govinfo:USCOURTS-tnmd-3_24-cv-00900-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
 
 
KYESHA JACKSON, DE’ANTE 
JACKSON, and DEBORAH KINDLE, 
as Custodian and Next Friend of the 
minor N.B., who are the Next of Kin and 
all the Children of KATHY D.LENA 
BLACK, Deceased, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
EDDY ORTIZ, PONCE’S XPRESS, INC., 
and MJC EXPRESS, INC., 
 
Defendants. 
 
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Judge Aleta A. Trauger 
 
 ) 
UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
 ) 
 Intervenor-Defendant. ) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 Before the court is the Conditional Motion to Intervene, filed by proposed intervenor 
United Specialty Insurance Company (Doc. No. 120). As set forth herein , the motion will be 
granted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 In July 2024, the plaintiffs, who are the children of Kathy D. Lena Black, deceased, filed 
this survival action, seeking damages arising from the death of Kathy Black in a vehicle crash on 
Interstate 24 West in Robertson County, Tennessee that took place on June 13, 2024 (the “crash”). 
(Compl., Doc. No. 1.) The operative pleading is now the Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 
(Doc. No. 69). The plaintiffs allege that Black was driving on I-24 when her vehicle was struck by PageID #: <pageID>
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a tractor-trailer rig recklessly operated by Eddy Ortiz, forcing Black off the highway and killing 
her in the crash. (FAC ¶¶ 10–11.) The plaintiffs allege that defendant motor carrier Ponce’s Xpress, 
Inc. (“Ponce’s”) was an authorized interstate motor carrier, issued U.S. DOT number 2818466, 
and that the 2019 Freightliner tractor that Ortiz was driving at the time of the crash was operating 
under U.S. DOT number 2818466. ( Id. ¶ 24.) The plaintiffs also allege that defendant MJC 
Express, Inc. (“MJC”) was an authorized interstate motor carrier, issued U.S. DOT number 
2429682, and was the registered owner of the 2019 Freightliner tractor and the 2019 Wabash trailer 
operated by Eddy Ortiz at the time of the crash. ( Id. ¶ 25.) The plaintiffs allege that Ortiz was an 
actual or statutory employee performing services for both Ponce’s and MJC and acting within the 
scope of his employment. ( Id. ¶¶ 26–28.) The plaintiffs bring claims against Ortiz for negligent 
and/or reckless driving and negligence per se, and they ass ert that Ponce’s and MJC, as Ortiz’s 
actual or statutory employers, are vicariously liable for the damages caused by Ortiz in the crash. 
They also assert negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims directly against Ponce’s and 
MJC. (See generally id. at 14–19.) 
 Although the defendants answered the FAC, denying many of the factual allegations and 
liability, counsel for all three defendants moved, and were granted leave, to withdraw shortly after 
filing their Answers. New counsel for Ponce’s and Ortiz subsequently entered an appearance, but 
MJC has remained unrepresented since June 30, 2025. In September 2025, the plaintiffs filed a 
Motion for Entry of Default against MJC, supported by the Declaration of plaintiffs’ counsel, 
Hamilton Jordan. (Doc. Nos. 89, 89-1.) The Clerk of Court granted that motion and entered default 
against MJC on November 4, 2025 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). (Doc. No. 
101.) The effect of the entry of default is to “conclusively establish[] every factual predicate of a 
claim for relief.” Thomas v. Miller , 489 F.3d 293, 299 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Harmon v. CSX PageID #: <pageID>
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Transp., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment Against 
Defendant MJC Express, Inc. , to determine damages, remains pending and has been referred to 
the Magistrate Judge for resolution. (Doc. Nos. 102, 119.) 
 Meanwhile, on June 26, 2025, shortly after counsel for MJC withdrew from representing 
MJC in th is case, USIC initiated a declaratory judgment action in this court against MJC (the 
“declaratory judgment action”), seeking a declaration that it has no contractual responsibility either 
to defend MJC or to indemnify it against any liability assessed against MJC in this case. Compl. 
for Decl. Jgmt., United Specialty Ins. Co. v. MJC Express, Inc. (M.D. Tenn. June 26, 2025), ECF 
No. 1. The basis for USIC’s position is that MJC no longer owned the truck Ortiz was driving as 
of the time of the crash (the “Subject Vehicle”), and USIC had removed it from the schedule of 
vehicles covered by the liability policy it had issued to MJC that was i n effect at the time of the 
crash (the “Policy”). 
