govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-1_22-cv-00070-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
JAHNELL PARKINSON, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
DETECTIVE MARK FLORELL, DETECTIVE CONNOR 
LEE, and OFFICER SEAN SIMMONS, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
1:22-cv-00070 (BKS/PJE) 
Appearances: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Jahnell Parkinson 
Schenectady, New York 12303 
 
For Defendant Florell: 
Lukas M. Horowitz 
Conway, Donovan & Manley, PLLC 
50 State Street, 2nd Floor 
Albany, New York 12207 
 
For Defendants Lee and Simmons: 
Ryan P. Bailey 
Bailey, Johnson & Peck, P.C. 
5 Pine West Plaza, Suite 507 
Washington Avenue Extension 
Albany, New York 12205 
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge: 
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff pro se Jahnell Parkinson brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against 
Defendants Mark Florell, Connor Lee, and Sean Simmons. (Dkt. No. 36). He asserts that 
Defendants—all law enforcement officials —violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching 

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his home and subjecting him to a visual body cavity search. Presently before the Court are 
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 
(Dkt. Nos. 109, 113, 118). The motions are fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 109-7, 113-5, 118, 124, 125, 
127, 130). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions are granted, and Plaintiff’s motion is 
denied. 
II. FACTS
1 
During 2019, Plaintiff lived in Niskayuna, New York. (See Dkt. No. 109-3, at 17, 96). 
Defendant Florell served as a Niskayuna Police Department detective; Defendants Lee and 
Simmons worked for the Rotterdam Police Department. (Dkt. No. 109-5, ¶¶ 1, 3; Dkt. No. 113-2, 
at 1; Dkt. No. 113-3, at 1). Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims stem from a May 23, 2019 
search of his home, and a search of his person following his arrest. (Dkt. No. 36, at 2, 5; see also 
Dkt. No. 72, at 10–15, 22). 
In March of that year, Plaintiff says, two people—one named Massimo Palleschi —
burglarized his home. (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 26, 96, 110–11; Dkt. No. 36, at 2). When Plaintiff 
reported the burglary to Niskayuna police, Florell and others responded “to the scene to take the 
report” and interview neighbors. (Dkt. No. 36, at 4; Dkt. No. 109-3, at 97–99, 114; Dkt. No. 109-
5, ¶¶ 6–8). But after this initial investigation and further correspondence with Florell, Plaintiff 
became frustrated with Florell’s handling of the case. (See Dkt. No. 36, at 4; Dkt. No. 109-3, at 
34, 114–15). Plaintiff believed that Florell and other officers “did not intend on investigating the 
 
1 The facts are drawn from the parties’ exhibits submitted in connection with the motions. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se 
status, the Court has also considered his amended complaint, summary judgment submission, and statement of material 
facts, (Dkt. Nos. 36, 118, 124) —all of which comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746—“as evidence for summary judgment 
purposes.” Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 26 n.5 (2d Cir. 2019); cf. Tracy v. Freshwater , 623 F.3d 90, 101– 02 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (discussing the special solicitude afforded pro se litigants) . In assessing the cross- motions for summary 
judgment, the Court will “draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” 
Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World All. Inc., 16 F.4th 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 
53 (2d Cir. 2010)). 

