govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01757-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
RONALD NOBLE, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
LT. J. BURLEY, SGT. FIERO, C/O 
MAYS, C/O SCHNELL, LT. CLARY, 
C/O NOLAN GERLING, 
C/O MUSGRAVE, C/O T. BARTH, and 
NURSE DEENA SEED, 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 

 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge: 
Plaintiff Ronald Noble, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is 
currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctiona l Center, brings this action pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his co nstitutional rights while at Lawrence 
Correctional Center. In the Complaint, Noble alleges that Defendants used excessive 
force and denied him medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
This case is now before the Court fo r preliminary review of the Complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Sectio n 1915A, the Court is required to screen 
prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any 
portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is 
immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Page ID
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The Complaint 
On December 26, 2025, Noble arrived at Lawrence from a court writ (Doc. 1, p. 31). 
Noble alleges that as with all of the other individuals on the transfer bus, he was 
handcuffed and seated until he arrived at Lawrence. Officer Schnell was the officer who 
seated the inmates and cuffed them to a long chain ( Id.). Correctional Officer (“C/O”) 
Mays was also on the bus, and Lieutenant (“Lt.”) Burley was the driver (Id.). 
Noble was transferring to segregation and, as a result, was the first to exit the bus 
(Doc. 1, p. 32). He was carrying a brown bagged lunch. Lt. Clary informed Noble that he 
could not have the bagged lunch and directed him to throw it away or there would be 
problems (Id.). Noble agreed to throw the bag away but asked if he was able to keep his 
court writ bag which contained his hygiene items, shower shoes, and legal mail ( Id.). 
Lt. Clary stated that he did not care about his court writ bag and again told Noble to 
throw his bagged lunch away (Id.). 
Clary then grabbed the lunch bag out of Noble’s hands, grabbed Noble’s arm, and 
twisted it (Doc. 1, p. 32). Lt. Clary, Tactic al Officer Nolan Gerlin g, Tactical Officer 
Musgrave, and Lt. Burley wrestled Noble to the ground even though Noble was 
handcuffed and did not pose a threat to anyone (Id.). Noble noted that he was handcuffed 
and was not causing any problems, but the officers said they were going to teach him to 
listen to officers. An officer placed his knee on Noble’s neck, and the officers punched 
him in the ribs, stuck a finger in his right eye, and sprayed mace in his eyes and ears (Id. at 
p. 33). Sergeant (“Sgt.”) Fiero approached the group and dove on top of Noble, holding 
his head and neck down ( Id.). Despite Noble’s pleas that he could not breathe, Officer Page ID
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Musgrave said he did not care and tried to pull Noble’s hair out while the other officers 
choked him ( Id. at p. 33). He was then placed in a restraint chair despite still being 
handcuffed (Id.). 
Noble was placed in the showers where Internal Affairs Officer B. Costantino took 
pictures of his injuries (Doc. 1, p. 34). Noble suffered bruising to his face and eyes. His 
right eye was red and puffy from the mace, and he suffered a cut in the corner of his right 
eye (Id.). He also suffered cuts on his elbows, wrists, and hands ( Id.). Noble asked Sgt. 
Fiero and Lt. Clary for medical attention but they declined his request ( Id.). Over two 
hours later, Nurse Deena Seed saw Noble. He informed her of his many injuries (Id.). She 
documented the injuries, but when he requested something for the pain and for help 
cleaning up his injuries, she stated that she would return later to tend to his injuries (Id.). 
But Seed never came back to treat Noble. 
Seed also conducted a mental health assessment for crisis care (Doc. 1, p. 34). Noble 
noted that he was not suicidal, he just needed medical treatment ( Id.). He later learned 
from Sgt. Fiero and Lt. Clary that Nurse S eed ordered Noble placed on crisis watch ( Id. 
at p. 35). Fiero, Clary, Gerling, and Ba rth transported Noble to crisis watch ( Id.). Noble 
alleges that Seed was not qualified to orde r his placement on crisis watch because she 
was not a mental health provider (Id. at p. 35). He asked several officials for medical care, 
including Lt. Deimal, Sgt. Severly, and Nurse Joy ( Id.). He showed them his injuries, 
including the mace and blood that was coming out of his ear (Id.). They merely noted that 
the healthcare unit was aware of his injuries (Id.). Page ID
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The next morning, Noble spoke with mental health provider E. Marsh and the 
mental health doctor, L. Hoke (Doc. 1, p. 36). He informed them that he was not suicidal. 
They agreed and removed him from crisis watch ( Id.). He was transported to the 
healthcare department where he asked Nu rse Brown to clean his injuries and the 
lingering mace. She refused because it had been over a day since his injuries and she said 
he did not need treatment ( Id.). He then spoke to Internal Affairs Officer Rich and 
informed Rich that he needed the camera footage, pictures, and reports from Costantino’s 
investigation (Id.). 
On January 8, 2025, Noble went before Lt. Brain1 Tolliver and C/O Carmen Milian 
on a disciplinary ticket related to the incident (Doc. 1, p. 37). Noble was allowed to present 
a written statement. He also argued that he was charged with an assault resulting in 
injury to a staff remember but there were no incident or injury reports to support the 
ticket (Id.). There were no documented injuries from the officers, none of the guards were 
seen by medical professionals for injuries or decontamination from mace exposure, and 
he only received one ticket for assault despite supposedly fighting several officers ( Id.). 
Noble notes that the hearing officers failed to document his entire written statement in 
the final summary (Id.). 
 
