govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00598-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
ANTHONY GLEN, 
 
 P l a i n t i f f , 
 
v. 
 
 
ERIKA WRIGHT, LEAH SIKS, and 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & 
FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
 D e f e n d a n t s . 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1 
 
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge: 
 This matter is before the Court on review of Plaintiff Anthony Glen’s amended 
complaint. 2 (Doc. 7). Glen, wh o is proceeding pro se , is an inmate of the Illinois 
Department of Corrections currently incarcer ated at Taylorville Correctional Center. 
(See Doc. 2). Pursuant to this Court’s order of May 11, 2026 (Doc. 5), Glen has submitted 
an amended complaint (Doc. 7). In Glen’s amended complaint, he alleges that Defendants 
 
1 A nearly identical copy of this order was issued on June 10, 2026. (Doc. 11); see also Glen v. Wright, No. 26-
CV-598, 2026 WL 1678222 (S.D. Ill. June 10, 2026). The Court has since become aware of a few clerical errors; 
specifically, (1) an accidentally omitted quotation mark, Glen, 2026 WL 1678222, at *2 n.4; (2) the 
unintentional omission of subsection designations in describing the historical enactment of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, id. at *3; and (3) typographical errors in referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), 
Glen, 2026 WL 1678222, at *3–4. The Court may correct these sorts of errors on its own initiative. F ED. R. 
CIV. P. 60(a); accord 12 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil §§ 60.11, 60.13 (2026); see also United States v. Griffin, 782 
F.2d 1393, 1396–97 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining which errors are and are not correctable under Rule 60(a)). 
Accordingly, the Court enters this amended order, whic h supersedes its previous order of June 10, 2026. 
This amendment does not change the outcome for Plaintiff Anthony Glen in any way; for all practical 
purposes, the two orders are identical. 
2 This Court ordered Glen to amend his original complaint (Doc. 1) for a violation of Rule 5.2(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 5). The initia l complaint was never subjected to a screening under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Page ID
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Erika Wright, Leah Siks, and the Illinois De partment of Children and Family Services 
(DCFS) made material misrepresentations in his minor children’s foster care proceedings 
and ignored his written warnings about the danger of the proposed foster parents. 
(Doc. 7). According to the amended complaint, his children were placed in a foster home 
where they were physically and sexually abused as a result of Defendants’ actions. Id. He 
brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for compensatory and punitive damages in the 
amount of 50 million dollars. Id. 
 Because this Court granted Glen’s motion to proceed in district court without 
prepaying fees or costs (Doc. 10), his amended complaint must now be screened pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2) re quires careful threshold scrutiny. If the 
Court determines that Glen’s action is frivolous or malicious, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), then “the court 
shall dismiss the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 
(7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or 
transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal 
expense.”). 
For the reasons set forth below, Glen’s amended complaint must be dismissed 
without prejudice.
3 The Court first examines the text of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and concludes 
that Glen’s entire amended complaint must be dismissed. Second, the Court explains why 
 
3 Because this Court would permit a non-indigent plaintiff in the same position to amend his complaint, 
Glen will also be permitted to file a second amended complaint. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 
1014, 1023–25 (7th Cir. 2013). Page ID
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dismissal would be required even under a contrary interpretation of the statutory text. 
ANALYSIS 
Glen’s amended complaint runs into trouble more or less immediately: one of the 
three named defendants is DCFS (Doc. 7, at 4), a state agency entitled to sovereign 
immunity, e.g., Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 2013). 
Because Glen only seeks damages as a remedy (Doc. 7, at 9), DCFS is immune from his 
suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Tang v. 
Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 17-cv-05790, 2021 WL 4477891, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
2021). In other words, Glen’s “action . . . s eeks monetary relief against a defendant who 
is immune from such relief.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 
According to the plain text of the statute, the Court is now required to dismiss 
Glen’s “case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (providing that, if th e Court determin es one of the 
three enumerated defects is present, “the court shall dismiss the case” (emphasis added)); 
see also Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220, 223 (2018) (“[T]he mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally 
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998))). But in practice, 
courts tend to apply § 1915(e)(2) on a claim-by-claim basis. E.g., Porter v. Murphy, No. 24-
CV-5, 2024 WL 4363297 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 1, 2024); Eldridge v. City of Alton, No. 24-CV-1788, 
2025 WL 3537568 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2025); Edwards v. Lake Terrace Condo. Ass’n Bd. of Dirs., 
No. 10 C 2986, 2010 WL 3516173 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2010). But see Lloyd v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 
No. 19cv411, 2019 WL 5057944, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 8, 2019) (explaining that its dismissal 
of a prisoner’s claim was not under § 1915(e)(2), which “authorizes dismissal of only ‘the Page ID
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case,’ not a claim, and here the court is not dismissing the entire case”). And when a pro 
se plaintiff seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, courts (including this one) 
have commonly—maybe ubiquitously—dismissed only the immune defendants. 
E.g., Rose v. Illinois ex rel. Jud. Branch , No. 25-CV-1207, 2025 WL 3153411, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. 
Nov. 12, 2025); see, e.g. , Maddox v. Berge , 473 F. Supp. 2d 888, 897 (W.D. Wis. 2007) 
(“Section 1915(e)(2)(iii) requires dismissal of any claim that ‘seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii))); see also, e.g. , Al-Haj v. OMH , No. 18-CV-5505, 2019 WL 2074726 
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019) (dismissing claims ag ainst only two of th ree defendants under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)); cf. Porter , 2024 WL 4363297, at *2–3 (dismissing claims against 
immune defendants with prejudice but claims against non-immune defendants without 
prejudice). 
In the Court’s view, the common practice of dismissing individual claims under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) is incorrect. The meanin g of the statutory text is plain and 
unambiguous: if a plaintiff’s action seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, the 
court must dismiss the case. The statute does not direct courts to sever and dismiss only 
the claims seeking money damages from immune defendants. Instead, it contemplates the 
dismissal of an entire case if a given conditio n is true: that it seeks monetary relief from 
any defendant who is immune from such relief. 4 Here, it is literally untrue to say that 
 