3 
crimes committed against Plaintiff,” (Dkt. No. 36, at 2), because Massimo Palleschi’s “cousin, 
Claude Palleschi, [was] a state trooper born and raised in Rotterdam,” (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 96; see 
also Dkt. No. 36, at 1–4). Instead, Plaintiff alleged, Defendants “conspired” to investigate him 
and “his assets,” intending to “arrest[] him and convict[] him on various drug charges so that 
they [could] eventually seize his assets.” (Dkt. No. 36, at 2–3; see also id. at 4 (alleging that 
Defendants and the alleged burglars “grew up together and [were] all friends on Facebook”); 
Dkt. No. 109-3, at 117–19 (similar)). 
On May 22, 2019, Rotterdam police sought a warrant to search Plaintiff’s home 
following their own investigation into Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 109-4, at 2–5). Defendant Lee 
submitted a warrant application containing the following information about that investigation. 
Police became aware of Plaintiff after a confidential informant (“CI”) told them Plaintiff was 
“selling [crack and powder] [c]ocaine and that he usually had product for sale.” (Id. at 3). They 
subsequently set up two “controlled buy[s]”—one on May 16, 2019, and the other on May 21—
in which Plaintiff sold a substance to the CI that later tested positive for cocaine. (Id. at 3–4). 
Before the first buy, which took place in Schenectady, police “observed [Plaintiff] leaving his 
residence” in Niskayuna. (Dkt. No. 109-4, at 3, 4). The second buy took place in Rotterdam, and 
police “followed [Plaintiff] without stops to the” buy location. (Id. at 4). The application 
included significant details about the buys—including that the participating officers had sear ched 
the CI before and after each transaction, ensured the CI made a signed statement, and collected 
supporting evidence consisting of “audio, video, and photographs.” (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 113-3, 
at 20–22 (police report containing same details)). Following those buys, officers conducted a 
photo array with the CI, who identified Plaintiff as the seller. (Dkt. No. 109-4, at 4; Dkt. No. 

4 
113-3, at 21). The application further noted that Plaintiff had been “the reporting party and caller 
for” previous police “reports” at the Niskayuna residence. (Dkt. No. 109-4, at 4). 
A Rotterdam town justice issued the warrant on May 22, and police searched Plaintiff’s 
residence the next day.2 (Id. at 6; Dkt. No. 36, at 4; Dkt. No. 113-3, at 2). That morning, officers 
pulled Plaintiff over as he left his home. (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 22, 28–29; Dkt. No. 118, at 1–2). 
“Plaintiff did not know the nature of the stop[,] only that he was legally driving his vehicle and 
not committing any crimes or in the process of such.” (Dkt. No. 36, at 4). Plaintiff was then 
“taken out of his vehicle . . . , handcuffed, searched and placed in the back of an unmarked 
vehicle.” (Id.; Dkt. No. 109-3, at 23, 30). At some point while he sat in the unmarked car, 
Plaintiff says, Lee told him that he had “messed up” and should never have “tried to get a 
relative of [a] police department [employee] arrested, because the guy who broke in [Plaintiff’s] 
house, Massimo, his cousin was a cop.” (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 30, 31, 35; see also Dkt. No. 36, at 
4). Plaintiff also testified that Lee tried convincing him to be an informant, threatened to kill 
Plaintiff’s dog, and repeatedly stated that police had a warrant, warning that they would “destroy 
[Plaintiff’s] house.” (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 23–24, 30–32, 35–36, 135–36). Ultimately, no one 
showed Plaintiff the warrant. (Id. at 33, 35; Dkt. No. 118, at 7). 
Eventually, police moved Plaintiff to Simmons’s marked patrol vehicle for transportation 
to the Rotterdam police station. (Dkt. No. 118, at 2). Defendants have submitted video footage 
from the patrol vehicle’s dashboard camera depicting this drive, which depicts the following. 
 
2 The warrant—directed to the Rotterdam and Niskayuna police departments, among other agencies —also conferred 
authority to search Plaintiff’s person. (Dkt. No. 109- 4, at 6). Although employed by the Niskayuna police, Florell 
denies participating in this warrant’s execution. (See Dkt. No. 109-5, ¶¶ 15–16). Plaintiff disputes this and testified at 
his deposition that security camera footage from his home during the search reflected a person that “looked like” 
Florell; other parts of Plaintiff’s testimony, however, contradict this statement. ( See Dkt. No. 109- 3, at 104–05; see 
also id. at 55–56, 99, 107–10, 137–39). Police later sought and received additional search warrants for Plaintiff’s car 
and bank accounts. (See Dkt. No. 113-3, at 5–8, 15, 37–48). 

