govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_26-cv-03353-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
J.E., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
TODD BLANCHE, et al., 
Respondents. 

 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
(ECF No. 1) 
 
 
Petitioner J.E. filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he has 
been improperly detained in immigration custody. (ECF No. 1.) The Government filed a 
response acknowledging “that Petitioner is entitled to be released from custody subject to 
conditions of supervision.” (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner filed a Traverse (ECF No. 9.) For the 
reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and orders that Petitioner be 
released under DHS supervision. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the writ 
is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 
A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or she is in 
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custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It applies 
to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 
(2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since he is seeking release from custody, he has 
standing to pursue this Petition. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 On September 19, 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
apprehended Petitioner, a Mexican citizen. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 10, 19.) DHS released 
Petitioner under an order of supervision. ( Id.) Petitioner received lawful employment 
authorization. (Id. ¶ 20.) He has since had two U.S. citizen children. (Id.) 
On September 12, 2025, he received a positive credible fear determination. (Id. ¶ 
21.) Nonetheless, on December 18, 2025, when he appeared for a monitoring appointment, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took him into custody and escorted him 
to Mexico. ( Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Ninth Circuit 
alleging he had been unlawfully removed. ( Id. ¶ 25.) Customs and Border Protection 
coordinated with Petitioner’s counsel to have Petitioner returned to the United States. (Id.) 
On May 20, 2026, he was paroled back into the United States but was immediately detained 
by ICE. (Id. ¶ 28.) 
Petitioner argues his detention violates both his substantive and procedural due 
process rights and requests immediate release under the same order of supervision. The 
Government admits it is “unable to ascertain sufficient facts at this time to establish 
Petitioner’s supervised release was revoked according” to appropriate DHS procedures. 
(ECF No. 8.) Therefore, the Government “acknowledge[s] that Petitioner is entitled to be 
released from custody subject to conditions of supervision.” 
III. ANALYSIS 
 Petitioner’s re-detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard and without 
noticeably changed circumstances violates Petitioner’s due process rights. Individuals 
released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a liberty interest in 
continued liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parolees); 
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Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (pre-parolees); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 782 (1973) (probationers). Thus, this Court agrees with those courts that have held: 
[O]nce a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from 
rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, 
the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed 
circumstances— namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or 
has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal. And if 
the noncitizen disputes the notion that changed circumstances justify his 
rearrest, he is entitled to a prompt hearing before an Immigration Judge. 
Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Kamalpreet 
v. Singh , No. 26 -cv-1211-LL-JLB, 2026 WL 622687, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) 
(“Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 
government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 
creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty will be 
revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.” (citation modified) (quoting 
Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025))). 
 Because DHS released Petitioner upon finding he was not a flight risk or a danger 
to the community in 201 4, and because there is no evidence those circumstances have 
changed, Petitioner is entitled to remain released on the same conditions as he was initially 
released. If DHS believes circumstances have changed, it must provide notice of these 
changed circumstances to Petitioner and provide Petitioner an opportunity to be heard 
promptly before an Immigration Judge. Hence, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ: 
The Court ORDERS that Petitioner J.E. (A# 205-141-724) be released on the 
same terms and conditions as he was previously released in 2014. 
The Clerk of Court shall close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 16, 2026 
 
 
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge 
United States District Court 
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