 
1 Noble repeatedly refers to this individual as “Brain.” The Court suspects his name is “Brian” but at this 
time will use the spelling offered by Noble. Page ID
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Preliminary Dismissals 
 
 Noble identifies several individuals throughout his pleading that he fails to 
identify as defendants in the case caption. He notes that he informed numerous officers, 
including Lt. Deimal, Sgt. Severly, Nurse Brown, and Nurse Joy, about his need for 
medical care and they refused his requests for care. He mentions two internal affairs 
officers and a disciplinary hearing officer who allegedly failed to properly document the 
incident. He alleges that Barton failed to intervene in the use of force (Doc. 1, p. 45). None 
of these individuals are identified as defendants in the case caption. In order to be a party 
in the case, a plaintiff must identify them in the case caption. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); 
Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because these individuals are 
not identified as defendants in the case caption, any potential claim against them is 
DISMISSED without prejudice. 
 Noble also attempts to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim against Deena 
Seed. He argues that was en gaged in protected speech when he asked for medical care 
and she retaliated against him by placing him on crisis watch (Doc. 1, p. 41). To state a 
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity, “suffered a 
deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment activity was at least 
a motivating factor in the decisi on to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 
F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). “The ‘motivatin g factor’ amounts to a causal link between 
the activity and the unlawful retaliation.” Manuel v. Nalley , 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 
2020). “A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events 
from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble , 226 F.3d 568, Page ID
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573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Noble alleges that Seed retaliated against him 
because he requested medical care, but he fails to allege that his request was a motivating 
factor. He merely alleges that he asked fo r medical care and she failed to return and 
instead placed him on crisis watch. Noble fails to adequately allege a retaliation claim. 
 Noble also states that he is bringing an equal prot ection claim and that the 
defendants who used force against him were motivated by “discriminatory litigation 
bias” (Doc. 1, p. 38). Noble fails to further allege how he believes he faced discrimination. 
He merely states this potential claim in conclusory fashion. Thus, any claim for an equal 
protection violation is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
Discussion 
 
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following 
counts: 
Count 1: Eighth Amendment exces sive force claim against A. 
Musgrave, Nolan Gerling, Lt. Clary, J. Burley, and Sgt. Fiero 
for their use of force against Noble on December 26, 2024. 
 
Count 2: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against 
Schnell, Barth, and Mays for failing to intervene in the use 
of force. 
 
Count 3: Illinois State Law assault and battery claim against A. 
Musgrave, Nolan Gerling, Lt. Clary, J. Burley, and Sgt. Fiero 
for their use of force against Noble on December 26, 2024. 
 
Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliber ate indifference to medical 
needs claim against Deena Seed for refusing to treat Noble’s 
injuries after the incident and improperly placing him on 
suicide watch. 
 
Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliber ate indifference to medical 
needs claim against Sgt. Fiero and Lt. Clary for their failure 
to obtain medical care for Noble after the use of force. Page ID
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 Count 6: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Lt. Brain 
Tolliver for finding Noble guilty of a staff assault despite 
the lack of evidence of a staff assault. 
 
The parties and the Court will use these design ations in all future pleadings and orders, 
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is 
mentioned in the Complaint but not addresse d in this Order should be considered 
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading 
standard.2 
Counts 1 and 3 
Noble alleges that Defendants beat, chok ed, and sprayed mace into his face. He 
alleges that this use of force was taken despite Noble being handcuffed and unable to 
move, suggesting that the force was used “ma liciously and sadistically” rather than in 
“a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 
890 (7th Cir. 2009). The same allegations also adequately state an assault and battery claim 
under Illinois state law. Shea v. Winnebago County Sheriff’s Department, No. 17-3078, 746 F. 
App’x 541, 548 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2018) (discussing assault and battery under Illinois law). 
Because the allegations derive from the same allegations as the federal claim, Count 3 will 
also proceed against Defendants A. Musgrave, Nolan Gerling, Lt. Clary, J. Burley, and 
Sgt. Fiero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 
 
