govinfo:USCOURTS-okwd-5_23-cv-00548-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
 
STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE ) 
C O M P A N Y , ) 
 ) 
 P l a i n t i f f , ) 
 ) 
v . ) C a s e N o . C I V - 2 3 - 5 4 8 - D 
 ) 
JASON K. OBE; JUSTINA D. FAAPOULI; ) 
BRENDA ROBERTSON; KIMBERLY ) 
V ARGAS; and STEPHEN ROBERTSON, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER 
 Before the Court is Defendant Jason K. Obe’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 
Against Brenda Robertson, St ephen Robertson, and Kimberly Vargas [Doc. No. 46]. On 
May 11, 2026, the Clerk of Court filed an entry of default against Defendants Brenda 
Robertson, Stephen Robertson, and Kimberly Vargas (Default Defendants) [Doc. No. 45]. 
Default Defendants have not taken any action in this case, nor have they responded to the 
Clerk’s entry of default or Defendant Obe’s present motion for default judgment. Although 
duly served with process, Default Defendant s have failed to appear and answer or 
otherwise respond to Defendant Obe’s Answer and Crossclaim [Doc. No. 39]. 
BACKGROUND 
 On June 22, 2023, Plaintiff State Farm Life Insurance Company initiated this 
interpleader action regarding the distribution of proceeds from the life insurance policy of 
Jimmie Obe (the Insured) [Doc. No. 1]. Plain tiff filed executed summons for each of the 
defendants [Doc. Nos. 8-12]. On July 26, 2023, Defendant Justina D. Faapouli filed an 

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Answer and Crossclaim [Doc. No. 7] against Default Defendants seeking half of the life 
insurance proceeds. 
 Defendant Faapouli did not include Defenda nt Obe in her crossclaim. It appears 
from the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint that the last change of beneficiary form 
that was accepted and processed by Plaintiff listed Defendant Faapouli and Defendant Obe 
as 50/50 primary beneficiaries [Doc. Nos. 1-16, 1-17]. 
 On July 11, 2024, the Court entered defau lt judgment in favor of Defendant Faapouli 
on her crossclaim in the amount of $24,078. 97, plus accrued interest of $468.04, 
representing one-half of the life insurance pr oceeds. [Doc. Nos. 32, 33]. The Court then 
issued an Administrative Closing Order [Doc. No. 35], directing the Clerk of Court to hold 
the remaining $24,078.98, plus accrued and accruing interest , in accordan ce with The 
Guide to Judiciary Policy. 
 On January 9, 2026, Defendant Obe file d a Motion to Reopen Proceedings and for 
Final Determination and Distri bution of Remaining Interple ad Proceeds to Defendant 
Jason K. Obe [Doc. No. 37]. The Court granted Defendant Obe’s motion and reopened this 
matter. On March 20, 2026, Defendant Obe filed an Answer and Crossclaim [Doc. No. 39], 
seeking the remaining one-half of the life insurance proceeds, plus accrued interest. 
 Default Defendants have not responded to Defendant Obe’s crossclaim, the Clerk’s 
entry of default, or Defendant Obe’s motion for default judgment. 
STANDARD OF DECISION 
The entry of default judgme nt is committed to the sou nd discretion of the Court. 
Tripodi v. Welch, 810 F.3d 761, 764 (10th Cir. 2016). “Before entering default judgment, 

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district courts ‘should ordinarily evaluate’ the five ‘Ehrenhaus factors,’” which include: 
(1) the degree of actual prej udice to the defendant; (2) the 
amount of interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the 
culpability of the litig ant; (4) whether the court warned the 
party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely 
sanction for noncompliance; a nd (5) the efficacy of lesser 
sanctions. 
 
Chavez-DeRemer v. Ascent Constr., Inc., 2025 WL 1638134, at *3 (10th Cir. June 10, 2025) 
(unpublished)
1; Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds , 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal 
citations omitted). Default judgments are genera lly disfavored in light of the policy that 
cases should be decided on their me rits whenever reasonably possible. In re Rains , 946 
F.2d 731, 732–33 (10th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, default judgment is viewed as a reasonable 
remedy when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive 
party. Id. 
Upon entry of default, the Court takes all of the well-pleaded facts in a complaint as 
true. See Tripodi, 810 F.3d at 765 (“By his default, Mr. Welch relieved Mr. Tripodi from 
having to prove the complaint’s factual allegations.”); United States v. Craighead, 176 F. 
App’x 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citation omitted) (“‘The defendant, by his 
default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts 
by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.’”). 
The Court, however, need not accept the moving party’s legal conclusions or factual 
allegations relating to the amount of damages sought. Therefore, before granting a default 
 
1 Unpublished opinions are cited pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 
 

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judgment, the Court must fi rst ascertain whether the uncontested facts constitute a 
legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit conclusions of law. See, 
e.g., Mathiason v. Aquinas Home Health Care, Inc. , 187 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1274–75 (D. 
Kan. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (“‘Even after default, it remains for the court to 
consider whether the unchalleng ed facts constitute a legitimat e basis for the entry of a 
judgment since a party in default does not adm it conclusions of law.’ . . . Furthermore, a 
default judgment does not establish the amount of damages. . . . Plaintiff must establish 
that the amount requested is reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
“‘If [a] defendant does not contest the amount prayed for in the complaint [by failing 
to answer] and the claim is for a sum cert ain or a sum that can be made certain by 
computation, the judgment gene rally will be entered for that amount without any further 
hearing.’” Craighead, 176 F. App’x at 925 (citation omitted); Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, 
Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[A] court may enter a default judgment without 
a hearing only if the amount claimed is a li quidated sum or one capable of mathematical 
calculation.”). 
DISCUSSION 
Accepting as true the well-pled allegati ons in the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] and 
Defendant Obe’s Crossclaim [D oc. No. 39], the Court finds that the entry of a default 
judgment is appropriate. Plaintiff initiated this interpleader action related to the proceeds 
from the life insurance policy on the life of Jimmie Obe. On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff 
interpled $48,157.95 into the Court’s registry. [Doc. No. 17]. Thereafter, the Court entered 

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default judgment in the amount of $24,078.97, plus accrued interest, in favor of Defendant 
Faapouli. [Doc. Nos. 32, 33]. 
On March 20, 2026, Defendant Obe filed his Crossclaim [Doc. No. 39], claiming 
entitlement to the remaining one-half of life-i nsurance proceeds, pl us accrued interest. 
Although being served with the Complaint, Defendant Faapouli’s Crossclaim, and 
Defendant Obe’s Crossclaim, Default Defendants have taken no action in this case. Upon 
review of Defendant Obe’s mo tion for default judgment, the Court finds that Defendant 
Obe is entitled to the remaining one-half of life insurance proceeds, plus accrued interest. 
Because the amount claimed by Defendant Obe is easily calculated and a sum certain, the 
Court can enter default judgment as to the sum certain without a hearing. See Venable v. 
Haislip, 721 F. 2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1983). 
For these reasons, Defendant Obe’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment Against 
Brenda Robertson, Stephen Robertson, and Kimberly Vargas [Doc. No. 46] is GRANTED. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to remit the 
remaining life insurance proceeds in the amount of $24,078. 98, plus any accrued interest 
thereon, to Defendant Jason K. Obe. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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