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govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_13-cr-00170-2

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 2026-06-16

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:52:39

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
MARCUS LEE RICARDO WILSON, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
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1:13-cr-170-1 
 1:19-cr-333-1 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Lindsey A. Freeman, United States District Judge. 
Marcus Lee Ricardo Wilson is a federal inmate serving a total term of 
imprisonment of 126 months. B efore the Court is Mr. Wilson’s pro se motion for 
compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)(1)(A). Case No. 1:13-cr-170-1, Dkt. 
75; Case No. 1:19- cr-333-1, Dkt. 26. 1 The Government has responded , opposing the 
motion. Dkt. 28. Because Mr. Wilson has not established an extraordinary and 
compelling reason and because the 18 U.SC. § 3553(a) factors weigh against release, the 
motion will be denied. 
 
1 Mr. Wilson filed the identical motion for compassionate release in both cases. Unless 
specified, references in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to documents filed with 
the Court in CM/ECF refer to documents filed in Case No. 1:19-cr-333-1. 

 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On September 20, 2013, Mr. Wilson pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to 
one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Case No. 1:13-cr-170-1, Dkt. 13 at 1. Mr. 
Wilson was sentenced to 70 months of imprisonment followed by three years of 
supervised release.2 Case No. 1:13-cr-170-1, Dkts. 13, 39. Mr. Wilson began his term of 
supervised release on September 6, 2018, but was arrested just months later on January 
9, 2019, after a search of his home produced over 187 grams of marijuana, six pills, 27 
grams of crack cocaine, scales and a grinder, a Taurus 9mm handgun with magazine and 
ammunition, a Taurus .45 handgun with magazine containing ammunition , a Smith & 
Wesson SD-40 VE handgun with magazine containing ammunition, and over $ 4,000. 
Dkt. 10, ¶ 8. In an interview with the police, Mr. Wilson said that the Taurus .45 handgun 
and the cocaine base belonged to him. Id., ¶ 9. 
Mr. Wilson was subsequently charged in Case No. 1:19-cr-333-1 with possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C ) 
and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 
 
2 Mr. Wilson was originally sentenced to 74 months in prison and three years of 
supervised release, but the term of imprisonment was subsequently reduced to 70 
months. Case No. 1:13-cr-170-1, Dkts. 13 at 2; 39 at 1. 
 

 
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924(a)(2). Dkt. 1. He pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to both counts and was 
sentenced to 102 months of imprisonment. 3 Dkts. 5, 12. Mr. Wilson’s probation officer 
also petitioned for revocation of Mr. Wilson’s supervised release in Case No. 1:13-cr-170-
1. Case No. 1:13-cr-170-1, Dkt 43. After a revocation hearing, the Court ruled that Mr. 
Wilson had violated the terms and conditions of his release and revoked Mr. Wilson’s 
supervised release . Case No. 1:13- cr-170-1, Dkt. 62 at 2-3. The Court sentenced Mr. 
Wilson to 24 months of imprisonment, the time to run consecutively to his 102- month 
term in Case No. 1:19-cr-333-1, for a total term of 126 months of imprisonment. Id. at 2. 
 On November 23, 2020, Mr. Wilson filed his first motion for compassionate release 
seeking a reduction of sentence based on his increased risk of serious illness or death 
from COVID-19 due to his various health issues. Dkt. 15. The motion was denied by the 
Court. Dkt. 20. On June 27, 2024, Mr. Wilson filed a motion seeking a reduction of 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on retroactive changes lowering the 
applicable sentencing guideline range, which was also denied.4 Dkts. 18, 24. On January 
16, 2026, Mr. Wilson filed the motion for compassionate release presently before the 
 
3 Mr. Wilson was sentenced to 102 months of imprisonment on each count, the sentences 
to run concurrently. Dkt. 12 at 2. 
 
4 The probation office determined Mr. Wilson did not qualify under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 
because he was in custody on revocation of supervised release, not the original sentence, 
and because Amendment 821 did not lower his sentencing guideline range. Dkt. 20. The 
Government as well as counsel for Mr. Wilson agreed that Mr. Wilson was ineligi ble for 
a reduction under § 3582(c). Dkts. 21, 23. 

