govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-2_25-cv-00107-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION 
 
SHADAVIAN YARD-DANIEL, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00107-JPH-MJD 
 ) 
LLOYD ARNOLD Commissioner of IDOC, ) 
 ) 
Respondent. ) 
 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
 Shadavian Yard-Daniel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks relief 
from his conviction and sanctions in prison disciplinary case ISF 24-12-3257. 
For the following reasons, his petition is denied, and this action is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
I. Overview 
 Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits or 
of credit-earning class without due process. Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 
274 (7th Cir. 2016); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007); see 
also Rhoiney v. Neal, 723 F. App'x 347, 348 (7th Cir. 2018). The due process 
requirement is satisfied with: 1) the issuance of at least 24 hours advance written 
notice of the charge; 2) a limited opportunity to call witnesses and present 
evidence to an impartial decision-maker; 3) a written statement articulating the 
reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it; and 4) "some 
evidence in the record" to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. PageID #:
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Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 563-67 (1974). 
II. Disciplinary Proceeding 
On December 1, 2024, at approximately 22:14, Officer Bailey called a 
signal 10-10 in 12 North A-Side Cube 2 "due to a massive fight involving multiple 
offenders." Dkt. 10-1 (Conduct Report). Officer Bailey observed Mr. Yard-Daniel 
"throwing multiple closed fist strikes at other offenders." Id. The officer's verbal 
commands to stop fighting were ignored. Id. He identified Mr. Yard-Daniel by 
using the facility camera, past experience, and DELTA (the offender information 
system). Id. 
On December 13, a screening officer notified Mr. Yard-Daniel of the charge 
of "battery against an incarcerated individual" and provided him with a copy of 
the conduct report and the notice of disciplinary hearing (screening report) Dkt. 
10-2. Mr. Yard-Daniel pleaded not guilty and did not request any witnesses. Id. 
He requested a lay advocate, and one was appointed. Dkt. 10-3. He also 
requested video evidence. Dkt. 10-2. 
On December 19, disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) M. Hilliard prepared a 
written report stating that he "review[ed] footage of an incident that occurred on 
12/01/24 at approximately 22:15 in 12 North A-Side Cube 2. I observed 1/1 
Yard-Daniel, Shadavian #228315 throwing closed fist strikes during a massive 
fight." Dkt. 10-5. 
At the hearing, Mr. Yard-Daniel pleaded not guilty but did not make a 
statement. Dkt. 10-4. After considering the conduct report and video footage, PageID #:
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DHO Hilliard found Mr. Yard-Daniel guilty of code 212, battery against an 
incarcerated individual. Id. DHO Hilliard sanctioned Mr. Yard-Daniel with a 45-
day loss of earned credit time and a suspended one-step demotion in credit class. 
Id. 
On appeal, the appeal review officer modified the charge from B-212, 
battery against an incarcerated individual, to B-240/212, 
conspiracy/attempting/aiding or abetting battery against an incarcerated 
individual, but she did not modify the sanctions. Dkt. 10-8. 
This habeas action followed. 
III. Discussion 
Mr. Yard-Daniel's claims are discerned as: 1) he was denied effective 
assistance of his lay advocate; 2) he was denied the "mitigating circumstances of 
self-defense"; 3) he was denied an impartial decisionmaker; 4) Officer Bailey was 
not present at the altercation and lied on the conduct report; 5) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the modified charge; and 6) double jeopardy. 
Dkt. 1 at 3. 
Mr. Yard-Daniels concedes that he failed to raise his claim of double 
jeopardy on appeal. Dkt. 1 at 3. This claim is therefore procedurally defaulted 
and will not be considered. To the extent the respondent contends that additional 
claims were not raised on appeal, the Court finds it more efficient to consider the 
claims on the merits than to further consider the issue of exhaustion. See 
Washington v. Boughton, 884 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2018). PageID #:
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A. Lay Advocate 
Mr. Yard-Daniel first argues that he was denied an effective lay advocate 
because the advocate did not speak during the hearing. This claim fails because 
"due process does not require that prisons appoint a lay advocate for a 
disciplinary hearing unless 'an illiterate inmate is involved ... or where the 
complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect 
and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case.'" 
Wilson-El v. Finnan, 263 F. App'x 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Wolff, 418 
U.S. at 570); see also Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002, 1004 (7th Cir.1992). 
Here, Mr. Yard-Daniel is not illiterate, nor does he contend that the issues are 