 Shortly after USIC filed the declaratory judgment action, the plaintiffs in this case sought 
and were denied leave to intervene, as intervenor-plaintiffs, in the declaratory judgment action. In 
March 2026, the court also denied their subsequent Renewed Motion to Intervene , which argued 
that whether MJC had sold the Subject Vehicle prior to the crash was a disputed question of fact. 
 On April 16, 2026, however, the court held a telephone conference in this case, in which 
all parties except MJC participated and of which USIC apparently did not receive notice, having 
withdrawn from providing a defense for MJC. As set forth in the Joint Motion for Telephonic 
Status Conference, the plaintiffs have reached a tentative settlement with defendants Ortiz and 
Ponce’s, but the settlement does not resolve the plaintiffs’ claims against MJC, which the plaintiffs 
intend to continue to pursue. (Doc. No. 118.) As the court noted in the Order entered in the 
declaratory judgment action on April 20, 2026, “[w]hat emerged from the conversation concerning PageID #: <pageID>
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a settlement between all parties but MJC Express, Inc. were new or clarified arguments by 
plaintiffs’ counsel as to how the United Specialty Insurance policy at issue in this case provides 
coverage for the fatal collision on June 13, 2024, despite the fact that the truck involved had been 
removed from the policy.” Order at 1, United Specialty Ins. Co. v. MJC Express, Inc. (M.D. Tenn. 
June 26, 2025), ECF No. 30. In light of that new argument, the court vacated the Order denying 
the intervenor-plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Intervene in the declaratory judgment action and 
issued a new Order, granting leave to intervene and directing the parties to brief the intervenor-
plaintiffs’ new theory of recovery. 
 The court has now issued a Memorandum and Order granting USIC’s Motion for Default 
Judgment against MJC in the declaratory judgment action, finding, based on the plain language of 
the Policy, that USIC is not contractually obligated to provide a defense to MJC in this case or to 
indemnify MJC for any judgment, settlement, or other damages awarded in this case, because the 
Subject Vehicle, though initially covered, had been removed from the Policy’s schedule of covered 
vehicles prior to the crash. In the sa me Memorandum, however, the court determined that 
ownership of the Subject Vehicle is simply irrelevant , and the Order accompanying the 
Memorandum includes a declaration to the effect that the MCS-90 endorsement governs USIC’s 
obligations with respect to any unsatisfied final judgment entered against MJC in this case, subject 
to federal law, and that USIC may not rely on any policy condition, provision, stipulation, 
limitation, vehicle deletion endorsement, or premium refund to avoid an MCS-90 obligation to the 
plaintiffs. See Memo. at 26, Order at 2, United Specialty Ins. Co. v. MJC Express, Inc. (M.D. Tenn. 
June 15, 2026), ECF Nos. 37, 38. PageID #: <pageID>
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 USIC filed its Conditional Motion to Intervene in this case on May 19, 2026, the day after 
it filed its Answer to the Intervenor Complaint in the declaratory judgment action. Its position in 
the declaratory judgment action is that the MCS -90 endorsement does not apply, but in the event 
the court does not agree, it seeks to intervene in this case to protect its interests. It argues that the 
changed circumstances in the declaratory judgment action —namely, the court’s granting the 
intervenor-plaintiffs’ Motion to Intervene and its consideration of their new theory that the MCS-
90 endorsement may obligate USIC to satisfy any final judgment entered against MJC in this case, 
regardless of whether the Subject Vehicle was listed on the Policy —justify intervention, because 
the plaintiffs’ new theory “raises the specter that, should the Court determine the MCS -90 
endorsement applies, Plaintiffs could obtain a judgment in this case premised on the allegation that 
MJC owned the Subject Vehicle and then seek to enforce t hat judgment against USIC under the 
MCS-90 endorsement, all without any adversarial proceeding in which the factual question of 
vehicle ownership was actually tested.” (Doc. No. 120 at 5.) 