 
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Court. See Case No. 1:13-cr-170-1, Dkt. 75; Case No. 1:19- cr-333-1, Dkt. 26. Mr. Wilson 
argues he should be released because he needs to act as a caregiver for his minor daughter 
and because of his medical issues. Dkt. 26. The Government has responded and opposes 
the motion. Dkt. 28. Mr. Wilson is 39 years old, presently incarcerated at Allenwood FCI, 
and has a current expected release date May 6, 2028. See BOP Inmate Locator, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/(last visited May 12, 2026). 
ANALYSIS 
While the Court is sympathetic to Mr. Wilson’s concerns regarding his health and 
particularly his daughter ’s care, on the information presented Mr. Wilson fails to 
demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason sufficient to upend the finality of 
his sentence and justify his early release. Generally , a court may not modify a term of 
imprisonment after sentencing. See United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 653 (4th Cir. 2024). 
However, a court may modify a sentence in narrow circumstances when expressly 
permitted by statute . See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) . Relevant here, under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A) a court may reduce a sentence and grant what is known as compassionate 
release when: (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason supports a reduction; (2) the 
reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission; and (3) the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) weigh in favor of release. Davis, 
99 F.4th at 654. The policy statements generally restate the requirements of § 
3582(c)(1)(A) but also require that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other 

 
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person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2). 
The policy statements also provide guidance regarding what constitutes “extraordinary 
and compelling reasons,” with a list of circumstances that may warrant granting 
compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). A defendant has the burden of 
establishing the circumstances warranting his release. United States v. Perez , No. 1:18-
CR-303-2, 2024 WL 1014161, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (citing United States v. Hargrove, 
30 F.4th 189, 195 (4th Cir. 2022) ). Even once a defendant shows an extraordinary and 
compelling reason, a court has discretion to deny the motion if consideration of the § 
3553(a) factors weigh against relief. See United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 831 (4th Cir. 
2022). 
First, however, the Court must assess whether Mr. Wilson’s motion is properly 
before it. Under § 3582, a defendant must exhaust administrative remedies before 
seeking relief from the court . S ee 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Exhaustion is not 
jurisdictional and is waived unless invoked. See United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 
129-30 (4th Cir. 2021). Mr. Wilson filed a request for relief with the Bureau of Prisons 
(“BOP”) in October of 2020. Dkt. 28-2. The Government acknowledges Mr. Wilson filed 
this request for administrative relief and concedes exhaustion.5 Dkt. 28 at 5. T herefore, 
the Court will proceed to the merits of Mr. Wilson’s motion. 
 
5 Mr. Wilson’s request for administrative relief with the BOP was filed over five years 
prior to the instant motion and approximately 40 days before his first motion for 

 
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I. Mr. Wilson Has Failed to Establish an Extraordinary and Compelling Reason 
that Supports Compassionate Release 
 
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires (1) the court to find an extraordinary and compelling 
reason to support a reduction and (2) that any reduction be “consistent with the 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission .” As the Fourth 
Circuit has stated, these requirements “are supposed to work together.” United States v. 
Burleigh, 145 F.4th 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2025) . Section 3582(c)(1)(A) does not define an 
“extraordinary and compelling reason,” but the policy statements provide guidance with 
a list of circumstances that constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant 
compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). Applicable here, the policy statements 
include certain medical and family circumstances of the defendant as extraordinary and 
compelling reasons that may support a reduction of sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1) 
& (3). For the reasons discussed below, however, Mr. Wilson cannot meet his burden to 
demonstrate that either reason constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance 
warranting early release. Perez, 2024 WL 1014161, at *1. 
 
 
compassionate release. Dkts. 28-2, 15, 26. Because the Government concedes exhaustion, 
Dkt. 28 at 5, any question of whether the administrative request made years earlie r 
satisfies the threshold exhaustion requirement for the present motion is not an issue 
before the Court. See Muhammad, 16 F.4th at 130 (a claim of exhaustion must be invoked 
by the Government or is waived). 

 
7 
 
A. Mr. Wilson cannot establish his family circumstances are an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. 
 
 Mr. Wilson argues that he should be granted compassionate release because he 
needs to act as the caregiver for his minor daughter, Nyaziah Wilson, but he fails to 
demonstrate a reduction should be granted for this purpose . The presentence 
investigation report confirms that Mr. Wilson has a daughter, Nyaziah Wilson, who in 
2019 resided with her mother Rondell Nelson in Rockingham, NC. Dkt. 10, ¶ 54. Based 
on that information, Ms. Wilson would be approximately 16 years old a t this time. Mr. 
Wilson states that Ms. Wilson’s mother passed away in December of 2025, and he is now 
her only legal guardian. Dkt. 26. Mr. Wilson asserts that he needs to be present because 
his daughter is “lacking support” and “suffering trauma.” Id. 
The Sentencing Commission policy statement recognizes the care of a child may 
be an extraordinary and compelling circumstance supporting a reduction of sentence in 
the case of: 
The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child 
or the defendant’s child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable of 
self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A). 
Mr. Wilson is unable to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for a 
reduction of sentence on this basis. First, as the Government argues, Dkt. 28 at 8-9, Mr. 
Wilson has not provided adequate information to support his claim. Mr. Wilson makes 

