govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_26-cv-02296-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SAHAND ROSTAMI BORUJERDI, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH 
AMERICA, LLC; and DOES 1-50, 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 

 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 
MOTION TO REMAND 
 
[Doc. No. 6.] 
 
On May 14, 2026, Plaintiff Sahand Rostami Borujerdi filed a motion to remand the 
action back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.) On June 1, 
2026, Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“JLRNA”) filed a response in 
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 10.) 
A hearing on Plaintiff’s motion is currently scheduled for Monday, June 29, 2026 at 
10:30 a.m. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7. 1(d)(1), the Court determines the matter is 
appropriate for resolution without oral argum ent, vacates the hearing, and submits the 
motion on the parties’ papers. For the reasons below, the Court deni es Plaintiff’s motion 
to remand. 
Background 
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Ca lifornia. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 19.) 
Defendant JLRNA is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of 
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Delaware with its principal place of business located in New Jersey. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12.) 
On February 26, 2022, Plaintiff purch ased a 2022 Land Rover Sport HST, VIN
 
SALWS2RU8NA221152 (“Vehicle”). (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) When the Vehicle was purchased, 
Plaintiff received express written warranties in which Defendant JLRNA, an automotive 
manufacturing company, undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of 
the Vehicle or to provide comp ensation if there is a failure in utility or performance. (Id. 
¶¶ 4, 8.) 
At the time of delivery and during Plaintiff’s ownership of the Vehicle, the Vehicle 
manifested defects and noncon formities covered by De fendant’s express warranties. (Id. 
¶¶ 9, 16, 33.) Plaintiff delivered the Vehicle to an authorized repair facility. (Id. ¶ 21.) 
However, Defendant JLRNA and Defendant’s authorized repair facilities were unable to 
conform the Vehicle to the applicable expr ess warranties after a reasonable number of 
repair attempts, failed to service or repair th e Vehicle within thirty days pursuant to Civil 
Code § 1793.2(b), and failed to replace the Vehicle or make restitution in accordance with 
the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 43, 50, 51.) 
On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complain t in the Superior Court of California, 
County of San Diego against Defendant, alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of express 
warranties pursuant to the Song-Beverly Cons umer Warranty Act, Civil Code § 1790 et 
seq.; (2) breach of implied warranties in vi olation of Civil Code § 1791.1, § 1792, and § 
1794; (3) failure to promptly repurchase product in violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d) and 
§ 1793.1(a)(2); and (4) failure to commence repairs within a reasonable time and to 
complete them within 30 days in violati on of Civil Code § 1793.2(b). (Id. ¶¶ 14-51.) 
Plaintiff explicitly revokes acceptance of the Ve hicle in its Complain t and seeks general, 
special, actual, incidental, a nd consequential dama ges. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 26, 36, 37, Prayer for 
Relief.) 
On April 10, 2026, Defendant removed the action to United States District Court for 
the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal.) On April 10, 2026, Defendant filed an 
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answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No. 3, Answer.) By the pr esent motion, Plaintiff 
moves to remand the action back to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.) 
Discussion 
I. Legal Standard 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Unite d States v. Mark, 530 F.3d 
799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. 
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to ex ist, the only function 
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). A case is removable only if 
it could have been originally filed in federal court. Chicago v. Int’l Coll. Of Surgeons, 522 
U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). 
“The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal 
requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore–Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 
1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
This presumption against removal “means that ‘the defendant always has the burden of 
establishing that removal is proper.’” Id. (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566). 
Here, Defendant removed th e action to federal court on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. No. 1.) “Trad itional diversity jurisdiction 
requires complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy greater than 
$75,000.” Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The Supreme Court has e xplained that where removal is based on 
diversity jurisdiction, “a defendant's notice of removal need include only a plausible 
allegation that the amount in controversy ex ceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart 
Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Where it is not 
facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing 
party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets 
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the jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 
1090 (9th Cir. 2003). While “a defendant cannot establish re moval jurisdiction by mere 
speculation and conjecture, with unreasona ble assumptions,” Ibarra v. Manheim 
Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015), the defendant need not “research, 
state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages,” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 
730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (i nternal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he 
amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise), the costs 
of complying with an injunction, and attorneys' fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or 
contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). 
II. Analysis 
Plaintiff does not dispute the timeliness of Defendant’s removal, that complete 
diversity of citizenship exists, or that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 
requirement. (See generally Doc. No. 6.) Rather, Plaintiff me rely asserts that Defendant 
has the burden of proving that removal is proper both substantively and procedurally as the 
removing party. (Id. at 8 at 2, 6.) Defendant states it has properly removed this action 
because it involves citizens of different stat es and the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (Doc. No. 10 at 7.) The Court agrees. 
A. Diversity of Citizenship 
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant notes that there is complete diversity of 
citizenship. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff does not assert otherwise. 
For purposes of diversity, citizenship of an individual is established by both United 
States citizenship and domicile in a state of the United States. See Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 
747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). An individual's domic ile is determined at the time the action is 
filed, see Lew, 797 F.2d at 750, and is established based upon “a fixed habitation or abode 
in a particular place, and an intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Owens 
v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940). A corporation, on the other hand, is a 
citizen of its state of incorporation and of the state where its prin cipal place of business 
(i.e., its “nerve center”) is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 
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U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010). A limited liability company “is a citizen of every state of which its 
owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 
899 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff, “at the time this action was commenced, was 
and is still a citizen of the United States who is domiciled in the State of California, in the 
City of San Diego.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11.) In support, Defendant points to the retail 
installment sales contract attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint which lists a San Diego address 
for Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 10 at 14; see Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 19.) Defendant also retained 
an investigator who found nine addresses for Plaintiff, seven of which were in San Diego. 
(Doc. No. 10 at 14.) Plaintiff does not contest that he is domiciled in California. (See Doc. 
No. 6.) Defendant JLRNA is a limited liability company formed under the laws of 
Delaware with its principal place of business located in New Jersey. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12.) 
Defendant JLRNA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Jaguar Land Rover Holdings Limited. 
(Id. ¶ 13.) Jaguar Land Rover Ho ldings Limited is a citizen of England with its principal 
place of business located in Coventry, England. (Id. ¶ 14.) Further, none of the addresses 
found for Plaintiff are in Delaware or New Jersey. (Doc. No. 10 at 14.) Thus, Defendant 
has met its burden of establishing that there is complete diversity of citizenship between 
the parties. 
B. Amount in Controversy 
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff prays for actual 
damages, a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages, incidental 
and consequential damage s, and actual attorneys’ fees. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 17.) 
Plaintiffs offer no facts or reason to doubt Defendant's assertion. 
 1. Actual Damages 
California Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B) provides that the measure of damages 
in an action such as this one includes restitu tion in “an amount equal to the actual price 
paid or payable by the buyer,...including any co llateral charges such as sales or use tax, 
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license fees, registration fees, and other official fees[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 
1793.2(d)(2)(B). While Plaintiff’s Complain t does not provide a cl ear and unambiguous 
statement as to actual damages, (see generally Doc. No. 1-2, Compl.), Defendant contends 
that Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle throughout the 
Complaint. (Id. ¶ 25, 38.) The retail installm ent sale contract attached to the Complaint 
states the total sale price for the Vehicle as $124,181.20. (Id. at 19, 20.) 
Section 1793.2(d)(2)(C) permits the manuf acturer to reduce the amount payable to 
the buyer “by that amount direc tly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the 
buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized service 
and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.” Cal. 
Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). The set-off amount is determined by multiplying the “actual 
price of the new motor vehicle paid or pa yable by the buyer...by a fraction having as its 
denominator 120,000 and having as its numerator the number of miles traveled by the new 
motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer de livered the vehicle” for correction of the 
problem. Id. Although Defendant did not calculate a mileage offset reduction in its Notice 
of Removal, Defendant provides mileage figur es for Plaintiff’s repair visits in its 
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. No. 10 at 11.) Defendant notes that 
Plaintiff’s first repair visit for a check e ngine light and Apple Ca r Play cutting out was 
August 3, 2022, with 6,081 miles on the odometer at the time of presentation. (Id. at 11, 
27, 28.) The second visit was on March 25, 2024, with 26,526 miles on the odometer. (Id.) 
The third visit was on May 3, 2025, with 40,341 miles on the odometer. (Id.) There were 
two more visits in June 2025. (Id.) Usi ng the more generous 40,341 mileage figure of 
Plaintiff’s third visit, a mileage o ffset of $41,746.61 can be calculated. 1 Subtracting 
$41,746.61 from $124,181.20 (total sale price) yields $82,434.59, an estimate of Plaintiff’s 
actual damages. 
Defendant’s submission is sufficient to establish by a preponderance of evidence 
 
