govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-1_25-cv-01252-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 EASTERN DIVISION 
 
 
 ) 
SHAWN F. SHAW, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-01252-JDB-jay 
 ) 
BRIAN ELLER, WARDEN, ) 
 ) 
Respondent. ) 
 ) 
 
 
ORDER DISMISSING § 2254 PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO 
EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES, 
DENYING A COA, 
 AND 
 DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL 
 
 
On November 5, 2025, the Petitioner, Shawn F. Shaw , Tennessee Department of 
Correction prisoner number 476037, an inmate at the Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain 
City, Tennessee, filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus (the 
“Petition”). (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.) 
The Petition raises three grounds for relief : (1) “[m]erge has no Tennessee Code 
Annotated [and] does not exist in law” ( id. at PageID 4) (“Ground 1”) and (2) Petitioner was 
“[c]onvicted twice under the same [statute, Tennessee Code Annotated] § 39-13-202[,] on the same 
victim” (id. at PageID 6) (“Ground 2”). The third ground for relief (“Ground 3”) is a duplicate of 
the first. (See id. at PageID 7.) 
Petitioner admits that he has not raised any of his three grounds for habeas relief in a state 
post-conviction application. Additionally, he admits that he has not raised Grounds 1 and 3 in a 
direct appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”). PageID
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On preliminary review, the Court ordered Shaw to show cause “why the Petition should 
not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state -court remedies.” (D.E. 10 at 
PageID 28.) He responded to the show cause order claiming that the “state courts [were] informed 
of this merge” and that “all . . . courts supported this merge . . . knowing it has no [Tennessee] 
statute to support such action/judgment.” (D.E. 11 at PageID 31.) The Court has reviewed the 
TCCA’s decision in the inmate’s direct appeal and, contrary to Shaw’s response to the show cause 
order, finds the claims raised in the Petition have not been exhausted. 
Shaw was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, first -degree felony 
murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. State v. Shaw , 715 S.W.3d 
340, 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024). Before the TCCA, he argued that his conviction s for 
especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault violated the prohibition against double 
jeopardy. Id. at 344 -45. He also attempted to raise an evidentiary issue about a witness’s 
testimony at trial, “but due to the largely incoherent nature of [Petitioner’s] brief, [the TCCA was] 
unable to determine precisely what issue [he was] attempting to raise.” Id. at 348. Nonetheless, 
because Petitioner had failed to raise any issue about the witness’s testimony in a motion for a new 
trial, the TCCA deemed the issue waived. Id. 
The TCCA affirmed the state trial court’s judgments but remanded the case in order for the 
trial court to correct various errors in the judgment forms. Id. As relevant to the Petition, the 
TCCA ordered the state trial court to enter “an amended judgment form for count 2 . . . to reflect 
that it merges into count 1 for a single conviction of first degree murder.” Id. PageID
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Although Grounds 1 and 3 are difficult to decipher, they appear to relate to the TCCA’s 
order on remand directing the state trial court to enter an amended judgment form that merged 
counts 1 and 2 into a single conviction of first -degree murder. Id. Petitioner has not appealed 
the state court’s amended judgment. 
Shaw raises a double jeopardy claim in Ground 2 , alleging that he was “convicted twice 
under . . . § 39-13-202 on the same victim.” ( D.E. 1 at PageID 6.) The statute to which he refers 
defines first-degree murder in Tennessee. The only double jeopardy challenge considered by the 
TCCA related to Petitioner’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 
assault. Shaw, 715 S.W.3d at 343. The court did not address any double jeopardy challenge to 
Petitioner’s convictions under §§ 39-13-202(a)(1) and (a)(2) for first-degree premeditated murder 
and first-degree felony murder. See id. 
A federal court cannot decide a § 2254 petition until the petitioner exhausts the remedies 
available in state court . See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 
518-19 (1982). In Tennessee, a petitioner exhausts state remedies on a claim when the claim is 
presented to at least the TCCA. Adams v. Holland , 330 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 39). “To be properly exhausted, each claim must have been ‘fairly presented’ 
to the state courts.” Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009). The petitioner bears 
the burden of proving exhaustion. Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). A petitioner 
has not satisfied his burden of showing exhaustion where he has failed to fairly present the claims 
in his petition to the TCCA. See id. 
 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a stay and abeyance of a federal 
habeas case while a petitioner exhausts his state remedies are appropriate only in limited PageID
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circumstances. Rhines v. Weber, 554 U.S.269, 277 (2005). “Because granting a stay effectively 
excuses a petitioner’s failure to present his claims first to the state courts [before filing his federal 
habeas petition], stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there 
was good cause f or the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. Shaw 
has not demonstrated good cause for a stay of these federal proceedings. 
For the reasons set forth above , the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to 
Shaw’s right to file a new § 2254 petition after he exhausts his claims in state court. 
APPELLATE ISSUES 
No § 2254 petitioner may appeal without a certificate of appealability (“COA”) . 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make “a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where 
habeas relief is denied on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying 
constitutional claim(s), “a COA should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of 
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 
In this case, the Petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies . 
Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural 
ruling dismissing the Petition for failure to exhaust. The Court DENIES a COA. 
To appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in a habeas case under § 2254, the petitioner must 
obtain pauper status under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). See Kincade v. Sparkman, 
117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997). A party seeking pauper status on appeal must first file a motion PageID
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in the district court, along with a supporting affidavit. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1) . If the district 
court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, or otherwise denies leave to appeal 
IFP, the petitioner must file his motion to proceed IFP in the appellate court. See Fed. R. App. P. 
24(a)(4)-(5). For the same reasons the Court denies a COA, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal 
in this matter would not be taken in good faith. Leave to appeal IFP is DENIED.1 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of June 2026. 
 
 s/ J. DANIEL BREEN 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 1If Petitioner files a notice of appeal, he must pay the full $605 appellate filing fee or file a 
motion to proceed IFP and supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals within thirty 
days of the date of entry of this order. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5). PageID
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