govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_20-cv-00264-10

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
JUAN BARRON, individually and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
vs. 
 
PAYCOR, INC., 
 
Defendant. 
 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
DUGAN, District Judge: 
 This matter comes on for hearing on the Plaintiff Juan Barron’s Motion for 
Sanctions. (Doc. 265, 266). Defendant Paycor filed its response to the Motion. (Doc. 270). 
The parties filed respective supplemental briefing. (Doc. 288, 296). The Motion was 
argued before the Court on June 2, 2026 and is now ripe for consideration. 
PLAINTIFF ’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
 Plaintiff contends generally that Paycor has not provided an accurate class size 
and that this this evident from the several class size assessments and errors made by 
Paycor in reaching those assessments. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that Paycor’s 
assessments over the years have varied from 14,000 members in 2021, 15,178 in December 
2024, to 14,178 in April 2025, and to 11,602 in June 2025. But then, later in June 2025 Paycor 
announced a new data set it had just discovered that reduced the class size to only 2,968. 
However, just 2 months later, Paycor disclosed that its latest assessment was also Page ID
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incorrect and that the actual class size consisted of 16,546 members. (Doc. 266, pp. 4-5) Of 
significance is that Paycor appears to have been until November 2025 excluding from the 
class size assessment those individuals who possibly consented to the scans. So, including 
those individuals, the class as of November 2025 was approximately 29,922 members. At 
the time of oral argument in June 2026, the class size grew to approximately 30,000. 
According to Plaintiff’s Counsel, notices have been sent to those individuals. 
 Plaintiff claims that the various changes in the class sizes configured by Paycor 
was a product of failure to “double check” th e work of Mr. Goodwin, as well as his lack 
of access to necessary data and his belief that the Class lists would be more precise “if 
they were rooted in biometric data Paycor has [available to it], such as biometric 
templates.” (Doc. 266, pp 6-7). Plaintiff also co ntends that the failur e of Paycor to have 
Mr. Goodwin verify the accuracy of the class size amounts to bad faith that warrants 
sanctions. (Doc. 266, P. 12). In particular, Plaintiff argues th at the discovery of a “new 
data set” that reduced the class size to 2,968 “lacked any basis in fact [and] should have 
been obvious to Paycor” since it directly contradicted the sworn deposition testimony of 
Mr. Dahdaly. Id. These considerations, together with allegations that Paycor refused to 
properly meet and confer about the discrepancies of the new data set, suggest to Plaintiff 
that Paycor acted vexatiously. 
Plaintiff argues that given the lack of tr ustworthiness of Paycor and the lack of 
confidence in its methodology to arrive at a precise and accurate class size, sanctions are 
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1927 in the form of access to and an audit of Paycor’s 
databases. Page ID
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Paycor disagrees that it acted in bad faith in its assessments of class size and that 
the erroneous dataset that resu lted in the reduction of cl ass size to only 2,958 was an 
innocent error which was readily and timely corrected. Paycor also argues that 28 U.S.C. 
§1927 does not authorize this Court to impose sanctions other than in the form of fees and 
certainly not of the kind that would allow Plaintiff’s expert “unfettered access to Paycor’s 
customers’ segregated , private environments located on over 100 databases, and 500 
applications, which contain the data of US-based customers and their US and worldwide-
based employees.” (Doc. 270, p. 4) 
 For the reasons explained below, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions will be 
denied. 
ANALYSIS 
28 USCA § 1927 provides that “[a]ny attorney or other person . . . who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by 
the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct.” Section 1927 “explicitly requires that counsel act 
unreasonably and vexatiously before sanctions are warranted.” Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 
F.2d 1181, 1184 (C.A.7 (Ill.),1992)(emphasis in original). And “past decisions have 
interpreted vexatious to mean either subjective or objective bad faith.” Id. See, Ordower v. 
Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1574 (7th Cir.1987) (indicatin g that intentional ill will or reckless 
conduct constitutes vexatious conduct); In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir.1985) (bad 
faith can be demonstrated by subjective evidence of malice, objective evidence of reckless 
conduct, or indifference to the law). Mere negligence alone does not satisfy the Page ID
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requirement of §1927. Walter v. Fiorenzo , 840 F.2d 427, 433 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1988) (“A court 
may impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, against an attorney where that attorney 
has acted in an objectively unreasonable ma nner by engaging in a “serious and studied 
disregard for the orderly process of justice”) By its own terms, the statute limits the 
authority of a district court to impose sanctions to” excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' 
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” But Plaintiff does not seek these 
sanctions. Rather, Plaintiff wants the Court to allow his expert to have access to Paycor’s 
databases for the purpose of conducting an audit. The grant of such access is not a 
sanction permissible under § 1927. 
But Plaintiff pivots to the argument that this Court may invoke its “inherent 
authority” to impose sanctions because that is appropriate where “those who show 
willful disobedience of court order, delay, disruption, or hamper ing enforcement of a 
court order.” See Doc. 266, p. 9, citing Fuery v. City of Chicago , 900 f3d 450, 463 (7 th Cir., 
2018). Certainly, “[s]anctions imposed pursuant to the district court's inherent power are 
appropriate where a party ha s willfully abused the judicial process or otherwise 
conducted litigation in bad faith.” Tucker v. Williams , 682 F.3d 654, 661–62 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 
2012). However, a district cour t must exercise restraint an d caution in ex ercising its 
inherent power. Id. This Court will do so here. 
First, Plaintiff cites to no authority that suggests that a district court may, in its 
exercise of its inherent authority, impose as a sanction to allow wholesale access to a 
party’s private databases for the purpose of carrying out an audit. The closest that 
Plaintiff comes is his reference to an unreported West Virgina case, Adair v. EQT Page ID
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Production Company , 2018 WL 3617887, at *1 (W.D.Va., 2018). There, the Plaintiffs 
contended that Defendant had failed to provid e it with accurate lists of the names and 
addresses of putative class members and had resisted doing so since the classes were 
certified approximately a year prior. But far fr om helpful to Plaintiff in this matter, the 
Court in Adair denied the sanctions request and directed Defendant to correct its class 
list. Id at *2. 
Second, Plaintiff points to no specific act on the part of the Defendant or its 
attorneys that amounts to a willful misrepresentation of class size. 1 Rather, Plaintiff 
points to the fluctuations in the class size estimated by Paycor for the proposition that 
Paycor’s conduct has been vexatious and has caused intolerable delay. Certainly, the class 
size as assessed by Paycor did fluctuate on several occasions in 2024 and 2025. The first 
eyebrow raising downward fl uctuation occurred in early June 2025 resulting in a class 
size of 11,620. The second significant downwa rd assessment occurred later the same 
month when the putative class size was estima ted by Paycor to be only 2,968. Paycor’s 
counsel represented to the Court on August 13, 2025, that 2,968 was, in fact, the class size. 
(Doc. 217, Tr. p. 12). During that hearing, th e Court ordered Paycor to produce both the 
2,968 and the 15,178 lists, which Paycor did. Shor tly thereafter, Plaint iff brought to the 
attention of Paycor that the lists demonstrated discrepancies. (Doc. 266, p. 5). The next 
 