5 
(See Dkt. No. 113-2, at 6 (“Video”)). The top of Plaintiff’s body is visible in the backseat, sitting 
directly behind Simmons in the driver’s seat; Plaintiff’s hands are restrained behind his back. 
(See id. at 0:32–50). Officers executing the search warrant could not enter Plaintiff’s home, so 
after several minutes into the drive, they call Simmons and request that he ask Plaintiff to give 
them the code to unlock the front door. (See id. at 06:48–58). Simmons then asks Plaintiff, “will 
you give them the code for the front door to get into your house?” (Id. at 6:59–7:03). Plaintiff 
immediately responds, giving Simmons the code.3 (Id. at 07:04–09). Simmons avers that during 
the drive to the police station he “saw [Plaintiff] moving around a lot” and “heard a noise that 
sounded like something crinkling.” (Dkt. No. 113-2, at 2). At times, the video depicts Plaintiff 
moving in the back seat, as well as Simmons appearing to observe that movement through the 
rearview mirror and in one instance turning around; crinkling noises can be heard throughout the 
video, but the video does not reflect whether Plaintiff caused those noises. (See Video at 01:22–
53, 03:00–06, 10:57–11:07). 
Upon arriving at the station, Plaintiff testified, Simmons removed him from the car and 
“placed [him] on a bench” before “strip search[ing] him.” (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 43–44; see also 
Dkt. No. 36, at 5; Dkt. No. 118,at 2; Dkt. No. 124, at 2). Specifically, Simmons directed Plaintiff 
to “strip down,” “bend over,” and “lift up [his] testicles and stuff.” (Dkt. No. 109-3, at 45). No 
one else was present. (Id. at 44). Plaintiff does not allege that Simmons penetrated any body 
cavity. At his deposition Plaintiff was unsure how long the search took, but he believed it was 
“quick” and took under five minutes. (See id. at 49). For his part, Simmons states that he did not 
 
3 Plaintiff alleged that Lee and Simmons—at the station, not in the unmarked car —had threatened to kill his dog and 
“caus[e] excessive damage to his home” unless Plaintiff gave them the code to unlock his apartment. ( See Dkt. No. 
36, at 5; Dkt. No. 109- 3, at 24–25, 35–38; Dkt. No. 124, at 2). During the videotaped ride, when Plaintiff expresses 
concern that officers would shoot his dog, Simmons tells Plaintiff that he heard another officer call an animal control 
officer to the scene to care for the dog. (Video at 07:10–26). 

6 
perform a “cavity search”; he maintains that he only “performed a search of [Plaintiff’s] person 
for the purpose of identifying weapons “ and “took [Plaintiff] to the booking area.” (Dkt. No. 
127-3, ¶¶ 8–9; see also Dkt. No. 113-2, at 2). 
Later, Simmons searched the back of his patrol vehicle. (Dkt. No. 113-2, at 2, 5). 
Simmons had previously ensured that the vehicle contained no contraband before Plaintiff 
entered. (Id. at 1–2, 5). But after transporting Plaintiff, Simmons “found a large plastic bag with 
a large number of plastic bags inside, each containing a white powder,” which was “partially 
wedged between the two seat cushions.” (Id. at 2). Simmons gave this evidence to the assigned 
detective and memorialized it in a supplemental report. (See id. at 2, 5). 
Police seized various items from Plaintiff’s home following the search, including scales 
and money counters. (Dkt. No. 113-3, at 24–26; see also Dkt. No. 36, at 5; Dkt. No. 124, at 3). 
Lee filed felony complaints charging Plaintiff with various state drug and other offenses. (See 
Dkt. No. 113-3, at 30–35). Plaintiff later pled guilty to third-degree criminal sale of a controlled 
substance and served two years’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ post-release supervision. 
(See id. at 2; see also Dkt. No. 109-3, at 65–67). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if all the submissions taken 
together “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); 
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). The moving party bears 
the initial burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 323. A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
governing law,” and is genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of 