 USIC further argues that the default entered against MJC in this case reflects “MJC’s 
failure to defend; it is not a judicial determination of any fact.” ( Id.) It contends in particular that 
the ownership of the Subject Vehicle is a material fact that no party in this lawsuit is presently 
contesting, meaning that no party is protecting USIC’s interest in “ensuring that this Court does 
not enter a judgment based on a factual predicate— MJC’s ownership of the Subject Vehicle—that 
is directly contradicted by the documentary evidence.” (Id.) Its proposed Complaint in Intervention 
asserts that it is in possession of a “Notice of Sale and/or Bill of Sale” showing that MJC sold the 
Subject Vehicle to PPP Transportation Express Inc. of Palm Springs, Florida on November 8, 
2023; that, because MJC sold the Subject Vehicle and subsequently caused it to be deleted from 
coverage under the Policy, USIC is not contractually obligated to defend MJC in this lawsuit or to PageID #: <pageID>
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provide insurance coverage to MJC for any damages awarded against it; the intervenor -plaintiffs 
in the declaratory judgment action have asserted in that case that the MCS -90 endorsement 
attached to the Policy obligates USIC to satisfy any final judgment en tered against MJC in this 
case, regardless of whether the Subject Vehicle was listed on the Policy at the time of the crash; 
and that the intervenor -plaintiffs’ “MCS-90 theory depends upon the factual predicate that MJC 
owned the Subject Vehicle at the time of the collision—a fact that USIC disputes on the basis of 
the Bill of Sale showing MJC sold the vehicle over seven months before the accident.” (Doc. No. 
120-1, Proposed Compl. in Intervention ¶¶ 18, 20, 26–27.) USIC contends that an “actual and 
justiciable controversy exists as to whether MJC owned the Subject Vehicle” at the time of the 
crash, and that, “if MJC did not own or operate the Subject Vehicle at the time of the collision, 
there is no basis upon w hich USIC could be held liable under the Polic y or the MCS -90 
endorsement.” ( Id. ¶ 34.) On the basis of these factual and legal assertions, USIC seeks a 
declaration that “USIC is not obligated to indemnify MJC for any final judgement, settlement, or 
other damages against MJC awarded in this action due to the Subject Vehicle[’s] being sold by 
MJC prior to the accident at issue and/or specifically deleted from the Policy’s coverages.” (Id. at 
6.) 
 Based on the procedural posture of the case as it now stands, USIC argues that intervention 
is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) or, alternatively, under Rule 
24(b)(1)(B), which pertains to permissive intervention. ( Id. at 6 –8.) The plaintiffs oppose the 
motion, arguing that “[i]ntervention at this terminal stage,” when a default has already been entered 
against MJC and the only issue to be resolved is the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are 
entitled, “would serve only to delay justice for the surviving children of K athy D. Lena Black.” PageID #: <pageID>
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(Doc. No. 121 at 2.) It also argues that USIC’s coverage defenses are being litigated in the 
declaratory judgment action, making it unnecessary to raise them here. 
 USIC filed a Reply in which it argues that the plaintiffs are “attempting to foreclose USIC 
from litigating the ownership issue in every forum while simultaneously asserting a coverage 
theory in the Declaratory Judgment Action that depends on ownership.” (Doc. No. 122 at 1.) It 
continues to argue that a default judgment against MJC “necessarily assumes or finds MJC 
ownership” and that it “should not be boxed out of contesting a factual issue that Plaintiffs 
themselves have made the backbone of their MCS -90 theory.” (Id. at 2; see also id. (“Based on 
Plaintiffs’ response in opposition, it appears they genuinely contend that this Court could order 
USIC to pay a judgment up to policy limits under the MCS -90 endorsement even if MJC did not 
own the truck at the time of the accident. That being the case, ownership is plainly a threshold 
issue that USIC should be permitted to contest.”).) USIC also argues that its motion is not untimely, 
given the change in circumstances. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) 
 Under Rule 24, the court, on “timely motion,” “must permit anyone to intervene who . . . 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so 
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability 
to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(a)(2). The rule thus embodies four requirements: (1) a timely motion, showing that (2) the 
proposed intervenor has a “substantial legal interest in the case”; (3) the intervenor’s “absence 
from the case would impair that interest”; and (4) that “interest is inadequately represented by the 
parties.” Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass’n v. Twp. of Peninsula, 41 F.4th 767, 771 (6th PageID #: <pageID>
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Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). When these requirements are met, “intervention as of right is 
warranted.” Id. at 777. 
B. USIC Meets the Required Elements 
1. Timeliness 
 The plaintiffs contends that USIC’s motion is untimely, based on the fact that they shared 
with USIC their proposed motion and supporting memorandum, seeking to consolidate this case 
and the declaratory judgment action, in September 2025 and that their then-proposed memorandum 
“specifically referenced coverage under the MCS -90 endorsement.” (Doc. No. 121 at 5 (citing 
Doc. No. 94-1 at 3).) USIC opposed the motion to consolidate, as a result of which, the plaintiffs 
claim, it “cannot credibly claim timelines s to address the issue eight months after Plaintiff 
contended the MCS-90 endorsement could provide an avenue of recovery notwithstanding USIC’s 
coverage position.” (Id.) The plaintiffs also argue that the case has been pending for more than two 
years; default was entered against M JC in November 2025; and the court’s order granting 
intervention in the declaratory judgment action does not qualify as a changed circumstance, when 
USIC has known about “the MCS -90 endorsement, the ownership issue, M JC’s default, and the 
risk that a judgment against MJC could trigger its federal obligations since long before April 
2026.” (Id. at 6.) USIC responds that, because the plaintiffs were belatedly permitted to intervene 
in the declaratory judgment action—also after default had been entered in that case against MJC—
basic fairness requires that USIC be permitted to intervene here to protect its interests. 
