govinfo:USCOURTS-idd-2_26-cv-00090-0

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
 
 
BRYAN SENTELL MCLEOD, 
 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
SHOSHONE COUNTY, IDAHO; 
SHOSHONE COUNTY 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE; SHOSHONE COUNTY 
SHERIFF’S OFFICE AND JAIL; 
SHOSHONE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
AND CLERK OF COURT’S OFFICE; 
JACKSON COUNTY, OREGON; 
JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
OFFICE AND JAIL; KING COUNTY, 
WASHINGTON; PORT OF SEATTLE 
POLICE DEPT.; JOHN DOES 1-20. 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 

 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Plaintiff Bryan Se ntell Mcleod’s Complaint (Dkt. 2) and 
Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the 
Court must review Mcleod’s request to determine whether he is entitled to proceed in forma 
pauperis—which permits civil litigants to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee or 
to pay the filing fee over time. Rice v. City of Boise City , 2013 WL 6385657, at *1 (D. 
Idaho Dec. 6, 2013). The C ourt must also undertake an initial review of Mcleod’s 
Complaint to ensure it meets the minimum required standards. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

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For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Mcleod’s application to proceed in 
forma pauperis and DISMISSES the case WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Mcleod alleges that Defendants, acting under color of state law in Idaho, Oregon, 
and/or Washington, violated his Constitutional rights and subjected him to repeated 
unlawful arrests and detentions based on an invalid and improperly maintained warrant, 
seized and retained property and bail funds in violation of Due Process, denied him 
necessary medical care while in custody, obstructed access to the courts, and engaged in 
racially discriminatory conduct. Dkt. 2, at 4. Mcleod claims that these actions caused him 
to suffer a prolonged incarceration, loss of li berty, loss of property, physical injury, and 
emotional distress, all in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. Mcleod brings this action 
against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. Id. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. IFP Application 
In order to qualify for in forma pauperis status, a plaintiff must submit an affidavit 
that includes a statement of all assets he posse sses and indicates that he is unable to pay 
the fee required. The affidavit must “state th e facts as to affiant’ s poverty with some 
particularity, definiteness and certainty.” United States v. McQuade , 647 F.2d 938, 940 
(9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
B. Pleading Standards 
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, 

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Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly 
“facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference th at the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not 
required, but a plaintiff must offer “more th an . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there 
is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has 
not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). “Bare assertions” and conclu sory allegations without adequate factual 
support are not enough. Id. At 681. 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to screen complaints filed in 
forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss any action or claim that is frivolous or malicious, 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. “These last two categories—together with 
claims that fall outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those 
claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-
established legal rule.” Nevarez v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 2023 WL 3886484, at *1 (D. Idaho 
June 8, 2023), aff'd sub nom. Nevarez v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 4562746 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 24, 2024). 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 4 
The Court liberally construes the pleading s to determine whether a case should be 
dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient fact s to support a cognizable legal theory or for 
the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inqu iry is whether a constitutional 
claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. 
Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, Lopez v. Smith , 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 
2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, 
giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to 
amend). 
Moreover, “under what has come to be known as the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, 
lower federal courts are precluded from exerci sing appellate jurisdiction over final state-
court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
As an initial matter, Mcleod appears to be totally indigent. The Court, therefore, 
GRANTS his application to proceed in forma pauperis. 
Turning to the Compla int, as discussed below, Mcleod fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, and he seeks monetary relief against defendants who are 
immune from such relief. The Court must, therefore, DISMISS the Complaint. The Court 
will, however, grant Mcleod 30 days to amend the Complaint. 
A. § 1983 Claims 
Mcleod brings claims under § 1983, which provides a cause of action for civil rights 
violations. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that a person acted 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 5 
under color of state law, and that the person’s act proximately caused a violation of rights 
protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute. Crumpton v. Gates , 947 F.2d 
1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). 
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits agains t a State: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Local governments, however, are 
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 369 (2001). “A county is subject to section 1983 liability for such suits if its 
policies, whether set by the government’s lawmakers ‘or by those whose edicts or acts that 
may fairly be said to represent official policy,’ caused the particular constitutional violation 
at issue.” Streit v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell 
v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 
Bringing a § 1983 claim against a county po lice department is essentially bringing 
the claim against the co unty, not the State. See Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Dep’t , 
351 F. App’x 243, 246 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 764 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (holding a California sheriff’s department as “a county actor subject to suit under 
§ 1983” because it “performs the function of conducting criminal investigations.”). By 
contrast, a district attorney’s office “acts as a state office with regard to actions taken in its 
prosecutorial capacity, and is not subject to suit under § 1983.” Jackson, 749 F.3d at 767. 
Similarly, a county court is also “entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” 
Bilyeu v. Myers, 649 F. App’x 372, 373 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 6 
of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010)). This immunity 
likewise extends to court clerks. See Ellis v. Cnty. of El Dorado, 2022 WL 6765809, at *1 
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2022) (citing Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Sup. Ct. , 318 F.3d 1156, 
1161 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity subject to municipal 
liability under Monell, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or 
unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Streit, 236 F.3d at 
559. Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are: (1) 
the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity ha d a policy or custom; 
(3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional 
right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 
Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). 
1. Wrongful Arrest Claims 
The Court construes Mcleod’s claims conc erning the 2018 arrest, the warrant 
maintenance, and refusal to extradite as asserted against Shoshone County, Idaho. 1 The 
Court further construes the alle gedly wrongful 2022 arrests claims as asserted against 
Jackson County, Oregon Sheriff’s Office and Jail; King County, Washington; and Port of 
Seattle Police Department. 
Mcleod’s Complaint fails to indicate any policy or custom as the propelling force 
behind the alleged violation of his rights. Thus, his claims against these defendants are not 
 