7 
New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The movant may 
meet this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient 
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway 
Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (explaining that summary judgment is 
appropriate where the nonmoving party fails “‘to come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a 
reasonable juror to return a verdict in [their] favor on’ an essential element of a claim” (quoting 
In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010))). 
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 323–24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). The nonmoving party 
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot “rely 
on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for 
summary judgment,” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Quarles 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). “Mere conclusory 
allegations or denials cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none 
would otherwise exist.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations adopted) 
(quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
“When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all 
reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 
775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). When presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, courts 

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“evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all 
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Jingrong, 16 F.4th 
at 56 (quoting Byrne, 623 F.3d at 53). However, the Court will assess the facts “in the light 
depicted by the” dashboard camera footage. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007); see 
also Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir. 2010). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Defendants seek summary judgment as to both of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims, 
challenging the search of his residence and the search of his person. (Dkt. No. 109, at 10–13; 
Dkt. No. 113-5, at 9–21). 
A. Search of Plaintiff’s Residence 
As an initial matter, Florell argues that “there is no credible evidence establishing that 
[he] was personally involved in” the search of Plaintiff’s home. (Dkt. No. 109-7, at 10 
(capitalization and boldface omitted)). Florell denies participating in the search and argues that 
no reasonable juror could infer otherwise from Plaintiff’s “conflicting testimony.” (Id. at 12; see 
also Dkt. No. 109-5, ¶¶ 15–16). 
Although a defendant must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional 
violation to be liable under § 1983, see Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 
2001), “[a]ssessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are 
matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment,” Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553–54 
(quoting Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996)). True, in “rare” cases—where a 
“plaintiff relies almost exclusively on his own testimony, much of which is contradictory and 
incomplete”—courts m ay make “some assessment of the plaintiff’s account.” Rojas v. Roman 
Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Jeffreys, 426 
F.3d at 554). In those “extraordinary cases,” however, there must be no “plausible explanation 

9 
for discrepancies in [the plaintiff’s] testimony,” such as that an “earlier account” was merely 
“ambiguous, confusing, or simply incomplete.” Id. at 106 (quoting Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 555 n.2). 
Here, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff’s testimony is sufficiently “contradictory 
and incomplete” to discredit it for summary judgment purposes. Id. at 105. Even assuming 
Florell participated in the search, for the reasons discussed below, that search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
“Because the home is the first among equals in the Fourth Amendment’s eyes,” Alexander v. 
City of Syracuse, 132 F.4th 129, 146 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation modified), officers generally must 
obtain a warrant to search a suspect’s home, United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 
2000) (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per curiam)). “Ordinarily, an arrest 
or search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate is presumed reasonable 
because such warrants may issue only upon a showing of probable cause.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 
F.3d 139, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)); see also 
Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 214 (2d Cir. 2012). Here, as described above, officers 
searched Plaintiff’s home pursuant to a warrant issued by a town justice. 
Plaintiff advances several arguments to overcome the presumption of reasonableness, 
none of which are persuasive. Plaintiff first asserts that the warrant was unsupported by probable 
cause, and that the town justice “rubberstamped” it. (Dkt. No. 118, at 3; Dkt. No. 124, at 1, 2). 
The reasonableness presumption can be “defeated” where the “warrant affidavits, on their face, 
fail to demonstrate probable cause.” Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 156 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). Probable cause to search exists where, based on the totality of 
circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 