 The Sixth Circuit has instructed courts to “look[] to the totality of the circumstances to 
determine timeliness.” Davis v. Lifetime Cap., Inc., 560 F. App’x 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 
Stupak–Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 475 (6th Cir. 2000)). To assess timeliness, courts in this 
circuit must consider five factors: PageID #: <pageID>
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(1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for which intervention 
is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the application during which the 
proposed intervenor knew or should have known of their interest in the case; (4) 
the prejudice to the original parties due to the proposed intervenor’s failure to 
promptly intervene after they knew or reasona bly should have known of their 
interest in the case; and (5) the existence of unusual circumstances militating 
against or in favor of intervention. 
Id. (quoting Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
 This suit has progressed almost to the trial date, and the plaintiffs’ Motion for Default 
Judgment is currently pending. With respect to the plaintiffs’ claims against MJC, essentially 
nothing is left to be determined aside from the amount of damages to be assessed against that 
defendant. USIC seeks to i ntervene in order to protect its interests —essentially to walk back the 
entry of default and to oppose MJC’s liability on the basis that it did not own the Subject Vehicle 
at the time of the crash. 
 As for the third element, while USIC has known for some time that the plaintiffs believed 
that the MCS-90 endorsement would require USIC to cover a judgment against MJC, USIC has 
apparently believed that the fact that the truck was sold by MJC and removed from the Policy’s 
schedule of covered vehicles meant that it can not be liable. Not until the court granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion to intervene in the declaratory judgment action (after twice denying leave to 
intervene) did MJC’s potential liability under the MCS-90 endorsement become critically relevant 
to USIC.
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1 This is a generous interpretation of USIC’s actions. It clearly knew of the presence of the 
MCS-90 endorsement in the Policy, and it has litigated the applicability of the endorsement before. 
See, e.g., Russell v. Escobar , No. 18-00660-BAJ-EWD, 2022 WL 136854, at *5 (M.D. La. Jan. 
13, 2022) (granting summary judgment for USIC on the issue of whether the endorsement applied, 
because the truck at issue was not “ engaged in the transportation of property in interstate 
commerce” at the time of the subject accident); United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Sweeney , No. 1:21-
CV-244-HAB, 2023 WL 2931405, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2023) (entering default judgment in 
favor of USIC in a declaratory judgment action and issuing declarations that USIC had no duty to 
indemnify or defend the defendant under the insurance policy at issue and that USIC’s duties under PageID #: <pageID>
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 While there is certainly some prejudice to the plaintiffs in allowing USIC to intervene at 
this late date, there was likewise also prejudice to USIC in allowing the plaintiffs to intervene in 
the declaratory judgment action at a similarly late date in that case. USIC, that is, simply had no 
reason to intervene in this case until the plaintiffs were permitted to intervene in the declaratory 
judgment action. The existence of these parallel actions and the parties’ relative positions give rise 
to unusual and compelling circumstances that make USIC’s motion timely in this particular case, 
despite the late date and the procedural posture of the case. The court finds that this requirement 
is satisfied. 
2. USIC’s Legal Interest in This Case 
 A proposed intervenor must show that it has a “substantial interest in the subject matter of 
litigation.” Davis, 560 F. App’x at 495 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit, however, “subscribes 
to a ‘rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right.’” Id. (quoting 
Mich. State AFL–CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 Here, USIC argues that it “has a direct financial interest in ensuring that no judgment is 
entered in this case on the basis of an untested factual allegation that could be used to impose 
liability on USIC under the MCS -90 endorsement.” (Doc. No. 120 at 7.) That factual question is 
MJC’s ownership of the Subject Vehicle at the time of the crash. According to USIC, the plaintiffs’ 
“MCS-90 theory depends upon MJC having owned the Subject Vehicle at the time of the 
collision.” (Id.) The sole basis for its int ervention is to contest this fact and to continue to argue 
that it has no contractual obligation to indemnify MJC for a final judgment or other damages 
awarded against it. 