140,341/120,000 x $124,181.20 = 41746.61491 
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that Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act actual dama ges are, after taking mileage offset into 
account, at least $82,434.59. The actual damage alone readily meets the amount-in-
controversy of $75,000 for the purposes of this Motion. 
 2. Civil Penalty Damages 
Under California Civil Code 1794(c), the buyer of a defective consumer good may 
receive a civil penalty “not [to] exceed two times the amount of actual damages” if the 
buyer establishes that the failure to comply was “willful.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). “The 
Ninth Circuit routinely considers civil penalties when deciding whether the amount-in-
controversy requirement ha s been satisfied, including in Song-Beverly cases.” Wang v. 
FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 1218745, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (citing Babasa v. 
LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Morey v. Louis Vuitton North Am., 
Inc., 561 F. App'x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011)). Courts have also rejected the argument that 
defendants must proffer evidence to support th e likelihood of civil penalties for purposes 
of meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Pulver v. Nissan North America, 
Inc., 2025 WL 1766529, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2025) (“[I]t is appropriate to consider 
only the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint in assessing whether a claim of 
willfulness should be used in determining whether the amount in controversy is satisfied.”) 
Plaintiff explicitly alleges that Defendant willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act in 
multiple ways, including by refusing to comply with its obligations to promptly offer 
restitution or replacement for the vehicle, or commencing service and repair within a 
reasonable time or to complete such service or repairs within thirty days. (Doc. No. 1-2, 
Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23, 24, 47, 50, 51.) Plaintiff also alleges that these violations entitle them 
to “civil penalty [damages] for each violation, in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s total 
damages” pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(c) and (e). (Id. at 17.) Thus, by 
alleging willfulness and requesting the maximum of civil penalties, Plaintiff has put the 
maximum amount of civil penalties in controve rsy and that amount should be included. 
Defendant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a civil penalty of up to two-
times the Vehicle price can be considered in determining whether the amount-in-
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controversy requirement has been met. Combined with the actual damages of $82,434.59, 
the addition of $164,869.18 readily meets the amount-in-controversy of $75,000 for the 
purposes of this Motion. 
3. Attorneys’ Fees 
Lastly, Plaintiff’s Complaint requests atto rneys’ fees pursuant to California Civil 
Code 1794(d). (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 17.) Under California Civil Code 1794(d), a 
buyer of a defective consumer good is allowed to recover, as a part of the judgment, “a 
sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs a nd expenses, including attorney's fees based 
on actual time expended ....” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). In its Notice of Removal, 
Defendant cites Brady v. Mer cedes-Benz USA, Inc., where th e Court recognized that fee 
awards in similar lemon law cases regularly included attorney's fees of over $60,000. (Doc. 
No. 1 ¶ 23) (citing Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002)). Factoring in negligible attorneys’ fees here, the court finds that Defendant has 
met its burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons above, the Defendant has satisfied its burden of establishing that 
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present action based on diversity 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 16, 2026 
 
 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 
 U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T 
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