1 During oral argument, the Court asked Counsel to point to misrepresentations were made by Defendant 
and none were identified. (Tr. p. 5) Still, the Court is mindful of the obvious resistance Paycor exhibited 
toward this Court’s refusal to exclude “consenters” from the class definition but the record does not clearly 
reflect that Paycor intentionally misrepresented a class membership assessment on that basis. Page ID
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day, on September 5, 2025, Paycor filed its Notice of Withdrawal of Argument, assigning 
the error to calculations made by Mr. Goodwin. 
Plaintiff’s claims of willfulness are based mostly upon Paycor’s 2,968 member class 
size and the failure of Paycor to “confirm, investigate or double-check” Mr. Goodwin’s 
First Supplemental Declaration (Doc. 266; see al so Doc. 186-1) Plaint iff focuses on the 
2,968 class size reduction as evidence necessary to justify sanctions, but the record reflects 
that it was more likely an error of negligen ce. Once discovered it was self-reported. 
Paycor immediately withdrew its argument that the class was only 2,968 individuals and 
submitted Mr. Goodwin’s Second Supplemen tal Declaration. (Doc. 212, 212-1) These 
observations from the record suggest to this Court that Paycor’s conduct relative to the 
class size assessments and calculations was not vexatious under § 1927. Likewise, the 
Court cannot find, based upon the record before it, that Paycor, “willfully abused the 
judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation in bad faith” so as to warrant sanctions 
under the Court’s inherent authority. See, Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 661–62 (C.A.7 
(Ill.), 2012). 
Worthy of note here is that the complexity of Paycor’s platforms, databases, 
datasets and templates for the collection of un ique biodata is readily apparent from the 
record. Paycor in its briefing emphasizes the complexity of and the breadth of its efforts 
in arriving at a reliable estimate of cla ss membership and outlines. (Doc. 270, pp. 10-14) 
Likewise, Paycor outlines the testimony of Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Dahdaly to illustrate its 
efforts. Id. Paycor asserts that “Paycor’s systems are complex, and Paycor has no data 
that would definitely show who used a finger- or face-scan device in Illinois.” (Doc. 296, Page ID
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p. 5) It is apparent that over time repeated queries with different search parameters may 
result in a different number of class members. Here, with the exception of the errors that 
resulted in a massive reduction in the class size, the other changes in class sizes were 
relatively small. These small changes in class size calculations do not necessarily point to 
any willful or contumacious behavior on the part of Paycor that would call for sanctions. 
Before concluding, the Court should note as well that the apparent confusion over 
fluctuations in the class membership occurred during a period when avenues of 
supplemental discovery were available. Su pplemental requests for production and 
supplemental interrogatories, designed and fashioned to address the very questions 
raised in the instant motion, were apparently not tendered. Nor were requests for 
supplemental depositions made. Possibly, given the obvious animosity existing between 
the parties, Plaintiff believed such efforts woul d be futile. Still, even if it was futile to 
make the requests, the Court would have been available to consider such requests, and 
expend possibly less time in that consideration than with the present motion and its 
plentiful pages of briefing and exhibits. Plaintiff asks for an evidentiary hearing to build 
its case in support of its motion for sanctions generally and “to determine the mechanics 
of Plaintiff’s audit” specifically. (Doc. 288, p. 11) Under these circ umstances, the Court 
declines to do so. “The inherent authority of federal courts to punish misconduct before 
them is not a grant of authority to do good”, nor is it, this Court believes, to be used in 
place of available discovery processes. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking 
Company, Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 390 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 2002) Page ID
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DISPOSITION
Plaintiff Juan Barron’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 265 and 266) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 
 Dated: June 16 2026. 
 
 __________________________ 
 DAVID W. DUGAN
 United States District Judge
Judge 
Dugan
Digitally signed 
by Judge 
Dugan 
Date: 
2026.06.16 
07:13:35 -05'00' Page ID
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