10 
a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 
82 (2d Cir. 2017). The standard does not require “hard certainties.” Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 156 
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231); Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2016). Rather, it 
turns “on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts,” Florida v. Harris, 568 
U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232), requiring “only such facts as make . . . 
the discovery of evidence” of wrongdoing “probable,” Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 157. 
The warrant application here contained ample information to meet this standard. In that 
application, Lee explained: (1) that a CI known to police reported that Plaintiff sold cocaine and 
“usually had product for sale”; (2) that police had conducted the May 16 and May 21 controlled 
buys in which Plaintiff sold the CI cocaine, gathering “audio, video, and photographs” as 
evidence, in addition to the cocaine and signed statements from the CI; (3) that before the first 
buy, police observed Plaintiff leaving the Niskayuna residence, and before the second, “followed 
[Plaintiff] without stops” to the buy location; (4) that police had conducted a photo array after 
those buys in which the CI identified Plaintiff as the seller; and (5) that Plaintiff had been the 
reporting party for previous calls to the Niskayuna residence. (Dkt. No. 109-4, at 3–4). On these 
facts, a reasonable person would conclude it “probable,” under the totality of circumstances, that 
the Niskayuna residence contained evidence of “wrongdoing”—namely, evidence that Plaintiff 
had sold cocaine. Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 157; Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
Resisting this conclusion, Plaintiff asserts that the CI was not “determined to be reliable 
or credible pursuant to constitutional standards.” (Dkt. No. 118, at 3). But the subsequent 
investigation—including the two controlled buys, photo array, and other accompanying evidence 
described above—sufficiently established the known CI’s reliability and credibility. See United 
States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[i]nformation may be 

11 
sufficiently reliable . . . if it is corroborated in material respects by independent evidence”); see 
also McColley v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 2014) (similar). 
 Plaintiff also argues that police lacked probable cause because the drug sales did not take 
place at his residence. (See Dkt. No. 118, at 3). Warrant applications must contain “a sufficient 
nexus between the criminal activities alleged and the place to be searched,” but need not do so 
using “direct evidence.” United States v. Silva, 146 F.4th 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration 
adopted) (quoting United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 182 (2d Cir. 2004)). Rather, officers may 
establish that nexus “based on a reasonable inference from the facts presented.” Id. (alteration 
adopted) (quoting Singh, 390 F.3d at 182). Here, the warrant application explained that, before 
the first buy in Schenectady, police observed Plaintiff leaving his residence in Niskayuna. (Dkt. 
No. 109-4, at 3, 4). And police followed Plaintiff “without stops” to the second buy location. (Id. 
at 4). The application thus contained a “sufficient nexus” between Plaintiff’s alleged crimes and 
the Niskayuna residence. See Silva, 146 F.4th at 189; cf. United States v. Muhammad, 520 F. 
App’x 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The short time between [suspect’s] transactions . . . and his arrival 
at . . . home provide[d] a ‘reasonable inference’ of a nexus between the drug purchases and his 
residence ‘based on common sense.’” (quoting Singh, 390 F.3d at 182)). 
Finally, although, as described above, Plaintiff alleges that the real reason Defendants 
searched his home stemmed from his accusing Massimo Palleschi of burglarizing his home, 
officers’ “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 
U.S. 769, 771–72 (2001) (per curiam). Whatever their motivations, no record evidence exists to 
call into question the other information contained in the warrant application establishing 

12 
probable cause. For all these reasons, this is not a case where the warrant affidavit, on its face, 
failed to show probable cause. Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 156. 
Plaintiff next argues that the warrant was “forged,” (see Dkt. No. 124, at 1, 2; Dkt. No. 
118, at 1–2; Dkt. No. 130, at 1), and that the warrant application contained false information, 
(see Dkt. No. 36, at 10). Plaintiffs may rebut the reasonableness presumption when “the issuing 
magistrate was . . . misled into finding probable cause by material omissions for which 
defendants were knowingly or recklessly responsible.” Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 156 (citing Franks, 
438 U.S. at 155–56). But here, Plaintiff provides only conclusory allegations of forgery and 
falsity. (Dkt. No. 36, at 10; Dkt. No. 118, at 1–2; Dkt. No. 124, at 1, 2). His “‘conclusory 
statements or mere allegations’ will not suffice to defeat summary judgment.”4 Moll v. 
Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., 94 F.4th 218, 228 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Davis v. New York, 316 
F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments as to the search of his home are without merit. The 
Rotterdam town justice had authority to issue a warrant to search Plaintiff’s Niskayuna home. 
(Dkt. No. 118, at 3; Dkt. No. 124, at 1). Niskayuna and Rotterdam are both within Schenectady 
County, and one of the underlying offenses—the second controlled buy— occurred in Rotterdam. 
Cf. People v. Hickey, 40 N.Y.2d 761, 763 (1976) (“Where the underlying offense allegedly 
occurred within the geographic jurisdiction of the Justice Court, a search warrant may, if 
necessary, be executed throughout the county or in an adjoining county.”); see also People v. 
Alteri, 47 A.D.3d 1070, 1071 (3d Dep’t 2008) (“[A] local court may properly issue [a search] 
warrant when it has geographic, but not, necessarily, trial jurisdiction . . . .”). Plaintiff also argues 
 