4 Congress used the word “action” to describe the unit of evaluation. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The statute does not 
ask the Court to evaluate whether a given claim seek s relief from an immune defendant, but whether the 
action does. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). And, if the Court determines that an action does do so, the statute describes 
what must be dismissed as “the case,” not “the claim.” Id. This is also why the typical practice of evaluating 
individual claims for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failures to state a claim is perfectly consistent with Page ID
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Glen’s action does not seek monetary relief from an immune defendant: DCFS is a named 
defendant, and he only seeks monetary relief. Accordingly, Glen’s complaint must 5 be 
dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion when interpreting analogous 
language. For instance, take Ru le 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
governs voluntary dismissa ls of “an action.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)–(2). The Seventh 
Circuit has held that voluntary dismissals of individual claims are not permitted because 
the word “action” refers to the entire case. Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. Inc. , 242 F.3d 
772, 777 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Nevertheless, Rule 41( a)(1)[] does not speak of dismissing one 
claim in a suit; it speaks of dismissing ‘an action’—which is to say, the whole case.”); 
Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the same is true as to Rule 
41(a)(2) under its plain meaning, a s i t a ls o re f e rs e xc l u s i vely to “actions”). To reach a 
contrary result—to dismiss only Glen’s cl aim against DCFS, rath er than the entire 
complaint—this Court would need to pret end that when Cong ress wrote the word 
“case,” what it really meant was “claim.” But it is not this Court’s place to second-guess 
the words Congress has chosen to employ. E.g., Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220, 224 (2018) 
(“[R]espect for Congress’s prerogatives as policymaker means carefully attending to the 
 