 
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broad statements that his daughter is fending for herself and soon will not have a place 
to live but does not provide any details about her circumstances or evidence to support 
his claim. See Dkt. 26. Mr. Wilson has not explained where Ms. Wilson has been staying 
or who has been caring for her since her mother’s death. In fact, the Court only has Mr. 
Wilson’s assertion that Ms. Wilson ’s mother died and that Ms. Wilson was being cared 
for by her mother at the time of the death. Mr. Wilson has not presented anything to 
substantiate these claims.6 
Nor has Mr. Wilson shown that Ms. Wilson needs him to be her caregiver. The 
Sentencing Commission policy statement addressing the care of a minor child does not 
specify a defendant must be the “only available caregiver” as it does in other parts of the 
policy statement. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(B) -(D). However, when addressing such 
claims, courts, including other judges in this district, have generally considered whether 
another caregiver is available. See, e.g., United States v. Holman , No. 12-cr-72, 2025 WL 
3496564, * 2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); United States v. Cates, No. 20-cr-223, 
2023 WL 167409, at *3- 4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2023) (collecting cases) . Mr. Wilson has not 
 
6 The Court has located a December 2025 obituary for a Rondell Nelson in Rockingham , 
NC. S ee https://richmondobserver.com/stories/obituary- rondell-shellette-nelson,77146 
(last visited June 3, 2026). However, the obituary only generally refers to family and does 
not list specific surviving family members. While it is likely this is Ms. Wilson’s mother, 
it is not possible to affirm that fact on the information before the Court. 
 

 
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addressed the availability of any other family members or explained why another family 
member cannot act as caregiver, particularly if one is already doing so. 
Further, there is nothing to advise that Mr. Wilson would be a suitable caregiver 
and therefore should have his sentence reduced for that purpose . Mr. Wilson has been 
incarcerated for large periods of his daughter’s life, and his criminal history shows 
constant involvement with drugs and guns. See Dkt. 10, ¶¶ 30-41. When arrested for the 
current offense, Mr. Wilson had illegal narcotics, paraphernalia associated with drug 
trafficking, and loaded weapons throughout his home . Mr. Wilson has been in and out 
of custody since around the time his daughter was born, see id., ¶¶ 37-41, and except for 
a brief four-month period he has been incarcerated since she was four years old. Id. There 
is no indication Mr. Wilson has ever parented his daughter or evidence showing whether 
they have maintained contact while he has been incarcerated. Consequently, on the 
information before the Court Mr. Wilson has failed to establish an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for release based on the need to act as a caregiver for his daughter. 
B. Mr. Wilson cannot establish that his medical circumstances are an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. 
 
Mr. Wilson also argues that he should be granted compassionate release because 
of his medical issues, Dkt. 26, but Mr. Wilson is unable to establish an extraordinary and 
compelling reason f or a reduction of sentence on this basis . Mr. Wilson states that he 
suffers “from health issues that include [T]ype 2 Diabetes that [r]equires me to [h]ave to 

 
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take insulin 3 times a day.” Dkt. 26. He lists various medicines and supplements he takes 
for his medical issues, specifically, aspirin, magnesium oxide, Empagliflozin, Vitamin D, 
and potassium . Id. However, Mr. Wilson does not explain why he believes these 
circumstances are grounds for compassionate release. 
The Sentencing Commission policy statement s provide that medical 
circumstances may amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction if: 
(B) The defendant is— 
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, 
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or 
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of 
the aging process, 
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to 
provide self -care within the environment of a correctional 
facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover. 
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-
term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without 
which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B )-(C).
7 Mr. Wilson has not demonstrated that any of these 
circumstances apply to him. 
 
7 The policy statements also recognize an extraordinary and compelling reason when a 
defendant is suffering from a terminal illness or when t he defendant is housed in a 
correctional facility affected by a public health emergency o r outbreak of infectiou s 
disease. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) & (D). Mr. Wilson has not claimed, nor do the facts 
support, that either of these circumstances are applicable in his case. 

 
11 
 
Mr. Wilson refers to his diabetes but does not indicate the condition limits his 
ability to provide self-care or that he requires specialized treatment he cannot receive in 
BOP custody . The medical records indicate h is health is being monitored and he is 
receiving regular and appropriate treatment. See generally Dkt. 29. He has been 
prescribed insulin and Empagliflozin for his diabetes .8 Id. at 8. The records show Mr. 
Wilson is only 60 percent compliant with the prescribed medicine, but he nonetheless 
may be able to discontinue insulin in the future if the oral medication provides adequate 
control. Id. at 6. Mr. Wilson does not otherwise identify any particular health complaints, 
claim that his health is declining, or claim that he is unable to provide self-care within the 
prison environment. 9 Accordingly, Mr. Wilson has failed to establish his medical 
circumstances are an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. 
II. The Section 3553(a) Factors Weigh Against Granting a Reduction of Sentence 
As Mr. Wilson fails to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason that will 
support compassionate release, the Court does not need to consider whether the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors weigh in favor of a reduction. See United States v. Hargrove , 30 F.4th 
 
8 Empagliflozin is used to treat Type 2 diabetes. See https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-
supplements/empagliflozin-oral-route/description/drg-20113010 (last visited June 3, 
2026). 
 