1 Shoshone County Sherriff’s Office and the Shoshone County Jail are arms of the county and thus 
redundant defendants. Hearn v. Truesdale, 2025 WL 3101761, at *3–4 (D. Idaho Nov. 6, 2025). 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 7 
cognizable under Monell and fail as a matter of law. 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy this deficiency in an amended complaint. 
2. Unreasonable Seizure / Procedural Due Process Claims 
The Court construes Mcleod’s claim that hi s bail was wrongfully withheld to be 
asserted against Jackson County, Oregon. The Court treats the claim regarding the seizure 
of $27,000 in cash while at Seattle-Tacoma In ternational Airport to be asserted against 
King County, Washington and the Port of Seattle Police Department. 
Mcleod’s Complaint fails to indicate any po licy or custom as the propelling force 
behind the alleged violation of his rights. Thus, his claims against these defendants are not 
cognizable under Monell and fail as a matter of law. 
Additionally, Mcleod’s claims that Jackson County, Oregon denied his motion for 
return of bail is an attempt to appeal an Oregon State court’s final judgment. Such claims 
are prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Lance, 546 U.S. at 463. 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 
3. Deliberate Indifference Claim. 
Mcleod’s Complaint fails to identify the entity from which he seeks relief regarding 
his claim that he was denied necessary medical care while in custody. Nevertheless, since 
all defendants are governmental entities, Mcle od’s Complaint must identify a policy or 
custom that caused the constitutional violation. Streit, 236 F.3d at 559. The Complaint fails 
to do so. Thus, Mcleod’s claims against these defendants are not cognizable under Monell 
and fail as a matter of law. 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 8 
4. Denial of Access to the Courts 
The Court construes Mcleod’s denial of acce ss to the courts clai m to be asserted 
against the Idaho District Court for the First Judicial District and the First Judicial District 
Clerk’s Office.2 
Idaho courts are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity: “[A] plaintiff may not 
sue the State of Idaho or the Idaho state cour ts in federal court because such claims are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Harris v. Att'y Gen. , 2025 WL 26759 38, at *3 (D. 
Idaho Sept. 17, 2025) (citing Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161). “The clerk of court is also a non-
viable section 1983 defendant.” Ellis v. Cnty. of El Dorado, 2022 WL 6765809, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 11, 2022) (citing Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161). 
Because Mcleod’s denial of access to the c ourts claims are asserted against parties 
which enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, those claims must be DISMISSED. 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 
5. Equal Protection / Due Process Claim 
 
The Court construes Mcleod’s claim that the 2018 Idaho stop and arrest were based 
on racial prejudice to be asserted against Shoshone County, Idaho. 
Again, this claim fails under Monell because Mcleod did no t allege that the 
defendants have a policy or custom of racial discrimination. 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 
 
2 Although the Complaint lists the Shoshone County Courthouse and Clerk’s Office as defendants, the 
Courthouse is a building rather than a legal entity. A dditionally, Idaho courts and clerk’s offices are arms 
of the state, not of the counties in which they sit. The Court, theref ore, construes the Complaint as suing 
the correct defendants. 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 9 
6. Unconstitutional Pretrial Detention 
Construing the Complaint liber ally, the Court treats Mcleod’s claim regarding the 
detention while awaiting trial to be asserted against Shoshone County, Idaho. Again, the 
Complaint fails to indicate any policy or custom as the propelling force behind the alleged 
violation of his rights. Thus, Mcleod’s claim against these defendants is not cognizable 
under Monell and fails as a matter of law. 
The Court is uncertain why Mcleod’ s Complaint lists Shoshone County 
Prosecutor’s Office as a defendant. He has not made any explicit allegations against this 
defendant. The Court infers th at this is somehow related to Mcleod’s acquittal at trial. 
Nevertheless, a county prosecut or’s office is entitled to El eventh Amendment immunity. 
See Jackson, 749 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 
B. § 1985 Claims 
§ 1985 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. To state a claim under § 
1985(2) or (3), a plaintiff must allege a racial or class-based discriminatory animus behind 
the conspirators’ actions. See Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); 
see also A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 676 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that claims under §§ 1985(2) and 1985(3) require the element of class-
based animus). 
Mcleod’s Complaint does not allege that he is a member of a racial group or other 
protected class against whom a conspiracy was perpetrated, nor has he alleged facts 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 10 
sufficient to support a plausibl e inference of a conspiracy. Th erefore, the Complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
Mcleod may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. 
C. § 1986 Claims 
§ 1986 provides that persons who negligently fail to prevent a wrongful conspiracy, 
as described in § 1985, may be liable to the party injured. 
Because Mcleod has not stated a plausible § 1985 claim in his Complaint, his § 1986 
claim is one on which relief cannot be gran ted. Mcleod may attempt to remedy these 
deficiencies in an amended complaint. 
D. § 1988 Claims 
§ 1988 authorizes the Court to awar d parties who prevail under §§ 1981–86 
attorney’s fees and costs. Because Mcleod’s Complaint does not state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, his § 1988 claim becomes invalid. 
E. Leave to Amend Complaint 
If amending a complaint would remedy its deficiencies, then courts should provide 
plaintiffs an opportunity to do so. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2003). Because 
Mcleod may be able to state a claim upon relief can be granted, the Court will allow him 
an opportunity to amend his Complaint to remedy its deficiencies. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Mcleod’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
2. Mcleod is GRANTED leave to amend. Any such amended complaint must be filed 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 11 
 
 
within 30 days from the entry of this Order. 
3. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed 
with prejudice and without further notice. 
 
DATED: June 15, 2026 
 
 
 _________________________ 
 David C. Nye 
 U.S. District Court Judge 
 
 
 
 
 

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