4 Likewise, neither do Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the town justice had not signed the warrant at the time 
police searched his home suffice to defeat summary judgment. ( See Dkt. No. 118, at 7; Dkt. No. 124, at 1). As noted 
above, the warrant reflects that the town justice signed it the day before the search. (See Dkt. No. 109-4, at 6). 

13 
that officers never showed him the warrant or the search warrant application. (Dkt. No. 118, at 3, 
7; see also Dkt. No. 124, at 2; Dkt. No. 130, at 1). But those assertions do not change the fact 
that the search was reasonable in light of the warrant. See Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 155–56; see also 
United States v. Armstrong, 406 F. App’x 500, 501 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004)); United States v. Sims, 553 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). 
In sum, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this Fourth Amendment claim 
because a warrant supported by probable cause authorized the search of Plaintiff’s home.
5 
B. Visual Body Cavity Search 
Plaintiff’s remaining Fourth Amendment claim stems from Simmons’s search of Plaintiff 
after they arrived at the police station. Specifically, as described above, Plaintiff alleges that 
Simmons directed Plaintiff to remove his clothes, bend over, and lift his testicles. (See Dkt. No. 
109-3, at 44–45). Simmons denies conducting such a search, maintaining that he “performed a 
search of [Plaintiff’s] person for the purpose of identifying weapons “ and “took [Plaintiff] to the 
booking area.” (Dkt. No. 127-3, ¶¶ 8–9). However, he argues, even accepting Plaintiff’s version 
of events as true, he possessed sufficient justification for conducting the search Plaintiff 
describes. (See Dkt. No. 113-5, at 11–13). 
Searches incident to arrest have long constituted an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). The Second Circuit has 
explained: 
(1) a “strip search” occurs when a suspect is required to remove his clothes; (2) a 
“visual body cavity search” is one in which the police observe the suspect ’s body 
cavities without touching them (as by having the suspect to bend over, or squat and 
cough, while naked); (3) a “manual body cavity search” occurs when the police put 
anything into a suspect’s body cavity, or take anything out. 
 
5 In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address Lee’s and Simmons’s arguments regarding consent and 
qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 113-5, at 15–21). 

14 
 
Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. City of 
Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2013)). When police subject a suspect to a visual body 
cavity search “as an incident to a lawful arrest,” they must possess “a specific, articulable factual 
basis supporting a reasonable suspicion to believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body 
cavity.” Id. at 38 (quoting People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 311 (2008)). 
 Accepting Plaintiff’s version of events, Jingrong, 16 F.4th at 56, Simmons conducted a 
visual body cavity search that must have been supported by reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff 
had secreted evidence inside a body cavity, see Sloley, 945 F.3d at 36, 38. Reasonable suspicion 
requires more than a “mere hunch,” but “the level of suspicion the standard requires is 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously 
less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. at 43 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 
393, 397 (2014)); see also Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2016). This standard “is 
satisfied as long as authorities can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, provide a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski, 112 F.4th 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2024) 
(citation modified); Dancy, 843 F.3d at 106. Courts consider the totality of circumstances, Sloley, 
945 F.3d at 43, “based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior,” 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); see also Dancy, 843 F.3d at 106. 
Here, Simmons argues that the following facts established reasonable suspicion to 
support of the visual body cavity search: (1) Plaintiff’s “suspicious behavior during transport,” 
(2) Simmons’s discovering cocaine in the back of his patrol vehicle after transporting Plaintiff to 
the station, and (3) that the offense underlying Plaintiff’s arrest concerned possession of 