2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). Page ID
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Count 2 
 Noble also alleges that several officers failed to intervene in the use of force. 
Although he alleges that Schnell and Mays failed to stop the other officers, Noble fails to 
offer any allegations suggesting that Schnell and Mays had the ability to intervene. An 
official can be liable for failing to interven e in an assault if they “have a realistic 
opportunity to step forward and prevent” another official from using “excessive force 
but fail to do so.” Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). Noble merely alleges 
that Schnell and Mays were correctional officers on the transfer bus and that Schnell 
initially cuffed Noble prior to his transport. But nothing in his statement of facts indicates 
where either officer was during the use of fo rce, and there are no allegations suggesting 
that they had a realistic opportunity to intervene in the assault. It is not clear that either 
officer was even present when the incident occurred. 
Noble also refers to an Officer Barth, although at times he appears to reference this 
officer as Barton (Doc. 1, pp. 16, 39). It is not entirely clear that these two individuals are 
the same officer. He notes that Barth transported him to crisis watch, but there are no 
allegations to suggest that he was present during the use of force or had an opportunity 
to intervene (Id. at p. 35). Accordingly, Count 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
Count 4 
 Noble states a claim against Seed for her failure to provide him with medical care 
and for his placement on suicide watch. Noble alleges that he requested medical care and 
although Seed initially indicated that she would return to provide him with that care, she Page ID
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never returned to his cell. Noble also alleges that Seed placed him on crisis watch despite 
no evidence that he posed a risk to himself. Thus, Count 4 shall proceed against Seed. 
Count 5 
 Noble also adequately alleges a deliber ate indifference claim against Fiero and 
Clary. Noble alleges that he requested medical attention from the officers after meeting 
with internal affairs and they specifically stated that they would not obtain medical care 
for him. Thus, Count 5 shall proceed against Fiero and Clary. 
Count 6 
In order to state a due process claim, an inmate must allege “(1) a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest and (2) deficient procedures attendant to the deprivation of that 
interest.” Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 964 (7th Cir. 2024). An inmate’s liberty interests 
are protected by the Due Proce ss Clause only insofar as a deprivation of the interest at 
issue would impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In situations 
where an inmate complains about discipline in which he received segregation 
constituting an atypical and significant hardship (but not the loss of good-time credit), 
the disciplinary proceedings are subject to an inform al due process inquiry. Ealy, 109 
F.4th at 965 (citing Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th Cir. 2024)). Informal due process 
requires only that an inmate is provided (1 ) notice of the reasons for his placement in 
segregation, and (2) an opportunity to presen t his views in either a written statement or 
hearing. Ealy, 109 F.4th at 966. Page ID
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The Court first notes that Noble failed to identify Brain Tolliver as a defendant in 
the case caption and the section set aside for identifying defendants (Doc. 1, pp. 1-4). He 
is, however, identified as a defendant un der a section Noble added to his pleading 
entitled “parties” (Id. at pp. 5-6). Even assuming that Noble properly identified Tolliver 
as a defendant, he fails to state a viable due process claim. Noble alleges that he received 
a year in segregation. Because he received segregation and lost no good time credit, he is 
only entitled to informal due process. Ther e are no allegations to suggest that he was 
denied either of the requirem ents of informal due process. He acknowledged receiving 
notice of the reasons for the guilty finding and was allowed to present a written statement 
at the hearing. Although Noble complains that Tolliver failed to cite Noble’s entire 
written statement, there is no requirement that his entire statement be documented in the 
statement of reasons for the disciplinary findings. Thus, his due process claim is 
DENIED. 
Motion for Counsel 
 As to his motion for counsel (Doc. 2), Nobl e states that he only has a grade school 
education and he does not understand legal proceedings. But his filings have been easy 
to understand. And given the early stages of the litigation process, it is difficult to 
accurately evaluate the need for the assistance of counsel. See Kadamovas v. Stevens , 706 
F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the de fendants respond to the complaint, the Page ID
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plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel ... cannot be gauged.”). 3 There is nothing 
currently pending that would require counsel. Once Defendants have filed an Answer, 
the Court will enter a scheduling order explaining the next steps in the litigation process. 
If Noble continues to experience difficulties in litigating his case at that time, he may 
resubmit his request for counsel. At this time, counsel is not needed, and his motion is 
DENIED. 
Disposition 
For the reasons stated abov e, Counts 1 and 3 shall pr oceed against A. Musgrave, 
Nolan Gerling, Lt. Clary, J. Burley, and Sgt. Fiero. Count 4 shall proceed against Deena 
Seed. Count 5 shall proceed ag ainst Sgt. Fiero and Lt. Clar y. All other defendants and 
claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for A. Musgrave, Nolan Gerling, Lt. Clary, 
J. Burley, Sgt. Fiero, and Nurse Deena Seed: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request 
to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The 
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum 
and Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by Noble. If a defendant 
fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 
30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect 
formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the 
 
3 In evaluating the motion for counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote, 
503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007), and related authority. Page ID
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full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Noble, the 
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the de fendant’s current work address, or, if not 
known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending 
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the 
address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained 
in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. 
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to 
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a repl y pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g). 
Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this 
Merit Review Order. 
Because Noble’s claims involve his medical care, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED 
to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order. 
If judgment is rendered against Noble, and the judgment includes the payment of 
costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless 
of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(f)(2)(A). 
Finally, Noble is ADVISED that he is under a contin uing obligation to keep the 
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court 
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not 
later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply Page ID
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with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result 
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED.R .C IV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 16, 2026
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of 
your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been 
achieved, the defendants will enter their a ppearance and file an Answer to your 
Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the 
defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all 
the defendants have filed Answers, the Cour t will enter a Scheduling Order containing 
important information on deadlines, discovery , and procedures. Plai ntiff is advised to 
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the 
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before 
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. 
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to th e Court at this time, unless specifically 
directed to do so. Page ID
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