this Court’s interpretation of the statute. An action seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant 
whether every named defendant is immune or only one is; the same cannot be said of frivolousness, 
maliciousness, and failure to state a claim. If a plaintiff brings an action with four counts, one of which is 
frivolous and another of which fails to state a claim, one would not be using words’ ordinary meanings to 
describe the entire action as frivolous or as failing to state a claim; ergo, dismissal of the entire case would 
not be required under § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
5 Section 1915(e)(2)’s use of the word “shall” does not leave this Court with discretion to ignore the 
statutory command. See Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220, 223 (2018) (citing Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad 
Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998)). Page ID
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words it chose rather than replacing them with others of our own.”) 
The strongest evidence that § 1915 means what it says comes from the immediately 
subsequent provision of the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Sections 1915(e) and 
1915A were both enacted as part of the Pr ison Litigation Refo rm Act of 1995 (PLRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71 to -75. Wh ere § 1915(e)(2) direct s courts to screen 
the complaints of plaintiffs seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (regardless of whether 
they are imprisoned), § 1915A di rects courts to scr een the complaints of all imprisoned 
plaintiffs (regardless of whether they seek to proceed in forma pauperis). Both provisions 
direct courts to look for frivolousness or maliciousness, failures to state a claim, or suits 
seeking monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. 
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). But despite being en acted at the same time by the same 
Congress, they differ materially in describing what a court should dismiss if a complaint 
contains an enumerated defect. While § 1915(e)(2) requires a court to “dismiss the case,” 
Congress wrote in § 1915A(b) th at the screening court must “dismiss the complaint, or 
any portion of the complaint.” § 1915A(b) (emphasis added). 
The textual variation between § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) would not ordinarily be 
so significant: the United States Code is vast and sprawling, and it would be unrealistic 
to expect its usage of terms to be perfectly consistent throughout. E.g., Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170–73 (2012). Sections 
1915(e) and 1915A, however, were enacted in the same bill at the same time; indeed, the 
text of §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(b) were drafted on adjacent pages. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 
Stat. 1321-74 to -75. If ever one would expect Congress to use the same words to mean the Page ID
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same thing, and different words to mean different things, it would be in this context. See, 
e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra, at 173. 
It is worth acknowledging that in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), the Supreme 
Court reached a different conc lusion in interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), another 
provision of the PLRA. Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with 
respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as 
are available are exhausted.” The Supreme Co urt held that § 1997e(a) does not require 
the dismissal of an entire action if only so me of its individual claims are unexhausted; 
instead, courts should analyze exhaustion on a claim-by-claim basis. Jones, 549 U.S. 
at 219–24. It explained that the statute’s reference to an “ac tion” was insufficient to 
overcome the general rule that “if a complaint contains both good and bad claims, the 
court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad. . . . ‘If Congress meant to depart from 
this norm, we would expect some indi cation of that, and we find none.’” Id. at 220–21 
(quoting Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748–49 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
But unlike § 1997e(a), the PLRA’s exhausti on requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 
does provide a clear indication of Congress’s intention to depart from that general rule: 
the difference in language between § 1915(e)(2) (the general-purpose indigence screening 
provision) and § 1915A(b) (the prisoner-specific screening provision), which otherwise 
largely mirror each other. Section 1997e(a), by contrast, is structur ally and functionally 
dissimilar to both § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Instead of mandating that courts screen 
certain classes of actions and appeals, it imposes a procedural requirement directly on 
prisoners. It makes sense that the Jones Court was unpersuaded by comparisons of Page ID
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§ 1997e(a) to § 1915A(b), because they are not parallel provisions. Sections 1915(e)(2) and 
1915A(b), on the other hand, perform the exact same function for tw o different sets of 
cases. When Congress chose to vary the language between those two sections, it provided 
precisely the indication that was absent in Jones. 
The Court concludes that Glen’s complaint should be dismissed without prejudice 
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 6 However, even if the Court were incorrect in its 
interpretation of that provision, the result would be the same. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that the § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) dismi ssal applied only to Glen’s claim against 
DCFS, the rest of his complaint would still be “transparently defective.” Hoskins, 320 F.3d 
at 763. 
In Glen’s remaining two claims, he alleges that Defendants Wright and Siks, DCFS 
employees, were involved in the placement of his minor children in a foster home. 
According to the complaint, Wright and Siks planned to place his children in the home 
of a foster mother they claimed was a godmother and family member of the children. 
Glen alleges that he wrote Wright and Siks to inform them that the proposed foster parent 
was neither the children’s godmother nor a fa mily member. He also allegedly informed 
them that his children would be in danger if placed in the home of the proposed foster 
mother. He claims that Wright and Siks ignored his letters, misrepresented the proposed 
foster parent’s relationship, and caused his children to be placed in the foster home where 
 