 
the MCS-90 endorsement were “limited to payment of a final judgment entered against” one of 
the defendants in connection with the underlying liability lawsuit against that defendant). PageID #:
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 The plaintiffs respond, first, that the “MCS -90 endorsement applies notwithstanding 
USIC’s reliance on the change endorsement, alleged sale, and scheduling arguments” and that, 
regardless, “USIC’s contention that ownership defeats its MCS -90 obligation is a coverage 
argument it is already litigating in the Declaratory Judgment Action.” (Doc. No. 121 at 7–8.) 
Second, the plaintiffs contend that M JC’s ownership of the vehicle is not an issue that must be 
litigated before entry of judgment in this case, because M JC’s liability does not depend on its 
ownership of the Subject Vehicle, and USIC’s contentions to the contrary mischaracterize the 
plaintiffs’ position. (Id. at 8.) The plaintiffs also point out that USIC “does not seek to intervene 
to defend MJC against liability” or otherwise litigate the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. (Id.) 
 USIC replies that the fact that its interests are being litigated in the declaratory judgment 
action is not a sufficient reason to deny its “ability to contest the factual issue of ownership in this 
action, where it is not presently clear what evidence th e Court may hear on that issue in the 
Declaratory Judgment Action.” (Doc. No. 122 at 3.) It contends that it should “have the opportunity 
to test ownership through the adversarial process here if necessary—particularly where Plaintiffs 
are taking the position that USIC should have to pay regardless of whether MJC even owned the 
tractor-trailer at issue.” (Id. at 4.) 
 The court finds that, insofar as USIC continues to assert that its liability under the MCS -
90 endorsement is dependent upon whether MJC owned the Subject Vehicle at the time of the 
crash, its argument is misguided and contrary to law, as discussed in the court’s Memorandum 
issued in the declaratory judgment action. USIC’s liability in this case depends on whether a 
judgment is entered against MJC based on MJC’s own negligence or its vicarious liability for 
Ortiz’s negligent or reckless driving and on whether the other requirements of the MCS -90 
endorsement are met. As the court has already found, neither MJC’s nor USIC’s liability depends PageID #:
<pageID>
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on who owns the vehicle. The factual issue USIC seeks to litigate simply is not relevant. In 
addition, the court has also already found that USIC has no obligation to defend MJC in this case 
or to indemnify MJC for any damages that may be awarded against it. 
 At the same time, USIC undeniably has a substantial legal interest in this case, as a finding 
of liability on the part of MJC and an assessment of damages against it could put USIC on the 
hook to cover up to $1,000,000 of that liability. Although the MCS -90 endorsement gives it the 
right to attempt to recover that sum from MJC, such recovery is far from guaranteed. The court 
therefore finds that USIC has met this requirement, despite the apparent futility of its position. 
3. USIC’s Absence from This Case 
 To satisfy this requirement, USIC only needs to show that “impairment of its substantial 
legal interest is possible if intervention is denied. This burden is minimal.” Davis, 560 F. App’x at 
495 (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 If the plaintiffs obtain a judgment against MJC and that judgment remains unsatisfied, the 
plaintiffs can pursue recovery of up to $1,000,000 of that judgment from USIC under the MCS-90 
endorsement. USIC’s absence from this case could at least arguably impair its legal interests in 
seeking to avoid that possibility. USIC has met its minimal burden of showing a possibility that its 
legal interests would be impaired absent intervention , despite the fact that the issues it seeks to 
resolve are either not relevant (the ownership issue) or have already been resolved in the 
declaratory judgment action (the indemnity issue). 
4. Whether Other Parties Represent USIC’s Interests 
 Again, USIC’s burden at this step is minimal. “The proposed intervenor need show only 
that there is a potential for inadequate representation.” Id. (quoting Grutter, 188 F.3d at 400) 
(emphasis in original). In this case, if MJC were represented by counsel and actively litigating the 
question of its liability, USIC’s interests might be adequately represented. Since USIC takes the PageID #:
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position that it is not contractually obligated to defend MJC , and MJC has not entered an 
appearance through alternate counsel since the withdrawal of counsel supplied by USIC , USIC’s 
interests are no longer represented at all. It has met this requirement as well.2 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth herein, USIC’s Conditional Motion to Intervene (Doc. No. 120) 
will be granted. An appropriate Order is filed herewith. 
 
 
 
ALETA A. TRAUGER 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 
2 Obviously, if USIC had continued to defend MJC in this case, MJC could adequately 
represent USIC’s interests, and USIC would have had no need to seek intervention. PageID #:
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