15 
cocaine.6 (See Dkt. No. 113-5, at 11–13). At the outset, however, the Court will not consider the 
cocaine found in the patrol vehicle. According to Plaintiff, the search occurred shortly after he 
arrived at the station. (See Dkt. No. 109-3, at 43–44). Indeed, Simmons asserts that he had no 
further contact with Plaintiff after taking him for booking, and that he searched the car after that. 
(See Dkt. No. 113-2, at 2, 5; Dkt. No. 127-3, ¶¶ 8–9). Drawing reasonable inferences in 
Plaintiff’s favor, it appears that any search of the patrol vehicle occurred after the alleged visual 
body cavity search. Thus, the facts uncovered by that search cannot be considered in evaluating 
reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (requiring that courts assess 
reasonable suspicion based on “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or 
the search”). 
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that the remaining facts were sufficient to confer 
“reasonable suspicion to believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity.”
7 Sloley, 
945 F.3d at 38. Plaintiff had just been arrested for selling cocaine. And during the drive to the 
station—with his hands cuffed behind his back—Simmons “saw [Plaintiff] moving around a 
lot.” (Dkt. No. 113-2, at 2). As described above, the video confirms that Plaintiff had been 
moving, and that Simmons appeared to have observed this movement through the rearview 
 
6 Simmons notes that the warrant authorizing officers’ search of Plaintiff’s home also authorized them to search 
Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 113-5, at 12). The warrant, however, did not authorize a visual body cavity search. ( See Dkt. No. 
109-4, at 6). 
7 Simmons also argues that any visual body cavity search was “justified by the need to prevent the concealment of 
contraband prior to entering a secure facility.” (Dkt. No. 113- 5, at 13). The Second Circuit has explained that “a 
blanket policy of conducting visual body cavity searches on new inmates,” instituted in response to legitimate 
penological concerns, “is constitutional.” See Murphy v. Hughson, 82 F.4th 177, 185 (2d Cir. 2023) (alteration 
adopted) (quoting Gonzalez, 728 F.3d at 160). Unless a plaintiff presents “‘substantial evidence’ of an ‘exaggerated’ 
response” to those concerns, courts generally “defer” to such policies. Id. (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 5 66 U.S. 318, 330 (2012)). But “[a]bsent an actual penological justification or 
institutional policy,” the Circuit’s “prior case law on the constitutional boundaries of permissible strip searches,” 
including Sloley, “continues to apply.” See id. at 186. Here, no party has presented evidence of an institutional policy, 
and Simmons argues that the search was warranted by penological concerns generally without any record citations in 
support. (See Dkt. No. 113-5, at 12–13). Because the Court concludes that the visual body cavity search was in any 
event supported by reasonable suspicion under Sloley, it need not address this issue. 

16 
mirror and by turning around. These facts formed a “particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting” that he secreted contraband in a body cavity. Soukaneh, 112 F.4th at 117; cf. Sloley, 
945 F.3d at 46 (giving examples of relevant facts in this context, including “evidence that [the 
arrestee] was fidgeting or moved about suspiciously”). Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegation that 
a visual body cavity search occurred, that search was supported by sufficient reasonable 
suspicion, and Simmons is entitled to summary judgment on this claim, too.
8 
V. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 109, 113) are 
GRANTED; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 118) is DENIED; 
and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is 
further 
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, close this 
case, and serve a copy of this decision on Plaintiff in accordance with the Local Rules. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 16, 2026 
 Syracuse, New York 
 
8 The Court therefore need not address Simmons’s qualified immunity argument. And having determined that—even 
viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff —Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, the Court 
denies Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. See Jingrong, 16 F.4th at 56. 

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