 
that the vehicle contained narcotics, the officers retrieved Widman from the CI’s residence.  Id.   
Upon Widman’s arrival at the scene, officers read him his rights, and he indicated that he wanted 
to speak to the officers.  Id. at 22.  Widman then told officers that Birkla had set up the meeting 
to obtain the narcotics recovered at the scene, and that Widman and Birkla had both visited 
Birkla’s contact on the morning of March 3 prior to driving to Frankfort.  Id. at 22-23.  Widman 
gave the officers consent to search his phone, and the testifying officer noted that Widman’s 
phone history indicated that he had been in regular contact with Birkla in preparation for the 
narcotics transaction and otherwise generally corroborated Widman’s story.  Id. at 23. 
 The above facts, coupled with the facts that justified the traffic stop of the Buick, are 
more than sufficient to justify Birkla’s arrest.  First, the officers already possessed reasonable 
suspicion that Birkla was involved in the narcotics transaction based on his association with 
Widman immediately prior to and during the timeframe that Widman officers knew, based on a 
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reliable confidential informant, that Widman would be conducting a narcotics transaction.  
Birkla’s involvement in the transaction was further bolstered by the fact that when Birkla and 
Arro were stopped by officers, they were unable to provide an explanation for their presence in 
the area. 
 Next, Howard’s arrival on the scene with the narcotics certainly tends to implicate Birkla 
and Arro.  The officers, using their commonsense judgment, could have reasonably taken 
Howard’s arrival to indicate that once Birkla and Arro had been stopped by the officers, Howard 
assumed that her and Widman had been caught as well, further supporting the officer’s suspicion 
that the four were working in concert.  And finally, the statements and phone history from 
Widman gave the officers further cause to justify Birkla’s arrest.  
 In sum, officers performed a lawful investigatory stop on Mr. Birkla, sufficiently justified 
by articulable facts.  They then legally frisked his person by performing a precautionary search.  
Further, the subsequent arrest of Birkla was sufficiently justified by probable cause.  Because 
none of the events of March 3, 2025, violated the Fourth Amendment, there is no fruit of the 
poisonous tree analysis for the Court to apply.  The evidence seized falls squarely within existing 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements.  
III 
 Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED 
that Defendant Birkla’s Motion to Suppress [R. 87] is DENIED. 
 
 
 
 
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This the 15th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
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