9 Mr. Wilson’s medical records show that he suffers from several other chronic health 
conditions such as hyperlipidemia, tachycardia, and gastroesophageal reflux disease but 
the records also indicate these conditions are monitored and treated by BOP health 
personnel. Dkt. 29 at 6-9. 

 
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189, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2022) (a court may find a defendant eligible for compassionate release 
only after finding that such a reduction is warranted by extraordinary and compelling 
reasons). However, even if Mr. Wilson had shown an extraordinary and compelling 
reason, the § 3553(a) factors weigh against granting relief in this case. 
Section 3553(a) requires a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. Section 3553(a) directs the Court to weigh 
factors including the nature of the offense, defendant’s history, the need for a sentence to 
impose just punishment, the need to promote respect for the law, the need to protect the 
public and deter crime, and the need to provide a defendant with rehabilitative training 
or treatment. A court may also consider post- sentencing facts in the record such as 
evidence of behavior or rehabilitation while incarcerated. See United States v. Martin, 916 
F.3d 389, 397 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 In making his motion, Mr. Wilson notes he has enrolled in many BOP programs 
and continues to work on his rehabilitation. Dkt. 26. He states he is participating in the 
Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) and trying to make better choices and 
surround himself with the right types of people. Id. The Court recognizes that Mr. Wilson 
has taken some positive steps towards rehabilitation while incarcerated. The records 
show he is working towards his GED and has taken over fifty BOP courses, including 
programs on behavior modification and problem solving, as well as courses such as 
forklift certification which may help him find employment upon release. Dkt. 28-3 at 1-

 
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2. While Mr. Wilson has received three disciplinary infractions while incarcerated, he has 
not received any infractions in the last three years. See Dkt. 28-4. 
Nonetheless, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors overall weigh s against a 
reduction of sentence. Mr. Wilson’s efforts towards rehabilitation are encouraging, but 
taking classes and working to improve oneself is expected of an inmate, not evidence of 
extraordinary behavior. See United States v. Mitchell, Case No. 1:21-cr-72, 2025 WL 674347, 
at * 3 (M.D.N.C. March 3, 2025) (citing United States v. Logan, 532 F. Supp. 3d 725, 735 (D. 
Minn. 2021)). This evidence of rehabilitation cannot overcome other factors. 
First, the circumstances of the offense weigh against a reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(1). Mr. Wilson , only months into his period of supervised release for prior 
convictions involving drugs and illegal possession of weapons , was arrested after the 
police searched his home and found numerous loaded weapons , drugs, scales and a 
grinder, and over $4,000. Dkt. 10, ¶¶ 5 -8. These circumstances show a repeated and 
blatant disregard for the law, and his propensity to rely on weapons in furtherance of his 
drug crimes presents a danger to the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
Second, Mr. Wilson’s criminal history also weighs decidedly against a reduction. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Mr. Wilson has a lengthy criminal history, beginning in his late 
teens, which includes multiple prior felony convictions for drug and gun crimes. Dkt. 10, 
¶¶ 30-41. Most concerning, his history shows a record of poor performance on probation 
and that periods of incarceration and supervision have done little to curb additional 

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criminal behavior. In fact, d espite receiving a 70- month term of imprisonment for his 
prior federal convictions, Mr. Wilson re-offended almost immediately once released. Id., 
¶ 41. This history signals a substantial risk of recidivism. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); United 
States v. Gardner, No. 23 -6450, 2023 WL 4839592, at *1 (4th Cir. 2023) (unpublished) 
(affirming district court’s denial of a pro se compassionate release motion after 
considering “recidivism risk” and other factors). 
Accordingly, the § 3553(a) factors weigh against a reduction of sentence. A 
reduced sentence would not reflect the seriousness of Mr. Wilson’s behavior, promote 
respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence, or protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a). The Court concludes Mr. Wilson’s current sentence is “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary” and nothing presented by Mr. Wilson shows the type of extraordinary 
circumstances required to upend his final sentence and grant compassionate release. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Wilson’s motion for compassionate release 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)(1)(A) , Case No. 1:13- cr-170-1, Dkt. 75; Case No. 1:19- cr-
333-1, Dkt. 26, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
This the 16t h day of June, 2026. 
___________________________________ 
LINDSEY A. FREEMAN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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