6 Because this Court dismisses Glen’s amended comp laint for seeking monetary relief from an immune 
defendant, this dismissal should not count as a “strike” under § 1915(g), which only applies to actions 
dismissed as frivolous, maliciou s, or failing to state a claim. See Holmes v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. , 141 
F.4th 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2025). Page ID
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they were, ultimately, abused. 
The first problem is jurisdictional. Children in state custody have a constitutional 
right “not to be handed ove r by state officers to a foste r parent or other custodian . . . 
whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser.” Waubanascum v. Shawano County, 
416 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. 
Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990)). But that right belongs to Glen’s children, not to 
Glen himself; accordingly, he does not have standing to bring suit for an alleged violation 
of that right. See, e.g. , Chaudhry v. Thorsen , No. 20-cv-50381, 2026 WL 766048, at *7–8 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2026) (“[T]he plaintiff gene rally must assert his own legal rights and 
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))). Where a plaintiff lacks standing, a 
federal court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim. E.g., Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 73 F.4th 
502, 511 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Nettles v. Midland Funding LLC , 983 F.3d 896, 899 
(7th Cir. 2020)). So, if Glen’s amended complaint were construed as pursuing relief solely 
on his own behalf, the Court would be required to dismiss it under Rule 12(h)(3). FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 
But the Court is mindful that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally. 
E.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally 
construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (quoting Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))). Accordingly, the Court assumes Glen intended to bring Page ID
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these claims as next friend to his children. Children cannot bring suit in federal court on 
their own; instead, they “must be represente d by a competent adult, ordinarily a parent 
or relative.” Johnson v. Collins, 5 F. App’x 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2001) (first citing T.W. by Enk 
v. Brophy , 124 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1997); and then citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)). This 
reading of Glen’s complaint would eliminate the potential jurisdictional defect. 
Even construed liberally, however, Glen’s claims remain defective. Glen is 
proceeding without the representation of counsel, and pro se parents may not litigate on 
behalf of their minor children.7 E.g., Bowersock v. Matherly, No. 23-1368, 2023 WL 6847548, 
at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2023); Bullock v. Dioguardi , 847 F. Supp. 553, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
(“Although a parent has a right to litigate claims on his own behalf without an attorney, 
he cannot litigate the claims of his childre n unless he obtains counsel.” (citations 
omitted)). “Because the choice to appear pro se is not a ‘true choice’ for minors who cannot 
determine their own legal actions, minors are en titled to trained legal assistance so that 
their rights may be fully protected.” Johnson, 5 F. App’x at 485 (quoting Cheung v. Youth 
Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
Ultimately, Glen cannot bring a pro se claim against Wright and Siks for violations 
of his children’s rights. E.g., Bowersock, 2023 WL 6847548, at *6. So even if 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) only barred one of Glen ’s claims, the outcom e would not change. 
Depending on how the Court construed Glen’s amended complaint, he would either lack 
 
7 There are narrow exceptions to this rule, none of which are applicable here. See, e.g., Bowersock v. Matherly, 
No. 23-1368, 2023 WL 6847548, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2023) (first citing Oleszczak ex rel C.O. v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Child. & Fam. Servs. , No. 17 C 933, 2018 WL 3428102, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2018); and then citing Wrhel v. 
United States, No. 18-cv-1199, 2018 WL 3800251, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 25, 2018)). Page ID
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standing or be impermissibly representing the interests of his minor children without 
counsel. Under either approach, the Court would be obliged to dismiss his amended 
complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Plaintiff Anthony Glen’s amended complaint (Doc. 7) is 
DISMISSED without prejudice . However, Glen will be permitted to file a second 
amended complaint. 
If Glen seeks to litigate th e rights of his minor children, he must at a minimum 
have legal representation. 8 Glen SHALL NOT file a second amended complaint 
purporting to represent his children as next friend unless he first secures legal 
representation. The Court encourages Glen to seek legal representation on his own. If he 
attempts to secure legal representation and does not succeed, he may ask the Court to 
appoint counsel for him under § 1915(e)(1). Johnson v. Doughty , 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 
(7th Cir. 2006). If Glen chooses to ask this Court to appoint counsel to help him sue on his 
children’s behalf, he must file a motion requesting appointment of counsel before he 
files his second amended complaint.9 
The Court warns Glen that, if he requests appointed counsel, he must show that 
 
8 The Court does not wish to offer false hope: even if he secures legal representation, he may or may not 
be legally entitled to represent their interests as next friend. See, e.g. , Burnside v. Ill. Tenth. Jud. Cir. Ct. , 
No. 23-cv-01107, 2023 WL 3568097, at *4 n.4 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2023) (citing Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 
270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
9 If, however, Glen seeks only to litigate his own rights, not those of his children, he may file a second 
amended complaint without requesting appointment of counsel or securing legal representation on his 
own. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Maury Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 26-cv-00037, 2026 WL 1068989, at *3–4 (M.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 20, 2026). The requirement only applies if he is seeking to represent the interests of his children in this 
lawsuit. Page ID
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he has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel himself (or that he has been 
effectively precluded from doing so). See Santiago v. Walls , 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th Cir. 
2010).
Glen is further ORDERED to file either a second amended complaint or a request 
for representation of counsel on or before August 10, 2026 . Failure to comply with this 
Court’s order may result in the dismissal of this action.
Finally, the Court advises Glen that pursuant to this Court’s Local Rules, he is 
under a continuing obligation to keep the Court informed of any change in his location. 
SDIL-LR 3.1(b)(2). If his address changes, he must notify the Court within 14 days of the 
change by filing a Notice of Change of Addr ess. Failure to do so may result in the 
dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 16, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge Page ID
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