govinfo:USCOURTS-miwd-1_26-cv-01709-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
______ 
 
AHMED EBNOUOUMAR, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al., 
 
Respondents. 
____________________________/ 
 
 

 
Honorable Jane M. Beckering 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated 
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention 
and asks the Court to, inter alia , issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Id., PageID.29.) 
In an Order entered on May 29, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within 
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should 
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on May 29, 2026, (ECF No. 
4.) Petitioner filed his reply on June 3, 2026, (ECF No. 5.) After re viewing the parties’ 
submissions, the Court concludes that the petiti on is properly dismissed without prejudice for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Discussion 
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mauritania. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Petitioner entered 
the United States in 2024 and has remained in the United States since that time. ( Id.) On May 4, 
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2026, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (ECF 
No. 1, PageID.6.) Respondents have not provided Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before 
an immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).1 
Since September of 2025, this Court has cons idered hundreds of petit ions similar to the 
present petition. In resolving those petitions, until recently, the Court has declined to require that 
immigration detainees exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief or, in the 
alternative, the Court has waived the exhaustion requirement. Then, turning to the merits, the Court 
has determined that immigration detainees in Petitioner’s circumstance are properly detained, if at 
all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and, accordingly, entitled to a custody redetermination hearing if the 
government intends to continue the detention. 
On May 11, 2026, in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft , Nos. 25-1965, 1969, 1978, 1982, 2026 
WL 1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026), the United Stat es Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
also concluded that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs the detention of persons in Petitioner’s 
position. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit explained: 
Noncitizens who have “passed through our ga tes, even illegally, may be expelled 
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed 
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei , 345 U.S. 206, 
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher , 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus, 
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of 
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well 
established that the Fifth Amendment enti tles aliens to due process of law in 
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also Demore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequent ly, the government may not deny 
“notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the 
country, and has become subject in all resp ects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01. 
 
1 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of 
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
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Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11. The Sixth Circuit th erefore upheld the lower courts’ 
determinations that the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond 
under § 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at *13. 
In Respondents’ submissions to this Court, they indicate their intention to comply with the 
binding holdings of Lopez-Campos and afford Petitioner a custody redetermination hearing. (ECF 
No. 4, PageID.45.) This changes the Court’s exhaus tion analysis. At present the Court concludes 
that exhaustion would not be futile, and that th e balance of prudential ex haustion factors weighs 
in favor of requiring exhaustion. 
There are no applicable statutes or rules that mandate administrative exhaustion by 
Petitioner. Thus, whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” 
See Shearson v. Holder , 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan , 
503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an 
agency as a ‘judge-made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. 
v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion 
rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. 
Notably, the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative 
exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habe as petition for unlawful mandatory detention,” 
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) 
(citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 
2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a 
standard for determin ing when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft , 
No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However, courts within 
the Sixth Circuit “have applied th e three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care 
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Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 
484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to determine whether 
prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test, 
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when: 
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper 
record and reach a proper decision; 
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 
administrative scheme; and 
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes 
and to preclude the need for judicial review. 
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)). 
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion, 
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See id. (citations omitted). A court may choose to 
rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and 
delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. , 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) 
(citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of administrative remedies 
would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). 
In resolving hundreds of prior petitions like Petitioner’s, this Court concluded that 
prudential exhaustion should not be required after balancing the prudential considerations and the 
likely futility of starting with an agency decision. But after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lopez-
Campos and the government’s unequivocal commitme nt to apply its holding in this case, 
administrative review of the controlling legal question is likely to result in an agency decision that 
honors the law. This, in turn, means that exhaustion is no longer futile. 
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Therefore, the Court will require Petitione r to exhaust the available administrative 
remedies. The Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice. Should the administrative 
remedies prove to be an unavailable path to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes, Petitioner 
may file a new petition. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, the Court w ill enter a Judgment dismissing the petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice. 
 
Dated: June 16, 2026 
/s/ Jane M. Beckering 
Jane M. Beckering 
United States District Judge 
 
 
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