govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_14-cr-20206-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
DAMASE CAMERON, 
 
Defendant. 
______________________________/ 
 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Damase Cameron’s Supplemental 
Motion for Writ of Mandamus and Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A) (“Motion”), ECF No. [481]. The Government filed a Response in Opposition, ECF 
No. [483]. The Court has considered the Motion, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is 
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion is denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On April 1, 2014, Defendant was charged by Indictment with one count of conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, more than 28 grams of cocaine 
base, methylone, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); one count of conspiracy 
to possess or carry a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count 2); one count of possession or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 3); and one count of possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 4). ECF No. [3]. 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement, agree ing to plead guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the 
Indictment. ECF Nos. [247], [248]. 
On January 30, 2015, the Court sentenced Defendant to 202 months of imprisonment as to 
Case 1:14-cr-20206-BB Document 484 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2026 Page 1 of 6

2 
Count 1 and 60 months of imprisonment as to Count 3, to run consecutively. See ECF No. [343] 
at 36–41; ECF No. [324]. 
On August 1, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. [474]. In it, Defendant argued, in relevant part, that his family 
circumstances constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. Id. at 10. 
Specifically, he argued that the deaths of his son and father, combined with his mother’s medical 
conditions including dementia, justified compassionate release. Id . The Court found that 
Defendant’s family circumstances did not justify compassionate release because Defendant had 
not shown that his mother was medically incapacitated or that he was the only person available to 
care for her. ECF No. [480] at 7–8. 
On April 13, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion, arguing that “newly arisen and 
materially significant circumstances” support the application of compassionate release. ECF No. 
[481] at 1. Specifically, he notes that since his prior filing, his mother “was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident as a passenger, resulting in hospitalization and physical injury.” Id. at 2. This 
compounds the challenges he raised in his previous Motion for Compassionate Release—namely, 
the deaths of his son and father and his mother’s medical conditions. Id. 
The Government responds that Defendant remains ineligible for release, as the car accident 
has not incapacitated his mother. ECF No. [483] at 4–8. Specifically, Defendant’s records indicate 
that she was discharged from the hospital with a prescription for acetaminophen and instructions 
to be aware of the symptoms of a more serious head injury. Id. at 5. Moreover, Defendant has still 
not demonstrated that he is the only person capable of providing care for his mother. Id. at 6. 
II. LEGAL STANDRD 
“Generally, a court ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’” 
Case 1:14-cr-20206-BB Document 484 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2026 Page 2 of 6

3 
United States v. Pubien, 805 F. App’x 727, 729 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). 
“The authority of a district court to modify an imprisonment sentence is narrowly 
limited by statute.” [ United States v. Phillips , 597 F.3d 1190, 1194- 95 (11th Cir. 
2010)]. Section 3582(c) of Title 18 provides that the district court may not modify 
a defendant’s imprisonment sentence except: (1) if the Bureau of Prisons files a 
motion and extraordinary or compelling circumstances wa rrant modification or if 
the defendant is at least 70 years old and has served 30 years in prison; (2) if the 
modification is e xpressly permitted by statute or Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 35; or (3) if the defendant’s original sentencing range has subsequently 
been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines by the Sentencing 
Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 
 
United States v. Shaw , 711 F. App’x 552, 554- 55 (11th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. 
Celedon, 353 F. App’x 278, 280 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Diaz -Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 
1316-18 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “[t]he law is clear that the district court has no inherent authority 
to modify a sentence; it may do so only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. 
Rivas, 800 F. App’x 742, 745 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Puentes , 803 F.3d 597, 
605-06 (11th Cir. 2015)); see also United States v. Llewlyn , 879 F.3d 1291, 1296- 97 (11th Cir. 
2018) (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010)). 
Defendant seeks compassionate release pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The relevant 
portion of the statute provides that: 
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion 
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to 
appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf 
or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the 
defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment 
(and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without 
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of 
imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) [18 USCS 
§ 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— 
 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .. 
. . . 
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by 
Case 1:14-cr-20206-BB Document 484 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2026 Page 3 of 6

4 
the Sentencing Commission . . .. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
To grant a defendant’s request for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the Court 
must: (1) find Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons 
(“BOP”); (2) conclude that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant com passionate release 
in this case; (3) weigh the relevant § 3553(a) factors; and find that (4) “such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Eleventh Circuit has held any such reduction must be consistent with the 
applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Bryant , 996 F.3d 1243, 1262 
(11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (“In short, we hold that [§] 1B1.13 is an applicable 
policy statement that governs all motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, district courts 
may not reduce a sentence under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) unless a reduction would be cons istent 
with [§] 1B1.13.”). Moreover, Defendant bears the burden of establishing that compassionate 
release is warranted. See United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 337 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that “a defendant, as the § 3582(c)(2) movant, bears the burden of establishing that” compassionate 
release is warranted, but that, even where a defendant satisfies this burden, “the district court still 
retains discretion to determine whether a sentence reduction is warranted”). 
Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines lists the following extraordinary and 
compelling reasons: (1) the defendant’s medical circumstances; (2) the defendant’s age; (3) the 
defendant’s family circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by the defendant while 
serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced; (5) other circumstances similar in gravity 
to those described in (1) through (4); and (6) an unusually long sentence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). 
“Each of these circumstances is further defi ned in the Guidelines’ policy statement. The policy 
Case 1:14-cr-20206-BB Document 484 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2026 Page 4 of 6

5 
statement definitions are binding on courts in this Circuit.” United States v. Harris, Case No. 8:18-
cr-483, 2024 WL 4932775, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2024) (citing Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Court finds that Defendant has not established an extraordinary and compelling basis 
for compassionate release. As the Court explained in its previous Order, for family circumstances 
to support compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, Defendant first must demonstrate that 
(1) his mother is medically incapacitated; and (2) Defendant is the only person available to care 
for her. ECF No. [480] at 7 (citing § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C)). Defendant has failed to do so. 
The only change in circumstances since the Court’s last Order is the car accident 
experienced by Defendant’s mother. While the Court regrets that Defendant’s mother experienced 
this hardship, as the Government correctly points out, the record reflects that Defendant’s mother 
was discharged with a prescription for acetaminophen, which is a mild form of treatment. ECF No. 
[481-1] at 13. Nothing else in the records submitted my Defendant indicates that his mother was 
incapacitated from the car accident. 
Moreover, Defendant still has not demonstrated that he is the only person capable of caring 
for his mother. As the Court noted in its prior Order, Defendant’s sister appears to be another 
available caregiver. ECF No. [480] at 8 (citations omitted). The ins tant Motion provides no 
additional information to indicate that Defendant’s sister is not an available and adequate 
caregiver. See generally ECF No. [481]. 
For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion. Because the Court finds that 
extraordinary and compelling circumstances do not exist, the Court does not reach the § 3553(a) 
factors or applicable policy statements. CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that 
Case 1:14-cr-20206-BB Document 484 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2026 Page 5 of 6

6 
1. Defendant Damase Cameron’s Supplemental Motion for Writ of Mandamus and 
Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) , ECF No. 
[481], is DENIED. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on June 15, 2026. 
 
 
________________________________ 
BETH BLOOM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Copies to: 
Counsel of record 
Damase Cameron 
05344-104 
Pollock FCI 
Federal Correctional Institution 
Inmate Mail/Parcels 
Post Office Box 4050 
Pollock, LA 71467 
PRO SE 
Case 1:14-cr-20206-BB Document 484 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/16/2026 Page 6 of 6

Passage view · GavelSight