overly complex. 
B. Self-Defense 
While Mr. Yard-Daniel contends that he acted in self-defense, that defense 
does not apply in disciplinary actions. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 848 
(7th Cir. 2011) ("inmates do not have a constitutional right to raise self-defense 
as a defense in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings"). This claim fails. 
C. Impartial Decisionmaker 
Mr. Yard-Daniel asserts that the DHO has a reputation for "falsely 
convicting inmates." Dkt. 1 at 3. He argues that compared with other inmates, 
he was sanctioned "biasly and falsely." Id. 
As noted above, inmates facing disciplinary charges have a due process 
right to be heard by an impartial decision-maker. Hearing officers "are entitled 
to a presumption of honesty and integrity" absent clear evidence to the contrary. PageID #:
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Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003); Perotti v. Marberry, 355 F. 
App'x 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
Indeed, "the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high," and hearing 
officers "are not deemed biased simply because they presided over a prisoner's 
previous disciplinary proceeding" or because they are employed by the IDOC. 
Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Instead, hearing officers are impermissibly biased when, 
for example, they are "directly or substantially involved in the factual events 
underlying the disciplinary charges, or in the investigation thereof." Id. at 
667. Another possible example of bias is if the DHO were found to have an 
intimate relationship with a crucial witness in the case. See Eads vs. Hanks, 280 
F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). However, none of those circumstances are alleged 
here. Mr. Yard-Daniel's general allegations concerning the DHO's "reputation" 
are not clear evidence of bias. Therefore, the presumption that the DHO was not 
biased prevails. 
D. Some Evidence 
Mr. Yard-Daniel next challenges the adequacy of the conduct report and 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the modification of the charge on appeal. 
Dkt. 1 at 3. He argues that Officer Bailey was not present at the time of the fight 
and therefore must have lied on the conduct report. Id. 
In a prison disciplinary proceeding, the "hearing officer's decision need 
only rest on 'some evidence' logically supporting it and demonstrating that the 
result is not arbitrary." Ellison, 820 F.3d at 274. The "some evidence" standard 
is much more lenient than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Moffat v. PageID #:
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Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). "[T]he relevant question is whether 
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 
the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56 (emphasis added); see also 
Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). 
Once the Court finds "some evidence" supporting the disciplinary 
conviction, the inquiry ends. Jones, 637 F.3d at 849. The Court may not 
"reweigh the evidence underlying the hearing officer's decision" or "look to see if 
other record evidence supports a contrary finding." Rhoiney, 723 F. App'x at 348 
(citing Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
Mr. Yard-Daniel did not argue at his hearing that the reporting officer did 
not witness the fight, so the only evidence the DHO considered was the conduct 
report and the video. Dkt. 10 -4 . The Court cannot now entertain a claim, i.e., 
reweigh the evidence, that the reporting officer did not, in fact, witness the fight. 
The conduct report and video evidence reviewed by the DHO were sufficient to 
satisfy the evidentiary threshold. 
On appeal, the offense was modified to a "conspiracy or attempt" to batter 
another inmate, B-240/212. Dkt. 10-8. Although Mr. Yard-Daniel rejects any 
claim that he conspired with anyone else, he admits in his appeal that he did 
take a swipe at another inmate. Dkt. 10-6. Thus, he cannot dispute that he 
attempted to commit a battery against another inmate. The evidence is sufficient 
to support the modified charge. PageID #:
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IV. Conclusion 
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against 
arbitrary action of government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary 
action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions 
involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional 
infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Yard-Daniel to the relief he seeks. 
Accordingly, Mr. Yard-Daniel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be 
denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. Judgment consistent with this 
Order shall now issue. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution: 
 
SHADAVIAN YARD-DANIEL 
228315 
PUTNAMVILLE - CF 
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only 
 
David Corey 
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL 
david.corey@atg.in.gov 
 
Date: 6/15/2026 PageID #:
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